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Abstract
The thesis examines democratic ideas, their political implications and 
democratisation in contemporary China. It intends to offer both a map of 
the main democratic ideas, the key positions and arguments as well as a 
series of critical reflections upon them, and particularly upon liberal ideas of 
democracy in China. There are three overriding objectives. The first is to 
provide an introduction to, and discussion of, three competing models of 
democracy, namely, radical, official and liberal, in contemporary China. 
Second, the thesis offers a critical review of liberal ideas of human rights, 
evil and proceduralism, and provides a liberal constructive critique of the 
intellectual and moral foundations of the Chinese liberal theory of 
democracy. The third objective is to analyse carefully the issue of the 
practical feasibility of liberal democracy as well as basic problems associated 
with Chinese democratization from the aspects of political culture, civil 
society and legitimacy.
The whole thesis is organized around the idea that the process of 
democratization in China can be seen in terms of both intellectual and 
practical activities of planting the democratic "seed" in Chinese "soil". 
According to this metaphor, the thesis is divided into three parts to deal 
with seed selection, raising seedling and soil amelioration respectively.
Part One deals with seed selection, that is, it will provide political 
philosophical and practical justifications for Chinese liberal rejection of both 
the radical and Chinese official paternalistic models of democracy, and of 
Chinese liberal selection of the liberal "seed" democracy in contemporary 
China. Thus, Part One analyzes the variants of democracy and illuminates 
why liberal democracy is more attractive than the other models. This is 
partly a chronological review of democratic ideas and partly a critical and 
comparative analysis of them. It provides a very brief historical background 
of, and a detailed theoretical introduction to, each model of democracy.
Part One consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 examines the radical ideas 
of populist democracy viewed by Yang Xiguang (1968), Li Yizhe's group 
(1974) and Chen Erjin (1976), and shows a shift from the radical to the liberal 
model of democracy in the 1980s. Chapter 2 examines Deng Xiaoping's 
official paternalistic model of democracy and the liberal critique of that
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liberal ideas of democracy. Chapter 3 undertakes a full-scale review of how 
three contemporary Chinese liberal thinkers, Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping, and 
Yan Jiaqi, view democracy.
Part Two deals with raising seedling, that is, the attempt to raise the 
liberal "seed" of democracy by eradicating and overcoming internal tensions 
in Chinese liberal ideas of democracy and providing a more coherent 
theoretical foundation for the Chinese liberal theory of democracy. Thus, 
Part Two offers a detailed critical review of liberal ideas of human rights, 
evil and proceduralism or constitutionalism, and discusses a number of the 
issues associated with the intellectual and moral foundations of Chinese 
liberal theory of democracy. It further explains the decline of the Chinese 
Marxist idea of democracy and the rise of the liberal discourse of democracy. 
More importantly, it focuses on moral and intellectual foundations for 
Chinese liberal democratic theory and for Chinese political institutional 
design.
Part Two consists of four chapters. Chapter 4 explores the problem of 
the coherence of the Chinese liberals' ideas of human rights by examining 
the roles of, and operation of, their ideas of human rights in the process of 
realizing those rights. It also attempts to address a set of difficult problems 
relating to putting their ideal of human rights into practice in China.
Yan Jiaqi argues that the idea that human beings are potentially evil is 
the starting-point for the rule of the law and procedural systems (Yan, 1986c, 
1988, 1991a, 54-8). Also Liao Xun (1987, 7) claims that the principle of 
preventing evil is a theoretical basis for democracy. Chapter 5 attempts to 
describe, discuss and develop this supposition of evil and to provide a 
reliable theoretical foundation for the Chinese liberal arguments for 
democratic institutional design.
Chapter 6 defends Yan Jiaqi's idea of procedural democracy by dealing 
with the difficult question of the problem of the exception, raised by Carl 
Schmitt, which challenges the coherence of procedural democracy; it also 
undertakes a critique of Schmitt's doctrine of the exception and outlines the 
liberal ideas of the exception.
Chapter 7 focuses on creating a solid moral foundation for Chinese 
liberal institutional design by discussing what might be called the project of
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infusing rights-based morality into political institutions. That is, democratic 
institutional arrangem ents require a m orality which is characterized by 
urgent recognition of the following: equal liberties, institutional protection 
of rights and fair procedures. This chapter also examines and rejects a 
num ber of argum ents against that project such as the argum ent of the 
independence of politics from morality, the practical argum ent concerning 
the catastrophic consequences of that project and the cultural relativist 
argum ent.
Part Three deals with soil amelioration, that is, it will demonstrate the 
existing democratic "soil" in Chinese political culture, social structure and 
leadership on the one hand, and investigate the problems associated with 
"soil" for Chinese democracy on the other hand. In other words, Part Three 
addresses the issue of the feasibility of liberal democracy as well as basic 
problems associated with Chinese democratization.
Part Three consists of three chapters. Chapter 8 examines the emergent 
dem ocratic cultural conditions under w hich Chinese liberal ideas of 
democracy will develop and prove feasible in China. It also examines a 
number of cultural problems posed for the liberals in China.
Chapter 9 studies em ergent civil society as a social base for Chinese 
democracy. It assesses the positive impact of civil society on the Chinese 
democratic movement in 1989. It also explores the dual roles of civil society, 
the self-lim itations and the problem s civil society poses for Chinese 
democratization.
Chapter 10 investigates the search for new foundations of legitimacy by 
Deng's leadership and examines changes in legitim ating techniques in 
relation to the move tow ards dem ocratization in China after 1978, and 
particu larly  since 1989. The central objective is to investigate  the 
relationship between legitimacy (old and new forms of legitimation) and 
democracy in contemporary China. The purposes of this Chapter are (1) to 
identify changes in the conceptions of legitimacy, particularly the recent 
adjustm ent of legitim ating techniques; (2) to assess the im pact of these 
changes on the direction of political developm ent by exam ining the 
possibility of playing the democratic card by reform er factions within the
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CCP; and finally (3) to discuss the limits and the problems associated with 
the Party's search for new legitimacy.
I have also included an appendix which critically examines David 
Humqe's supposition of knavery in institutional design. This is an extended 
discussion of the problem  of evil in relation to institu tional design 
introduced in Chapter 5.
INTRODUCTION
Background to Studyl
Various W estern "democratic seeds" have been "planted" in Chinese 
political institutions and culture in m odern China. At the begining of this 
century, China adopted W estern democratic institutions such as the first 
formally democratic institution of the gentry — the city Council (1905-1914) 
and the representative institutions (1909-1913) at local and national levels. 
H ow ever, these institu tions failed in the end. After that, both the 
Nationalist Party (1930s-1940s) and the CCP after 1949 established autocratic 
or to talitarian  system s in the names of either Sun Yat-sen’s idea of 
democracy or the Chinese Marxist view of democracy. But, since the 1970s, 
dem anding  true dem ocracy has been a m ajor them e in Chinese 
communities: two major democratic m ovements (1978-1989) in Mainland 
China, the democratic breakthrough in Taiwan in the later 1980s and the 
success of a democratic party in the 1991 election in Hong Kong.
Particularly, the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) resulted 
in or, more precisely, was a prelude to the dem ocratic m ovem ents in 
contem porary China. As Friedman argues, just as the religious wars of 
Europe helped give birth to toleration, the bloody vigilante violence of 
M ao's C u ltu ra l R evolution m ay give b irth  to new  and creative 
democratisation.
The tragedy of the Cultural Revolution revealed the weaknesses and 
shortcom ings of the Chinese Com m unist system, and discredited Mao 
Zedong's ideal of "proletarian democracy". There em erged populist, 
paternalistic and liberal ideas of democracy which directly reacted to the 
Cultural Revolution; these are the three contestants in Chinese ideological 
in-fighting today and will likely remain so (Chapters 1, 2 & 3).
First, there emerged the populist model of democracy of Yang Xiguang 
(Whither China in 1968), Li Yizhe's group (On Democracy and the Socialist 
Legal system in 1974) and Chen Erjin (On Proletarian-Democratic  
Revolution in 1976), which inspired the young generation of that time, and
iHere I only provide a very brief background to my study. For more information about this 
background, see Section 6 of Chapter 1, Section 1 of Chapter 2, Section 1 of Chapter 5, Section 
2 of Chapter 6, Section 4 of Chapter 7, Section 2 of Chapter 8, and Section 1 of Chapter 10.
2influenced China's Democracy Movement in the later 1970s and early 1980s. 
They advocated a direct mass democracy which is the antithesis of 
bureaucratic apparatus and in which the working class or proletarian class 
has power of final control of state affairs.
Second, since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping 
developed a paternalistic model of "people's democracy" characterized by 
collectivism, limitations on political freedom and the mixture of formalistic 
democracy and paternalistic authority (Chapter 2). This model of democracy 
also used the state-civil society schema as a new art of rule, albeit limited in 
the economic area (Chapter 10). This model of democracy was designed by 
Deng to give a measure of legitimacy to the Chinese communist regime 
which faced serious legitimacy crises whilst leaving the realities of party 
rule and power untouched by popular intrusion. As well as legitimising the 
established set-up, the model also modified elements of Mao Zedong's 
perspective on politics and popular participation, criticized radical populist 
and liberal models of democracy, and even posed a challenge to Western 
"bourgeois" democratic theory.
Third, since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese liberals such 
as Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi have established a liberal model of 
democracy which advocates human rights to fight tyranny, upholds moral 
scepticism to undermine official dogma and to check hierarchies of status, 
and believes in political competition to disrupt monopolies of political 
power. The rise of liberal ideas of democracy was the major intellectual 
challenge to paternalistic democracy and was the product of a response to 
the Chinese totalitarian system. Liberalism is attractive to Chinese 
intellectuals not because it is being forced on them by an aggressive and 
hostile world but because it appears to some Chinese intellectuals to offer 
potential solutions to pressing problems.2
Among certain circles of Chinese intellectuals, there have been a 
number of shifts in orientation towards crucial questions in political theory. 
In the first place, Chinese liberals such as Wei Jingsheng and Hu Ping have 
turned away from collectivism and egalitarianism toward individualism, 
and from the idea that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is the one
2
Hu Ping has discussed in detail the ideas and works of liberal Chinese authors in the past 
ten years. See Hu Ping, 1991a, esp. No. 2, 36-8, and No. 3,46-49. Also see Wu Guoguang, 1990.
3and only absolute and infallible truth to the idea that all human knowledge 
is inherently fallible.
Another im portant change is that, as a result of the violence and social 
disruption during the "Cultural Revolution", Chinese liberals such as Hu 
Ping and Yan Jiaqi have abandoned the Maoist idea of the goodness of 
hum an nature which constitutes a basis for an ideal of communist society, 
and have instead adopted the view that hum an nature is potentially evil. 
This is the philosophical basis underlying their conviction that orderly 
society and governm ent cannot be established by relying on the good-will 
and moral character of the leadership, but m ust be based on a coherent, 
institu tionalized  system  of checks and balances aim ed at preventing 
corruption and over-concentration of power.
M oreover, more liberal-m inded intellectuals no longer support the 
Party 's aim of reaching the ideal Com m unist society by "continuous 
revolution", which implies the right of the State to interfere in society and 
in the lives of individuals. They repudiate the official model of "socialist 
democracy", and are searching for liberal-democratic solutions to China's 
present political problems.
Among the models of democracy above, the liberal one is the strongest 
in China and, by most estimates, has gained currency in China throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. Political liberalism, which is an echo of Chinese 
liberalism  of the period betw een the 1890s-1940s, is undoubtedly  the 
dom inant current of thought in China.3 It will have an im portant role in 
defining the future of China (the Conclusion).
I should perhaps em phasise that I have selected only these three 
models of democracy, which I consider to be of central im portance to 
political development in China. As David Held (1987) does, I take the view 
that an extensive, in-depth coverage of a num ber of the most central ideas 
and themes is preferable to a superficial review of all. Thus, the thesis does 
not not include an introduction and analysis of, for example, Chinese 
M arxist hum anists ' ideas of dem ocracy;4 because hum anists’ ideas of 
democracy neither provide a distinctive model of democracy at a theoretical
3 As for Chinese liberalism between the 1890s-1940s, see Elvin, 1969; Fincher, 1989; 
Nathan,1986; Grieder, 1970.
4Marxist humanists' idea of democracy contains and supports core liberal elements of 
individual rights, legality, pluralism and proceduralism (See Hua Shiping, 1992).
4level, nor have extreme im portance to future political developm ent in 
China (reasons for that see Chapters 5 and 10) and, finally, Brugger and Kelly 
(1990) have already studied them in detail.
Also I should acknowledge that the idea of a model of democracy is 
borrowed from David Held (1987). This refers to a theoretical construction 
designed to reveal and explain the chief elements of a democratic form and 
its underlying structure or relations. Models of democracy also involve 
necessarily a shifting balance betw een descriptive and explanatory and 
norm ative statem ents. Also, I should say clearly, the above models of 
dem ocracy are ideal types and distinguished as independent solely for 
analytical purpose. In the complex real life of political activities, these ideas 
are so overlapping that they are not clear-cut as the thesis suggests. 
However, these models are useful for understanding the distinctive features 
and the developments of democratic ideas, and for analyzing their political 
implications in contemporary China.
General Aims and Focus of the Thesis
There is a growing body of literature (Nathan, 1986, 1990a; Seymour, 1980; 
John P. Burns, 1988; Barrett L. McCormick, 1990, 1992, 1993a & b; Friedman, 
1989, 1991, 1993a, 1993b; Womack, 1984 and 1990; Gittings, 1990, Chap. 8 & 10; 
Julia Ching, 1990, Chap. 9; Bachman & Yang, 1991, Unger, 1991b; White, 
1993, 1994; Rosen, 1985, 1991, 1993, and Saich, 1989) focusing on Chinese 
democratic ideas and practices in the historical, political and intellectual 
contexts. These studies have made a great contribution to the understanding 
of Chinese democratic ideas and democratisation. Particularly, the detailed 
studies of historical, political and cultural backgrounds of Chinese ideas of 
democracy have enriched our sociological knowledge of Chinese democracy; 
for exam ple, Barret McCormick's (1993b) study of the people's congress 
system in China. These studies have also examined strategies of Chinese 
writings such as their use of the words of Mao and of others, the political 
atm osphere where a certain degree of freedom  was allowed, access to 
alternative ideas, and finally survival considerations, which are very 
im portant to understanding Chinese democratic ideas.5
°For example, Unger has studied in detail Yang's personal development and the social milieu 
that influenced his political stance and thought. See Jonathan Unger, 1991a. Also see Rosen, 
1985; Seymour, 1983.
5However, little has been said about different conceptions of democracy, 
and, particularly, their political implications for different types of political 
developments in China. This thesis attempts to overcome some of the 
above problems.
The thesis examines democratic ideas, their political implications and 
democratisation in contemporary China. It intends to offer both a map of 
the main democratic ideas, the key positions and arguments as well as a 
series of critical reflections upon them, and particularly upon liberal ideas of 
democracy in China. There are three overriding objectives. The first is to 
provide an introduction to, and discussion of, three competing models of 
democracy, namely, radical, official and liberal, in contemporary China. 
Second, the thesis offers a critical review of liberal ideas of human rights, 
evil and proceduralism, and provides a liberal constructive critique of the 
intellectual and moral foundations of the Chinese liberal theory of 
democracy. The third objective is to analyse carefully the issue of the 
practical feasibility of liberal democracy as well as basic problems associated 
with Chinese democratization from the aspects of political culture, civil 
society and legitimacy.
Among the above models of democracy, the liberal one is a central 
focus of my thesis. The reasons for this focus are as follows. Most liberal- 
minded Chinese intellectuals have become increasingly pragmatic and less 
and less interested in exploring the foundations and principles of democracy 
in past decades. This pragmatic approach leaves Chinese liberal democratic 
theory as well as ideas of political reform without solid intellectual and 
moral foundations. Thus there is a need to develop the current liberal ideas 
into a systematic theory of democracy. Efforts towards this end have been 
made. For example, a few liberal scholars and activists such as Wei 
Jingsheng, Yan Jiaqi, Hu Ping and Jin Guantao have paid attention to the 
issue of a reliable and coherent foundation for democratic theory. For them, 
China needs liberal and decent philosophers at the core. Their intellectual 
efforts are highly laudable; but, more work needs to be done in regard to 
critical examination of their assumptions, internal tensions and implica­
tions, and the translation of principles into practical programs which will 
enable political liberalism to tackle concrete political, economic, and social 
problems at the policy-making level.
6Influenced by the attem pt to establish an academic liberal tradition in 
China by Jin Guantao (1988), Lin Yusheng (1988) and Zhang Hao (1989), and 
particularly by Barry Hindess' (1991, 1993) sharp intellectual critiques of 
democratic ideas and liberalism, I attem pt to undertake a reconstruction, 
criticism and tentative extension of some particular theoretical positions 
that need to be fortified by more stringent theoretical investigation into 
Chinese liberal theory of democracy. Particularly, I attem pt to develop the 
existing work done by Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi by providing a 
m ore coheren t theore tical foundation  for Chinese liberal theory of 
democracy.
I should say immediately that by use of the term foundation, I do not 
m ean to take up a position here in methodological and foundationalist 
debates. Rather, I believe that it is possible to develop a practical social 
dim ension of political philosophy independent of certain controversial 
philosophical questions; that is, I present a set of practical argum ents for 
choosing political principles which are upheld on a rational basis by liberal- 
m inded Chinese. An intellectual foundation, I see, has the following three 
features.
(1) Priority: when there are conflicts between values, certain basic values 
have priority over other values.
(2) Reductionism: Chinese liberal theory of democracy and of institutional 
design is reducible to certain starting-points. In other words, we can derive 
the plan of political institutional design from certain starting-points and 
premises.
(3) Coherence: there m ust be consistency am ong certain values and 
starting-points, as well as between premises and arguments based on those 
premises.
There are two things to be considered when investigating foundations: 
moral principles and intellectual concepts such as natural rights, evil and 
procedure. The form er focuses on a rights-based m orality; the latter 
discusses intellectual utility or necessity of concepts of natural rights, evil 
and procedure. Obviously, the distinction is arbitrary because these two 
things do overlap; but it is distinction that serves well my analytical 
purpose.
7Thus the thesis will undertake a constructive critique of three basic 
concepts -- hum an rights, evil and proceduralism  -- which serve as the 
in te llectual foundation of liberal theory of democracy in contemporary 
China. I will identify possible or existing tensions and inconsistencies 
associated w ith these three concepts in Chinese liberal thinking of 
democracy, and suggest ways of dissolving or resolving these tensions. The 
thesis also will examine a rights-based political morality which serves as a 
m o ra l foundation  for liberal dem ocratic institu tional design. I will 
investigate the reasons why Chinese liberals have chosen rights-based 
political morality, how rights-based political morality serves as a foundation 
for democratic institutional design, and why we need to distinguish the sage 
conception of morality from the procedural conception of morality, and 
further reject the sage conception of morality (Chapter 7).
I should acknowledge that I am, in fact, largely in sym pathy with the 
fundam ental tenets of Chinese liberal views of democracy, yet worried 
about some theoretical problem s and the neglect of certain elem entary 
tensions in these views of democracy. Also, my critique of the internal 
limits and the problems of Chinese liberal theory of democracy is for the 
sake of actually realizing political liberalism in China.
In exploring democratic ideas, we cannot escape too far from the aspect 
of preconditions for, and their restrictions on, liberal dem ocracy at a 
practical level. Thus, the thesis will also focus on the issue of the feasibility 
of liberal democracy. It will examine the preconditions of political culture, 
social structure and leadership  on the one hand, and investigate the 
problems associated with Chinese democratisation on the other hand. Here 
the thesis has three tasks. The first is to examine anti-democratic arguments 
concerning the cu rren t cu ltu ral, political, social and dem ographic 
conditions in China. The second task is to demonstrate the existing practical 
bases of these for Chinese democracy. The third task is to examine a set of 
serious problem s for Chinese dem ocracy associated w ith the existing 
cultural, political, social and demographic conditions, and critically analyze 
the solutions adopted by Chinese liberals to resolve these problems. The 
C onclusion  w ill p ro v id e  m ore d e ta iled  reflections on C hinese 
democratisation.
Methodology
I. An Inside Normative Approach
8
The important role of values such as democracy, liberty and justice has been 
emphasized by a number of scholars on Chinese politics. Nathan (1990b, 
314), for example, calls for the incorporation of values issue, as he argues 
that area studies cannot treat itself as detached from the great issues. 
However, most works on Chinese politics adopt an empiricist, scientific, 
objective position, or what I might call an outside observing perspective. 
This outside observing approach has some limits. For example, some works 
(see Burns, 1988, Unger, 1991a and Saich, 1989) are not interested in, so as to 
overlook, significant theoretical issues of Chinese democratic ideas. Some 
(see Jenner, 1992) deny the relevance of the normative approach in 
examining democratic ideas in China; one reason being that Chinese culture 
teaches us that no natural rights exist. As a result, these scholars tend to 
make no value judgments, so that the basic value of equal liberty is ignored 
in the context of Chinese political studies.
Encouraged by Nathan and Apter,6 I have decided to adopt an inside 
normative approach which attempts to overcome the problems associated 
with the outside approach discussed above. Not only as an outside observer, 
but as an inside participant, I have joined in internal debates over different 
theoretical issues, brought some theoretical concepts to life, and made them 
relevant to Chinese political development.
The insider normative approach holds that a study of Chinese ideas of 
democracy has to take account of the normative dimension, to deal with the 
fundamental issues of politics, and to focus on the development of a 
democratic political culture. This is because a new democratic political 
culture has the task of breaking the communist political cultural value 
system in the transitional period. It also must make justice, rather than 
power the primary virtue of social institutions (Apter, 1987, 3). The 
traditional and communist political cultures must be evaluated according to 
democratic values, and be reconstructed and adapted to meet the needs of
6David Apter also claims that the rationality of developmental theories enables democracy 
to substantiate its claim to moral uniqueness, and to maintain itself as a self-evidently 
superior form of politics (Apter, 1987, 7).
9dem ocratic institu tions. Institutions also have a norm ative content. To 
develop a dem ocratic political culture dem ands, in short, a radical 
restructuring of all aspects of the political organizations and associations of 
everyday life in China. It is not only possible but also necessary to establish a 
fru itfu l link betw een the exposition of dem ocratic values and the 
redesigning of political institutions.
The norm ative approach also defends the im portance of the 
conceptions of natural rights, evil and proceduralism. These conceptions are 
intellectual constructs. So is a right-based political morality. As Hume 
(1949b) argues about justice: it is an "artificial virtue" and is "invented" as a 
virtue because of the advantages it brings indirectly.
The im portant issue is to investigate what, how and w hy certain 
intellectual inventions are rejected and defended. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of the 
thesis will show the decline of the official idea of communist society and of 
the radical idea of populist democracy, and the rise of the liberal intellectual 
invention of the ideas of natural rights, evil and proceduralism. Chapters 4, 
5 and 6 will explain why Chinese liberals choose the notion of natural 
rights, evil and proceduralism  as norm ative prem ises for dem ocratic 
institutional design and how  these intellectual conceptions serve as a 
normative basis for democratic institutional design.
Further, the inside norm ative approach holds that Chinese liberals' 
assertions about natural rights are assertions of w hat o u ght to be as the 
result of hum an choice. To assert that "All men are of equal worth" is not to 
state a fact bu t to choose a side. It announces This is where I stand 
(Macdonald, 1984, 34, also see Hu Ping, 1990b, 38). The value claims or 
statements which are logically certain are tautological or analytic and are 
neither verified nor falsified by what exists (Macdonald, 1984, 26, also see Hu 
Ping, 1990b, 38). Thus, since the liberal ideal of dem ocracy is purely 
hypothetical, it is not a valid objection to say that some conditions for an 
ideal arrangem ent have never been nor ever will be satisfied (see Rawls, 
1971, 167). The failure of democratic politics in m odern China does not
7
Political culture discourse which emerged in the 1980s in China, has a subversive and 
critical character. Conversely, empirical political cultural discourse in the West, according 
to Luke, lacks a critical perspective, and constitutes a system of rules for creating and 
legitimising apathy, docility and passivity in mass politics. See Luke, 1989, 142-7, Carol 
Pateman, in Almond & Verba, 1980, 61.
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disprove the ideal of liberal democracy and does not constitute a powerful 
reason for rejection of, or not acting in light of, the liberal ideal of 
democracy although it does raise difficult problems for implementing the 
liberal ideal of democracy. The reason for this is that the liberal ideal of 
democracy has been chosen by Chinese thinkers such as Hu Ping and Yan 
Jiaqi on the basis of moral conviction, and the existing problems associated 
w ith Chinese political culture should not inhibit the choice of the just 
p rincip le  of righ t-based  m orality  a lthough  these m ight inh ib it its 
application. Further, a set of failures of liberalism  in various ways in 
m odern China does not prove that political liberalism is unsuitable in 
China. As Rawls asserts, a conception of justice for the basic structure is 
w orth  having for its own sake. It should not be dismissed because its 
principles are not everywhere satisfactory (Rawls, 1971, 9).
Also, intellectual invention is not totally disconnected from social fact. 
The discourse of the idea of natural rights results from the tragedy of the 
C u ltu ra l R evolution, and from the historical lesson that theoretical 
justifications of the violation of hum an rights always depend on the denial 
of the idea of natural rights (Chapters 4 and 7). Further, the idea of infusing 
the right-based m orality into political institutions m irrors the economic 
developm ent in China. Fairness is required by the development of m arket 
econom ics in China. And further developm ent of m arket econom ics 
dem ands that the state should protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
private enterprises.
II. The Principle of Methodological Complementarity
I attem pt, throughout the whole thesis, to bridge the gap, or reduce the 
tension, between the desirable and the feasible by seeking a combination of 
the  n o rm a tiv e  and  p rac tic a l a p p ro a c h e s . A m e th o d o lo g ic a l 
com plem entarity is a guiding principle for me in arguing further that it is 
necessary to combine these two approaches.®
Here, intellectual virtues of the norm ative philosophical approach can 
help us to establish a relatively, autonom ously ideal world. W hen ugly 
reality conflicts with an ideal world, an idealist will not surrender but 
struggle for the ideal; w ith the help of the norm ative and regular ideal,
8I have adopted this principle in arguing for a combination of the cultural and institutional 
approaches, see He Baogang, 1992c.
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people can protect themselves against ugly reality. At the same time, the 
actual meaning of normative thinking m ust be fully understood only in the 
context of an analysis of the crucial problems pertaining to the process of 
realizing a normative ideal such as political liberalism in the transitional 
period . N orm ative thinking risks falling apart if it ignores practical 
problem s and engages in wishful thinking to risk the charge of practical 
irrelevance. Further, if a norm ative philosophical approach does not 
incorporate the practical approach, it will be solely concerned with w hat is 
desirable; this way of th inking will lead to little more than u topian  
solutions to existing problems. Thus a combination of the norm ative and 
practical approaches, therefore, is needed, and we need to become realistic 
idealists, or idealistic realists. In short, practical considerations should be 
incorporated as an explicit element of normative political theory.
The norm ative and practical approaches are complem entary in this 
sense: a norm ative approach describes an ideal arrangem ent and defines 
principles, which are a guide in employing the practical approach; a practical 
approach  attem pts to und ers tan d  the actual problem s of the ideal 
arrangem ent and provides a realistic way of thinking about how we might 
achieve the ideal arrangement. In this thesis, while the normative approach 
is used as the major m ethod, the practical approach is subordinated to the 
normative approach, and used to supplem ent the philosophical arguments.
U nder the g u id in g  p rin c ip le  of the above m ethodo log ica l 
complementarity, in my work I attem pt to combine the normative approach 
of John Rawls and the practical approach of Lucian Pye in a constructive 
critique of Chinese liberal ideas of democracy. It seems to me that the major 
problem in Western study of Chinese political life is that the Rawlsian kind 
of political philosophy has been separated from the Pyesian kind of theory 
of political developm ent. The works of neither Rawls nor Pye are self- 
sufficient in the Chinese context. Although Pye has studied the problems in 
the process of Chinese political development and made a great contribution 
in doing so, he never justifies the basic value of liberty and its role in 
political developm ent, and seldom  analyzes the process of realizing the 
ideal of freedom. Rawls, on the other hand, provides us with sophisticated 
philosophical justifications of the priority of basic equal liberties, but his 
theory does little about how the priority of freedom can be set up, and how 
the priority of freedom can be justified in another political community such
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as China. My work has attempted to fill the above gap in the way that it has 
applied Rawls’s theory in a critique of Chinese liberal ideas of democracy 
and applied Pye's theory of Chinese politics in a deeper understanding of 
the difficulties associated with Chinese democratisation.
Certainly there are always tensions between these two approaches. For 
exam ple, while my argum ent for the rights-based m orality im plies a 
deontological position which focuses on honoring liberty, my practical 
considerations of self-limiting rights implies a consequentialist position 
which stresses prom oting liberty (an analytical distinction betw een a 
consequentialist and a deontological attitude towards liberty, see Pettit, 1991 
& 1993). These two different philosophical positions come into conflict 
when applied to particular issues such as whether or not the official tough 
birth control measure should be continued in China, or whether or not the 
Tibetans should exercise their right of autonom y to separate Tibet from 
Mainland China. In order to reduce the tensions, and so ensure combining 
the moral normative and moderate realistic approaches, we need to become 
skilful m asters of the m ethods we use, and we need a reflective and 
dynamic equilibrium (see Rawls, 1971, 20, 48-51, 120, 430, 434, 579) to deal 
with realistic judgments. It is necessary for Chinese liberals to limit, revise 
and w ithdraw  some realistic judgm ents in order to arrive at the just 
principles.
A rrangem ent of the Thesis
The w hole thesis is organized around the idea that the process of 
dem ocratization in China can be seen in terms of both intellectual and 
practical activities of planting the dem ocratic "seed" in Chinese "soil". 
According to this m etaphor, the thesis is divided into three parts to deal 
w ith  "seed selection", "raising seedling" and "soil am elio ration" 
respectively.
Part One deals with "seed selection", that is, it will provide political 
philosophical and practical justifications for Chinese liberal rejection of both 
the radical and Chinese official paternalistic models of democracy, and of 
Chinese liberal selection of the liberal "seed" democracy in contem porary 
China. Thus, Part One analyzes the variants of democracy and illuminates 
why liberal democracy is more attractive than the other models. This is 
partly a chronological review of democratic ideas and partly a critical and
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comparative analysis of them. It provides a very brief historical background 
of, and a detailed theoretical introduction to, each model of democracy.
Part One consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 examines the radical ideas 
of populist democracy viewed by Yang Xiguang (1968), Li Yizhe's group 
(1974) and Chen Erjin (1976), and shows a shift from the radical to the liberal 
model of democracy in the 1980s. Chapter 2 examines Deng Xiaoping's 
official paternalistic model of democracy and the liberal critique of that 
model. It shows the major ideological struggle between the official and 
liberal ideas of democracy. Chapter 3 undertakes a full-scale review of how 
three contemporary Chinese liberal thinkers, Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping, and 
Yan Jiaqi, view democracy.
Part Two deals with "raising seedling", that is, the attempt to raise the 
liberal "seed" of democracy by eradicating and overcoming internal tensions 
in Chinese liberal ideas of democracy and providing a more coherent 
theoretical foundation for the Chinese liberal theory of democracy. Thus, 
Part Two offers a detailed critical review of liberal ideas of human rights, 
evil and proceduralism or constitutionalism, and discusses a number of the 
issues associated with the intellectual and moral foundations of Chinese 
liberal theory of democracy. It further explains the decline of the Chinese 
Marxist idea of democracy and the rise of the liberal discourse of democracy. 
More importantly, it focuses on moral and intellectual foundations for 
Chinese liberal democratic theory and for Chinese political institutional 
design.
Part Two consists of four chapters. Chapter 4 explores the problem of 
the coherence of the Chinese liberals' ideas of human rights by examining 
the roles of, and operation of, their ideas of human rights in the process of 
realizing those rights. It also attempts to address a set of difficult problems 
relating to putting their ideal of human rights into practice in China.
Yan Jiaqi argues that the idea that human beings are potentially evil is 
the starting-point for the rule of the law and procedural systems (Yan, 1986c, 
1988, 1991a, 54-8). Also Liao Xun (1987, 7) claims that the principle of 
preventing evil is a theoretical basis for democracy. Chapter 5 attempts to 
describe, discuss and develop this supposition of evil and to provide a 
reliable theoretical foundation for the Chinese liberal arguments for 
democratic institutional design.
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Chapter 6 defends Yan Jiaqi's idea of procedural democracy by dealing 
with the difficult question of the problem of the exception, raised by Carl 
Schmitt, which challenges the coherence of procedural democracy; it also 
undertakes a critique of Schmitt's doctrine of the exception and outlines the 
liberal ideas of the exception.
Chapter 7 focuses on creating a solid moral foundation for Chinese 
liberal institutional design by discussing what might be called the project of 
infusing rights-based morality into political institutions. That is, democratic 
institutional arrangem ents require a morality which is characterized by 
urgent recognition of the following: equal liberties, institutional protection 
of rights and fair procedures. This chapter also examines and rejects a 
num ber of argum ents against that project such as the argum ent of the 
independence of politics from morality, the practical argum ent concerning 
the catastrophic consequences of that project and the cultural relativist 
argum ent.
Part Three deals with "soil amelioration", that is, it will dem onstrate 
the existing democratic "soil" in Chinese political culture, social structure 
and leadership on the one hand, and investigate the problems associated 
with "soil" for Chinese democracy on the other hand. In other words, Part 
Three addresses the issue of the feasibility of liberal democracy as well as 
basic problems associated with Chinese democratization.
Part Three consists of three chapters. Chapter 8 examines the emergent 
dem ocratic cultural conditions under which Chinese liberal ideas of 
democracy will develop and prove feasible in China. It also examines a 
num ber of cultural problems posed for the liberals in China.
Chapter 9 studies em ergent civil society as a social base for Chinese 
democracy. It assesses the positive impact of civil society on the Chinese 
democratic movement in 1989. It also explores the dual roles of civil society, 
the self-lim itations and the problem s civil society poses for Chinese 
dem ocratization.
Chapter 10 investigates the search for new foundations of legitimacy by 
Deng's leadership and examines changes in legitim ating techniques in 
relation to the move tow ards dem ocratization in China after 1978, and 
particu larly  since 1989. The central objective is to investigate  the
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relationship between legitimacy (old and new forms of legitimation) and 
democracy in contemporary China. The purposes of this Chapter are (1) to 
identify changes in the conceptions of legitimacy, particularly the recent 
adjustm ent of legitim ating techniques; (2) to assess the impact of these 
changes on the direction of political developm ent by exam ining the 
possibility of playing the democratic card by reformer factions within the 
CCP; and finally (3) to discuss the limits and the problems associated with 
the Party's search for new legitimacy.
I have also included an appendix which critically examines David 
Hum qe’s supposition of knavery in institutional design. This is an extended 
discussion of the problem  of evil in relation to institu tional design 
introduced in Chapter 5.
PART ONE
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY
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CHAPTER 1
The Radical Model of Populist Democracy
This chapter discusses the radical model of populist democracy of Yang 
Xiguang (Whither China in 1968), Li Yizhe's group (On Democracy and the 
Socialist Legal System in 1974) and Chen Erjin (On Proletarian-Democratic 
Revolution in 1976), which inspired the young generation of that time, and 
influenced China's Democracy Movement in the later 1970s and early 1980s. 
It focuses on the theoretical relationships between their ideas of democracy, 
their ideas of an emerging "new class" and their assessments of the 
"Cultural Revolution". Populist democracy in this chapter is defined as a 
direct mass democracy which is the antithesis of bureaucratic apparatus and 
in which the working class or proletarian class has power of final control of 
state affairs.
This Chinese radical model of populist democracy is usually now 
regarded merely as politically irrelevant to today's China and is 
remembered as an historical curiosity. However, for some Chinese 
dissidents, the June 4th Events in 1989 re-raise the issue of a new class and 
radical means to achieve democracy in China. This new development thus 
calls for a re-examination of populist democracy, which will likely remain 
one of the major ideologies in the field of political thoughts in future 
China. Further, the above writings on democracy contain some elements of 
the liberal idea of democracy; these can be seen as a theoretical stage of the 
transition to a liberal model of democracy in contemporary China. A study 
of the populist idea of democracy, therefore, helps us to understand the 
intellectual development of democratic thought from the populist to the 
liberal model of democracy in contemporary China (Chapter 3). Also, 
despite the difficult circumstances and narrow limits within which the 
above writers worked, their writings have enough intellectual substance to 
be accorded the dignity of an intellectual critique. The study of their 
intellectual merits and weaknesses, therefore, helps us to understand the 
advantages and the limits of Chinese liberal idea of democracy.
I draw a distinction between sociological understanding of why and 
what they wrote and a substantive analytical critique. The chapter focuses 
on the latter, because a growing literature has already studied strategies of
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their w ritings such as their use of the words of Mao and of others, the 
political atmosphere where a certain degree of freedom was allowed, access 
to alternative ideas, and finally survival considerations, which are very 
im portant to understanding their democratic ideas (see Unger, 1991a).
The chapter is partly descriptive and partly analytical. It has six sections. 
The first three sections review the populist ideas of democracy of Yang 
Xiguang, Li Yizhe's group and Chen Erjin respectively. Section 4 describes 
the transform ation of the assessments of the "Cultural Revolution" with 
reference to a shift from a populist to a liberal model of democracy. Section 5 
is a liberal critique (including self-critiques by Li Zhengtian and Yang 
Xiguang) of the idea of a "new class" and class analysis, constituting a 
rejection of a key feature of the populist model of democracy. Section 6 
discusses the decline of the populist model of democracy and the possibility 
of revival of that model.
1. Yang Xiguang: Whither China? 9
The tragedy of the "Cultural Revolution" has led to the rise of democratic 
m ovem ents in recent decades; and to understand  dem ocratic ideas in 
contem porary  China, we need to trace the origin and process of the 
"Cultural Revolution" and the im pact of the "Cultural Revolution" on 
Chinese democratic ideas (Liu Guokai, 1986-87, Wang Bingzhang, 1985).
The early phase of the "Cultural Revolution" went through a set of 
political events such as Zhang Chunqiao’s suppression of Shanghai's "Red 
Guards Revolutionary Committee," liberation of the majority of the cadres, 
and a change in policy by the Central Cultural Revolution Committee over 
"Ferreting out a handful of capitalist-roaders in the PLA." These events 
awakened the radical rebels to the fact that, during all that time, their so- 
called spontaneous grass-roots movement had in reality been m anipulated 
by those at the top. They started to shout the slogan: "We w ant a genuine 
m ass m ovem ent, not a m anipulation  of the m ass m ovem ent!" (Liu 
Guokai, 1986-87,115).
Among these radicals was Yang Xiguang who belonged to an "Ultra- 
Left" group, shengzvulian, and was a 18-year-old high school student in
^The biographical information about Yang Xiguang, see, Unger, 1991a, and Yang's curriculum 
vitae which he sent me.
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early 1968. Born in 1950, Yang Xiguang was from an elite political family, 
whose father sat on the Hunan provincial Party committee and headed the 
committee's Secretariat (mishuzhang) and whose m other served as deputy 
head of the provincial trade union organization. In 1966, Yang participated 
in a secretive group of officials' children in response to the national 
movement. But his parents soon came under attack from above and Yang 
himself was criticized as a "counter-revolutionary revisionist." In 1967 he 
organized a small group of seven students to support the Xiang River 
Storm, a mass rebel organization. He was arrested for forty days and was 
released in March 1967. Yang later took active part in Shengiuulian, the 
H unan Provincial Proletarian Revolutionary Alliance Committee. In the 
name of Shengiuulian Yang com posed a short essay, Whither China, 
arguing for the establishment of a People's Commune of China, a model of 
direct democracy, as a solution to the political problem of the "new class" in 
China. Because of his dissident views, Yang was sentenced 10 years. In 1978 
He (renam ed Yang Xiaokai) w ent to the H unan University to study 
m athem atics, and later on to the Chinese Academ y of Social Science 
studying quantitative economics. He was granted a Ph.D degree in 1988 from 
Princeton U niversity. N ow  Yang is a reader in the D epartm ent of 
Economics, Monash University, Australia.
At that time, rebels held various ideologies, ranging from Maoism, 
Trotskyism  to Chiang Kai-shek's ideas; there was no unified ideology. 
H ow ever, certain groups such as the Support Station of the United 
Headquarters in Shanghai, the October Revolution Group in Shandong, the 
Big D ipper Society in W uhan, the April 3rd faction and the Com m unist 
Group in Beijing, all exchanged and shared the idea of the "new class." 
Yang's view of the "new class" and of the ideal of direct democracy can be 
seen as representative of the views of these groups.
Yang's views of the "new class" and direct democracy, according to 
Unger, derived from the following three sources: (1) Mao's idea of a new 
bourgeois class; (2) 1966 Cultural Revolution articles comm em orating the 
95th anniversary of the Paris Com mune, and the Red Flag editorial of 
January 1967 supporting the Paris Commune's principles; and finally (3) a
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Beijing student Red Guard proclamation entitled "Redistribution of Power 
and Property: Manifesto of the April 3rd Faction."^
Mao had posited the existence in China of a new bourgeois class whose 
leading representatives, located at the sum m it of the Com m unist Party, 
were bent on carrying out a "capitalist restoration." Yang m ulled over 
phrases lifted from Mao such as "new bourgeois class" and "capitalist 
restoration," and subtly reform ulated them as "red capitalist class." Yang 
also developed Mao's idea in the sense that Yang explained the political 
events of the early "Cultural Revolution" in terms of class struggle between 
this "new class" and masses. He felt the two-line struggle thesis couldn't 
explain the mass conflicts of the "Cultural Revolution," that it could only 
refer to the pre-Cultural Revolution political differences among the political 
elite (Unger, 1991a, 27). He stated that the root problem  lay w ith the 
m onopoly on pow er of a Leninist nomenklature that g radually  and 
inevitably had become transformed into a grasping self-perpetuating "new 
class." He argued that to comprehend why people hated cadres so much, a 
class analysis was needed. He viewed events, such as the January Storm of 
1967 and the February Adverse Current through the prism of a class struggle 
betw een the new bureaucratic class m aneuvering desperately to stay in 
power, and the hitherto powerless masses (Yang Xiguang, 1976, 62-3).
Further, in Yang's view, an institutionalized means was needed to 
constrain and weaken and thw art these political apparachikis, in other 
words, a more pluralistic and democratic polity was necessary. Thus, Yang 
advocated the establishm ent of a "People’s Commune of China," modelled 
on the Paris C om m une,^  which would eliminate the need for bureaucrats 
(Yang Xiguang, 1976, 62-3). This, in Yang's view, was the political direction 
tow ards w hich China should  go. Yang took seriously the egalitarian 
principles of the Paris Commune where officials would have no special 
privileges. Economically, they w ould receive the same treatm ent as the 
masses in general. Politically they should be elected by people rather than
10Manifesto of the April 3rd Faction declared that the target of the "Cultural Revolution" 
was to be the redistribution of property and the overthrow of the privileged. As to the 
question of how these three sources influenced Yang’s idea, see Unger, 1991a, 25-7. 
n The role of the idea of the Paris Commune in the "Cultural Revolution", see, The Cultural 
Revolution in the Provinces, ed and published by East Asian Research Centre, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971, 2-3. The Paris Commune model was still supported even in 
the 1980s. See Hu Jiewei & Chang Dalin, 1982; Rong Jian & Yang Fengshun, 1989.
23
appointed by the bureaucracy. They could be dismissed or replaced at any 
time at the request of the masses.
Here, Yang was different from Mao who initially praised the Paris 
Com m une in June 1966 bu t finally rejected the inauguration  of the 
"Shanghai People's commune" m odel for a new form of governm ent in 
late January 1967 and turned to favour the model of the revolutionary 
committees — the new administrative organs set up in the wake of "power 
seizures" from the beginning of 1967. It was Mao's rejection of the Paris 
Com m une model that led Yang to the belief that Mao was not a pure 
Marxist, that he would not put the principle of the Paris Commune into 
practice and that only from the masses themselves, could the ideal of the 
Paris Com m une be realized in China. Further, Yang rejected the 
revolu tionary  com m ittees as "bourgeois reform ism ," still under the 
dom ination of the "Red Capitalists" (Yang Xiguang, 1976, 64-5). He saw the 
"Cultural Revolution" as only the beginning of socialist revolution in 
China, as a violent action of overthrow ing one class by another (Yang 
Xiguang, 1976, 75). Thus He supported the following methods to achieve a 
"Paris Commune of China": "Overthrow the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie," 
"abolish bureaucratic organs," and "thoroughly smash the state machinery." 
These were accompanied by the celebration of incidents of armed struggle in 
the "Cultural Revolution," and support for the seizure of arms from the 
Army, which the leaders of the "Cultural Revolution" had condem ned 
(Yang Xiguang, 1976, 66, 88).
Yang's ideas of a "new class" and of direct democracy had influence on 
the Li Yizhe group's famous dissident manifesto "On Socialist Democracy 
and the Legal System" (Unger, 1991a, 33). His explanation of the "Cultural 
Revolution" in terms of social conflicts also had influence on Liu Guokai's 
w riting on the "Cultural Revolution." W ang Xizhe observed in 1980 that 
"the Yang Xiguang group was the forerunner of the Thinking Generation" 
(Wang Xizhe, 1980, 252).
2. Li Yizhe's Group: On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System
The group who posted up the famous On Socialist Democracy and the Legal 
system posters12 exam ining the central theme of the connection between
12Chinese version of their posters was included in Ding Wang, 1976. English translation see 
Chan, Rosen and Unger, 1985.
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the rule of law and popular participation in politics, at a busy junction of 
Canton's Beijing Road on November 10, 1974, was composed of Li 
Zhengtian, Chen Yiyang, Wang Xizhe and Guo Hongzhi.13
Without ever having read Djilas, the Li Yizhe authors eloquently 
propounded ideas strikingly similar to those in Djilas's critique of the "New 
Class." It was the inspiration of the harsh realities of the class struggle that 
led Li Yizhe's group to the question of the newborn bourgeois class, the way 
it appropriated possessions, and the need for struggle against it (Li Yizhe, 
1976, 2-3).
The group argued that whether recognized or not, there was an 
emerging privileged stratum in China similar to that in the Soviet Union. 
Each level of the Party and government leadership, according to this group, 
had completed a qualitative change from being "the servants of the people" 
to being "the masters of the people." Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao were no more 
than its political agents (Li Yizhe, 1976, 27-8). They further argued that the 
essence of the appropriation of possessions by the "new bourgeois class" was 
to "turn public into private" while still maintaining a system of socialist 
ownership of the means of production. In order to protect privileges already 
acquired and to obtain further privileges, the "new class" must suppress the 
masses who rose to oppose their privileges and must illegally deprive 
[them] of their political rights and economic interests (Li Yizhe, 1976, 2-4).
The new problem then was, according to Li Yizhe's group: what the Liu 
Shaoqi clique, and especially the Lin Biao clique, attempted to establish was 
not ordinary bourgeois dictatorship, but a feudalistic socialist-fascist 
despotism which was China's main danger (Li Yizhe, 1976, 25-6). The term, 
"a feudalistic socialist-fascist despotism" was mainly rhetorical and polemic 
in the sense that it was used politically to condemn the Lin Biao system, or
13Li Zhengtian, author of the first draft of the "Socialist Democracy" poster, had been a 
leader of Rebel Red Guard group. He was detained in August 1968, at the close of the 
"Cultural Revolution" fighting, and not released until 1972. With the fall of Li Biao, Li 
Zhengtian was released in 1972 in a general amnesty as China entered a period of leniency. 
He obtained a temporary job in the library of Canton Fine Arts Institute, and there finished 
the first draft of the "Socialist Democracy" essay in early 1973. Wang Xizhe played the 
largest role in authoring the third and final draft and its preface. He had participated in Li 
Zhengtian’s Red Guard group and, when the rebels were repressed in 1968, was assigned to 
settle in the Guangdong countryside. In 1969, perhaps through the intervention of his family, 
Wang Xizhe had managed to returned to Canton and was assigned to a job as a boiler worker 
in a cod-liver oil factory, a post that he would hold, in between arrests, until his final 
imprisonment in 1981. See, Chan, Rosen and Unger, 1985, 2-4, 9-10.
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feudal and fascist systems in the name of socialism. It was also a conceptual 
innovation in the sense that it insisted that the major task was in 
opposition to feudalism rather than capitalism. Here they differed from 
Mao who warned of capitalist restoration in China. For Li Yizhe's group, it 
was impossible for a new privileged class to share its gains with the old 
overthrow n landlords and compradors.^ 4 New bourgeoisie could only 
im plem ent a feudalistic socialist-fascist despotism  under the social- 
economic conditions of the country (Li Yizhe, 1976, 25-6).
The Li Yizhe group also saw the "Cultural Revolution" as practices to 
resolve the problem of the new class. The essential form of the "Cultural 
Revolution," according to Li Yizhe, was the mass m ovem ent and a 
comprehensive people's revolutionary mass democracy. They declared:
Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and 
freedom of association, which are all incorporated in the Constitution, and 
the freedom to travel to meet other people [chuanlian], which is not yet in 
the Constitution, have been truly practised and moreover have received the 
support of the Party Centre headed by Chairperson Mao. This is a vivid and 
m om entous revolutionary accom plishm ent that has had no counterpart 
among the Chinese people during these past several thousand years (Li 
Yizhe, 1976,19, also see Chan, Stanley & Unger, 1985, 63).
However, for Li Yizhe's group, the "Cultural Revolution" revealed its 
lim itations and problem s. First, the "Cultural Revolution" had not 
completed its task of institutionalizing these practices in a comprehensive 
socialist democracy (Li Yizhe, 1976, 4-5). Second, the Cultural Revolution, 
the experiment of class struggle, had become the factional struggle among 
the people; or in other w ords, Marxist class democracy had become a 
"factional democracy" (Li Yizhe, 1976, 24-5). Third, there was a fundamental 
contradiction of the Cultural Revolution. On the one hand, the centralized 
leadership of the Party could not be shaken. On the other hand, the focus of 
the Cultural Revolution was to rectify the captalist-roaders in the Party. At 
the same time, these captalist-roaders were the concrete expressions of the
14However, Li Yizhe's group still employed the term of capitalism as contrast to socialism to 
explain the task of the "Cultural Revolution". This contradicts their exclusion of "capitalism 
restoration" in their idea of "feudalistic socialist-fascist despotism". The contradiction may 
be due to the historical fact that they had to use thus term in the political conditions in the 
mid 1970s.
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centralized leadership in the places and the departments under their control 
(Li Yizhe, 1976, 26).
The lesson that they learnt was that both factions should be entitled to 
rights of democracy; the suppression of one faction by another does not 
work. As they asserted , unless we change the previous relation of 
suppression and being suppressed into a relationship based on united 
criticism and counter-criticism, Marxist class-based democracy cannot exist 
(Li Yizhe, 1976, 24-5). This was a logic that led them to the idea of the 
protection of rights. An alternative solution, according to Li Yizhe's group, 
was to institutionalize the protection of rights and to realize genuine 
participatory democracy. In their letter to Chairm an Mao and the Fourth 
National People's Congress in 1974, they presented their ideal of democracy 
as follows:
(1) Democracy is a rule of law. They had witnessed that the rule of law did 
not work and that across the length and breadth of the land, everywhere 
there was suppression and imprisonment of the innocent. Thus they argued 
the need to guard against substituting Party leadership for legislative and 
judicial powers. Li Zhengtian later in 1979 used the case of Zhang Z h ix in^  
to argue for a continuing need to institutionalize a whole list of hum an 
rights safeguards: from laws guaranteeing freedom  of the press and of 
association to the establishm ent of a system  of judicially independent 
defense attorneys. He urged that adm inistrative power m ust be prevented 
from interfering with legislative and judicial powers. Appellate courts m ust 
also be set up to protect the legitimate right of the defendant (Li Zhengtian, 
1985,170-2).
(2) Democracy is an election system. The group argued that when certain 
cadres (especially high-level cadres of the central organs) lose the trust of the 
broad masses of people, the people's right to replace them at any time 
should be addressed by the Fourth National People's Congress (Li Yizhe, 
1976, 28). Li Zhengtian later in 1979 argued, if the masses do not truly enjoy 
the right to elect and recall, the cadres would not deem themselves public
15Zhang Zhixin, a Party member in Liaoning province, had been imprisoned in 1969 for 
having injudiciously confided her inner feelings to friends. She denied the charge that she 
had sympathized with Mao Zedong’s opponents ever since Peng Dehuai's fall in 1959, but she 
insisted that by Party tradition she did have the right to oppose a leader's positions. To 
silence her, her vocal chords were severed in prison. She was executed after five years of 
gruesome treatment.
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servants of the people; they would only see themselves as officials 
appointed by the higher authorities (Li Zhengtian, 1985, 161).
(3) Democracy is to safeguard the most fundamental right of the people, 
the power of the people to manage the state and society. Li Yizhe’s group 
thought that the masses' right of revolutionary supervision over the Party's 
and the country's various levels of leadership -- for example, the right of the 
people to exercise the unconditional use of big character posters as the 
people's broad democratic weapon — should be guaranteed by a new 
constitution (Li Yizhe, 1976, 28-9).
Li Yizhe's group realized that the Party Constitution and Central 
Committee documents did grant democratic rights to the people. But 
unfortunately, in practice, these rights had often not been safeguarded. They 
stated that the people's "great democracy" cannot depart from the correct 
line. Otherwise, the revolution not only cannot complete its own task, but 
in fact will be used by bourgeois opportunists. Thus, the solution, according 
to Li Yizhe's group, was to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship under 
the guidance of the correct political line (Li Yizhe, 1976, 29). This gives rise 
to a tension between their ideal of democracy and their idea of the guidance 
of the correct political line. The latter undermines the former which 
contains some elements of liberal democracy. The contradiction is partially 
due to the historical constraints which forced them to use the concept of the 
correct line; it is also partially due to their commitment to the idea of the 
correct line which was then taken for granted as a fundamental principle for 
politics.
3. Chen Erjin: On Proletarian-Democratic Revolution
Chen Erjin^ played an active part in the "Cultural Revolution" as leader of 
a Rebel Red Guard group in Kunming. From the early 1970s onwards, he 
worked as a statistician in a local mine, and it was during this period that he 
wrote On Proletarian-Democratic Revolution. In early 1978, he was arrested 
after submitting the work to official publishing bodies. He spent ten months 
in prison. He was thereupon freed and declared to have been a victim of the 
"Gang of Four" in early 1979. Shortly after his release from prison, Chen 
went to Beijing with the aim of having his book published officially, but he
16The following biographical information was taken from Robin Munro's introduction, in 
Chen Erjin, 1984.
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met with no success. He there contacted the April 5th Forum unofficial 
publishing group. Finally, On Proletarian-Democratic Revolution ap p ea red  
as a samizdat edition. Chen was arrested again in April 1981 for his 
involvem ent in the Democracy Wall movement. The following year, A 
Kunming court sentenced him to ten year's im prisonm ent and five years' 
deprivation of political rights for "plotting the creation of a counter­
revolutionary party." He should have been released in April 1991, but the 
Chinese governm ent has provided no information about his current status 
or whereabouts.^7
Chen Erjin continued the populist tradition. With Chen's long essay, 
On Proletarian-Democratic Revolution, the populist tradition peaked at a 
theoretical level in the sense that he developed a systematic theory of the 
origin of the new class, the origin and nature of the "Cultural Revolution" 
and an ideal model of populist democracy.
Chen regarded  the "new class" not as capitalists, bu t as the 
rep resen ta tives  of qua lita tive ly  d ifferen t exp lo itative  re la tions of 
production. Chen argued that socialist production, through the dual agency 
of state power and public ownership, imposed upon this social production a 
greater degree of concentration and monopoly, generated a high level of 
organization, united and integrated the powers of political leadership and 
economic control, and led to the formation of more formidable productive 
forces than  before. Political pow er thus form ed the dom inant and 
controlling resource in the sphere of socialist public production (Chen Erjin, 
1984, 88). Further, Chen pointed out that in a public ow nership society, 
capital takes the form of privilege; whereas in private-ow nership society, 
capital is money capable of generating more money. There was, according to 
Chen, a new polarization of class relations, the sharp antagonism between 
labour and privilege, the working people and the bureaucrat-m onopoly 
privileged class which was in a day-to-day condition of intense m utual 
contradiction and antagonism (Chen Erjin, 1984, 110-19).
Drawing on the above idea of the antagonism between privilege and 
labour, Chen perceived the basic issue in the "Cultural Revolution" as the 
serious conflicts between the elite and the masses in the Chinese political 
system. Thus the "Cultural Revolution" was, in Chen's view, the result of
17This information is drawn from Human Rights Tribune, Vol. 2, No. 6, p. 20.
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new social contradictions and was bound to happen according to historical 
law. Further, Chen held that the "Cultural Revolution" amounted to the 
turning of the first page in the history of the struggle to oppose the 
revisionist system and prevent it from enslaving mankind (Chen Erjin, 
1984, 81).
Chen claimed that the system of revisionism in the Soviet Union was 
a new kind of social system, one in which the oppression and exploitation 
of man by man proceeded in a manner more devious and rapacious, more 
sinister and diabolical than any previously known. Chinese society was seen 
by him to be at the crossroads: a transition to socialism or towards 
revisionism (Chen Erjin, 1984, 71-9). But there was a basic contradiction in 
this "crossroads", according to Chen, which was the incompatibility 
between, on the one hand, highly organized and politico-economically 
unicorporate social production under public ownership, and on the other, 
coercive monopolization of power by the minority (Chen Erjin, 1984, 86-7). 
The real question, for Chen, was this: are the working people, the creators of 
history, to be relied upon to choose their own leaders, or are leaders simply 
to be forced upon them (Chen Erjin, 1984, 88-94)?
Chen argued that democracy as a solution to social contradictions has 
to take the populist form in which the working class is able to control the 
organ of the state and the "new class" is eliminated. The "Cultural 
Revolution," in Chen's view, was to allow the Chinese people, through 
individual participation in the struggle against revisionism, to accumulate 
concrete political experience and learn concrete political lessons, and was to 
lead to the formation of a broad contingent of theorists dedicated to the 
cause of struggle against revisionism (Chen Erjin, 1984, 81). Nevertheless, 
he thought, there were two limitations of the "Cultural Revolution," (1) the 
guiding ideology offered insufficient insight into the basic contradiction in 
the new mode of production, and (2) there was merely the search for change 
within a conventional framework of existing forms, and no pursuit of 
transformation, no break with this conventional framework (Chen Erjin, 
1984, 141-2). Therefore, proletarian-democratic revolution was now urgently 
required. To continue the "Cultural Revolution," according to Chen Erjin, 
was to realize the ideal of populist democracy characteristic of mass rule and 
direct mass participation.
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Chen's idea of a proletarian-dem ocratic system with its six features 
represented well this ideal and provided a much better picture of a model of 
populist democracy than that of Yang and the Li Yizhe group (Chen Erjin, 
1984,164-97).
(1) There would be the written Marxist constitution that represents the 
suprem e leadership of the State and functions as the highest arbiter in the 
state. All would be equal before the Constitution, and all, no m atter who, 
w ould be obliged to respect, obey and be restricted by the terms of the 
Constitution.
(2) The present single-party system would be replaced by a proletarian two- 
party system, in which the two parties would not represent different classes, 
but rather put forward different strategies and policy proposals towards the 
consensual attainm ent of common goals. Thus, political parties would be 
converted from being instrum ents of privilege, or m eans w hereby the 
bu reaucra tic  class exercises d ic ta to rsh ip  over the p ro le taria t, into 
instrum ents of true, authentic proletarian dictatorship. The fundam ental 
aim and principle of proletarian democracy would be: the implementation 
of a class dictatorship of the proletariat, one which w ould establish the 
latter, in its own right rather than through any paternalistic agency, as the 
true, direct master of society, and would thus bring about the liberation of 
both the workers and the productive forces.
(3) A people’s dem ocratic republican system  (renm in m inzhu gonghe 
zhidu) of universal suffrage, whereby every worker would enjoy the right to 
vote and the right to stand for election, would constitute the basis of state 
power as a whole.
(4) The upper-level structure of power would be divided into three parts: 
the people's conference would be, both in name and in fact, an organ of 
legislative power; the executive power of the state would be vested in the 
president; the judicial pow er of the state w ould rest w ith the Supreme 
People's Court, with H igher, Interm ediate and Prim ary People’s Courts 
designed by the people's conferences, and with the Court of Appeal.
(5) The grass-roots structure of power would be located in three areas. In 
factories, the workers w ould exercise their pow ers of legislation and 
supervision through a conference of workers' delegates. In the countryside,
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the post of production team leader would be subject to annual election. In 
the military, squad, platoon, company, battalion and regiment leaders 
would be elected by the rank-and-file soldiers and the committees at the 
different levels. And the state would gradually abolish the standing army, 
and would carry out the transition to universal military service and the 
arming of the whole people.
(6) The people would enjoy the rights of the individual citizen, such as 
genuine freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association.
Chen acknowledged the three sources for his ideal of democracy: (1) 
from his own interpretations of the events since the October revolution, 
and particularly of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, (2) from the 
ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin about the Paris Commune, and finally (3) 
from his idea of assimilation of the more positive features of the Euro- 
American social system (Chen Erjin, 1984, 155-63). Thus, while Chen's ideas 
of the electorate's power to recall and dismiss strictly mandated delegates, 
the need to reduce the social division of labour and the extensive powers of 
self-government were drawn from the second source, his ideas of a 
proletarian two-party system and the separation of powers in a tripartite 
division between legislative, executive and judiciary obviously were drawn 
from the third source. Chen’s model of democracy, nevertheless, is different 
from that of the democracy of Marx and Mao in the following ways. First, 
Chen develops Marx's idea of proletarian dictatorship in the sense that his 
idea of the advanced form of proletarian dictatorship incorporates the two- 
party system and the separation of powers. Second, Chen boldly attempted, 
in 1976, to appropriate the bourgeois democratic state structure for the 
proletarian cause on the ground that "sublation" or "synthesis," a particular 
movement of the dialectics, is necessary in democratic thinking.18 
However, in doing so, Chen did not see a tension of the combination 
approach; that is, sources 2 and 3 are not incontradictory. For an example, 
his advocacy of a separation of legislative and executive contradicts the Paris 
Commune model because the Commune, according to Marx, "was to be a 
working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same 
time" (Marx, 1970, 60-70).
18More discussion of how Chen differs from Marxism, Maoism and the "Gang of Four", and of 
what his contribution to Marxism is, can be found in Munro's introduction, in Chen Erjin, 1984.
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Further, Chen's definition of the "people" and the "enemy" involves 
totalitarian overtones and demonstrates Chen's crucial shortcoming in his 
dem ocratic  th inking. Chen has claim ed that during  the period  of 
proletarian-democratic revolution -- a present stage — it is the nature of the 
stance adopted towards that revolution which provides the new criterion 
for distinguishing between the people and the enemy, between revolution 
and counter-revolution. According to Chen, all classes, strata, social groups 
and individuals which endorse, support and participate in the proletarian- 
democratic revolution, and struggle for the establishment of a proletarian- 
democratic system, belong to the category of the people, represent the stand­
point of revolution and are our comrades. Conversely, it is argued, all social 
forces, social groups and individuals which oppose and sabotage the 
estab lishm ent of a proletarian-dem ocratic revolution, and are hostile 
towards and sabotage the establishment of a proletarian-democratic system, 
constitute the enemies of the people, represent the stand-point of counter­
revolution and are reactionaries (Chen Erjin, 1984, 232). Here, the definition 
of the people is arbitrary, accidental and uncertain; and he draw s an 
ideological dividing line betw een people and foe.19 According to this 
definition, the member of the working class, which, in Chen's view, plays 
the leading role in the proletarian revolution, will become "enemy" if they 
do not endorse, support and participate in this revolution. This is also true 
of individual citizens if they do not to do so. Thus, Chen's definition of 
people contradicts his idea of the rights of citizens, which, according to 
Chen's model of democracy, should be universally protected by laws; and it 
definitely will lead to the limits on hum an rights that Chen does not want. 
There is thus a tension between Chen's idea of dictatorship, which leads to 
the lim iting of freedom, and freedom of speech as a universal right, which 
tends to oppose any dictatorship. Further, there is a tension betw een his 
dem and for a legal system and citizens' rights on the one hand and his 
definition of people and enemy as well as his emphasis on the proletarian 
class's nature in his political thinking on democracy on the other hand. 
This is because his criterion of people and his class elements of the legal 
system underm ine the equal nature of the legal system if we suppose that 
the legal system should be neutral.
19If Chen were to follow his idea of the written Marxist constitution, he should have drawn 
a institutional dividing line between the people and foe in terms of the Constitution. That is, 
the people are friends of the Constitution and understand the constitutional order, foes of the
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4. A Shift of the Assessments of the "Cultural Revolution"
As the above shows, Yang Xiguang, Li Yizhe's group and Chen Erjin all 
regarded the "Cultural Revolution" as a movement to resolve the problem 
of the "new class" within the Party. Li Yizhe's group and Chen Erjin even 
regarded the "Cultural Revolution" as a form of mass democracy. At the 
same time, all were dissatisfied w ith the lim itations of the "Cultural 
Revolution"; they w anted to lead and push the "Cultural Revolution" 
towards radical democratization.
In this respect, Liu Guokai, who was influenced by Yang Xiguang, 
sum m arized well in 1980 the great practical significance and far-reaching 
historical importance of the "Cultural Revolution": (1) democratic rights in 
the C onstitu tion  becam e partly  true; (2) people gained a deeper 
understanding of the existing regime; (3) the "Cultural Revolution" enabled 
people to see Mao in a new light: "Mao is the root cause of all the 
injustices;" (4) the "ultra-left" trend of thought emerging in the later stage of 
the "Cultural Revolution" was like a heavy bom bshell in the field of 
ideology. It went beyond factionalism, and focused on the fundam ental 
problems of the existing system. It put forward far-reaching democratic ideas 
which inspired more followers and supporters (Liu Guokai, 1986-7, 139-45).
This then was the logic of the relationship  betw een a positive 
assessment of the "Cultural Revolution" and a populist form of democracy 
in the radicals' view. The "Cultural Revolution" originated in social 
contradictions; and it struggled against the "new class." If the "Cultural 
Revolution" was evaluated, then the ideal of democracy for China could be 
m odelled on the form of the "Cultural Revolution." And if the "Cultural 
Revolution" carried democratic implications, then the question was how to 
institu tionalize dem ocratic rights and how to legitim ize independen t 
political organizations. But if the "Cultural Revolution" was completely 
negated, then the people's dem and for democracy, the struggle against 
bureaucrats and the urge for reform and protection of political rights (for 
example, "sida") would be denied.
N evertheless, W ang Xizhe, one of Li Yizhe's group, eventually  
changed his assessm ent of the "Cultural Revolution." By 1980 W ang
Constitution are enemies of the state. This suggestion may overcome the weakness of the 
ideological dividing line, but it is still arbitrary.
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though t that the "Cultural Revolution" was the p roduct of M ao's 
m anipulation in serving to strengthen his power. Wang asked: "Why did 
students beat their teachers half to death? Was it because of a sharpening of 
social contradictions?" The answer is that it was not the result of their 
feeling of being oppressed at the time but rather of their having been 
deceived by Mao Zedong (Wang Xizhe, 1985, 256).
Today, Yang Xiaokai (Yang Xiguang) re in terp re ts the "Cultural 
Revolution": it has allow ed people to seek hum an rights and free 
association. Thus, according to Yang, the "Cultural Revolution" still has its 
implications for those who are pursuing democracy. Although Yang Xiaokai 
positively evaluates rebels in the "Cultural Revolution," he goes beyond the 
question of w hether rebels should be rehabilitated. For Yang, the most 
im portant lesson draw n from the "Cultural Revolution" is to set up a fair 
system of rules which protects equal opportunities and rights (Yang Xiaokai, 
1990b, 1991a & 1990b). Yang also stresses that the factional conflicts brought 
about by free association during the "Cultural Revolution" would and did 
influence the development of party politics in China and that there was a 
tradeoff betw een social order and free association and free press (Yang 
Xiaokai, 1991c). Further, Yang has criticized the populist m odel of 
democracy as impossible and destructive to a society; he has avowed an 
elitist democracy. Democracy, in Yang's view, is a check-balance mechanism 
between professional politicians and elites, and fair competition at the top 
layer of the hierarchy. For Yang, mass participation is merely a side-issue.^ 
Gu Xin, a young liberal scholar, also argues that it is im possible to 
institutionalize universal participation in political life on a large scale at the 
national level (Gu, 1988a, 19). In particular, he argues that, in a situation 
where Chinese culture allows no central place for individual liberty and 
rights, if mass participation is taken as a major task of democracy, this direct 
democracy will easily become formalistic in reality (Gu, 1988b, 20). Gu argues 
further, an elitist democracy does not deny the right to participation; rather 
this is possible through its institutional structure such as elections which 
are open to those who are interested in political affairs (Gu, 1988b, 20).
Also Yan Jiaqi, a liberal, has negated completely the form of the 
"Cultural Revolution", which, in his view, was a new form of dictatorship.
2°Yang informed me this in our talk, in his comments on my draft and his letter of 28th 
October 1992.
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He rem arked negatively that what was billed as the era of the Cultural 
Revolution was a time when feudalism ran wild as never before (JPRS- 
CAR-88-075, 23 November 1988, 39). Yan has adopted the power-struggle 
approach which views the Cultural Revolution as a result of a power 
struggle within the e lites.^  Why did Mao Zedong decide to do away with 
Liu Shaoqi before the Cultural Revolution? Yan has used the story that Mao 
told Edgar Snow in January 1965:
I have two books, one is the Constitution and the other is the 
party constitution. The Constitution provides me with a citizen's 
rights and the party  constitution provides me with a party  
member's rights. Now, one person (Liu Shaoqi) does not let me 
speak and another (Deng Xiaoping) does not let me attend the 
meeting (FBIS-CHI-89-020, 1 February 1989, 38).
Thus Yan has explained that by that time, the contradiction between 
Mao and Liu had come into the open for the first time. He has further 
rem arked that in the pre-Cultural Revolution period, Liu Shaoqi, Peng 
Zhen, and others had actually become centres of power not totally under 
Mao Zedong's control. Thus Mao Zedong needed to unleash a massive 
struggle to weaken and destroy their centres of power (JPRS-CAR-88-075, 23 
Novem ber 1988, 40). In Yan's political thinking, up until the Cultural 
Revolution, Chinese politics still adhered to this ancient unshakable rule: 
there exists in the state a suprem e pow er which is indivisible and 
untransferable and around which political struggles are waged (JPRS-CAR- 
88-075, 23 November 1988, 40).
Yan has fu rther held that m ass partic ipa tion  in the C ultural 
Revolution led to social disorder in the process of political development 
because there was an absence of well-established institutions. Yan has 
quoted and agreed with H untington's view that if the rate of political 
participation significantly exceeds the rate of political institutionalization 
for a lengthy period of time then political decay will occur (Yan Jiaqi, 1988, 
54; also H untington, 1968, 79). Having learnt a lesson from the Cultural
Liu Guokai believes the Cultural Revolution to have occurred in a three-year period from 
mid-1966 to mid-1969, while Yan Jiaqi adopts the official Chinese designation of "ten years 
of the Cultural Revolution" from 1966 to 1976. This matters in terms of assessing the Cultural 
Revolution. Because, for radicals, there were some democratic elements within the period 
from 1966-1967. But for Yan Jiaqi, the term of ten years of the Cultural Revolution is seen as 
the period of terror. See, Yan Jiaqi, 1987.
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Revolution, Yan has advocated "elitist democracy" which is open to elites 
from various strata and groups and is designed to absorb these elites. As far 
as Chinese political reforms are concerned, Yan has proposed to establish 
the authority of the Constitution and the National People’s Congress, and 
stresses the democratization of the elite's power basis.
The logic of Yan is thus: the Cultural Revolution was not a form of 
democracy, rather it was a form of dictatorship; an ideal of democracy, 
therefore, cannot be drawn from the form of the Cultural Revolution. If the 
C ultural Revolution reveals the weakness of the political 
institutionalization of power -- in particular, shortcomings of the political 
succession system -- the ideal of a democratic system should then be 
understood as procedural politics capable of resolving the political 
succession problem.
5. A Critique of the Idea of a "new class" and Class Analysis22
The above writers took seriously the issue of the "new class," and there was 
a logic in the development of their analysis of that class. Initially, Yang's 
term "red capitalist class" identified the danger of capitalist restoration 
through the new class within the Party. The developments of the "Cultural 
Revolution," nevertheless, certified that it was impossible for a new 
privileged class to share its gains with the old overthrown landlords and 
compradors. Thus, the Li Yizhe group argued that a feudalistic despotism, 
rather than capitalism, was China's main danger. While this view was 
shared and followed by Chen, however, he was not satisfied with the Li 
Yizhe group's rhetorical and polemic condemnation of the new class. Thus, 
Chen developed an analysis of the economic root of the new class. Chen saw 
the "new class" as the result of socialist production which gave rise 
necessarily to a new polarization of class relations and the sharp antagonism 
between the working people and the bureaucrat-monopoly privileged class.
In short, all the writers contributed greatly to Milovan Djilas' theory of 
the new class and to the understanding of the nature of the communist 
system in terms of the identification of the serious problem of the new class,
22White (1976) has provided an excellent sociological analysis of the discourse of class in the 
early part of the Cultural Revolution. Also, my critique of a new class analysis is influenced 
by Hindess who has rejected the class analyses of politics by Marx and Weber, see Hindess, 
1987.
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the criticisms of that, and the explanation of its origin. These ideas may still 
be relevant to today's China at least for some radicals. However, there are 
serious theoretical problems associated with the populist idea of the new 
class and the class analysis which underm ines the intellectual merit.
The first problem is that it is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
define the "new class" and to identify its members (Djilas, 1957, 39). What 
criterion can be used to define who are and who are not members of the 
"new class" among all cadres? A political criterion, which regards those who 
hold power as members of the "new class," does not work because it implies 
that ah officials are members of the "new class" and should be swept away, 
thus it implies an utopian anarchy. There is also an ideological criterion 
elaborated on by Chen Erjin, which regards those who do not comply with 
the correct line as members of the "new class." But this ideological criterion 
is subjective depending on the explanation of what the correct line is, and 
carries totalitarian elements which I have discussed in Section 3.
The second problem with the idea of the "new class" and the class 
analysis is that it faces the problem of how to classify a society, and of how to 
define the working class. Li Zhengtian, one of Li Yizhe's group, rethought 
the concept of the working class in 1979:
Today, how should we divide Chinese society into classes? Who 
should be included in the proletariat? If we say that the proletariat 
is the working class, then can the peasants in collectives be 
considered working class? Then there are the intellectuals; can 
they be considered working class? How do you draw  the line? 
D oesn 't the problem  stem  precisely from our attem pts to 
transform  the labourers' position from that of proletarians (Li 
Zhengtian, 1985, 159)?
Li Zhengtian also rejected the previously held concept of proletarian 
dictatorship or democracy. He denounced the concept of "dictatorship by the 
entire proletarian class," which his early colleague, W ang Xizhe still held, as 
groundless and unscientific, because, in Li's view, when a class is w ithout 
the means of production, it has no way of exercising dictatorship; and when 
it can exercise dictatorship, it has ceased to be proletarian (Li Zhengtian, 
1985, 159). Li argued that so long as the proletariat in its original meaning is 
preserved, there is no way for it to exercise dictatorship. Therefore it is
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unscientific and grossly inaccurate to propose the slogan "Strive for the 
Class Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Li said:
The proletariat should not, and cannot, exercise any sort of 
dictatorship for its own special class privileges; it can emancipate 
itself at the end only by liberating all mankind. . . . Irrespective of 
your subjective wishes, if you seek class dictatorship, it can easily 
be made indistinguishable objectively from totalitarian 
dictatorship (Li Zhengtian, 1985, 158).23
The third problem associated with the populist idea of class analysis is 
that it presupposes an ideal of a society without classes and hierarchy. Yang 
Xiaokai (Yang Xiguang) has challenged this assumption. In his article, "The 
Optimum Hierarchy" (Yang Xiaokai and Geoff Hogbin, 1990a, 125-40), Yang 
investigates the optimum number of layers in centralized and decentralized 
hierarchies. In doing so, he justifies the existence of a hierarchical system in 
terms of efficiency. For Yang, a hierarchical class society tends to be more 
efficient than an egalitarian society; and if a society lacks a hierarchy of 
classes it will break down. If his early work, Whither China expressed his 
romantic feeling towards an ideal of society, we may say that his "The 
Optimum Hierarchy" shows his cool-reasoning about a rational society; that 
is, for the rational society, class privilege and private property rights are 
useful to maintain social order and it is the privileged class that attempts to 
maintain the existing order through legal regulation. From Yang's Whither 
China to "the Optimum Hierarchy," Yang has completed his ideological 
transition from believing in the Paris Commune to believing in a 
decentralized hierarchical society which spontaneously emerges from fair 
competition and individuals’ free mobility across different layers of the 
hierarchy.
The fourth problem is that the concept of class-based democracy is not 
compatible with a liberal concept of democracy. The former undermines the 
idea of universal protection of basic human rights for all as shown in Chen 
Erjin's definition of "people" and "enemy" which I have discussed in 
Section 3.
Drawing on the above criticisms, I would argue that the populists' class 
analysis has little of a constructive nature to contribute to a practical and
23Dong Fang has made a similar argument, see Chen Erjin, 1984, 54.
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positive solution to the socialist problems. And the populist's idea of a 
"new class" will not produce powerful effects in reality and a proper policy 
to deal with the concrete class relationships in political life. The application 
of class analysis to the resolving of China's practical problems is simplistic 
and misleading. In short, as Graham Young and Dennis Woodward have 
argued, the analysis of the emergence of a "new class" in socialist society has 
been superficial and fragmentary with some confusion, or at least 
vagueness, on the main points of the new-class argument (Graham Young 
& Dennis Woodward, 1978, 43).
6. Decline of the Populist Idea of Democracy and Possible Revival?
In the past 10 years or so, there has been a gradual weakening of the Chinese 
populist Marxist-Maoist model of democracy and an increased awareness of 
the individualistic and institutional model of democracy. The same is true 
in Poland and Hungary where in the 1950s there was a major thrust for 
direct democracy, whereas today nothing of the sort can be observed 
(Ference Feher and Agnes Heller, 1990, 17). Also among sinologists in the 
West there has been a similar shift from regarding Maoist democracy as an 
alternative to liberal democracy, to taking liberal democracy as a second best 
choice for China.
Chinese officials have suppressed cruelly and put in jail those who 
hold the populist view of democracy such as Yang Xiguang, Li Yizhe's group 
and Chen Erjin. Suppression, however, is not the main reason why 
populism has declined in popularity; there have remained followers of the 
populists among a few intellectuals and workers despite official Chinese 
suppression of their ideas.^ A more plausible explanation of that decline is 
that Deng's reforms and soft cultural environment made it difficult for the 
radical-populist ideas of democracy to become widespread and acceptable 
throughout the country. Also, violent revolution such as the form of the 
"Cultural Revolution" to achieve populist democracy is commonly 
regarded as impractical, and as something which would create a new 
dictator. People are also tired of civil fighting from the "Cultural
was very impressed by a worker, 40 year old, who attempted to develop the idea of Chen 
Erjin in 1981 when I was undergraduate in Hangzhow University. The most impressive fact is 
that after I presented my analysis of the impractical elements of Chen's idea of democracy in 
the future of China, the worker cried, because he lost his personal value: populist democracy 
was his life and his "religion".
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Revolution." Most people dem and a stable social order and are more 
interested in im proving their m aterial lives. Take the example of Yang 
Xiguang who, even after a stay in jail (1968-78), has criticized his own 
advocacy of violent revolution and realized that violence only creates a new 
dictator and that only through non-violence and political compromise, can 
democracy be achieved. In his article entitled "On Political Reforms in 
China" published in 1987, Yang pointed out the logic of violence: a 
revolution which wants to overthrow  a tyrant, has to centralize power 
which is required to be much stronger than that of a tyrant. Thus, in the 
process of overthrowing an old tyrant, what emerges at the same time is a 
new tyrant of revolution who is not able to be controlled by people. This 
new tyrant will produce a new revolution. Thus violent revolution implies 
a vicious circle (Yang Xiaokai, 1987, 35). Since the June 4th Events in 1989, 
there has been a call for violent revolution to overthrow the rule of the 
C om m unist Party  in China. Yang has w orried  about the negative 
consequences of v iolent revolu tion  and has strongly  criticized this 
advocacy.
Li Zhengtian, one of Li Yizhe's group, provides a good example of 
explaining the effect of Deng's reform and soft policies. Li Zhengtian 
believed in 1979-80 that the Party was carrying out reforms. He therefore 
preferred to write for the official press and sought to persuade government 
leaders to reform administrative and legal institutions that would safeguard 
the due process of law and freedom of expression. Li Zhengtian disagreed 
with the pessimistic view of Wang Xizhe, another of Li Yizhe's group, that 
Party reform ers w ould not act spontaneously  to bring about either 
democracy or any significant extensions of freedom. Thus, in 1979-80, Li 
refused to join the populist actions of W ang Xizhe who participated in a 
national network of dissident organizations that were totally independent 
from the Party's sway; for which Wang was sentenced to 14 years in prison 
on April 20, 1981.
Another reason why the idea of populist democracy is in decline is that 
Chinese intellectuals have been dom inating the field of political thought in 
the last decade, whereas little has been heard from the workers and peasants 
at a theoretical level. Thus the democratic idea is confined to intellectual 
discourse. It has also served as an ideology for the intellectuals' road to 
power, and to legitimize their political actions for power. The point is that
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the "big intellectuals" of China are becoming members of a privileged 
group. That is why some Chinese intellectuals enter into the "new class" 
discourse only reluctantly, and accept the official Chinese criticism of the 
populist ideas of a "new class."
Also, the Paris Commune as a particular form of government was the 
sole theoretical choice in the "Cultural Revolution." However, in the 1980s 
the Western liberal idea of democracy became an option. Take the example 
of Yang Xiguang (Yang Xiaokai). After spending several years in the USA 
working on his Ph.D, it seemed to Yang that liberal democracy, particularly, 
private property rights, is practical and relevant to Chinese reality, while the 
Paris Commune is but a utopian ideal. Thus Yang Xiguang himself, let 
alone others of his generation, abandoned the idealistic dream of a polity 
shaped on the model of the Paris Commune. Yang, within the past decade, 
writing under the name of Yang Xiaokai in journals and newspapers such 
as Shanghai's World Economic Herald (e.g., Feb 20, 1989), has developed a 
reputation in China as a champion of "bourgeois democracy" and of a 
decentralized, indeed privatized, economy (Unger, 1991, 34).
Now let me turn to the question of the possibility of the revival of the 
model of populist democracy through modification and creative 
transformation. Certainly, the radical and romantic idea of democracy is able 
to provide some radicals with a theoretical basis for the populist and 
revolutionary strategy calling for violent revolution to resolve political 
problems in China. Even before these 1989 June 4 events, there had already 
been such calls (Cheng Shi, 1988, Yang Jiying, 1988). After the events, a 
radical common sense has been growing among overseas Chinese dissidents 
that there indeed exists a privileged class within the communist party, and 
that this "new class" can only be overthrown by revolution. Some Chinese 
in the USA and Japan are preoccupied with hatred of the CCP, rethinking 
the issue of the "new class" and the possibility of revolution, and adopting 
the more radical strategy for democratization in China. As Da Luren argues, 
the June 4th events demonstrate the failure of "reform within the system," 
and necessitate violent revolution "outside the system" (Da Luren, 1990).25 
Following Da's line of thought, one might argue further that the June 4th 
Events in 1989 were the result of the failure of reforms dealing with the
25Also see the strategy of the Chinese Liberal Democratic Party overseas, in C entral D aily  
N ew s, in Taiwan, August 20, 1990.
42
problem of a new class; and it was this new class, its corruption and the 
social gap between the new class and ordinary people that led to popular 
support for the students' dem onstration in 1989. Further, Ni Yuxian, a 
radical, argues that the reason why the democratic movement in 1989 failed 
was its commitment to non-violent strategies. He further argues that the 
students were misled by reformers so that they could not see the true nature 
of the Party. He also points out that the evolutionary or non-violent 
approach has failed; and it has blocked the process of democratization in 
China. Finally, Ni claims that the execution of Ceausescu and his wife Elena 
in Romania evidences the possibility of successful violent revolution, and 
that the failure of the Chinese democratic movem ent necessitates violent 
revolution in China (Ni Yuxian, 1990, 85-7).
Thus these claims made in 1989, I think, return to the conclusion that 
Chen reached more than 13 years ago. Chen claimed that reformism is no 
solution because the reform ist line seeks not the destruction  of the 
bureaucratic-m ilitary machine, but merely its passage from the control of 
one group of individuals to that of another group of individuals. However, 
the basic contradiction in socialist society at the crossroads, in Chen's view, 
is an antagonistic one, an irreconcilable one. The reformist line, therefore, is 
doomed to failure from the outset (Chen Erjin, 1984, 120-22).
Nevertheless, those who hold the radical view are a m inority at the 
m oment. Further, the possibility of revival of the populist m odel of 
dem ocracy depends on the follow ing conditions: that the reform  
programme fails in the end, and that liberal ideas of politics and democracy 
prove an impractical solution during serious political crises. So far, the 
current regime still carries out reforms, and the evolutionary m ethod of 
changing the system is the dom inant strategy of both leaders and opposition 
organizations. As this is so, there is less likely to be a revival of the idea of 
populist democracy in the near future.
Conclusion
The populist democratic ideas of Yang Xiguang, the Li Yizhe group and 
Chen Erjin, in terms of theoretical construction, fall into the tradition of 
Marxism and Maoism. Initially, the populists believed Mao on his word 
that the "Cultural Revolution" was a m ovem ent to combat the rise of the 
"new class" among the Party and State bureaucracy. But, later on, they felt
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that it failed to meet this goal, and proposed populist democracy as an 
alternative rem edy.26 Thus all the writers became dissidents in challenging 
the Maoist position; and in doing that, all have paid the high price of being 
sent to jail.
There are four common assum ptions or distinctive features of the 
populist democracy of the above writers. (1) The "new class" is the serious 
problem with which populist democracy wants to deal. (2) Direct control of 
state affairs by the working class is an ideal objective of that model of 
democracy. (3) Radical strategy, a new revolution and an attem pt to 
legitimize that, is the only way to achieve such democracy. On this matter, 
whereas Yang advocated violent revolution, Li Yizhe's group and Chen 
Erjin celebrated the m asses m ovem ent, the form of the "Cultural 
R e v o lu tio n " .27 (4) Their ideas of populist democracy contain liberal 
elements or seeds in terms of their emphasis on limiting special privileges 
and electing cadres. Particularly, for Li Yizhe's group and Chen Erjin, 
populist democracy has to protect basic hum an rights and to take the form 
of constitutionalism. This is also compatible with the form of representative 
democracy. However, there are theoretical tensions in Li Yizhe's emphasis 
on the "correct line" and Chen's definition of "people" and "enemy."
All the writers were populist in the sense that they appealed to a mass 
audience and urged direct democracy. This contrasts with liberals such as 
today's Yang Xiaokai and Yan Jiaqi who appeal to elitist rather than 
participatory democracy and have no interest in the model of the Paris 
Com m une. The populists also rep resen ted  a contem porary  political 
rom antic  position in the sense that they have idealized politics both as an
26As Wälder (1991, 59-60) remarks: "In taking class analysis more seriously than did leading 
Maoists, dissidents radicals departed from the ambiguous premises of official Maoism and 
approached a position not unlike reformers, but expressed in radical Marxist-Leninist 
language. Some dissident radicals, when they later became leaders of China's democracy 
movement of the 1970s, would make their break with Maoism clear in a way they did not in 
the 1960s."
27For example, Li Yizhe asserted that revolution is without doubt the most powerful and 
authoritative occurrence in the world; the mass movement is the richest source for the 
maintenance of the revolutionary spirit of the revolutionaries. See, Li Yizhe, 1976, 25, 28. 
Also Chen Erjin claimed that if state political power has fallen into the hands of 
revisionists, then, an interim period of armed struggle for the conquest of power will be 
necessary: one of even greater complexity, one still more cruel and bloody, than that whereby 
political power was wrested from the hands of the bourgeoisie - in other words, the unfolding 
of violent revolution at a still higher level" (Chen Erjin, 1984, 222). Here, in line with Yang 
Xiguang, Chen seemed to advocate a violent revolution.
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object of perfection which we would attain, and as the revolutionary means 
and enthusiasm whereby the ideal of democracy can be reached. This is also 
in contrast to liberals who take the pessimistic view of hum an nature, 
regarding liberal democracy as a second best rather than a perfect choice, and 
adopting a moderate non-violent strategy for democracy.
Further, the radical view of populist democracy raises the following 
questions which are overlooked by Chinese liberals.28 (1) The rights of 
w orkers and peasants to partic ipate  in political affairs should  be 
institutionalized. (2) Although there are theoretical problem s associated 
with the populists ' view of the new class, there is still a challenging 
question for liberals: how do they see the problem of the new class and deal 
w ith "a privileged class" w ithin the com m unist party? (3) Can reforms 
resolve "the new class" problem? Is it necessary to resolve the problem 
through revolution? In so far as the populists pose these challenges and 
speak more directly to the issue of the new class than liberals do, the radical 
idea of populist democracy remains one of the major ideologies in the field 
of political thought in future China. If both the Party's reform and the 
liberal solution fail, social gaps become wider, and the corruption of the new 
class cannot be tolerated by the whole of society, then the question of the 
potential developm ent of the idea of populist dem ocracy and even a 
populist upsurge in the early next century should remain open.
^Except that Wei Jingsheng's idea of equal rights has an implicit implication for the rights 
of workers and peasants, see Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 2
The Official Model of Paternalistic Democracy
This chapter examines Deng Xiaoping's paternalistic model of democracy 
characterized by collectivism, lim itations on political freedom  and a 
mixture of formalistic democracy and paternalistic authority. The task of 
this chapter is to explore the various tensions w ithin Deng's type of 
democracy and and to show that it has proved unsatisfactory both in theory 
and practice.
I use the concept, "paternalism" to provide a basic framework for a 
discussion on Deng's democracy. "Paternalism" as defined by Lucian W. Pye 
is an appropriate term to describe the cardinal feature of Chinese politics. As 
he observes:
Probably the cardinal feature of Asian paternalistic power is an 
overriding concern for unity, for holding the national community 
together. Paternalistic authority , especially in the Confucian 
cultures, can dem and conform ity on the basis that everyone 
should be willing to make sacrifices for the collective good. In 
term s of political developm ent the dem and for unity  and 
conform ity has been translated into unquestioning patriotism  
(1985,329) 29
In brief, Chinese paternalism has two major features: (1) limitations on 
individual liberty, and (2) collectivism as a base for such limitations. These 
two features have directly influenced the Chinese com m unist leaders' 
m odel of democracy. Although the validity of paternalism  as a way of 
describing the basic characteristics of socialism may be limited, it does help 
in understanding Deng Xiaoping's idea of a "socialist model of democracy" 
and the "characteristically Chinese road to democracy" which is based on
29pye-s collectivist definition of paternalism is different from an individual definition; 
while the former stresses the value of a community, the latter focuses the interests of a person 
whose liberty is limited. See, Miller (1987, 367) who defines paternalism as follows: "In 
modern use the term usually refers to those laws and public policies which restrict the 
freedom of a person in order that their interests may better be served" (Miller, 1987, 367). 
Gerald Dworkin (1977, 78) specified paternalism roughly as, "the interference with a 
person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, 
happiness, need, interests, or values of the being coerced".
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lim itations upon liberty and individuality, and a strong insistence on 
collectivism.
This chapter is in four sections. Section 1 examines and analyzes why 
Chinese paternalistic leaders such as Deng Xiaoping w ant democracy. 
Section 2 investigates what concept of democracy they currently hold, and 
w hat kind of democracy they wish to establish. Section 3 analyzes two 
premises of the Chinese paternalistic model of democracy: collectivism, and 
lim itations on liberty. Section 4 examines and disproves Deng's claim to 
have pu t into practice a new type of non-liberal democracy — the mainland 
Chinese paternalistic variety — which co-exists w ith W estern liberal- 
democracy by discussing the incompatibility between paternalistic authority 
and liberal democracy.
1. Why Democracy
In the official docum ents and new spapers, the Party claims to seek to 
establish democracy for its own sake, as in the slogan "without democracy 
there is no socialism". But, in reality, the major reasons why the current 
Chinese leadership seeks to establish democracy are (1) to resolve the 
authority  crisis in politics, (2) to make the nation more powerful and to 
provide better welfare, and (3) to respond to the need for m odernization, 
and especially for economic reform.
In contemporary China the demand for democracy came in response to 
w hat Li Yizhe (Chan, Rosen and Unger, 1985) called "feudalistic fascist 
dictatorship" in the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), and became recognized 
as an instrum ent which might both resolve the problem of corruption and 
legitimize the rule of the Com munist party. Argum ents for democracy in 
China are concerned w ith m odernization; the avoidance of another 
C ultural Revolution; the establishm ent of China as a Great Power; the 
realization of the "greater interests" of the people; and, finally, opposition to 
corrup t officials. Deng Xiaoping believes that dem ocracy can assist in 
tapping the collective wisdom necessary for economic development; assure 
the smooth transition to a new leadership, supply new and more able cadres 
for local posts, limit the overcentralisation of power and the consequent 
bureaucratic  im m obility, and prevent the reem ergence of a one-m an 
dictatorship  (Nathan, 1986, 224). This attitude is even shared by some 
dissidents: "For the average citizen, the purpose of dem anding democracy
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and rights is to promote national construction and prosperity for the whole
30nation. There should be no other purposes."
Thus the starting point, purpose and prem ises for the dem and for 
democracy are collectively (rather than individually) oriented, and the 
underlying attitude to democracy is functional (rather than idealistic). Those 
are the fundam ental and inherent limitations and "congenital deficiencies" 
in Deng Xiaoping's dem ands for democracy (also see Zhao Suisheng, in 
Democratic China, No. 4, Oct, 1990, 75). They have directly or indirectly 
lim ited the paternalistic leaders' choices, the scope of conceptions and 
models of democracy, and the future prospects of Chinese democracy.
Firstly, Chinese paternalistic democracy as a solution to the authority 
crisis is expected to contribute to an orderly, productive, and popular 
governm ental system  w ith a more com petent and effective leadership 
structure. It is expected to reconstruct and strengthen paternalistic authority. 
As a result, it tends to overlook the necessity for limits on power at the 
highest level. As Womack correctly observes:
The basic purpose of Chinese constitutional and legal reform is 
not the limitation of governm ent itself by citizens' rights but the 
estab lishm ent and streng then ing  of public  ru les and the 
limitation of arbitrary behaviours by officials.
This starting point [demand for democracy] is very different from 
that of W estern parliam entarism . W estern democracy em erged 
slowly, from a relatively short period of absolutism, in a process of 
political contention, piecemeal im provem ent, and institutional 
restriction of the public power (1984, 422, 435).
Secondly, Chinese paternalistic democracy as a means for establishing 
China as a Great Power and serving the interests of the vast majority of 
people is likely to overlook indiv idual freedom  and rights, and the 
developm ent of ind iv idual potentialities. In contrast, the dom inant 
rationale of W estern democracy is rights for all individuals, which were 
"extended slowly, from civil to political to welfare rights in content, and 
from elite to propertied to general citizenry in scope" (Womack, 1984, 435).
30An unknown dissident quoted in James D. Seymour, 1980, 35. This point should not be 
overestimated. Most liberal intellectuals have taken the position that democracy is an end 
in itself. See Chap. 3.
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The collective orientation of the Chinese has controlled and guided the 
construction of a particular Chinese model of democracy through the 
process of choosing among different Western concepts of democracy. Liang 
Qichao, Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping adapted their own 
collectivist experience to the ideas of collective democracy outlined by 
Rousseau and Marx; they then modified the ideas of individualistic 
democracy within their own collectivist framework and paternalistic 
culture. For example, when Liang Qichao referred to the concept of 
individual freedom, he did not emphasis individual liberty but the freedom 
of participation that "the citizenry as a whole has achieved vis-a-vis the 
government", and "national freedom" or nation-building. Liang argued 
that "the individual could have no freedom if the group to which he 
belonged was conquered, so the freedom of participation required the 
independence of the state". Another example is Deng's stress on the strict 
distinction between collective and socialist democracy on the one hand and 
individualist and bourgeois democracy on the other (Deng Xiaoping, 1983, 
183).
Thirdly, as Andrew Nathan (1986, xi) asserts, "When the concept of 
democracy came to China it was presented as an ornament of modernity 
and an asset for rulers". This underlying functional and pragmatic attitude 
toward democracy influences the way that the Chinese leaders have adopted 
Western democratic practices. It leads paternalistic leaders to reject essential 
elements of Western democracy and only take advantage of certain 
formalistic elements of Western democracy for the sake of pragmatism. 
They regard democracy as mere wordplay or rhetoric rather than as a serious 
or significant business. Chinese democracy, as a response to the need of 
modernization, is expected to be a means rather than an end and thus is 
secondary to the supreme value of power. The priority of nationalism over 
democracy, patriotism over individual rights, has led the Chinese 
Communists to sacrifice democracy to "revolutionary necessity" in their 
struggle to make China a Great Power. This attitude guides, and confines,
31 Liang Qichao quoted in Nathan, 1986, 56. Machiavelli also stresses the priority of 
national freedom to individual freedom. He argues that freedom is a form of service, since 
development to public service is held to be a necessary condition of maintaining personal 
liberty. If we wish to maximize our freedom to control our private affairs without anxiety or 
interference, the moral is that we must first turn ourselves into whole-hearted servants of the 
public good. See, Skinner, 1983, 4.
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the political actions of paternalistic leaders; they always hesitate and falter 
when faced with the challenge of democratization.
2. The Paternalist's Concept of Democracy
According to the official ideology of China, which is based on Marxism- 
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the dominant concept of democracy is 
not that of liberal-democracy. Instead, democracy is seen in Mao's terms: the 
masses keeping watch over the bureaucracy under the monocratic guidance 
of a national leader. It is also seen as a good governm ent "serving the 
people". Marx called democracy "proletarian rule" and this constitutes the 
key concept of democracy held by the Chinese elites. In contrast to the 
W estern individualistic tradition which was liberal first and democratic 
later (Macpherson, 1976, 6), China has sought to combine democracy with 
authority, dictatorship and centralism rather than with freedom. Its leaders 
believe that ind iv idual freedom  conflicts w ith  dem ocracy, as was 
dem onstrated in Deng's cam paigns against "bourgeois liberalization" in 
both 1983 and 1987, and expressed in Deng Xiaoping's understanding of 
democracy: "The dictatorship of the proletariat means socialist democracy 
for the people, democracy enjoyed by the workers, peasants, intellectuals 
and other working people, the broadest democracy that has ever existed in 
history" (1983, 176). Deng explains some features of socialist democracy:
We m ust make a special effort to explain the question of 
democracy clearly to the people, and to our youth in particular.
The socialist road, the d ictatorsh ip  of the p ro letariat, the 
leadership of the Com munist Party and Marxism-Leninism and 
Mao Zedong Thought — all these are tied up with democracy. 
W hat kind of democracy do the Chinese people need today? It can 
only be socialist dem ocracy, people 's dem ocracy, and not 
bourgeois democracy,individual democracy. People's democracy is 
inseparab le  from  d icta to rsh ip  over the enem y and from  
centralism  based  on dem ocracy. We practice dem ocratic  
centralism , which is the integration of centralism  based on 
democracy with democracy under the guidance of centralism. 
Democratic centralism is an integral part of the socialist system. 
Under this system, personal interests m ust be subordinated to 
collective ones, the interests of part to those of the whole, and
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immediate to long-term interests. In other words, limited 
interests must be subordinated to overall interests, and minor 
interests to major ones. Our advocacy and practice of those 
principles in no way means that we can ignore personal, local and 
immediate interests (1983, 182-183).
In Deng's thinking, there are three elements to which we should pay 
attention: (1) the people's rule over the government, which is the main 
principle of democracy; (2) leadership and centralism, which is the necessary 
condition for democracy; and (3) collectivism, which is not only the starting 
point for his concept of socialist democracy but also the major principle for 
resolving the conflicts of different interests in practice. In this concept of 
democracy, Deng rejects the Western power system:
In developing our democracy, we cannot simply copy bourgeois 
democracy, or introduce the system of a balance of three powers. I 
have often criticized people in power in the United States, saying 
that actually they have three governments. Of course, the 
American bourgeoisie uses this system in dealing with other 
countries, but when it comes to internal affairs, the three branches 
often pull in different directions and that makes trouble. We 
cannot adopt such a system (1987: 163).
He claims superiority for Chinese socialism:
The greatest advantage of the socialist system is that when the 
central leadership makes a decision it is promptly implemented 
without interference from any other quarters. When we decided 
to reform the economic structure, the whole country responded; 
when we decided to establish the special economic zones, they 
were soon set up. We don't have to go through a lot of repetitive 
discussion and consultation, with one branch of government 
holding up another and decisions being made but not carried out. 
From this point of view, our system is very efficient. We should 
neither copy western democracy nor introduce the system of a 
balance of three powers. We should uphold socialist democracy, 
so as to retain the advantages of the socialist system (1987: 192).
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To maintain the political leadership of the Communist Party, Deng was 
already to suppress by force any opposition movement which challenged 
Communist authority. As he claimed in 1986:
We cannot do without dictatorship. We must not only affirm the 
need for it but exercise it when necessary. Of course, we must be 
cautious about resorting to dictatorial means and make as few 
arrests as possible. But if some people attempt to provoke 
bloodshed, what are we going to do about it? We should first 
expose their plot and then do our best to avoid shedding blood, 
even if that means some of our own people get hurt (1987: 163- 
164).
3. The Paternalistic Model of Democracy
The Chinese paternalistic model of democracy is a "protective democracy", 
under the monocratic guidance of paternalistic leaders, which maintains 
and strengthens national power rather than protects individual rights. In 
contrast, it is said of the "protective democracy" of liberal theory that 
"nothing less could in principle protect the governed from oppression by 
the government" (Macpherson,1979, 22). The Chinese paternalistic model of 
democracy is, too, a "developmental democracy", which prefers to develop 
the nation rather than the individual, whereas the term "developmental 
democracy" in liberal theory is used to mean "a means of individual self­
development" (Macpherson, 1979, 22). Also, when conflicts occur between 
the collective interests and individual liberty, the Chinese paternalistic 
model of democracy affirms the supreme value of the former over the 
latter, and liberty must be subordinated to collective interests. Finally, the 
Chinese paternalistic model of democracy has not emerged from the ideas 
and practices of private property and a free market economy; rather it is a 
mechanism through which the state intervenes in certain issues concerning 
social equality, especially those which are conducive to a stable and secure 
society. Contrarily, the demand for liberal democracy and rights-based 
morality in China results from the development of a private market 
economy which is significant as the foundation of social power independent 
of the state (Chapter 7).
Mao's model of democracy placed great emphasis on equality and 
social-security-achieving-communism at the expense of liberty. Deng gave
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less emphasis to equality and social-security-achieving-communism, 
allowing more scope for individual opinion and behaviour in policy 
decisions but still disregarding liberty in the official ideology. Both Mao's 
and Deng's models of democracy share a common emphasis on leadership 
and centralism as the necessary condition for democracy in China. As Pye 
argues:
Distaste for open criticism of authority, fear of upsetting the unity 
of the community, and knowledge that any violation of the 
community's rules of propriety will lead to ostracism, all combine 
to limit the appeal of Western democracy. As a result, the 
development of more open and enlightened politics in Asia is 
likely to produce a much more contained form of popular 
participation in public life. At best it is likely to be a form of 
democracy which is blended with much that Westerners might 
regard as authoritarian (1985, 341).
Another feature of the particularly Chinese form of democracy is the 
mixture of formalistic democracy and paternalistic authority which will be 
discussed in the final section of this chapter.
Let us now examine two central premises of this model of democracy: 
(1) collectivism, and (2) limitations on freedom.
i. Collective Democracy
In western political culture, it is often acknowledged that the political 
process can legitimately be used by individuals and groups to try to force the 
state to serve their own interests. In comparison, in Chinese political 
culture, the major principle is collectivism — the supremacy of public 
interests over citizens' rights. Individual interests are never taken as a 
fundamental principle in politics; even the interests of leaders have no 
legitimacy in Chinese political culture. Pye argues that:
The Chinese system lacked any explicitly acknowledged and 
legitimately accepted linkage between the realm of government 
and that of private interests. In traditional China there was no 
legitimized interplay among privately based power groups, and 
people had to be taught that it is improper and dangerous to assert
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self-interests in making any claim upon the political system (1968,
16).
The concept of collectivism held by Chinese paternalistic leaders may 
be seen from the following two perspectives. First, collectivism, in a narrow 
sense is, the theory that the means of production, distribution and exchange 
should be owned and controlled collectively, so that all major decisions are 
the results of collective choice rather than individual preference. Deng's 
(1983, 175) conception of socialism is collectively oriented: "The socialist 
economy is based on public ownership".
Second, collectivism is a principle which allows a collective or the 
leaders of the collective to have rights that can override the rights of its 
members. The leader can demand conformity on the basis that everyone 
should be willing to make sacrifices for the collective good. As Deng (1983, 
182-183) claims that, under a socialist system, "personal interests must be 
subordinated to collective ones, the interests of the part to those of the 
whole, and immediate to long-term interests".
However, the first aspect of collectivism presents several problems. In 
terms of control and arrangement of public property, in reality only a few 
leaders control the public means of production. Those who have economic 
power over public property enjoy and share the political power and political 
privileges. Existing within such a paternalistic ownership system, the 
Chinese model of democracy fails to offer equality of political rights on 
account of this unequal distribution of the means of production and of 
wealth. In reality it tends toward totalitarianism or authoritarianism.
In theory, workers should and can own their property; in reality under 
a socialist ownership system they own nothing. So, on the one hand, 
workers lack any individual motivation and responsibility for collective 
enterprise; on the other hand, they depend on the collectivity for their life, 
happiness, order and security, as well as their housing, food and children's 
education. This dependence reinforces paternalistic authority. As Pye (1985, 
330-331) claims: "Paternalistic authority thus must be coupled with feeling 
of dependence. . . . The expectation that authority should produce tidiness 
and order also justifies the practice of obtrusive authority. It is accepted that 
the state can and should probe into the recesses of society."
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Here I w ould like to comment on the relationship between the first 
aspect of collectivism and the suppression of freedom of speech. Talmon 
(1970, 250) observes that comm unists saw "the essence of freedom  in 
ownership of everything by the State and the use of public force to ensure a 
rigidly equal distribution of the national income, and spiritual conformity" 
Talmon (1970, 255) asks further but does not presum e to answ er the 
following question: "must economic centralization aiming at social security 
sweep away spiritual freedom"? Here, I can give a definite answer because 
the Party which controls the public means of production can easily control 
the mass media and suppress freedom of speech (also see Hu Ping, 1988).
A second aspect of collectivism m ust also be examined. The principle 
of collectivism is that the people, under socialist ownership systems, should 
participate in controlling and discussing public affairs and should be 
oriented tow ard the group outcome or the common good, and that they 
should exchange their ideas in a way that has regard for common rather 
than selfish interests. In Mao's time, this principle was enforced in ways 
that were radical and extreme, and the legitimacy of individual interests and 
rights in public discussion was denied. As a result, people acted one way in 
public and another way in private, so that China became a nation of 
hypocrites. Mao wanted to transform hum an nature, that is, to develop a 
sense of collectivity, and get rid of selfish interests; but he ultimately failed 
in this attem pt. Mao's failure, in the Chinese liberal view, was due to that 
his concept of hum an nature denied the legitimacy of the egoistic nature of 
man (see Chapter 5).
In contemporary China, radical collectivism has been modified to take 
into account individual interests. Deng (1983, 182-3) has claimed that, "Our 
advocacy and practice of those [collective] principles in no way means that 
we can ignore personal, local and im m ediate interests." How ever, the 
political rights of the minority are still not acknowledged; and if necessary, 
individual interests m ust be subordinated to, or sacrificed for, collective 
ones, when there are conflicts between them.
Let us examine the notion of collective interest. In China, the pursuit 
of goals by common action usually, though not necessarily, is on the level of 
the nation as the largest collectivity, and through the agency of the state. So 
one p a rt of the collective in terest is "national interests", which can 
encompass national independence, state security, stability and unity. How
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are these collective interests ascertained? Paternalism provides one answer: 
collective interests are decided by enlightened elites. This is a less than 
democratic solution, for ordinary people have no influence over decision­
making concerning collective interests. A crucial question is, according to 
Wei Jingsheng (see Chap. 3), whether the decisions made by paternalistic 
leaders really represent and aggregate interests of individuals. This cannot 
be guaranteed, for there are no social choice m echanism s and well- 
established representative systems which can coordinate or aggregate 
individual interests and preferences.32
M oreover, paternalistic leaders often abuse "collective interests" to 
suppress the m ajority, to m aintain their own privileges, to legitim ate 
actions which violate individual rights and interests, and to ask people to 
make sacrifices in the name of the "collective" which are actually for the 
benefit of the paternalistic leaders themselves (Wei, in Seymour, 1980, 62). 
This rhetorical use of "collective interests" is evidenced in Deng's 
campaigns against "bourgeois pollution" and the crackdown on the students 
demonstrations in 1989. In such cases, "collective interests" may be equated 
with paternalistic interests, and "collectivism" becomes merely an empty 
rhetoric. Hence Chinese collectivism is the tool of paternalism ; and the 
ideal of Chinese collective democracy has failed in practice.
In conclusion, I would like to quote Pennock's (1979, 108-10) statements 
that there are three reasons why collectivism is unsympathetic to the liberal 
democratic ideal:
[The collectivist] who would bend all efforts to the development of 
a political whole that absorbs all individuality into itself m ight 
well hesitate to entrust this operation equally to all men. The 
second reason grows out of the collectivist's distinction between 
"real" and "artificial" desires...that distinction soon runs into 
difficulties....It is easy to see why the collectivist is here tem pted to 
opt for a less than democratic solution. The third reason for the 
collectivist's tendency toward elitism is that he cannot accept the 
high valuation placed upon the individual as he is at any given  
time and place, which is the heart of individualistic democratic 
theory.
32It might be also a problem for a theory of collective choice, see Arrow, 1950, Sen, 1970.
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ii. Paternalistic limitations upon Liberty
Deng's economic reform allowed a limited economic freedom but 
prohibited political freedoms and opposition. Also Deng wanted to develop 
"socialist democracy", but strongly criticized "bourgeois liberalization." His 
concept of democracy denied liberty as the first and major value and his 
model of democracy was based on a paternalistic limitation of liberty. It is, 
therefore, important to examine the arguments for restrictions upon liberty.
It may be argued by paternalistic leaders that freedom is nothing more 
than a means to promote the individual's interests, and there are values 
such as equality, justice and security which are more important than 
freedom. Freedom has positive and negative consequences depending on 
the individual's attitude to it, and paternalistic guidance may help people to 
achieve the positive consequences and avoid the negative ones. Also liberty 
is not the ultimate value or solid foundation of democracy but, the idea of 
development is the foundation of liberty. It might be argued further that 
paternalism contributes positively and effectively to the personal 
development of those who are uncivilized, so it is rational to limit their 
freedom. If uncivilized and benighted people have too much freedom and 
are not accustomed to obeying laws and regulations, this will produce 
disorder and destructive conduct. This situation, it may be claimed, was 
demonstrated in China: when the peasants were given control over the 
land, they cut down and used all of the trees before the freedom to do so 
could be taken away from them. Moreover, it is argued, Chinese workers 
and peasants at present have more need for security and basic material 
necessities than for freedom, and that according to Hegel's dialectics, the 
limitation of freedom now will lead to more freedom in the future. Liang 
Qichao laid down the rationale which would be used to justify 
authoritarianism and the acceptance of authoritarianism: "They [Chinese 
people] must be trained as citizens first; until then, freedom would lead only 
to disorder" (in Nathan, 1986, 62-63).
In countering these arguments we must recognise the tensions 
between limitation on individual freedom and "socialist democracy". If 
ordinary people are not free to express their preferences and opinions, do 
not have influence over or the power to be involved in decision-making, 
how can there be majority rule ? When paternalistic leaders make wrong 
decisions and there is neither freedom of speech nor a well-established
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system of elections through which unpopular leaders may be dismissed or 
mistaken policies stopped, how can we say it is a democratic system and that 
people are masters of the country?
If individual rights and personal freedom  are denied, every act 
becomes open to examination in the light of revolutionary public interests, 
which inevitably invites authoritarianism  rather than Marx's original ideal 
of proletarian democracy. D uring the C ultural Revolution, the official 
ideology, to a great extent, denied the legitimacy of private affairs. In the 
post-Mao era, article 51 of the new constitution contains a clause that states 
"the exercise by citizens . . .  of their freedoms and rights may not infringe 
upon the interests of the state, of society and the collective, or upon the 
lawful freedoms and rights of other c itizens."^  Paternalistic leaders are 
expected to determine state interests and there is ultimately no absolute and 
explicit legal guarantee of personal liberty under the new Chinese 
constitution.
Democracy in the broader sense, according to C. B. M acpherson, has 
always been based on an idea of human equality (Macpherson, 1976, 20-22). 
W ithout equal individual liberties, those who have political power are in a 
position to enjoy their political privilege. By contrast, those w ithout power 
only have the "freedom" to sacrifice their interests for, and to subordinate 
their preferences to, those of the paternalistic leaders. Hence equality, which 
is a central feature of socialist democracy, no longer exists. What we can see 
in reality is that paternalistic authority in China suppresses freedom and 
m aintains an unequal political structure. So the basic conclusion m ust be 
reached that, w ithout basic political liberty, there is no chance of achieving 
equality and justice.
Sherover (1968, 590 f) recognizes that, essentially, liberty and equality 
stand in m utual opposition. This view is debatable. One might argue that 
equality means many things and there are some aspects in which liberty 
presupposes equality. Here, I would revise Sherover's argument: there are 
more tensions between non-liberty and equality than between liberty and 
equality. W ithout personal freedom , there can be no equal rights and 
opportunities or even an equal distribution of welfare and resources. The 
people 's lack of liberty inevitably invites and m aintains paternalistic
^"Constitution of the PRC", 1982, Beijing Review, 52 (27 December, 1982).
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political privileges and political inequality in the whole society, which in 
turn inevitably enlarges or deepens the unequal distribution of welfare and 
resources, as dem onstrated by the serious official corruption under the 
Chinese communist system. If individual liberties are recognized, although 
inequality  still exists, people can freely dem and that this situation of 
inequality  be changed. Political freedom  opens up the possibility of 
overcom ing at least some of the problems of political privilege. Hence it 
m ust be concluded that the value of freedom is more im portant than that of 
equality. Only if we have basic liberty can we hope to achieve political 
equality and democracy.
The legal protection of basic liberty has further consequences for the 
paternalistic position. If liberty is protected and guaranteed by the legal 
system, it might help to produce both order and constructive conduct.^4 For 
example, in the case cited above, the peasants would not have cut down the 
trees for fear of inviting disaster, if their freedom to do so had been 
guaranteed. The reason the peasants did cut down the trees is that they were 
w orried  about how  long their freedom  to use the land w ould last. 
Moreover, the argum ent that a tem porary limitation on liberty will lead to 
more freedom in the future is also fallacious. As Talmon points out:
The promise of a state of perfect harm onious freedom to come 
after the to ta l v icto ry  of the transitional R evo lu tionary  
dictatorship represents a contradiction in terms...the implication 
underly ing  totalitarian democracy, that freedom  could not be 
granted  as long as there is an opposition or reaction to fear, 
renders the prom ised freedom meaningless (1970, 253-254).
The argum ents presented above do not im ply a total rejection of 
lim itations on freedom ; rather it is necessary to examine why, how and 
under w hat conditions any limitations on liberty are to be imposed. Here I 
w ould like to m ake a sim ple comparison between the argum ents of the 
pa te rnalists and of the liberal theorists for lim itations on freedom . 
A lthough  John Rawls claim s tha t rational persons w ould  perm it 
paternalism  and its restriction on liberty, such limitations would be, "for the 
sake of liberty itself and [would] result in a lesser but still equal freedom" 
(Rawls, 1971, 247). The conditions for perm itting paternalism  are clear,
34It might have negative consequences in the process of realizing human rights in the 
transitional period, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.
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concrete and necessary, that is: "paternalistic intervention m ust be justified 
by the evident failure and absence of reason and will; and it must be guided 
by the principles of justice and what is known about the subject's more 
perm anent aims and preferences, or by the account of prim ary goods" 
(Rawls, 1971, 250). By contrast, the starting point and purpose of the 
paternalistic lim itations on liberty are, theoretically, for the sake of the 
collective's interests, security and equality; but in practice, they may be used 
in the interests of the power elites. This outcome is partly due to the loose, 
unexplicit and unlim ited conditions; and partly due to the paternalistic 
subjective will which play a significant role in limitations on liberty.
4. Is Paternalism Compatible w ith Democracy?
Deng (1983, 183) has claimed that, " We m ust link democracy for the people 
with dictatorship over the enemy, and with centralism, legality, discipline 
and the leadership of the Communist Party." In com paring the argum ents 
of democrats like Liang Qichao in the late Qing (Ch’ing) period with those 
of Deng, we find that they have faced a basic problem : how m ight a 
pow erful governm ent be reconciled w ith the exercise of influence from 
below, and how could the rules be reconciled w ith strong authority  
(N athan, 1986, xiii). In other words, is it possible to m odify W estern 
dem ocracy to harm onize w ith Chinese pa te rnalistic  au tho rity  and 
collectivism?
Although J. S. Mill and John Rawls perm it "despotic democracy", or 
paternalism , to occur under certain co n d itio n s,^  in essence paternalism  
clashes with liberal democracy where equal liberty is concerned.
Macpherson has acknowledged that socialist democracy is one type of 
non-liberal democracy which differs from western liberal democracy. In line 
w ith M acpherson, Womack (1990, 21-3) develops a theory of party-state 
democracy. This is characterized by the continuous dom ination of the Party, 
dem ocratization of the Party itself, encouragem ent of societal articulation, 
guarantees of citizen welfare as well as citizens' rights and their significant 
influence over personnel, and finally the em phasis of the role of the 
People's Congress System. The question is, can paternalism  be reconciled
35Mill argues for the possibility of a legitimate "benevolent despotism" (see, Gaus, 1983, 
221). Rawls (1971, 250) argues for two stipulations which are necessary for paternalistic 
intervention.
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with non-liberal democracy? And also, is the idea of non-liberal democracy 
a coherent one?
Mao's revolutionary and charismatic rule not only resorted to the 
principle of the people as sovereign but also established a paternalistic 
model of democracy. Such a model of democracy, based on collectivism and 
lim itation on liberty, failed in practice and was inevitably open to 
authoritarianism  or totalitarianism. At best, this model of democracy may 
be acknowledged to be a particular type of formalistic democracy with its 
electoral system, m ulti-level system of people's congresses, "democratic 
parties", and a press which is claimed to act as the m ost im portant 
institutional link betw een citizens and the state. But any real public 
involvem ent in the exercise of pow er is lim ited under this kind of 
democracy; small parties are allowed to exist but are prevented from 
becoming rivals for real power. So formalistic democracy is a means to 
justify paternalistic power rather than a means of public control over the 
governm ent. To some extent, formalistic democratic structures are easily 
compatible with paternalism because under such a system liberal democracy 
is limited. Furthermore, these structures can justify, support and strengthen 
revolutionary paternalism . Paternalism  and form alistic dem ocracy are 
com plem entary . Paternalistic  pow er is m ain tained , reinforced and 
legitimatized by formalistic democracy; while only under the guidance of 
pa ternalistic  leaders can form alistic dem ocracy be established  and 
developed. In common terms, it is "democracy from the top".
In the short term, formalistic democracy was used, as Mao has shown, 
to resolve the paternalistic authority crisis. But in the long term, formalistic 
democracy cannot fundam entally resolve the crisis of paternalism , as the 
problems of paternalism  such as official corruption, gerontocracy, pliable 
institutions, and the struggle over succession still continue. Furthermore, 
periodic power struggles create and deepen the crisis of paternalism, for they 
lead more and more Chinese people to doubt the genuine official ideology 
and the integrity of Communist leaders.
Even more im portant is the theoretical contradiction in the concept of 
"democratic centralism" in term s of substantial rather than form alistic 
democracy. Substantial democracy is, in Marx's sense, the majority principle 
that people, workers and peasants, can effectively participate in controlling 
the social arrangem ent and become masters of their own country. Logically,
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it dem ands that people play a genuinely active and im portant role in 
decision-making. If that is the case, then paternalistic leaders must in reality 
share their political rights with the people, thus limiting their will and 
challenging paternalistic centralism . If paternalistic  leaders w ant to 
m aintain their centralized power, they have to limit or distort substantial 
democracy. As a result, revolutionary paternalism is clearly not compatible 
w ith essential democracy. In fact, to enable them  to harm onize the 
paternalistic conception of democracy with centralism, paternalistic leaders 
really only seek to maintain a formalistic democracy. In short, the concept of 
democratic centralism is a theoretically misleading notion and it does not 
work in practice. Furthermore, in practice the term, "democratic centralism" 
becomes mere rhetoric which has been used by paternalistic leaders at will. 
For example, in December 1978 Deng (1983, 155) stated "at present, we must 
lay particular stress on democracy, because for quite a long time democratic 
centralism  was not genuinely practiced: centralism  was divorced from 
democracy and there was too little democracy. Even today, only a few 
advanced people dare to speak up." However in February 1980, Deng (1983, 
267) said: "We should promote democracy, but at the same time we need 
centralism. Now and perhaps for a rather long time to come, we will have 
to stress centralization where it is really required, so as to increase 
efficiency."
There also is a conflict between theory and practice. A lthough the 
Chinese people theoretically control their rulers, in fact they cannot control 
those who make and enforce political decisions. To avoid that contradiction, 
paternalistic  leaders tend to resort to the vanguard  theory. Yet, as 
M acpherson has argued, paternalistic au thority  even justified by the 
vanguard  theory, "may be a governm ent for the people bu t it is not 
governm ent by. the people, or even by the choice of the people. A vanguard 
state cannot in principle be a democratic state in the narrow sense, since the 
whole reason for vanguard rule is that the majority of the people are said to 
be too debased, too impregnated with the ethics and values of the inhuman 
society, to be trusted with immediate power (Macpherson, 1976, 20)." It is the 
idea of "governm ent by the people" that always, both in theory and in 
practice, creates the tension betw een paternalistic  leaders and those 
dem anding essential democracy. In m odern China people have a justified 
tool in the principle of "the people as sovereign" w ith which they can 
struggle against any form of paternalism.
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However, Macpherson (1976, 22) has argued that in terms of the 
broader concept of democracy as equality "the vanguard state, so long as it 
remains true to its purpose, may be called democratic". Can this idea of 
Macpherson be applicable in China so as to acknowledge Deng's model of 
democracy? My answer is no. The Chinese vanguard state did not remain 
true to its purpose. My analysis of the Chinese model of democracy has 
demonstrated that the vanguard state neither has achieved political equality 
in reality nor tends to more political equality through the action of the 
vanguard; rather it tends to increase and enlarge political and economic 
inequality. So even in terms of equality, paternalistic authority is not 
compatible with essential democracy.
Now let me make a final comment about Womack's model of party- 
state democracy. I have no objection to Womack's theory of party-state 
democracy as democratic strategy, insofar as it attempts to utilize the existing 
institutions and habits and at the same time open them up to redirection 
and modification. However, I reject Womack's (1990, 12-16, 24) theory of 
party-state democracy as an ideal model. The reasons are as follows:
(1) Even if the Party and its policies are popular and internal 
democratization is occurring, this can hardly be called 'democratic' because 
all authority still flows down and out from the Party centre, and any 
oppositional party is still rejected as counter-revolutionary. There will be no 
sincere and genuine internal democratization of the Party itself given that 
there will be no external pressure from oppositional parties independent of 
the control of the Party.
(2) If the Party maintains its domination, this certainly conflicts with 
guarantees of citizen rights, in particular, civil and political rights; if civil 
and political rights are guaranteed and institutionalized, this goes directly 
against party-state democracy.
(3) In the same way, continued domination by the Party excludes the 
People's Congress System from becoming the highest authority; if popular 
sovereignty is exercised through the organ of the People’s Congress System, 
this directly undermines party-state democracy. In short, the concept of 
party-state democracy is self-contradictory and self-rejecting.
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Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the Chinese official paternalistic model of 
democracy which has two basic premises: collectivism and limitations on 
liberty. These result in a contradictory mixture of formalistic democracy and 
pa te rna listic  au tho rity . The pa ternalistic  m odel of dem ocracy is 
unsatisfactory both in practice and in theory. It failed in practice and led to 
or supported totalitarianism  or authoritarianism  in China. It served as a 
means to justify paternalistic power rather than a means of public control of 
governm ent. It gave rise to a conflict between theory and practice: the 
Chinese people theoretically control their rulers, but actually cannot control 
those who make and enforce political decisions. There is also a theoretical 
contradiction in the concept of "democratic centralism", and paternalistic 
authority is not compatible with democratic institutions.
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CHAPTER 3
The Liberal Model of Democracy
This chapter focuses on how three contemporary Chinese liberal thinkers, 
Wei Jingsheng, H u Ping, and Yan Jiaqi, view democracy. It is largely 
descriptive, outlining the content and context of their ideas on democracy, 
and the sim ilarities and differences in their views. These descriptive 
accounts will serve as the basis for later discussion in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
The historical developm ent of each m an's thought, and a comparison 
between their ideas and Western liberal ideas, will not be attem pted here; it 
would be beyond the scope of this thesis to do so.
I define Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi, as being liberals on the 
basis of Eugene Lubot's criteria: (1) they look for m oderate, non-violent 
ways of reform; (2) they exhibit a genuine concern to protect basic civil liber­
ties such as freedom  of speech and of the press; (3) they favor a 
constitutional governm ent in order to support the democratization process 
and provide institutional checks on authoritarianism .36 I select these three 
as representative of Chinese liberals' thinking on democracy, because their 
w orks are rela tively  system atic and w ell-argued, and have greatly 
influenced today's Chinä. Since all three are alive and they will surely 
change their thinking on democracy, my current work is lim ited to a study 
of their works up to 1990 although I have made an effort to catch up with 
their latest developments.
This chapter is in four sections. Sections 1, 2 and 3 review the concepts 
of democracy of Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi respectively. Section 
4 discusses their similarities and differences.
36See Eugene Lubot, 1982, 3-4. One might argue that Wei, Hu and Yan are Marxists because 
they quote Marx's works in their writings, but in my opinion, they do so only for reasons of 
political prudence. Liberal intellectuals must dress up their liberalism with a coat of 
Marxism. As Yan Jiaqi says,"As for myself, when I was on the mainland I never openly 
criticized Marxism, but used every possible opportunity to press for democracy and freedom". 
See Yan Jiaqi, 1992b.
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1. Wei Jingsheng: An "Old Red Guard" Turned Dissident
Wei Jingsheng was born in Beijing in 1950, into a family originally from a 
small village in Anhui Province.37 His father, a People's Liberation Army 
veteran, was a tenth-grade cadre and Vice-President of a departm ent in the 
im portant Commission for Capital Construction.
When the "Cultural Revolution" was launched, Wei Jingsheng was in 
the process of completing the first part of his secondary education in the 
school attached to the People's University of China which was, with the 
secondary school attached to Qinghua University, one of the first places 
where Red Guards manifested themselves. He was one of the "Old Red 
Guards" who, at the end of 1966, formed the famous "Committee for United 
Action" hostile to Jiang Qing.
At the end of 1967, he was imprisoned for three months, and in 1968 
took refuge in his family village in Anhui. He then spent four years in the 
army (1969-1973), and on demobilization found work as an electrician in the 
Peking Zoo.
He personally w itnessed the events of 5 April 1976 in Tiananm en 
Square, when a crowd assembled to m ourn Zhou Enlai and to criticize the 
"Gang of Four". This m ade a strong im pression on him, and he became 
convinced that China needed a new kind of politics. He began w riting 
p o litica l e ssay s ,38 and established the d issident journal T a n s u o  
(Exploration), which was the most militant of all underground publications. 
It carried many articles which were highly critical of Marxist ideology and of 
the Chinese governm ent. It dealt penetrating ly  w ith the subject of 
democracy and m odernization, and it contained shocking exposes of the 
appalling situation in political prisons. On 29 March 1979, Wei was 
im prisoned , later to be sentenced to fifteen years as a "counter­
revolutionary".* 3^
3^The following biographical information was taken from Claude Widor, 1981, 38-39; James
D. Seymour, 1980; and from Andrew Nathan, 1986,14-15, 22-23, 34, 40,43,118, 208.
3^For examples, "The Fifth Modernization", "Human Rights, Equality and Democracy", and 
"A Twentieth-Century Bastille", included in Widor, 1981, Seymour, 1980.
39On 6 February 1989, dissident astrophysicist Fang Lizhi sent an open letter to the Party 
leadership, demanding the release of all political prisoners, and of Wei Jingsheng in 
particular. Fang's action was a prelude to the 1989 student movement.
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Democracy: "The Fifth Modernization"
Wei Jingsheng has become famous for his dictum  that China needs 
democracy as a "Fifth Modernization" in addition to Deng Xiaoping's "Four 
Modernizations" (i.e. of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and 
defense). He lists three reasons for demanding democracy:
(1) Human rights. Democracy is a cooperative system that recognizes the 
equal rights of all hum an beings, and resolves all social problems on the 
basis of cooperation.40 It is the opposite of autocracy, which protects the 
privileges of a small elite, and denies the hum an rights of everyone else. 
Democracy and autocracy are the two main categories into which all the 
political systems of the human race can be divided. China's political system 
belongs to the autocratic type, as it is "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and 
"a variation of Russian autocracy". Although the Communists claim that 
the people are the masters of history, it is, in fact, Wei states, more correct to 
call these "masters" slaves (in Widor, 1981, 52; and in Seymour, 1980, 49-50).
(2) Prosperity.  Dem ocracy is the prerequisite  for rap id  economic 
m odernization (in Seymour, 1980, 63, 54, 146). Autocrats are wont to engage 
in conspiracy and violence in their struggle for power, causing great social 
upheavals and causing irrem ediable dam age to production and living 
conditions. The example of Fascism shows that totalitarianism  can only 
bring disaster (in Seymour, 1980, 54). In contrast, the American democratic 
system  has p rovided the m ost favorable conditions for rap id  social 
developm ent.
(3) Freedom. Democracy, because it promotes prosperity, creates optimal 
opportunities for the pu rsu it of freedom , which is the first goal of 
happiness. Democracy provides the maximum attainable freedom so far 
known to hum an beings (in Seymour, 1980, 54).
An Individualistic Conception of "The People"
Wei is concerned in discussing the theme of democracy from as many 
angles as possible, giving various different definitions of democracy. Let us 
look at a num ber of them:
40See Wei Jingsheng, "Diwuge xiandaihua" ("The Fifth Modernization"), in Widor, 1981, 
79; and in Seymour, 1980,65.
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[Democracy] means that people have the right to exercise control 
over everything in society, including economic, political, cultural 
and social affairs (in Seymour, 1980, 144).
True democracy means the holding of power by the laboring mas­
ses, the right of the people to choose their own representatives to 
work according to their will and in their own interests. Only this 
can be called democracy. Furthermore, the people must also have 
the power to replace their representatives at any time when they 
are found to deceive others in the name of the people (in 
Seymour, 1980, 52).
In the first place, [democracy] is a political system; in the second 
place, it is an economic system. It is not a system of subordination 
or enslavement designed to do away with people’s freedom, but 
one which protects people's freedom and consequently provides 
them with a chance to work in cooperation with each other . . . 
Democracy may not be a means for promoting centralism, nor 
may [the pretext of] freedom be used to enforce discipline. 
Democracy is a means of protecting freedom, and discipline is the 
pillar of democracy. If we recklessly reverse the means and the 
end, we will only find ourselves sinking back into the quagmire of 
Maoist dictatorship (in Seymour, 1980, 144).
Importantly, Wei opposes the official Marxist collectivist view of "the 
people", and offers an individualistic definition of the concept:
"People" stands for a large number of individuals as well as for 
each individual. This is my definition of the term "people". ... At 
present, in a social system where there is no room for the 
independent existence of individualism, there can be no 
collectivism to speak of. What [is presently called "collectivism"] 
is actually "autocratic individualism" and small group mentality 
(in Seymour, 1980, 62).
Wei here criticizes the suppression of the interests of the individual by 
the ideology of collectivism, which, in reality, is aimed at furthering the 
interests of a small group. He points out how rulers have always tried to
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make autocracy acceptable to the population by pretending that it promoted 
the "interests of society":
Despite differences in vocabulary, autocratic rulers of all ages have 
invariably taught the people that since men are social beings, social interest 
should predominate [over individual interests]; that, since everyone has a 
stake in the interests of society, centralized management or administration 
is necessary; that, since rule by a minority, or even by a single person, is the 
pinnacle of centralization, autocracy is the most ideal form.
In contrast to this, Wei is of the opinion that man's individuality is 
more important than his sociability. In his view, society is composed of 
individuals who exist independently from each other, on the basis of their 
own natural instincts. Sociability is grounded in the common character and 
the common interests of many different individuals. Therefore, although 
both sociability and individuality are important constituents of human 
nature, it is sociability which depends on individuality, not the other way 
around. Wei argues that individuality is primary and sociability secondary 
(in Seymour, 1980, 57). Thus, Wei believes that in evaluating social 
arrangements our concern must be with the well-being of the individual. 
Wei’s idea reinforces the Western liberal position that collectives matter 
only because they are essential for the well-being of the individual (see 
Kukathas, 1990, 12-16; 1992, 112).
Democracy as Harmony and Cooperation
According to Wei, the difference between totalitarianism and democracy 
does not lie in the difference between individuality and sociability, but in 
the different forms of sociability on which they rest (in Seymour, 1980, 58). 
Totalitarianism, he argues, regards suppression of individuality as the basic 
condition of its survival. In essence, it is a form of enslavement. Democracy, 
on the other hand, regards harmony with individuality as the basic 
condition of its existence. In essence, it is a form of cooperation.
Wei argues that the main difference between totalitarianism and 
democracy lies in the exactly opposite views they have on human 
individuals, and in the vastly different living conditions they provide for 
the population (in Seymour, 1980, 58). He holds that socialism is not 
synonymous with totalitarianism, but that, on the contrary, socialism and
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democracy are compatible. While disagreeing with the orthodox 
interpretation of "socialism", he also disagrees with the hostile view that 
"socialism" means modern totalitarianism.
Chinese official ideology holds that socialist society is the most rational 
means of transition to the ideal communist society, but Wei argues that all 
forms of totalitarianism use the promise of an ideal future as a pretext to 
legitimize the sacrificing of people in the present for the sake of a future 
ideal, which, in reality, is unattainable. He states that if we continue to 
uphold this Utopian kind of socialism, we actually support totalitarianism 
or autocratic Fascism (in Seymour, 1980, 60-1).
He is hostile to the idea of "Chinese socialism" because it neglected the 
human rights issue, and because Marxist economics — "scientific socialism" 
-- had not led to the promised wealth (in Seymour, 1980, 141). The Marxist 
socialist experiment of using dictatorship to achieve equal rights has, after 
so many decades, finally been proved to be impossible by the actual facts. 
Furthermore, he states, the plan to realize the ideal society through a 
"dictatorship of the majority" is a Utopian dream, since a dictatorship, albeit 
of the majority, is still a dictatorship. It will always lead to power falling into 
the hands of the few (in Seymour, 1980, 68).
On the other hand, Wei finds the view that the concept "socialism" is 
synonymous with modern totalitarianism too narrow, stating that this view 
fails to analyze the entire process of the development of socialism, and to 
appreciate its significance. This significance, he claims, originally lies in the 
socialization of production and consumption.
Wei regards socialization as the process whereby all individuals receive 
equal rights and duties concerning the use of the means of production, and 
equal opportunities to enjoy economic wealth. Real socialism consists of 
ensuring equal rights for individuals in making a living, and ensuring that 
these rights can be realized through free organization and coordination in a 
democratic political system. He believes that socialism has an inherent 
tendency toward democracy (in Seymour, 1980, 61-2).
Democracy, in his view, is the form of government by which the equal 
rights of all are protected. Founded on the recognition of everyone's right to 
preserve his life, democracy will provide everyone with an equal
71
opportunity to realize this right. Wei emphasizes that people can be said to 
enjoy equal rights if nobody is allowed to infringe upon the rights of others, 
and if everyone has the actual opportunity to realize his/her rights. The 
point of democracy is that everyone should have equal opportunities to 
realize the right to preserve one's life and to earn a living, not whether or 
not the final result is perfect equality (in Seymour, 1980, 67).
Some Critical Observations
Wei had a somewhat idealized and over-simplified view of democracy, in 
so far as he assumed that there is no tension between democracy, 
individualism, and harmony. He believed that in a democracy, no single 
idea can become the dominating dogma, and that nobody will succeed in 
imposing a single ideology upon society (in Seymour, 1980, 145).
The main reason that Wei presented an idealized image of democracy 
was probably in order to use it as a forceful polemical instrument in his 
criticism of the Chinese autocratic system. Although he strongly criticized 
the Utopianism underlying "socialist democracy", his idealized image of 
democracy does not provide any clues to how liberal democracy can be 
achieved in practice in China.
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that, as a political dissident, he 
was a major pioneer in China. In the late 1970s, he was the first openly to 
call for democracy, paving the way for the dissidents of the 1980s. Sentenced 
to 15 years in jail, and recently reported to be in very bad health, he has paid 
an extremely heavy price for his courage and outspokenness.
2. Hu Ping: From Outcast to Exile
Hu Ping, who was President of the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (CAD) 
in the USA from January 1988 to June 1991, was born in Sichuan in 1947.44 
The son of an executed "counter-revolutionary", his lot was a life of poverty 
throughout the 1950s. His first encounter with political discrimination was 
at the age of 15, when he was denied admission to the Communist Youth 
League because of his "bad class background", and later, he was denied entry 
to the ranks of the Red Guards in the early days of the "Cultural 
Revolution". He was sent to a remote village to live among the peasants.
41The following biographical information was taken from Nathan, 1986, 206-208; 1990a, 3-4.
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There, he had the enforced leisure to think, and in the early 1970s, he 
formed his commitment to freedom of speech.
In 1978, he was admitted to Beijing University as a graduate student in 
European philosophy, specializing in Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. He became 
a contributor to the unofficial periodical Wotu (Fertile), in which he 
published his long essay, "Lun yanlun ziyou" (On Freedom of Speech), 
defending the thesis that freedom of speech benefits society.42
He was elected a representative on 11 December 1980 in the county- 
level elections, during which he had campaigned for freedom of speech, 
obtaining 57 percent of the vote. His political stance made him so con­
troversial that, after he obtained his MA, the university was unable to find 
him a job. He remained unemployed for five years -- the price he paid for 
having actively championed freedom of speech.
In 1987, he enroled in Harvard University in the USA to obtain a PhD 
in Western political thought. He gave up his academic work when he was 
elected CAD Chairman a year later. In 1989, a split occurred between him 
and former CAD Chairman Wang Bingzhang, culminating in a lawsuit 
against Wang for alleged private use of part of the CAD funds.
Freedom of Speech: a "Fulcrum"
Hu is an outspoken libertarian whose predominant concern is the 
protection of the citizen against abuse of power by the government (Hu Ping 
1991a, No. 4, 53). He has criticized the Chinese Communist idea of positive 
freedom, adopting instead Isaiah Berlin's idea of negative liberty. The 
reading of William Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich awakened 
terrible visions in his mind of how the contemporary world would have 
looked if Hitler had succeeded in completing his plan of military expansion 
(Hu Ping , 1988, 3). He stated that of the two major problems of today, 
namely, how freedom can be maintained in liberal societies, and how
42The essay was written in 1975, and first appeared in Wotu in 1979. Reprints in Qishi 
niandai, Nos. 3-6, 1981; Spear Head, Nos. 12-13, 1982 (translated in English); Qingnian 
luntai, Nos. 7 and 9, 1986; Zhongguo zhichun (China Spring), Nos. 50-52, 1987. Also included 
in a collection of his works: Hu Ping, Gei wo yige zhidian (Give me a fulcrum), Taiwan: Lian- 
jing chuban gongshi, 1988. This is the source used in this book, hereafter referred to as "Hu 
Ping 1988".
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despotic regimes can be toppled in totalitarian societies, the second problem 
is more pressing than the first (Hu Ping , 1988, 8).
Hu defines freedom of speech as the freedom to express different 
views, including wrong ones, which implies that expressing one's view 
may never lead to one being accused of a crime (Hu Ping, 1988, 98). This goes 
against the official CCP definition, which states that freedom of speech is 
limited to what the leadership allows to be expressed (Hu Ping, 1988, 48).
He regards freedom of speech as the "fulcrum" upon which to rest a 
lever to "lift up this world", i.e. activate it into changing the totalitarian 
system (Hu Ping , 1988, 47). He is well aware of the problem that a 
totalitarian regime can only be overthrown if an autonomous oppositional 
force is established, but that the very aim of any totalitarian regime is exactly 
to prevent the rise of such a force (Hu Ping , 1988, 14, 17-8). The only way out 
of this predicament, as Hu sees it, is to promote freedom of speech rather 
than to seek political power. He argues that freedom of speech strikes 
directly at one of the weakest spots in the totalitarian system: the power of 
modern totalitarianism is not only based on violent repression, but also on 
deception.
Although the "Gang of Four" had lost the support of the people, Hu 
points out, they nevertheless enjoyed great power during the "Cultural 
Revolution", because they had succeeded in suppressing freedom of speech 
so that the people could not communicate with each other and were 
unaware of what was really going on, and therefore felt powerless (Hu Ping, 
1988, 110-1). However, once in possession of freedom of speech, the citizens 
will be able to triumph over totalitarianism.4  ^ The major flaw in previous 
Chinese democratic movements, according to Hu, was that the principle of 
freedom of speech did not take root in the people's hearts (Hu Ping , 1988, 
119). For this reason, the principle of freedom of speech must now be as 
widely disseminated as possible (Hu Ping, 1988,149).
In 1975, Hu defined a democracy as the political system in which the 
freedom of speech, especially that of the minority, is guaranteed and 
protected (Hu Ping, 1988, 96, 151). He also defined it as being a set of 
generally recognized rules governing the competition for political power on 
the basis of a rejection of violent revolution, and the protection of "the basic
43This is the central theme of "On Freedom of Speech". See Hu Ping 1988, 479.
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hum an rights of political parties" (Hu Ping, 1988, 424). As is to be expected, 
Hu's definition of the role of the Constitution goes against the CCP's view 
of the m atter: he states that it is the task of the Constitution to pu t 
lim itations on the power of governm ent, and to protect the freedom of 
speech. The legitim acy of freedom  of speech is not derived from the 
Constitution, but rather vice versa: the legitimacy of the Constitution is 
dependent on freedom of speech (Hu Ping, 1988, 433-4). Freedom of speech 
is the basis on which Constitutions can be openly criticized (Hu Ping, 1988, 
51). Thus, Hu implicitly called into question the legitimacy of the Chinese 
State Constitution, as freedom of speech in China is a dead letter.
In a study written in 1991, he formulated more precise definitions of 
freedom on the one hand, and democracy on the other. Liberalization, he 
wrote, refers to the process of narrow ing the scope of State power, and 
extending the autonom y of civil society. Dem ocratization refers to the 
process of extending political participation, on the basis of the equal rights of 
all parties to enter the competition for power. Democratization is concerned 
w ith w ho rules and how this rule is exercised; liberalization is only 
concerned with the degree of rule (Hu Ping, 1991a, No. 2, 33).
Private Ow nership
Hu explores the complex relationship betw een dem ocracy and private 
ownership in his essay "Private Ownership and Democracy". In this essay, 
he concedes that, at least in theory, dem ocracy is compatible w ith a 
centralized planned economy. It is theoretically possible for people to enjoy 
political rights under the public ownership system. The real basis of the 
suppression of the democratic movement in the early 1980s, Hu states, was 
political violence rather than the public ownership system.
However, the public ow nership system and the centralized planned 
economy have, in reality, encroached upon citizens' private property. It has 
also put strict limits on their freedom to engage in economic activities, and 
increased the power of the governm ent to interfere with the economy. Hu 
agrees with Hayek that democracy must rest on private ownership: freedom, 
democracy and autonom y of action presupposes private ownership and a 
free m arket economy. Just as the origin of totalitarianism  lies in the 
annih ilation  of private ow nership  and the m iddle class by political 
violence, so the establishm ent of freedom and democracy is a necessary
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condition for the development of private ownership and the m iddle class 
(Hu Ping, 1988, 154-64).
Dialogue and Non-Violence
It is often said that China cannot realize democracy because the country is 
poor, and its people lack sufficient knowledge of democracy, and do not 
want democracy anyway. Against these views, Hu argues that, if democracy 
is defined as the existence of a representative governm ent and local self- 
government, then it is not necessary for each citizen to decide personally on 
all major policies. It is sufficient if the people are enabled to elect their own 
representatives. Moreover, he states, a belief in democracy is a necessary 
condition for its realization. If the Chinese believe in democracy, it will 
work, and if they don't, it won't (Hu Ping, 1988, 188-95).
Freedom of speech is, he argues, a basic principle which can be easily 
understood  and m aintained w ithout too m uch courage. A round this 
principle, a consensus can be formed between people with different views, 
so that "wide-ranging prospects for the improvement of democracy" can be 
opened (Hu Ping, 1988, 132-3). However, Hu fails to address the problems of 
how individual liberty can be combined with the interests of the nation as a 
whole. Earlier generations of Chinese liberals failed to arrive at a consensus 
by way of democratic institutions and procedures, which led them to over­
emphasize social stability at the cost of freedom.44
H u Ping rejects the use of violence in overthrow ing the totalitarian 
regime, advocating rationality, dialogue and non-violence. Initially, while 
acknowledging the legitimacy of the CCP as the ruling party, he aimed at the 
d iscon tinuation  of the CCP's pow er m onopoly. Since the June 1989 
massacre, he denies the legitimacy of the CCP, but he is still committed to a 
peaceful and rational dialogue by which to resolve the disagreem ents 
between the CCP and the CAD.4  ^ In his view, the struggle for democracy 
m ust be conducted by democratic means (Hu Ping, 1988, 258).
44On the failure of Chinese liberalism in modern China, see Jerome B. Grieder, 1970. 
^"Substitution of Dialogue for Antagonism", in Hu Ping 1988, pp. 356-7.
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Some Critical Observations
Hu Ping's rebellious, libertarian view of negative liberty is a product of, and 
is reactive to, the Chinese totalitarian system which is based on suppression 
of human rights and aggression. Interpretation of liberty as "being let alone" 
or "noninterference", as Yin Haiguang (1988, 120) observes, originates in 
psychological an ti-autocracy  or an ti-to ta litarian ism . This rebellious 
libertarian view of negative liberty proves unsatisfactory in discussing how 
to protect the rights of those who are supposed to be the "enemies" of 
democracy and freedom; how to keep a balance between individual rights 
and social obligations; how to deal with conflicts between rights; how to 
justify the priority of rights and limits on rights at the same time. It seems 
that this rebellious concept of negative liberty has more political uses in 
struggling against totalitarianism than in managing state affairs as a guiding 
principle. In other words, it m ight be of more use in the struggle for the 
pow er to attack totalitarianism  than in ensuring social order after the 
collapse of totalitarianism . The possible danger is that the rebellious 
libertarians m ay come close to the anti-state position of anarchism.
3. Yan Jiaqi: Natural and Political Scientist
Yan Jiaqi was born in 1942 in Jiangsu Province.46 In 1960, he enroled in the 
D epartm ent of A pplied M athematics and Electronic C om puting at the 
Chinese University of Science and Technology in Beijing. Later, he became a 
graduate student in the Institute of Philosophy in the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS), under the supervision of the famous philosopher 
and economist, Yu Guangyuan. During the "Cultural Revolution", he was 
involved in the editing of a collection of the writings of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao on war and revolution.
From 1972 onwards, he began to make a systematic study of the history 
of political thought, and international political systems. In 1982, he left the 
Institute of Philosophy where he had been working for 18 years, and was put 
in charge of the re-establishment of the CASS Institute of Political Science.
In 1985, when the CASS experimented with allowing the researchers to 
elect their own institute directors, Yan was elected Director of the Institute
46The following biographical information was taken from Yan Jiaqi, 1988, 5-56; 1991a, xiv- 
xxxii.
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of Political Science. At 43, he was the youngest CASS Institute director. In 
October 1986, he was assigned to Zhao Ziyang's Central Research Group for 
Reform of Political Structure, headed by Bao Tong.
In 1989, Yan played a major role as one of the leaders of the Association 
of the Intellectual Circle in Beijing. On 17 May, Yan was a member of the 
group of intellectuals who issued a sharply w orded statem ent attacking 
Deng Xiaoping as "China's uncrow ned Emperor and a senile, m uddle- 
headed dictator", and demanding his resignation.
After the massacre, Yan and his wife Gao Gao fled to France, and, on 20 
July 1989, co-founded the Federation Democracy of China in Paris, of which 
he was later elected Chairman. Since June 1989, there have been some 
changes in his political thought, especially with regard to his view of the 
nature of the CCP (he is no longer as optimistic as before about its ability to 
transform itself), but he has retained most of his former ideas on democracy 
(Yan 1991a, xxxiv).
Democracy to End Despotism and the Violent Transfer of Power
Yan Jiaqi (1987, 2-6) advocates the establishment of democratic institutions 
and procedures as a means of curbing power. Power relationships between 
individuals and groups are what hold all hum an organizations together (he 
calls it their "cement"). Organization is, in fact, the means of stabilizing 
power relationships in social groups. Although the exercise of power often 
produces injustice, power relationships cannot be abolished. Rather, the 
exercise of power must be rationalized, i.e. made to follow precisely defined 
procedures (Yan, 1987,1-9).
According to Yan, the basic problem in Chinese political history is the 
so-called "boom-and-bust" cycle: the gradual decline and corruption of a 
dynasty after its rise to power, its removal by a peasant rebellion, and 
succession by a new dynasty which reigns until it in turn becomes corrupt, 
and is overthrow n by another peasant rebellion, etc. Yan holds that this 
recurrent pattern of succession crises and violent transfer of power is caused 
by four characteristics of the traditional Chinese political system: (1) the 
concentration of absolute, indivisible and untransferable pow er in the 
hands of one man; (2) the existence of a nationwide monolithic, pyramidal 
pow er structure, w ithout any horizontal division of pow er am ong the
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people; (3) the lack of legal limits on absolute power,47 enabling those in 
power to intervene in all aspects of social life, combined with the lack of any 
solid psychological resistance in Chinese society against despotism; (4) the 
exercise and  succession  of pow er w ith o u t fo llow ing  fo rm al, 
institutionalized procedures (Yan, 1989, 80).
The overthrow of a dynasty by a peasant rebellion, Yan points out, 
never changed the feudal characteristics of the Chinese political system: all 
the rebels did was to change the ruler, but the despotic system remained the 
same (Yan, 1987, 88).
Both traditional and modern China lacked rules for power transfer: the 
Chinese political system is w hat Yan calls "non-procedural". In contrast, 
"procedural" political systems possess basic rules and procedures for power 
transfer, such as those laid down in the Constitution of the USA.4  ^ The 
third category is "the middle political system", a type in between procedural 
and non-procedural systems (Yan, 1986a, 18-9).4  ^ Yan's main concern is that 
political m atters should be handled strictly in accordance with democratic 
procedures. In particular, the non-procedural replacem ent of Party and 
governm ent leaders should not be allowed (Yan, 1991a, 96-108).
He states that the history of socialist countries proves that the 
transform ation from "collective leadership" into "individual centralism" 
takes place through "inner Party struggle", w ithou t any procedural 
framework. Since Mao Zedong's chairmanship was a life appointm ent, and 
his pow er was untransferable, m odern Chinese politics inevitably took on 
the non-procedural form of traditional Chinese politics. The "personality 
cult" was not really, as some people argue, a question of "exaggerating the 
role of an individual in history". Rather, it was the inevitable instrum ent of 
strengthening one individual's indivisible and untransferable power (Yan, 
1989, 83-9).
47However, Yu Yingshi points out that absolute power was in fact limited by Confucian 
ideology, which contained norms for behavior of the emperor and the bureaucracy. See Yu 
Yingshi, 1976, 50-2.
48Nixon’s fall, in Yan's view, was a success of procedural democracy in the USA. Also see 
Emmette S. Redford, 1976.
49This emphasis on procedures as the major criterion for distinguishing political systems is 
not present in the thought of Wei Jingsheng and Hu Ping, who both hold that there are only 
two, mutually exclusive, types, i.e. autocracy (or totalitarianism) and democracy.
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Up until the "Cultural Revolution", Yan states, Chinese politics 
rem ained traditional in that they were based on the assum ption that 
supreme power, indivisible and untransferable, should be vested in a single 
man, resulting in a series of succession crises and fierce power struggles. The 
Chinese political systems of today and yesterday are basically the same, 
although suprem e power, in the m odern system, is not conferred by 
"Heaven", nor hereditary, but is based on the correctness of the ideology of 
the individual who exercises it (Yan, 1988, 80).
Yan regards the "Cultural Revolution" as a direct result of the lack of 
procedures for power transfer, and the ensuing succession crisis brought 
about by Mao Zedong's attem pt to unseat Liu Shaoqi (also see Section 4 of 
Chapter 1). It was a struggle for power along traditional feudal lines, without 
any institutionalized framework of rules and procedures, leading, as usual, 
to immense suffering among the population. In contrast, Yan argues, the 
bourgeoisie in W estern countries established dem ocracy precisely by 
abolishing the indivisibility and untransferability of supreme power:
(1) in democratic systems, legislative power no longer belongs to the 
individual, but to parliam ent, which is newly elected at fixed intervals. 
Thus, the supreme power of legislation is separate from other powers;
(2) in democratic systems, the executive power of the president and prime 
minister is limited by parliament, and by the rule that office is held for fixed 
terms only. This, Yan em phasizes, stands in m arked contrast w ith the 
Chinese feudal system , in which office is held for life. In dem ocratic 
system s, w ith in  certain  constitu tional lim its, pow er is no longer 
untransferable.
Yan explains that the succession process in democratic countries is 
determ ined by "rules of the game", in the form of legal regulations and 
constitutional conventions. Statutes determine the fixed or maximum term 
of office for any top leader, the method of election is prescribed by law, and 
political parties have their ow n rules and regulations governing the 
selection of candidates, etc. He regards the establishm ent of m odern 
democracy as a great advance in hum an history, ending wars of succession, 
palace coups, and all other bloodshed previously accompanying periods of 
power transfer (Yan, 1987, 96).
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His major work, Shou nao lun (On the Head of Stated® is based on his 
extensive investigations into the many forms of governm ent and the 
various succession crises in world history, and in it, he recommends the 
democratic system of checks-and-balances as a way of overcoming the over­
centralization of pow er in China, and of establishing a non-violent, 
procedural means of power transfer (Yan Jiaqi, 1986a).
Two Stages of Political Reform
In "On Concepts of Democracy", Yan defines three characteristics of the 
concept of "democracy" which he thinks are im m ediately relevant to 
democratic practice: (1) it is a political system based on rule by the people, 
and in which the people's right to rule must be protected by a set of political 
institutions; (2) it guarantees the freedom  of people to express their 
op in ions; (3) it is a political system providing people with direct and 
indirect w ays of m aking and am ending decisions on State affairs, in 
accordance with prescribed procedures defined by the Constitution and the 
laws, and the majority principle (Yan, 1987, 33).
Yan also points out, a democratic system is not concerned w ith the 
search for the perfect man. Rather, it recognizes that hum an nature is 
im perfect and that m an is inherently  prone to m aking m istakes. It 
establishes rules and procedures to deal specifically with the fact that power 
corrupts.
Democracy, Yan points out, does not guarantee that the policy decisions 
it produces are completely correct, but it does guarantee that if policies turn 
out to be wrong, they will be corrected in accordance with predeterm ined 
procedures. Also, if decision-makers turn out to be incompetent, they can be
3°This book was circulated throughout China. In 1987, 310,000 copies rolled off the press in 6 
successive printings. In early 1987, the Xinhua bookstore in Guangzhou rated the book as one 
of the ten best-sellers of 1986. At the first meeting of the East China region to select out­
standing books on political science theory held in Hefei, Anhui Province, it won the first 
prize. At a Beijing public "book appraisal" meeting, the book won the 1987 "Golden Key 
Prize". Soon after, it was also published in Shanghai, the China Bookstore in Hong Kong, 
and the Yuanliu Publishing Company in Taiwan. During the "Chinese Cultural Plaza" in 
Taiwan, the public rated the book as one of "Taiwan's ten most influential books in 1987". 
olYan Jiaqi praised the freedom of the press in Western countries, calling for the lifting of 
press bans in China. See FBIS-CHI-89-200, 18 October 1989, p. 22. He even put forward a 
proposal to establish three kinds of newspaper, published independently by the State, 
government, and social associations respectively. See Yan Jiaqi, 1989, 39-40.
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replaced through predeterm ined procedures. W ithout dem ocracy, the 
people can correct neither of these situations (Yan, 1987, 87-8).
According to his understanding of democracy, Yan proposes a two-stage 
process of political reforms. The first stage should include those aspects 
which are closely linked with economic reform: reform of the cadre system, 
the separation of Party and government, and the separation of government 
and enterprise.
The second stage is one aimed at realizing the long-range goal of 
political reform, namely putting an end to the over-centralization of power 
through the establishment of a highly democratic socialist political system, 
and a system of scientific policy-making and scientific decision-making. In 
concrete terms, the overcentralisation of power should be dealt with in four 
different ways: (1) perfection of the people's participation in government, 
including the system of people's congresses. The National People's Congress 
(NPC) rather than the Communist Party's Central Committee should be the 
ultim ate organ of State power; (2) the horizontal separation of power 
between Party and governm ent, in order correctly to define a suitable 
position for the Party in the political structure of the State; (3) the vertical 
decentralization of power; (4) the demarcation between governm ental and 
social organizations, and the definition of the governm ent's sphere of 
authority. This includes the establishment of a national civil service system, 
as well as freedom of speech, press, and association (Yan, 1988, 79-86).
In this way, the four characteristics underlying the "rule of man" of 
traditional Chinese politics will be replaced by a democratic system based on 
the "rule of law" (Yan, 1988, 88-9, also see FBIS-CHI-80-230, 30th November 
1988, 22-3).
At the moment, the power assigned by the Constitution to government 
leaders is in fact exercised by Party leaders. The essence of party-government 
separation, Yan explains, consists of more than merely assigning different 
functions to Party and State organs; it also involves establishing the 
param ount position of the Constitution and the law, so that the highest 
State power is assigned, exercised, and transferred in full accordance with 
constitutionally  and legally prescribed procedures. Here Yan follows 
traditional Chinese constitutionalists, such as Liang Qichao and Zhang
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Jiumei, advocating China's need for a socialist "Washington" (FBIS-CHI-88- 
230, 30th November 1988, 23).
Defending the Constitution
Yan states that a Constitution should stipulate the basic principles of a 
country's social and political system. The idea of a Constitution, he holds, 
originated in the struggle against the feudal autocracy, and was aimed at 
lim iting the pow er of the monarch. "Constitution", in the m odern sense, 
refers to "basic laws" which transcend the laws defined by the King and 
anyone else, and occupy a position of supreme authority and dignity (Yan, 
1988,168).
Yan holds the liberal view that the role of the C onstitution is to 
stipu late  civil rights, and lim it the pow er of the governm ent. The 
Constitution provides the most authoritative basic rules according to which 
political s trugg les are to be resolved . The aim  and process of 
dem ocratization, according to Yan, involves establishing the param ount 
position of the Constitution.
In the early 1980s, Yan was one of the first to oppose the life tenure 
system, advocating that the Constitution ought to stipulate the term of 
office of both the Head of State, and the Head of Government, with a 
m axim um  of two successive terms. On 28 December 1988, a group of 
m iddle-aged and young political theorists held a forum in Beijing, at which 
Yan defended the idea that, if we want to follow democratic procedure to 
resolve political problems, we have to amend the Constitution on the basis 
of discussion by the whole nation (FBIS-CHI-89-023, 6 February 1989, 34).
Yan has taken a series of actions to defend the Constitution's authority. 
On 26 May 1989, shortly before the June massacre in Beijing, he published 
an article entitled "Resolving the Present Problems in China W ithin the 
Framework of Democracy and the Legal System: A Letter to Li Peng", calling 
for the use of Constitutional means to depose the Li Peng government. On 
26 June 1989, after he escaped to Hong Kong, he issued an open letter, 
saying: "I hope that the China of the future . . . will draw  up a Constitution 
that is everlasting and which will eliminate political disasters like the one 
now taking place. I w ould like to include in the C onstitution 's basic 
principles the separation of the three powers, a federal system , and a
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national, non-politicized army, with troops belonging to the State, not to 
any political party" (FBIS-CHI-89-177, 14 September 1989, 21).
Yan realizes very well that the m odernization of Chinese politics he 
envisages is a long-term  process, and that politicians are known to 
manipulate the rules in their own interest (Yan, 1986a, 85, 95, 302; 1989, 88- 
9). He is aware of the fact that it is impossible for leaders to comply 
com pletely w ith the rules of the political system , and that rules and 
procedures themselves are relative, and change from time to time. The 
procedures which are regarded as the best to adopt today may well exhibit 
serious shortcomings tomorrow (Yan, 1986a, 303).
Some Critical Observations
Ever since the W estern im pact on China m ade itself felt, Chinese 
intellectuals have always yearned to find the ultimate recipe for national 
salvation, tending to overlook the tension between this desire and the issue 
of liberty.52 In the works of Yan, there is a conflict between his democratic 
ideals and his elitism. He presum es that there is no friction between the 
interests of the people as a whole, and the representation of those interests 
by intellectuals. Yan seems to believe that representation by intellectuals 
will be an adequate expression of the "general will", and as such, identical 
with democratic representation. This intellectual paternalistic presum ption 
may hinder the development of a non-elitist system of representation, and 
of a system of competing interest groups.
Yan seems to hold an old image of science as equivalent to reason, and 
as therefore capable of final solutions to any and all problem s of both 
know ledge and value. This leads to an obvious tension betw een the 
principle of equal rights and the belief of Yan Jiaqi that his political views 
have scientific status, i.e. are absolutely rational (1988, 143-4, 1991a, 35-7, 63- 
76). Yan seems to claim that his idea of democracy is "objectively and 
scientifically" true, offering a coherent and complete answer to all problems. 
This claim to absolute comprehensiveness and omniscience is incompatible 
w ith liberty, as it a priori excludes other theories, thereby underm ining 
freedom of thought.
This attitude has often led to self-deception and defenselessness vis-ä-vis totalitarianism. 
See J.L. Talmon, 1970, 253.
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When Yan argues that democratic politics is the politics of procedures, 
he takes for granted the "principle of majority decision making". Yan seems 
to pay scarce attention to discussing the tension between majority rule and 
individual rights, and the possibility of the tyranny of the majority.
4. A Comparison
There are three common ideas in the political thought of Wei Jingsheng, 
Hu Ping, and Yan Jiaqi, which constitute intellectual and moral foundations 
for Chinese liberal theory of democracy:
1. A predominant concern for human rights and freedom
All three men, in spite of the fact that they have different formal education 
levels, intellectual backgrounds and interests, are in fundamental 
agreement on the urgent importance of human rights and freedom: this 
constitutes one of the basic elements in their ideal of democracy. There are, 
however, some differences in emphasis, which will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4.
2. The conviction that the principle of preventing evil is a theoretical basis 
for institutional constraints on power
On the basis of their own experience during the past decades, all three men 
have thoroughly rejected the Marxist belief that human nature can be 
moulded at will by exposing it to proper external conditioning, agreeing 
with Hobbes that human nature contains ineradicable selfish instincts. Wei 
(in Widor, 1981, 160-4) has warned that Deng Xiaoping might become a new 
dictator on the basis that leaders tend to abuse power if there is a lack of a 
democratic power-check system. Although Hu Ping (1990a, 150) disagrees 
with the Hobbesian war of all against all, he does argue that democracy is 
meant to prevent the abuse of power, and that this implies a deep scepticism 
of human nature (Hu Ping, 1990b, 42). Yan Jiaqi argues in detail that the idea 
that human nature is potentially evil is the starting-point for the rule of law 
and the procedural system (Yan, 1986c, 1988, 1991a, 54-8). Hu Ping and Yan 
Jiaqi, however, while recognizing that the establishment of democracy in 
China necessitates an analysis of evil human nature, also emphasize that 
human nature is capable of goodness — it is this goodness on which the
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possibility of democracy in China depends.53 I will discuss this in detail in 
Chapter 5.
3. An emphasis on procedure, rule of law and rules of games
All three agree that the real purpose of a democratic system is to realize the 
rule of law. While Wei (in Widor, 1981, 81-2) stresses democratic rule of 
law, Hu Ping (1988, 398-406) emphasizes the priority of rules or rights over 
truth, and Yan Jiaqi specifies the procedural aspect of democracy. Here I 
would like to sum up the important points.
(1) Democratic politics is one form of constitutional procedural politics. 
"Democracy", in a broad sense, is a process of m aking and am ending 
decisions according to the prescribed procedure (defined by the Constitution 
and laws) and the majority principle.
(2) Procedural democracy means establishing the param ount position of 
the Constitution and the law so that the creation, exercise and change of the 
highest state power is effected fully in accordance with constitutionally and 
legally prescribed procedures so as to maintain political stability and reduce 
the people's suffering.
(3) R epresentative dem ocracy is a publicly justified procedure  for 
resolving disputes about political decisions. (4) Procedure is understood as 
abstract and impersonal norms and laws with the universality of formal 
criteria. The legal norms are absolute, and hence a degree of objectivity is 
assured.
(5) Proceduralism  will be p u t into effect in China, and will have a 
norm ative force. These ideas serve a basis for procedural democracy in 
China, which I will discuss in Chapter 6.
There are differences among them. For Wei Jingsheng, democracy is 
desirable mainly for two reasons: freedom is one, and prosperity is another. 
On the one hand, he regards freedom as the first goal of the hum an race,54 
although he did not, like Hu Ping, state that freedom of speech can be used
o3See Hu Ping 1988, 268, also see Democratic China, No. 1, April, 1990, 42-3; Yan Jiaqi, 1986a, 
287-91, and in Zhongyang rihao, Taiwan, 15 May 1990.
C A
In the preface of Exploration, he claims that "our basic guiding premises" should be 
freedom of speech, publication, and association as stipulated by the Constitution. See 
Seymour, 1980, 34.
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as a practical lever to change the communist system, nor did he, like Yan 
Jiaqi, w ork out concrete details for the protection of freedom  by 
Constitutional principles and organizational procedures.
As a worker, Wei regarded democracy not only as an election system, a 
system of cooperation between individuals, and a means to protect equal 
rights and freedom, but also, and much more importantly, as a system of 
people's m anagem ent: a system in which the laboring masses hold the 
actual power to manage the means of production. Wei combined a Marxist 
concern w ith people's m anagem ent with ideas taken from dem ocratic 
practice in the USA and Japan, while Hu Ping explicitly advocated 
privatization of the ownership system. For Hu Ping, democracy is primarily 
associated w ith protection of freedom and civil rights ~  the ow nership 
system is secondary. In this context, it should be rem em bered that Wei 
wrote his articles almost ten years before Hu wrote h is .^  For Wei, who 
wrote in 1978, it would have been unthinkable not to support "socialism".56
For Yan Jiaqi, "democracy" is defined as "rule by the people", and his 
predom inant concern has been to specify the details of the procedural 
fram ework w ithin which this rule should be exercised. As hum an beings 
are prone to m aking w rong decisions, the political system  m ust be 
organized in such a way that small errors do not lead to big ones, and that 
incom petent or corrupt people can be removed from positions of power in 
time.
Here, it should be noted that Yan, as an intellectual, presuppose that 
"democracy" means rule over the m ajority by a m inority (presum ably 
intellectuals). Unlike Wei Jingsheng, who combined individualism  with 
populism , Yan's view of democracy is elitist. This could have significant 
im plications for his answ er to the question, which often crops up in 
Chinese debates on democratization, whether or not political participation 
of the m asses shou ld  be lim ited  for a certain period  du ring  the 
democratization process.
Before June 1989, a major difference between Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi 
was that Hu was an anti-totalitarian libertarian from the outset, while Yan 
Jiaqi was not. Yan started out as a m oderate reform er who attem pted to
” Hu's article "Ownership and Democracy" was written in 1987 at Harvard University. 
56 I am grateful to Professor James Seymour for drawing my attention to this point.
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m ake ad justm ents and im provem ents w ith in  the existing system , 
preferably in cooperation with the Party. In Chinese terms, Hu was a 
reform er "outside the system", while Yan was a reform er "within the 
system". Even now, their different ideas on democracy could constitute a 
basis for two different opposition parties with different aims and social and 
economic policies. For Hu Ping, democracy is based on private ownership, 
and he w ould definitely support privatization as a solution to China's 
present economic problems. Yan Jiaqi is relatively more concerned with 
social justice and equality, and has proposed to reform the existing system of 
public ownership from within (1989, 203-18; also see 1991b.).
Conclusion
This chapter describes the liberal views of democracy of Wei Jingsheng, Hu 
Ping, and Yan Jiaqi, outlining the content and context, and the similarities 
and differences. Wei Jingsheng com bines idea of dem ocracy w ith 
individualism. Hu Ping emphasizes the importance of liberty as the basis of 
democracy, and regards freedom of speech as the key to the development of 
the population's political awareness, so that the totalitarian system can be 
gradually  changed in a concrete fashion. Yan Jiaqi views democracy 
prim arily in terms of institutions and procedures, and his predom inant 
concern is how democracy can be used in stabilizing Chinese politics, and in 
preventing political violence.
There are three common ideas in the political though t of Wei 
Jingsheng, Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi: (1) a predom inant concern for human 
rights and freedom; (2) the conviction that the principle of preventing evil 
is a theoretical basis for institutional constraints on power; and finally (3) an 
emphasis on procedure and the rule of law. These common ideas constitute 
intellectual and moral foundations for democracy, which I will examine in 
detail in the following three chapters (4, 5 and 6) respectively.
PART TWO
INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
FO U N D A T IO N S
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CHAPTER 4
The Principle of Human Rights in Institutional Design
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, Chinese liberals, in spite of the fact that 
they all have different formal education levels, intellectual backgrounds 
and interests, are in fundam ental agreement on the urgent importance of 
hum an rights and freedom. This chapter reviews and discusses this in 
detail. The purposes of this chapter are (1) to investigate how the idea of 
hum an rights, precisely, the idea of natural rights, provides a basis for 
Chinese liberals to think about re-designing political institutions in China; 
(2) to discusses whether the similarities between the official and liberal ideas 
of hum an rights can provide a basis for political negotiation between the 
governm ent and C hinese liberals; and finally (3) to undertake  a 
reconstruction , criticism  and tentative extension of some particular 
theoretical positions.
The chapter consists of six sections. Section 1 reviews the ideas of 
hum an rights of Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi. Section 2 reviews 
the current official view of hum an rights, discusses the similarities and 
differences between the official and liberal ideas of hum an rights, and 
investigates the possib ility  of a political negotiation  betw een the 
governm ent and Chinese liberals provided by a minimal consensus on the 
idea of hum an rights. Section 3 discusses the problem of the degree of 
coherence of their ideas of natural rights. Section 4 argues for liberal 
limitation on liberty. Section 5 argues for compatibility between state power 
and individual rights. Section 6 addresses a set of difficult problems relating 
to pu tting  their ideal of hum an rights into practice in China. I will 
elucidate, at least, the four major problems: validity of the Constitution and 
laws, conflicts between rights, distorted forms of rights and a burden of 
rights. It needs to be made clear that to demonstrate the problems is not to 
deny the value of hum an rights and freedom in China, but rather to defend 
them  in a way that shows awareness of the serious problem s in the 
transitional period while attem pting to resolve them.
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1. The Chinese Liberals' Ideas of Human Rights
In practice, the Chinese people were persecuted by ad hoc authorities 
through non-legal procedures for acts that were deemed political crimes on 
no legal basis during the Cultural Revolution.^7 The Chinese official idea of 
hum an rights and the violation of human rights in practice, to which all of 
the liberal's ideas of hum an rights react, are the object of the Chinese 
liberals' attack. There has been a struggle between rights and political 
privilege, liberty and paternalistic authority. This struggle is the most 
conspicuous feature in contem porary China and constitutes the social 
context in which the Chinese liberals have developed their ideas of hum an 
rights in relation to democracy. Their central concerns are how can hum an 
rights be protected, and how can liberty overcome totalitarianism (Yan Jiaqi, 
1988, 59-66, Hu Ping, 1988, 3). This is the context of enquiry which governs 
their argum ents on hum an rights and accounts for their strengths and 
shortcom ings.
I selected Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi as representative of 
different ways in which the Chinese liberals perceive hum an rights. Wei 
Jingsheng takes an individualistic view of hum an rights. Hu Ping holds the 
idea of the priority of liberty over other political values. Yan Jiaqi favours 
an institutionalist notion of hum an rights.
Wei Jingsheng defines hum an rights as denoting the rights of an 
individual inherent in his hum anity. He claims that:
W hat rights does a person have? He or she has the rights to live, 
to live a meaningful life. The reason one m ust have these rights 
is that life will not be worth fighting for w ithout such rights, and 
that he or she will be able to win for himself or herself some 
station in life through these rights (Wei in Seymour, 1980, 65).
H um an rights, according to Wei, are not bestow ed but, rather, are 
inherent. At the same time, Wei argues that hum an rights only exist in 
relation  to o ther things and relate, d irectly  or indirectly , to their 
environm ent. Thus, it is argued, hum an rights are lim ited and relative
As for the practices of human rights in China since 1949, see Ann Kent, 1991.
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rather than unlimited and absolute. This limitation constantly grows and 
changes w ith the developm ent of the history of m ankind and with 
hum an's quest to tame and control his or her surroundings. There is, 
therefore in Wei's opinion, no such thing as "ultim ately achieving" 
human rights (Wei in Seymour, 1980, 142).
Wei further argues that politics is the activity of obtaining or 
suppressing hum an rights. Through politics, people's rights to manage 
their lives are either realized or suppressed (Wei in Seymour, 1980, 142). 
Therefore the political systems of the human race, divergent and numerous 
as they are, can be grouped into two categories: (1) Autocracy, such as the 
system of servitude, protects the special "rights" of the few, but denies 
everyone else their rights as hum an beings, and (2) Dem ocracy, a 
cooperative system, recognizes the equal rights of all hum an beings and 
resolves all social problems on the basis of cooperation (Wei in Seymour, 
1980, 65).
Wei defines freedom in terms of rights and equality. Freedom is said to 
be the right to use one's capabilities to satisfy one's desires, though not the 
right to satisfy any kind of desire one pleases. Only when one's right to 
choose is not h indered  can everyone's activities be p ro tected  and 
accommodated. According to Wei, the freedom we recognize is the kind 
that provides opportunities for unlimited choices and possibilities; it is not 
the kind of freedom that results in everyone acting exactly as they wish to 
satisfy their desires; this would actually be a denial of freedom for the 
majority, because inevitably a m inority would satisfy their desires at the 
expense of the majority. Thus, for Wei, freedom can only be obtained if it is 
enjoyed by all m ankind, and it can only be realized under conditions of 
m utual protection; it cannot be realized by some people depriving others of 
their freedom, nor can it be attained through the wilful satisfaction of the 
desires of a minority (Wei in Seymour, 1980, 144).
Wei continues w ith the argum ent that the basic political rights are 
freedoms of speech, assembly, association, the press, religion, movement, 
and the right to strike. These freedoms, according to Wei, are the conditions 
that protect the people when equal rights are endangered and that come to 
bear at any time to defend equal rights. Thus, basic political rights are the 
preconditions for equal hum an rights. It m ust be acknowledged, in Wei's
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view, in theory at least, that these freedoms should be unrestricted within 
their various spheres. After all, in an ever-changing world no one can 
possibly determine what ways and means may be used to deny one's 
human rights . . . Inasmuch as there are many people who abuse human 
rights to gain social power, and since the powerless common people find it 
relatively easy to use the above freedoms as methods of struggle, these 
freedoms must be unrestricted in theory and unregulated in reality (Wei in 
Seymour, 1980, 142-143). Here, Wei's concept of liberty is negative: freedoms 
are useful weapons to attack the communist system. Wei contradicts his 
argument set out above that human rights are limited and relative rather 
than unlimited and absolute. Also he assumes that any limitation imposed 
by the state on the individual should be denied; the alternative, therefore, is 
between state interference and no interference at all.
Human rights and equality are seen as inseparable because, without 
human rights, equality is an empty expression. Because human rights and 
equality are two aspects of the same issue, Wei uses the term "the equal 
human rights issue" (pingdeng renquan de wenti) (Wei in Seymour, 1980, 
141). In a despotic society, according to Wei, people do not enjoy equal rights 
of existence. Some people have the right to live by enslaving others. The 
majority of the people only have the right to live as slaves (Wei in 
Seymour, 1980, 146).
From the angle of protecting equal rights, Wei discusses the nature of 
the rule of law:
Law is the permanent part of a political system. Since law is 
needed all the time, it is reduced to writing to form the basis of a 
system, which is normally not subject to change. The rule of law 
backed up by criminal sanctions is a vital political vehicle to 
sustain society. It is used by democracies as well as by autocracies.
It all depends on the actual nature of the political system 
concerned. There are autocratic rules of law, such as that exercised 
by Qin Shi Huang and the Gang of Four, and democratic rules of 
law. Therefore the rule of law and autocracy are diametrically not 
opposed and the law does not mean democracy (Wei in Seymour,
1980, 67).
95
Wei further argues that we need the rule of law, but we need the kind 
of law which is conducive to the realization of equal rights. The people 
m ust attentively watch the progress of law-making and be sure that the law 
being adopted is the kind of law designed to protect equal rights (Wei in 
Seymour, 1980, 69).
Echoing Berlin, Hu Ping criticizes the Marxist doctrine of positive 
liberty which provides a moral justification for depriving others of their 
rights, and therefore argues for negative liberty (Hu Ping, 1991a, No. 5, 51-2). 
Hu further notes the distinction between political and civil rights and social 
and economic rights. While political rights such as freedoms of speech and 
association are designed to limit the power of states; social and economic 
rights require positive interference of state power in promoting both social 
welfare and a variety of community benefits (Hu Ping, 1991a, No. 4, 51-2). 
He emphasizes, the priority of political and civil rights over social and 
economic rights, as well as the priority of democracy and freedom over 
economic development. Rights have complete priority over certain other 
independent goals such as that of increasing the GNP of a society.58 Hu 
carefully argues that we have to recognize the fact that it is possible to 
achieve modernization under an efficient autocracy, such as has been done 
in Russia and Germany. He continues with the argum ent that there indeed 
has been realization of modernization w ithout democracy, but we should be 
made aware that (1) the economic development created by autocracy is a 
painful process because it inevitably involves cruel purges, and (2) the 
hum an race does not seek economic developm ent alone. Democracy, 
hum an rights and dignity, according to Hu, are also goals which are much 
more im portan t than the goal of economic developm ent. We cannot 
develop the economy at the expense of democracy (Hu, 1988, 136-40).
To legitim ize his rejection of the priority of national claims over 
individual claims in China, he advocates the idea of the priority of rights 
over truth. In his early work, On Freedom of Speech, he claims that the 
right to express one's own independent view cannot be transferred. Hu Ping
58Rawls (1982, 5) lists basic liberties as follows: "freedom of thought and liberty of 
conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the freedoms 
specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties 
covered by the rule of law". He (1982, 72) also emphasizes that "the basic liberties constitute 
a family, and that it is this family that has priority and not any single liberty by itself".
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also wrote an essay in 1987, Priority of Rights over Truth, in which he 
defended the legitimacy (the right to exist) of the Chinese Alliance for 
Democracy and refuted the charge by the Chinese government that the 
Chinese Alliance for Democracy was a "reactionary organization". In this 
essay he argues further that one of the basic principles of democracy is the 
priority of rights over truth, which means every citizen has a right to 
express and advocate his own political view through the freedoms of 
speech, press, assembly and association, no matter whether this view itself 
is wrong or not. You may, it is argued, disagree with what another says, 
and, in the same way, present your view and argue against the views of 
others in the same way, but no one, including any ruling party or 
government, has the right to suppress other people's freedom of speech. 
The protection of equal rights is primary — the question whether a view is 
right or wrong is secondary. This is what Hu calls "the priority of rights 
over truth" (Hu Ping, 1988, 400). Therefore, Hu claims, even if the political 
view of CAD were wrong, it nevertheless has a right to exist.
Hu emphasizes three points: (1) to violate a single person's right is 
potentially to threaten the right of others; (2) we must learn how to protect 
the right of the existence of unorthodox opinions; (3) a dutiful citizen is one 
who strongly defends civil rights (1988, 401-8). Hu defends the idea of an 
independent citizen and the right of a citizen to oppose any government: "I 
willingly support a government that I can oppose, but I firmly oppose a 
government that I can only support" (Hu, 1988, 372).
Yan Jiaqi holds that civil and political rights are natural rights which 
should have priority over economic and social rights; and these rights do 
not depend on political, social and cultural conditions and can be realized 
right now (Yan Jiaqi, 1992a, 50). He further argues that the concept of 
human rights is devised to limit state power, and human rights is the 
specific sphere in which political power cannot interfere. Here he makes the 
assumption that state power and rights, state actions and liberty are 
antithetical; and an increase in the power of the state is prejudicial to liberty. 
Yan further argues that the notion of human rights belongs to an essentially 
universal culture, and it is a rationalized and civilized common rule or 
criterion for political civilization as discovered by human beings both in the 
West and in the East (Yan, 1988, 59-66, also in Democratic China, No. 2, 1990, 
35-6). The tragedy of Chinese politics lies in the fact that no distinction
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between rights and power has been made, that hum an rights have been 
violated and that political power has never been limited, all of which led to 
the June 4 events in 1989. The goal of Chinese democratization, according to 
Yan, is fully to protect hum an rights and strictly to lim it totalitarian 
p o w e r .59 As the chairperson of the Federation for a Democratic China 
(FDC), Yan sets up the basic items of the Constitution of the FDC, which 
regards hum an rights as the cornerstone of modern, civilized society and 
the precondition of democratic politics: A guarantee to every person of 
inalienable hum an rights: the right to live and develop; the right to pursue 
happiness; and the inviolable rights of the individual to dignity and 
security .60 Yan further believes that "only when people enjoy the right to 
express themselves freely, only when people have the right, directly or 
indirectly, to influence state policies, only when the people's freedom and 
rights are protected in their own country, can they truly link themselves to 
the future and fate of their country" (Yan Jiaqi, 1991a, 145).
In conclusion, common to all authors is an emphasis on the urgent 
importance of hum an rights and freedom, which constitute one of the basic 
elements of their ideal of democracy. There are, nevertheless, differences 
among them. Wei Jingsheng adopts a liberal approach, with a few remnants 
of Chinese Marxism, to analyze hum an rights. By contrast, Flu Ping and Yan 
Jiaqi reject class analysis of hum an rights and take a more universal attitude 
tow ards the issue of hum an rights. Changes in the political thinking on 
hum an rights from class analysis to a universal and liberal one demonstrate 
that there has been a process of divergence from the Chinese Marxist 
discourse on hum an rights, and of reducing the theoretical tension between 
the Chinese Marxist and liberal ideas of hum an rights. In effect, in order to 
obtain acceptance of his work in the early 1980s, Wei Jingsheng, an early 
dem ocrat, had to use M arxist class analysis, which was not only very 
popular and predom inant, but the only analytic tool available. Conversely, 
Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi did not need to make use of Marxist class analysis in 
their discussion of hum an rights because of the official rejection of class 
discourse and the soft cultural background of the middle 1980s.
59Yan Jiaqi's preface, in Zhang Jiefeng, etc., 1989, ii-iii.
60See Manifesto of the Federation for Democracy, in Journal of Democracy, 1990, Winter, 
l(l):122-23.
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2. A Weak Basis for Political Dialogue?
In the past, the Chinese official ideology rejected the concept of fixed and 
universal "human rights." In the words of Red Flag:
Human rights are not "heaven-given", they are given and 
regulated by the state and by law; they are not universal, but have 
a clear class nature; they are not abstract but concrete; they are not 
absolute but limited by law and morality; they are not eternally 
fixed and unchanging but change their nature and proper scope in 
accordance with changes in the functions and position of people 
in the midst of shifting conditions of material production.61
However, there are now three new elements associated with the official 
Chinese position in the White Paper on human rights, to which we should 
pay attention.
(1) The current Chinese government does acknowledge the protection of 
human rights as a major goal of the government. This points to a change in 
the basis of legitimacy from the utopian goal of communist society to the 
goal of protection and improvement of human rights although the form of 
goal-rational legitimation remains.
(2) The current Chinese government claims to appraise highly the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an international or universal 
enterprise (Beijing Review, Nov. 4-10th, 1991, 8-9). Also, there is an 
emerging international law of human rights which sets standards for all 
states, and China is moving toward acceptance of this international law.62 
China has ratified seven international conventions pertaining to human 
rights issues while the US has ratified only two conventions. This 
acceptance of the minimal international law by the Chinese Government
61See Edwards, 1986,130, also see FBIS-CHI-90-166, 27 August 1990,17.
62A s the White Paper says, China has always held that to effect international protection of 
human rights, the international community should interfere with and stop acts that endanger 
world peace and security, such as gross human rights violations caused by colonialism, 
racism, foreign aggression and occupation, as well as apartheid, racial discrimination, 
genocide, slave trade and serious violation of human rights by international terrorist 
organizations. These are important aspects of international cooperation in the realm of 
human rights and an arduous task facing current international human rights protection 
activities. Beijing Review, Nov. 4-10th, 1991, 45.
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constitutes a basis for international dialogue and cooperation betw een 
Chinese and Western governments, on which a positive interplay between 
China and other countries may be hopefully expected. Although it might be 
wrong to claim that hum an rights has now become a concern in Chinese 
foreign policy decision-making, it is certainly right to argue that Chinese 
foreign policy will be justified in terms of the idea that state sovereignty is a 
basis of hum an rights.163
(3) Chinese officials have in the past adopted Marxist class and economic 
analyses of hum an rights. For example, the Chinese government has always 
claimed that hum an rights are not "heaven-given;” they are given and 
regulated by the state and by law; they are not universal, but have a clear 
class nature (see FBIS-CHI-90-166, 27 August 1990, 17). However, these kinds 
of analyses are no longer used in the official White Paper. This certainly 
show s ideological flexibility and one step tow ards an in ternational 
conception of hum an rights. The Chinese governm ent now realizes that 
hum an rights are a spiritual wealth created jointly by the whole of 
mankind; they are not the "privilege" of W estern capitalists (FBIS-CHI-90- 
166, 27 August 1990,17).
If the above understanding is correct, the Chinese governm ent and 
dissidents share at least the following common views.
(1) There is recognition of hum an rights as the most im portant issue. The 
White Paper states that to promote hum an rights and strive for the noble 
goal of full im plem entation of hum an rights is required by C hina’s 
socialism (Beijing Review, Nov. 4-10th, 1991, 9). Similarly, Wei Jingsheng, 
Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi, among other Chinese dissidents, are in fundamental 
agreem ent on the urgent importance of hum an rights: this constitutes one 
of the basic elements in their ideal of democracy.
(2) Both seek minimal institutional protection of rights. As the White 
Paper states, the Constitution and law of China always gave priority to 
hum an rights protection. Sim ilarly, Chinese d issiden ts also stress 
democratic institutions such as the rules of law, and the proceduralism  
needed to protect rights.
63See the speech of Jin Yongjiang, ambassador to UN, Renmin renbao, Nove 24,1991.
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(3) Both use, to some degree, a u tilitarian  justification of hum an rights. 
The ideas of the right to subsistence and of the right to development have 
been of practical appeal. Similarly, Hu Ping's justification of freedom of 
speech is also practically oriented (see Section 3). Here I should say that what 
they share is only a way of thinking at a philosophical level which is deeply 
rooted in Chinese "practical rationality".64
These common views seem to indicate a first step towards convergence 
on the hum an rights issue between the Chinese governm ent and Chinese 
dissidents, and im portantly  seem to constitute a minimal consensus for 
political dialogue betw een the G overnm ent and dissidents. This is 
obviously a practical chance available to Chinese liberal intellectuals on the 
M ainland and overseas to pursue their demand for further democratization 
and legalization in China. But further development of the convergence and 
the m aintaining of a m inim al consensus rely on the sp irit of seeking 
common ground while reserving differences, and depend on the following 
conditions. On the C hinese governm ent's  side, se lf-con trad icto ry  
statements about hum an rights, in particular about universal and particular 
views of hum an rights should be reduced. On the Chinese dissidents' side, 
feelings of hatred towards the Party should be controlled, hope rather than 
cynical attitudes should be preserved, and finally anger m ust give away to 
cool reason and tolerance. Thus a positive rather than a negative interplay 
between the Government and dissidents might be expected to develop.
The convergence and the minimal consensus is, in my personal view, 
significant. The process of dem ocratisation in China, I believe, entails 
moving away from denial of the democratic principle to recognition of it as 
a modus vivendi. In this respect, the significance of the changes in the 
current official views about hum an rights is that at the moment, as a result 
of various historical events and internal and external pressures, hum an 
rights have come to be accepted as a mere modus vivendi. This acceptance
64Some western scholars criticize Chinese utilitarian attitudes towards democracy. This 
criticism is unfair because social utility is seen as origin of Western democracy; it is also 
misleading in the sense that the reason why dissidents such as Hu Ping hold the utilitarian 
argument is in older to convince leaders to accept democratic institutions. In fact, Hu Ping 
regards human rights as an independent value. Also if we accept Ip’s (1991) distinction 
between nation-oriented and individual utilitarian commitment to democracy, I would argue 
that while Deng's utilitarian consideration of democracy is collective-oriented, Hu Ping’s is 
individual-oriented.
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has come about, we may assume, at first reluctantly, but nevertheless as 
providing the only alternative to endless and destructive civil strife. It is 
probable that improving the hum an rights situation in China is a way of 
improving the power of the government; and to use western terms such as 
"human rights" is a way of re-establishing the legitimacy of the Party. 
Importantly, the political agents are those who are commonly regarded as 
taizidang (new elites); they w ant to establish their legitimacy; they are 
seeking for som ething new, and they m ight create an opportunity  for a 
political dialogue.
However, the basis for political dialogue is very weak. A part from 
practical reasons, the idea that the basis is weak and unstable comes from 
the fundam ental differences which lie behind  the seem ingly common 
views. There are the following differences in the views of hum an rights of 
the Chinese government and dissidents.
(1) The order of priority of rights: the right to subsistence and the right to 
developm ent, in the Chinese governm ent's view, are m ost urgent, and 
civil and political rights are not urgent in developing countries such as 
China (Beijing Review, Nov. 4-10th, 1991, 42-4). Also, to protect social and 
economic rights implies an expansion of, and an increase in, the power of 
the Government. Conversely, according to Chinese dissidents, civil and 
political rights are natural rights which should have priority over economic 
and social rights; and these rights do not depend on political, social and 
cultural conditions and can be realized right now (Yan Jiaqi, 1992a, 50). Far 
more im portantly, to protect civil and political rights implies a limitation 
on, and decentralization of, the power of the Government. As Yan Jiaqi 
argues, the concept of hum an rights is devised to limit state power, and the 
idea of hum an rights demarcates a specific sphere in which political power 
cannot interfere (1988, 59-66, also see Section 1 of this chapter).
(2) Collective vs individual rights: the Chinese governm ent perceives the 
right to subsistence and the right to development as collective rights, which 
are far more im portant than individual rights such as civil rights (Beijing 
Review,  Nov. 4-10th, 1991, 44), while Chinese dissidents, such as Wei 
Jingsheng, H u Ping and Yan Jiaqi, regard individual rights as primary. Yan 
also criticizes the Chinese governm ent's abuse of "collective rights" to 
deliberately confuse the rights issue (Yan, 1992a, 49).
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(3) D ifferent in stitu tiona l designs: the C hinese governm ent does 
em phasize the aspect of constitutional and judicial protection of hum an 
rights (Beijing Review, Nov. 4-10th, 1991, 21), but does not want to change 
the Party-rule system. It appeals to a resolution of the UN General Assembly 
at its 45th session: "Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its 
political, social, economic and cultural systems" (Beijing Review, Nov. 4- 
10th, 1991, 21). Chinese dissidents, however, see the Party-rule system as an 
obstruction to the im plem entation of hum an rights and they w ant to 
in troduce the system  of division of three pow ers in China. As Wei 
Jingsheng argues, we need the rule of law, but we need the kind of law 
which is conducive to the realization of equal rights. The people m ust 
attentively watch the progress of law-making and be sure that the law being 
adopted is the kind of law designed to protect equal rights.
(4) Philosophical justification: although both sides employ a utilitarian 
justification of hum an rights, this similarity should not be exaggerated, and 
im portan tly , C hinese d issiden ts believe, and are com m itted to, a 
contractarian view of hum an rights. They view rights as natural and 
inviolable.
In conclusion, to seek common ground while reserving differences is 
only rhetorical for both sides. It is difficult for the Chinese governm ent and 
Chinese liberal intellectuals to reach agreem ent about issues such as the 
order of priority  of rights, institutional arrangem ents and contractarian 
assum ptions because of their different political positions, different 
backgrounds and the different major problems concerned. These difficulties 
will underm ine the possible basis for political dialogue.
3. The Idea of Natural Rights and its Priority
The Chinese C om m unists' denial of the idea of natural rights has a 
historical precedent. When the idea of natural rights was introduced into 
China in the late 19th century, it was little understood. Liang Qichao treated 
the notion that man had ever existed outside of society in a state of nature 
as a curiosity (in Edwards, 1986, 128). John C. H. Wu, a draftsman of the 1946 
Constitution, accepted W estern legal positivism and held that rights do not 
pre-exist, but are granted by the state (Greiff, 1985, 446).
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Wei Jingsheng's idea of rights goes beyond Liang's and Wu's in terms 
of his acceptance of the idea of natural rights. He argues that such a right is 
not granted by external agents, but is self-existent. He uses the following 
example to illustrate this: the stone, since it occupies a certain space, is 
entitled to have the right to exist in relationship to anything around it. That 
is a natural right which does not need to be bestowed by external agents 
(Wei in Claude Widor, 1981, 115). Thus in Wei's view, rights are conceived 
of as the attributes of individual hum an subjects deriving from their nature 
or essence, i.e. from their being free beings; being ends themselves rather 
than being means to an end.
Wei's argum ent that hum an rights are inherent may be com patib le  
with his argum ent that hum an rights are contingent on social conditions if 
we accept the following: while the idea of natural rights provides us with an 
ideal and a criterion for actions, it is social conditions that provide us with 
practical m eans of realizing the ideal of hum an rights. There is an 
interdependent relationship between philosophical presupposition about 
natural rights and realistic consideration about rights which are social 
products. On the one hand, the idea of natural rights provides us with the 
highest authority  over society, an axiom and a criterion to deal with 
conflicts between rights and political power, as well as conflicts of rights in 
practice. The social dem and for changes to the Chinese communist system 
calls for, from within the society itself, the idea of natural rights so as to 
ensure that equal rights will be protected. The argum ent that hum an rights 
are contingent on social conditions can be used to justify the idea of natural 
rights in the Chinese social context. It is the Chinese social background, in 
particular the violation of hum an rights in current everyday life, that brings 
about the discourse of the idea of natural rights. On other hand, the idea of 
natural rights has to be contingent on certain social conditions and 
development within society; the universal idea of natural rights has to take 
concrete forms under certain social conditions. It is here, nevertheless, that 
the concrete forms of rights, such as the distorted forms of rights discussed 
in Section 6 of this chapter, may undermine the universal idea of rights. To 
defend the idea of hum an rights, a distinction between problems of liberty 
and rights as an ideal and problem s of liberty and rights as actual 
institu tional norm s needs to be m ade. The same can be said of the 
distinctions between the principle of hum an rights and the consequences of
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implementing the principle of human rights. Essentially, the universal idea 
of natural rights is a value claim.
Wei’s argument that human rights are inherent may be incompatible 
with his argument that human rights are contingent on social conditions if 
he accepts that the idea of natural rights implies that rights should not be 
limited; as in the case of Wei's arguments about whether or not rights 
should be limited. On the one hand, Wei argues that basic political rights, 
such as freedoms of speech, assembly, association, the press, religion, 
movement, and the right to strike should be unrestricted within their 
various spheres. At the same time, Wei contradicts this by arguing that 
human rights only exist in relation to other things and relate, directly or 
indirectly, to their environment. Thus, it is argued that human rights are 
limited and relative rather than unlimited and absolute.65
There are also problems with Hu Ping's view of natural rights. Hu 
emphasizes the priority of rights and freedom over truth, and that a right is 
a "trump card" held by a citizen which may be played even against civil 
authority. But Hu's understanding of the priority of rights and freedom 
over truth is not based on the idea of natural rights; and he does not see that 
the rights which are held by citizens are prior to their entry into political 
society; not chronologically prior to the formation of civil society, but 
logically prior to government. As Hu (1990a, 151) claims, the idea of social 
contract is a myth, and has no base in reality although it does help to 
uncover the real origin of political power. Hu (1991a, No. 4, 50) also suggests 
that we do not need to have a theory of natural law to develop idea of 
human rights. Due to the lack of an idea of natural rights, Hu justifies 
freedom in terms of social utility.66 It is argued that to protect freedom of 
speech will benefit the quest for truth and development of the truth, the
63Here I reject Wei’s Marxist dialectical discourse. If one recognizes the Marxist dialectical 
method, he would argue there is no tension in Wei's thinking on human rights.
66In Hu's letter to me, he explains that since the ideas of natural rights and of natural law 
were too alien to be acceptable among the populace in the 1970s, he decided to use more 
utilitarian arguments for freedom of speech. This implies that Hu himself favours the idea 
of natural rights.
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"fostering of the real Marxists", and the "strengthening of the unity of 
nation and political power" (Hu, 1988, 74-99).67
Hu's argum ent about the priority of rights and freedom over truth 
may be compatible with social utilitarian argum ents68 about freedom of 
speech if we presuppose the idea of natural rights and use social utilitarian 
argum ents to supplem ent the rights-based argum ents. H ow ever, any 
philosophical justification of rights in terms of social utility has dual 
functions: it may either defend rights or limit and even w ithdraw  them. 
U tilitarian  argum ent is insufficient to justify  rights and m ay be 
incompatible with the rights-based argum ents if social utility is used to 
argue for deprivation of rights. For example, one m ight argue that it is 
necessary to deny individual rights in order to avoid social tragedy if 
conflicts between rights cannot be resolved, and such conflicts of rights will 
lead to civil war. The intellectual history of m odern China proves that 
theoretical justifications of the violation of hum an rights always come from 
utilitarian arguments. In short, to quote W aldron (1984, 18) "attempts have 
been made to produce utilitarian argum ents for free speech, civil liberty, 
economic equality, toleration, and so on, but the arguments are always at 
best marginal and contingent and, in any case, much more heavily qualified 
than the corresponding liberal principles."
The Chinese liberals' ideas of hum an rights may be vulnerable to the 
charge that rights are constructed; they are not inviolable, and they have no 
ontological status. To defend the value of freedom  and rights, a 
philosophical idea of natural rights is needed; and the idea that liberty is 
the source of all rights should be emphasized. The idea of contract also is 
needed to justify rights as a "trump" card overriding the purposes of 
governm ent and other public agencies. According to Heller, the law of 
natural right (according to which all hum ans are born free and are equally 
endow ed with reason) is the axiom, the self-evident starting point of the
67The Taiwanese scholar Sheng Qingsong has defined an additional justification for freedom 
of speech: apart from the consideration of protecting democratic institutions and of 
stimulating the quest for truth, he believes that freedom of speech is also helpful to the 
realization of the self. See Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily Nexus), 10 March 1990, Taiwan. 
^Hardin (1988) gives a wonderfully systematic utilitarian justification for the value of 
rights. But I still believe that utilitarian justification is insufficient.
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whole enterprise of human rights, and is the source of all rights.69 Heller 
further argues that rights stand in a hierarchical relation to each other; there 
are basic ones and inferred ones and only the highest have an absolute 
moral claim. In Heller's view, freedom is the axiom of all human rights, an 
ontological statement and a value, which the opposite (such as unfreedom, 
slavery, etc) cannot be chosen for a value (Heller, 1987, 150-9). As we know, 
the claims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights, and are endowed with reason and conscience serve as axioms in the 
United States' Declaration of Independence and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948). In line with Heller's arguments, I add the 
following arguments in defence of the idea of natural rights,70 while taking 
account of the Chinese intellectual and political context.7*
First, from a practical point of view, although the idea of natural rights 
cannot guarantee equal rights in political life, it is, definitely, a powerful 
weapon that can be used to oppose any ideology whose theme is designed to 
suppress, restrict and suspend rights. The Chinese Marxist view that rights 
are granted by the state in particular social conditions offers justification for 
rights provisions to be programmatic, for the state to grant rights only to 
those who are friendly or loyal to it, and for power holders to restrict, even 
deprive those they do not like of their rights (Nathan, in Edwards, etc., 1986, 
130-1). We observe that the Chinese Marxist ideas of rights can not ensure 
human rights in political life, because revolutionary claims are primary and 
individual rights are subordinated to revolutionary claims; conversely, the 
idea of natural right can indeed ensure that equal rights are protected, 
because the idea of natural rights implies a restriction on revolutionary 
claims rather than an aid to them.
Second, the key point is that the Chinese social demand for changes to 
the Chinese communist system calls for the highest authority to be placed 
over political authority and to act as a supreme criterion by which to deal 
with conflicts between rights and political power as well as conflicts of
69Whether or not the law of natural right is self-evident is a debatable issue.
70I am aware that in the Western literature the idea of natural rights is a debatable issue, 
and that in Hobbes' theory of the state of nature the idea of natural rights has been used to 
justify unlimited authority. Here I believe that Locke has corrected Hobbes' mistake.
71 Lin Yusheng suggests that the Confucian concept of moral autonomy can justify the idea of 
basic rights. This is a challenging topic that need to be examined. See Lin Yusheng, 1988, 320.
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rights. The idea of natural rights satisfies this social demand if the Chinese 
accept it; and it has the theoretical potentiality to ensure that the sphere of 
realization of human rights will be enlarged.
Third, one may avoid the question of whether or not the idea of 
natural rights is fiction, and simply examine how the idea of natural rights 
came about in contemporary China. Although the idea of natural rights is a 
theoretical presupposition, it is important to note that the presupposition 
comes from Chinese social practice. The discourse of the idea of natural 
rights results from the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution, and from the 
historical lesson that theoretical justifications of the violation of human 
rights always depend on the denial of the idea of natural rights. Those who 
deny the idea of natural rights tend to regard it as theoretical fiction, but it 
seems to some Chinese liberals that denial of the idea of natural rights 
means tragedy, unhappiness and suffering. The idea of natural rights easily 
takes root in the hearts of those who have suffered violations of human 
rights. They are happy to choose the idea of natural rights and treat it as an 
absolute truth. This is the practical reason why Yan Jiaqi advocates the 
universal idea of human rights.
Those who have enjoyed "bourgeois" human rights, such as Marx, 
criticised the idea of natural rights. But such criticism is irrelevant to 
Chinese practice, and even becomes an enemy of basic freedom. That is why 
Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi have rejected the Chinese Marxist discourse of 
human rights. One even imagines that if Marx were living in Chinese 
communist society, he would reject his own criticism of the idea of natural 
rights and turn to support it.
4. Justification of Limitations on Rights
To criticize the official ideological claim that rights should be limited, we 
need to put aside rebellious attitudes and explore fully the possible 
legitimate and legal limits on rights. It is possible to distinguish paternalistic 
and liberal claims about limits on rights and liberty with reference to 
different purposes, conditions and procedures which I have discussed in 
Section 3 of Chapter 2.
Chinese liberals differ in their views of limitation on liberty. Wei 
Jingsheng and Hu Ping, from the aspect of individual freedom, give a
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liberal definition of democracy and seldom talk about the lim itation on 
freedom .77 Yan argues that legal limitation on freedom by means of laws 
and institutions is necessary.
Although Wei Jingsheng and Yan Jiaqi mention limitation on rights, 
in general, all three overlook the issue of how laws regulate and limit rights 
through institutional norms, and how, why and under w hat conditions 
rights are to be limited. This is understandable because there has been too 
m uch talk about the limitation on rights in contemporary China and not 
enough about the protection of rights (see Judy Polumbaum, 1991). More 
importantly, the 1982 Constitutions clearly limit rights so as to render them 
m eaningless to any Chinese citizen who m ight have w ished to invoke 
them against arbitrary treatm ent at the hands of government.
Although Wei and Hu adopt an individualistic approach in looking at 
democracy, hum an rights and the political system, they do not make a clear 
dem arcation between the individual and the social within the framework 
of the law .7  ^ In Mill's (1947) liberal theory, law determines which actions 
are and are not w ithin the governm ent's sphere of duty. Law rules 
governm ent by excluding it from interfering with the citizenry within the 
citizen's private realm. At the individual level, the individual enjoys 
personal freedom  and the righ t to privacy, and state interference is 
unnecessary provided the right to privacy does not lead to self-harm or 
harm  of others. Rights, therefore, are infringed if the state interferes with 
the individual life. It is im portant to create and expand zones of privacy 
through various guarantees in China. Yin Ding (1991) has actually listed the 
following rights to privacy: the right not to participate in political life, the 
right to pursue personal interests, the right to express personal opinions 
and beliefs, the right to have a sexual life unhindered by state intervention,
72Freedoms in Wei's thinking are only limited in the sense that freedoms are not open to 
those who have opposite views, as he claims that we oppose any statements and theories 
which support bureaucratism and fascism, and as for those who are not prepared to allow 
freedom to other people, we should deny their right to publish in our magazine (Wei, in 
Seymour, 1980, 34).
73This demarcation is debatable. As John Keane (1988) has pointed out that the boundary 
between public and private has been dissolved. For example, welfare-state intervention is 
geared to solving basic economic and social problems, and thereby touches on and redefines 
the more intimate areas of private life. However, the distinction between private and public 
has, I think, obvious normative relevance to Chinese institutional design.
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the right to have variety in life-styles, the right to choose and believe in 
religion, and the right freely to choose partners in marriage. The above 
rights should not be condemned by public morality. These rights define a 
sphere within which the power of the state can not interfere.
But as to areas of human life which chiefly interest society, state 
interference becomes more complex. Rights are often related to other rights 
of other people. There is a conflict between rights, which this chapter will 
deal with later. The point here is to present the necessary regulations and 
limitations on rights if conflicts between rights occur. The justification for 
state interference7  ^ is that it saves individuals from being interfered with by 
other individuals who are more powerful than they are. Freedom, 
therefore, demands constraints on the rich to prevent corrupt government 
and prevent the poor being interfered with by the rich. A restriction of 
liberty comes from the demand for just social arrangements and 
distribution of rights as well as the reduction of injustice which already 
exists (Rawls, 1971, 244-5). Only through this limitation can the ideal of 
equal human rights be protected. Freedom and rights have to be developed 
and improved in ways that limit themselves. The key resides in democratic 
institutional limitations on rights. That is, if the state substitutes ordered 
and reasonable interference for arbitrary interference with individuals, it 
increases freedom. The extent to which state interference increases and 
promotes rights will depend on democratic institutions, procedures and 
wisdom displayed in the interference, and procedures and wisdom cannot 
be determined beforehand by rulers. There is, therefore, a vital connection 
between rights and liberty on the one hand and democratic government 
and procedures on the other, inasmuch as democracy is an effort to ensure 
that government shall only be exercised subject to popular control and 
criticism (A. D. Lindsay's Introduction in J. S. Mill, 1947, xxii).
5. Rights and State Power
Conflicts between rights and political power become a serious problem 
when the discourse of human rights is popularized and used by people to 
struggle against the Chinese communist authority. Given that the Chinese
74Also see Hardin's (1988, 86) utilitarian justification for state interference.
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communist system is based on suppression of the expression of aggression 
against the state, when people are granted civil rights, these rights easily 
become a powerful and subversive weapon to struggle against the political 
system  characterized by suppression of rights. Thus, the granting of 
individual hum an freedom and rights challenges the party 's control (see 
Wu Yuanli, 1988, 75). In this sense, state power and individual rights, state 
actions and liberty are antithetical. Yan is right in the sense that the right to 
privacy should be protected so that state pow er may not legitim ately 
interfere with individual life. However, Yan's assum ption that state power 
and rights, state actions and liberty are antithetical is wrong in the sense that 
individual liberty is compatible with the pow er of democratic political 
organizat ion;7  ^ state power sometimes needs to be increased in making 
laws, which are designed to protect rights, and in making them efficient.76 
It is compatible to combine rights and a reasonable exercise of power.77 For 
example, the right to elect and to be elected is a right to act but not a right to 
threaten the state.
The weakness of the Chinese liberals’ ideas of rights also lies in their 
overlooking the protection of the rights of "cadres" insofar as cadres are 
hum an beings. It is understandable for them not to discuss the rights of 
"cadres" because of their hatred of "cadres" and of the antagonism between 
liberals and Communist officials. However, to protect the rights of cadres to 
life within the law is a necessary condition to enable power holders to make 
concessions easily in the struggle. Only if cadres feel secure and protected by 
law in the struggle can they change their attitudes tow ards hum an rights 
from suppression to sympathy. The key issue is to realize the rule of law. 
The aspects of compatibility between rights and power and protection of the 
right of "cadres" to life provide a rational foundation of political strategy for 
democratization in China. In the process of political development, the key 
element is that political leaders, under popular pressure, m ight accept the 
ideal of rights and make concessions provided that rights are compatible
75Yin argues that individual liberty is compatible with Lockenian political organization 
and not with Leninist political organization (Yin Haiguang , 1988, 233-46).
76Yang Guoshu argues that the power of government to maintain social order in the 
transitional period is primary. See his speech in China Tribune, No. 317, December, 1989, 17. 
77The interesting thing is that the Chinese term c]uan li for "rights" originally combines the 
character quan meaning power, influence and privilege (among other things) and li meaning 
profit and benefits (Wang Gungwu, 1979, 3).
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with state power and their right to life is protected. The realization of 
human rights depends on both the struggle waged by the people from below 
and the concessions made by the leaders from above.78 As a matter of 
practical necessity, human rights can only become a living reality in 
Chinese politics if we recognize their self-limiting nature; human rights 
must, as a matter of principle, not only limit the power of the state over 
society, but also limit the power used by society against the members of the 
state.
6. The Difficult Problems in Realizing the Ideal of Human Rights
The actual meaning of rights can be fully understood only on the basis of an 
analysis of the crucial problems pertaining to the process of realization of 
human rights in the transitional period. The nature of the process of the 
realization of human rights in China lies in a shift from totalitarian control 
and suppression of rights to a liberal guarantee and protection of basic 
human rights. But this change is subject to social, political and cultural 
conditions under which human rights can be realized. In this transition, 
therefore, it follows that there will be intense conflicts and social disorder. 
Here a distinction between the meaning of liberties relating to ways of life 
and the principle of liberty (consequences of liberties and the principle of 
liberty) is made, and there is the assumption that the actual value of liberty 
is much more important than the abstract form of liberty itself.
i. The Validity of Constitution and Law
Here we face the problems similar to those of the Weimar Constitution of 
August 1919; that is, the Communist Party only manipulates the 
Constitution, and does not respect it enough to act seriously upon it. At the 
same time, the oppositional organizations such as FDC & CAD are hostile to 
the 1982 Constitution, although they hope to draw up a new constitution.
78As to the role of leaders in the transitional period, see Jadwiga Staniszkis (1989 & 1990), 
Samuel P. Huntington, 1984, 213, Larry Diamond, 1989,151, and Higley & Gunther, 1992. This 
opens up the whole problem of the transition from authoritarian rule.
79In the 1920s, the Communists and National Socialists were hostile to the Weimar 
Constitution. See Neumman, in Keith Tribe, 1987, 7.
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In princip le , equal rights m ust be pro tected  by in stitu tiona l 
arrangem ents such as a constitution and laws; the aim of laws is not 
prim arily to make people good, but to uphold a system of rights. But the 
problems lie in the nature of the laws and the process of law-making and 
law-im plem enting. According to Wei Jingsheng, we have only autocratic 
rules of law, such as those exercised by Qin Shi Huang and the Gang of 
Four, w ithout democratic rules of law in China. Lin Yusheng argues 
differently that traditional China has only "rule by laws": that is, law as the 
instrum ent of rule which weakens the meaning of legality and even creates 
an efficient totalitarian society.80 Following Lin's view, we may claim that 
Deng Xiaoping's legal reform s were instrum ental to changes in the 
economy and functionally useful in the m odernisation process, and not 
ends in themselves. It follows that the most serious problems are: (1) Laws 
them selves are unjust in the sense that legislation in China m ust first 
com ply w ith the so called "Four C ardinal Principles" in the 1982 
Constitution and that the Communist Party has policy superiority over the 
state and economy. (2) The Party is above the legal system; the legal system 
in China gives the Party a special form of authority; and legal regulations 
are g reatly  influenced and even decided by the subjective will of 
paternalistic leaders.81 (3) Although there is a positive and workable law, in 
practice it is not taken seriously by either the leaders or the masses.
It is justifiable for a citizen not to obey the old laws, because the laws 
themselves are problematic, and some of them are unjust. Thus the notion 
of a general duty to obey the law that holds in all cases must be abandoned. 
In the transitional period, the old legal system has been discredited, and the 
new legal system does not yet function well. The new law which aims to 
protect equal rights implies that the duty to obey the law is justifiably 
required. There is, however, a paradox between obeying the law and not
80Lin further argues that the rule by laws is totally different from the rule of laws which 
presupposes basic human rights and implies that any laws and regulations must comply with 
a meta-legal doctrine - the idea of natural rights (Lin Yusheng, 1988, 58, 79, 292, 381, 319).
81 The view may be well elaborated by Feng Xuefeng's fable in 1956 that a snake decides to 
make a law that no one can interfere with another animal's privacy without due process. 
Then to teach the timid hare how to use this law, the snake barges into his den and bites one 
of the baby hares to death. He waits by the door for the hare to come out and follow the new 
law by charging him with breaking it (see Nathan, 1986, 161-2).
113
obeying the law in the transitional period. It is this paradox that makes laws 
and their protection of rights ineffective.
However, a more serious problem resides not in the justification of 
obeying or not obeying laws, but in the practical implementation of laws. 
Let us examine the effects of corruption. One often talks about the serious 
corruption in China and in doing so refers only to officials or cadres. 
N evertheless, the problem  of m ass co rru p tio n  should be draw n to 
attention. Ordinary people, like taxi drivers, doctors, ticket sellers and shop 
assistants, do use their power for personal gain. A common attitude is that 
if you do not use what power is available to you, then it will expire as 
quickly as a film ticket. This attitude is so popular that it seems to legitimize 
"the back door" and abuse of power. The seeming legitimacy of "the back 
door" and abuse of power implies that people and cadres do not make a 
clear distinction between what is legal and what is illegal. It follows than 
that if people do not have a clear sense of laws and do not care about them, 
it is difficult to implement the rule of law. As Machiavelli claims, when it is 
corrupt, good legislation is of no avail; and a corrupted people, having 
acquired liberty , can m aintain  it only w ith the g reatest difficulty 
(Machiavelli, 1970, 157-60, also see Skinner, 1983). If laws and regulations 
are not effective, freedom in its operation is not action within the limits of 
law but a kind of anarchic action. Thus, without the rule of law this form of 
freedom inevitably increases social disorder and becomes a "negative force" 
rather than a constructive one.
ii. Conflicts between Rights
The realization of freedom is always associated with what Jean-Paul Sartre 
calls moral dilemmas or emotional contradictions on the individual level 
(B. H. Slater, 1988, 317). There are m ore in tim ate links betw een 
contradictions and freedom on the collective level than on the individual 
level.
The operation of rights at both the dyadic (the right of voluntary 
exchange or contract) and collective (the right of associations and state 
organizations) levels is subject to, and affected by, certain social, political 
and cultural conditions as well as social relationships under which hum an 
rights can be realized. Rights, therefore, are often related to other rights of
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other people. There are conflicts between rights. According to Hardin, the 
protected actions of one party coincidentally bring harm to another party, 
typically because of the external effects of the actions. And the protected 
dyadic right of contract conflicts with collective rights that would deny 
members of relevant collectivities the right to enter certain dyadic contracts 
(Hardin, 1988, 117). Let us examine the example of tensions between human 
rights and democracy in terms of political development. When the control 
and suppression  of m inority nationalities by the ruling party  loosen, 
conflicts betw een nationalities increase; and nationalism  will override 
dem ocracy given abuse of the right to autonom y. For exam ple, the 
operation of the right to regional autonomy may undermine a possibility of 
the realization of a democratic federal system if conflicts betw een rights 
occur. If people in Taiwan and Tibet are supposed to be granted fully the 
right of autonom y, they m ay choose to build an independent nation. 
Therefore the rights of autonom y may contradict the idea of a democratic 
federal system as proposed by Yan Jiaqi. In short, the Chinese liberals have 
not set up principles for dealing with these conflicts of rights.
The Chinese liberals also overlook the consequences of the operation 
of the right to property. The right to property and its protection in the legal 
system m ay become an even greater source of political conflict in Chinese 
social life. To protect the right to property in Chinese economic life means, 
at times, that political privilege turns into economic privilege given the 
corruption of power and the absence of fair rules. Thus economic privilege 
leads to unequal competition and injustice. The close relationship between 
democracy and the right to property and private ownership is mere wishful 
thinking.
The conflicts between rights cannot be attributed to the old system but 
to the nature of rights operating in the transitional period. This will bring 
forth a new problem , more serious than the conflicts betw een political 
pow er and indiv idual rights if the collapse of the Chinese com m unist 
party's m onopoly control occurs. The greatest difficulty for the realization of 
hum an rights lies in the overlapping of the old and new problems. And the 
old problem s such as political privilege, corruption and the crisis of 
succession have not been resolved; while new problems — tensions between
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rights, distorted forms of rights and a burden of rights arise from the actual 
social and political background in China.8^
iii. Distorted Forms of Rights
In adhering to a "perfected" ideal of human rights, there will be an increase 
in the inevitable distortions attaching to the processes of realizing human 
rights. First, freedom and rights operate in an anarchic way or, what Wei 
Zhengtong calls, "break from any bondage" in China. Thus liberty is 
understood to be completely antagonistic to tradition and its culture. As 
Wei Zhengtong observes, in modern China liberty takes the form of anti­
tradition: if we have tradition, then we have no freedom; if we want 
freedom, we have to break with tradition completely (Wei Zhengtong, 1976, 
55-69, in particular, 66). Thus this rebellious kind of negative liberty not 
only contains the idea that liberty is being let alone, but become a 
subversive force set up to oppose the existing political and cultural 
system.88
Second, in Mao's time, there was roughly an egalitarian distribution of 
wealth but there was a lack of equal rights and opportunity.84 Conversely, 
in Deng's time, there was neither equal rights and opportunity nor equal 
distribution of wealth. Injustice has become a crucial social problem. We see
8^As to the study of the contradictions in the transition period in the Communist societies, see 
Jadwiga Staniszkis (1989 & 1990).
83In order to overcome these theoretical problems, I suggest that Philip Pettit’s (1990) 
republican conception of negative liberty is an alternative intellectual basis for Chinese 
democratic institutional design, because of the following intellectual virtues: (1) The republic 
conception of negative liberty emphasizes equal liberty in the context of a particular society 
where individuals exist and interact with one another. This conception requires that a person 
be let alone to the greatest extent that is standard for anyone in the society; and that he 
(she) is given a status in law, and perhaps a status vis-a-vis social convention generally, 
that provides some objective assurance against interference; and finally that he (she) and 
others must share an awareness that he (she) enjoys this status (Pettit, 1990, 164-5, 176). This 
conception is contrary to Chinese liberals’ slight attention to the problems of in realizing the 
ideal of human rights due to their rebellious attitude towards the Chinese totalitarian 
regime. (2) The republic conception of negative liberty favours the right political products for 
the state to deliver such as criminal justice, social welfare and a variety of community 
benefits (Pettit, 1990, 168-72). This conception is contrary to Yan's implicit assumption that 
rights and the power of the state are antithetical. (3) The republic conception of negative 
liberty see citizens not only as consumers of the political product, but also as active, 
deliberative participants in the political process (Pettit, 1990, 172-6). This conception is 
contrary to Yan's elite democracy.
84The degree of egalitarian distribution of wealth in Mao's China is subject to debate.
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that some people enjoy economic freedom on the basis of suppression of 
others' freedom. The poor and powerless are controlled by the rich and and 
power holders in political and economic life. Also freedom of contract and 
enterprise makes sense only in the context of a free market system in which 
the workers and employers are both free to give or w ithhold work. But 
under political monopoly, freedom of contract and of enterprise becomes a 
privilege and a new tool of exploitation on the part of political power 
holders.85 That sort of freedom and rights becomes despotism.
Third, a person, freed from the bonds of a totalitarian society, which 
sim ultaneously gave him security and limited him, has not gained freedom 
in the positive sense of realization of his individual intellectual, emotional 
and moral potentialities. Some people break free from political oppression 
but, unfortunately, are then worse off because they are enslaved under 
economic oppression. For those people, nothing is gained except alteration 
of the form and sphere of enslavement.
Fourth, freedom and rights are supposed to be a consensus for political 
institutional arrangem ents and actions, but in reality China is currently an 
unprincipled society which lacks consensus and trust between and among 
governors and the governed; and the principle of freedom and rights is 
often m anipulated  by politicians and even Chinese dem ocrats living 
overseas for their own interests.
Using analysis of the distorted forms of rights, we further argue that 
the political system in China is a mixture of totalitarianism  and distorted 
forms of rights and freedoms; it has become part authoritarian and part free. 
The classic polar opposites of totalitarianism and democracy, therefore, are 
not an analytical value to analyze the political system  in the transition 
period (Pye, 1990c, 14).
iv. Burden of Rights
While John Rawls (1989, 235-8) discusses the burden of reason, and Erich 
Fromm (1960) the burden of liberty, here, we emphasize that rights may
88 Also See Franz Neumann "On the Preconditions and the Legal Concept of an Economic 
Constitution", in Keith Tribe, 1987, 48.
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become a burden in the following cases in which (1) people do not know 
how to make a choice when there is a conflict of rights; and in which (2) 
certain people do not want to be held responsible for their choices which, 
while ensuring independence, leave them uncertain of w hether or not 
there will be a price to pay for their choice. The point here is to show that at 
the crossroads for liberty, the burden of rights may, during the transition, 
contribute to the totalitarian tendency.
From the above discussion, we conclude that there are three 
particularly difficult problems86 attaching to the process of realizing human 
rights. (1) To protect human rights we need a just constitution and law, but 
we have neither a just constitution and law nor well-civilized people who 
support the rule of law in China. (2) To protect, develop and improve equal 
hum an rights some regulations and limitations on rights are necessary. But 
the ruling party suppresses human rights and imposes arbitrary limitations, 
while the oppositional organizations seldom address the problem of legal 
lim itations; it is, therefore, difficult to arrive at a consensus of definite 
limitations on rights through institutional norms. (3) Tolerance is a virtue 
of freedom and is recognition of the autonomy of others. However, China 
lacks tolerance after the events of June 4, 1989. People are full of revenge. 
Hatred and revenge tend to suppress the freedom of others. The servile and 
intolerant spirit of the people is the "enemy" of freedom.
Conclusion
I have defended the idea of natural rights. This idea constitutes the source 
of all rights as a political principle and a moral basis for a democratic system 
which respects and is bound to honour the liberty of its m em bers and 
recognizes the proper autonomy of citizens. To protect equal hum an rights 
is the goal of law and of democratic political institutions. The extent to
^Jerome B. Grieder (1970, 345) discusses similar difficult problems. As he claims, liberalism 
failed because China was in chaos, and liberalism requires order. It failed because in China 
the common values which liberalism assumes to exist did not exist, and liberalism could 
provide no means to bring such values into being. It failed because the lives of the Chinese 
were shaped by force, while liberalism requires that men should live by reason. In short, 
liberalism failed in China, because Chinese life was steeped in violence and revolution, and 
Chinese liberalism offered no answers to the great problems of violence and revolution.
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w hich hum an rights are achieved m irrors the degree of political 
civilization and rationalization achieved.
Wei's idea of equal natural rights implies that the workers' right to 
organize should be guaranteed by democratic institutions. This serves as a 
basis for a platform that combines civil liberties with workers' rights. Also, 
Wei's idea implies that the peasants' right to have input into the political 
process should be protected by democratic institutions, and that under­
representation of the rural population in the National People's Congress 
should be discussed and altered.
Hu Ping's idea of the priority of right over truth implies that scientists 
do not have the final say in decision-making, and that even the rights of 
non-scientist citizens should be protected by democratic institutions. The 
value of equal liberties rather than truth and science in general constitutes a 
basis for democratic institutional design.
However, the above authors seem to overlook social obligations in 
relation to freedom; the aspect of compatibility between state power and 
individual rights; the principle for resolving conflicts between rights and 
finally the difficult problems of implementing democratic and liberal ideas 
in the process of democratisation and liberalisation.
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CHAPTER 5
Evil and Redesigning Democratic Institutions87
Chinese liberal intellectuals such as Yan Jiaqi (1986c, 1989, 1991a), Hu Ping 
(1988, 1990b, 1991b) and Liao Xun (1987),88 based on their respective 
experiences of the tragedies in China, have taken the idea of potential rather 
than actual evil as a starting-point for democratic institutional design, as I 
have mentioned in Chapter 3. Political discourse in China seems to be going 
back to the old topic of the evil side of hum an action, which has been 
discussed through centuries by such theorists as Augustine, Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, Hume, Han Fei and Xun Zi.
The central theme, as Yan Jiaqi argues, is that the idea that hum an 
beings are potentially evil is the starting-point for the rule of law and 
procedural systems (Yan, 1986c, 1988, 1991a, 54-8). Or in Liao Xun's (1987, 7) 
w ords, the principle of prevention of evil is a theoretical basis for 
democracy. This chapter attem pts to describe, discuss and develop this 
theme and to provide a reliable theoretical foundation for the Chinese 
liberal argum ents for democratic institutional design.
87I should acknowledge that although political thought about institutional arrangements 
depends on certain suppositions about human action, institutional design in political life 
depends on culture, technology, economics and particular situations.
88Although I focus on the three writers, I will broadly refer to and discuss the ideas of a 
group of liberal writers such as Jin Guantao, Su Wei, Ding Xueliang and Ding Chu. Yan Jiaqi 
and Hu Ping are selected as representative of Chinese liberals' thinking on evil and 
democracy, because their works are relatively systematic and well-argued and have greatly 
influenced today's China. Liao Xun, a less well-known scholar, is selected because his article, 
published in 1987, specifically discusses the issue of evil and democracy and raises a lot of 
interesting points although the article has been published in a less well-known journal. The 
leading thinkers of democratic theory and practice in post-Mao China such as Wang Ruoshui, 
Su Shaozhi and Hu Jiwei are excluded because their commitment to, and discussion of, the 
Marxist theory of alienation presupposes an ideal of the goodness of human nature which 
results in them paying less attention to the problem of evil than the three writers I have 
selected. Also their understandings of democracy fall into the Marxist framework which has 
been declining; their influence on Chinese politics therefore will be much weaker than the 
above three writers. Furthermore, although these three writers share some views on evil, 
they make different arguments (which I will discuss later) and take different roles in their 
political positions (which I will not discuss because it would be beyond the scope of my goals 
here).
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The chapter consists of five sections. Section 1 describes the emergence 
of the discourse of evil and institutional design, or a shift from the notion 
of goodness to the concept of evil as a starting-point in Chinese political 
thought on democracy. Section 2 discusses Chinese liberal views of evil and 
specifies the Chinese liberal minimal concept of evil in terms of violation 
of basic rights. Section 3 justifies an attem pt to take the supposition of 
potential evil as a starting-point for liberal democratic institutional design 
and briefly discusses the limits and problems associated with that attempt. 
Section 4 criticizes neo-authoritarian institutional design which is based on 
the concept of the evil of the masses. Section 5 argues for democratic 
institutional design, including an institutional guarantee of rights, division 
of power and coercive and restrictive institutions to deal with the problem 
of evil.
891. The Emergence of the Discourse of Evil and Institutional Design
I should say right at the beginning that the emergence of the discourse of 
evil in China does not imply that the idea of goodness disappears or no 
longer plays a role in political thinking. Furthermore, the observation that 
while the M aoist project is largely based on the idea of goodness or 
perfection of hum an nature, and Chinese liberals' institu tional design 
largely on the idea of evil, does not imply that the Maoist project does not 
incorporate the idea of evil and that the liberal project does not incorporate 
the idea of goodness.
The revolutionary and rom antic project, designed and guided  by 
Maoism, which follows Rousseau and M arx’s tradition of Enlightenment, 
can be seen as an attem pt to design and create the best arrangem ents of 
economic, political and social institutions, and to transform the egoistic and 
self-interested hum an into "a new socialist man" in order to achieve the 
ideal of a C om m unist society. There are, at least, six assum ptions 
involved in this project.
89More discussion of this shift, see Yan Jiaqi, 1991a, 54-8.
90More discussion, see Jin, 1990, 27-8, Ding Xueliang, Democratic China, No. 2, 1990, 42. Also 
see Sowell, 1987,14, 25-6, Chaps. 3 and 4.
121
(1) The Maoist project assumes that humans, lacking innate defects, are
thoroughly malleable and perfectible through a public ownership system
and education. This assumption makes it possible for Maoism to favour a
moral-educational remedy. The Maoist "moral approach" to politics stresses
the exemplary virtues of uprightness and benevolence as the essential
ethical bases of social and political order, and denigrates written laws,
91regulations and punishments as ineffective and even counterproductive.
As Yan Jiaqi (1986c) points out, the notion of the goodness of human nature 
was a starting-point for Mao Zedong in "choosing a perfect successor" and 
launching movements of "criticizing selfishness and fostering public 
spirit."
(2) The idea that people are "perfectible" unavoidably implies that they are 
currently imperfect. In this respect, Maoism, according to Hu Ping (1990b, 
39-40, 1991b, 117-8), distrusts people and regards them as immature and 
unable to distinguish good from evil. Some Chinese communists inwardly 
believe that human nature is inferior and liable to be seduced by evil so as 
not to be interested in virtues. Also Wälder correctly observes that Maoism 
saw hidden enemies and traitors within Chinese intellectual circles and 
within the Party. The proclaimed purpose of the Cultural Revolution was 
to unmask these hidden traitors, drag them out of their hiding places, and 
save socialism from domestic and international forces of subversion 
(Wälder, 1991, 43-6).
(3) The Maoist project assumes that revolutionary elites have the capacity 
to master truth and science, to tell good from evil persons, and to know 
what is a right project and how to realise it. It is this assumption that makes 
the romantic revolutionary project feasible.
(4) Points 1 and 2 show two sides of the views of human nature held by 
Maoism. These views seem to be contradictory, but are self-consistent in 
terms of social relationships being determinants of human nature. A vulgar 
class analysis has defined the proletariat on the basis of blood lines, and the 
incorrigibility of evil as being due to membership of 'bad classes' in the
91 Here the sage-moral educational approach should be distinguished from the rule­
following educational approach to politics, which is based on the idea that politics is about 
the proper procedure to deal with conflicts; and that rule-following is a necessary condition 
for the operation of democratic institutions.
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early period  of the C ultural Revolution. Further, it is thought that 
econom ic and educational environm ents determ ine w hether hum an 
beings will be good or evil. It is private ownership that makes people 
selfish; and public ownership, if it is set up, can help hum an beings to be 
altruistic.
(5) For thousands of years, hum an beings have been the slaves of private 
ownership, and selfishness has taken root in the hearts of hum an beings. 
Consequently, when public ownership is established, selfish hum an nature 
will not be automatically eradicated. The solution to this problem is to carry 
out m oral education which dem ands of the Chinese that they be moral 
sages, or achieve the highest ideal state. This requirem ent of sagehood 
denies the legitimacy of individual self-interest. To be a sage is to break 
totally with the fundam ental instinct of self-interest.
(6) Economic institutional arrangem ents such as public ow nership are 
im portant in the sense that these are conceived of as useful tools to mould 
hum an nature, and instruments to achieve the ideal of communist society. 
At the same time, the idea that state institutions can be used to perfect 
people unavoidably implies that the state is better than and should be above 
the people. Also, politically, institutional checks on top leaders are thought 
to be less im portant because it is assum ed that the first generation of 
revolu tionary  leaders are intellectual m asters and m oral sages. This 
assum ption requires only a partial check system  and partial personal 
morality on the part of the leaders because the assum ption implies, creates 
and supports the idea that revolutionary leaders such as Mao Zedong are so 
good that they do not need to be checked, or at least we can trust them 
generally w ithout checking them. Thus as Liao Xun (1987, 8) argues, the 
principle of preventing evil through division of power is overlooked by the 
Chinese communists.
In the early 1930s, there were many writers who saw the danger of 
communism. For example, N iebuhr (1948, 61, 222 and in Kegley & Bretall, 
1956, 15, 139, 302) codified the errors of the Com m unist project in the 
following: (1) The Communists found the Kingdom of God in history; and 
regarded hum ans as perfectible. (2) Com munist economic reorganization 
gravely jeopardized the condition of freedom. Niebuhr also predicted that 
(1) the destruction of economic privilege could hardly be expected to alter
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human nature to the degree that no one thereafter would desire to make 
selfish use of power; (2) The attempt to establish an economic equilibrium 
through social ownership might create a new disproportion of power; and 
finally (3) the abuse of power was bound to grow as the pure revolutionary 
idealists were supplanted by those who consciously sought the possession of 
power.
Fifty years after Niebuhr's remarkable criticisms of communism, 
Chinese liberals have arrived at the same conclusions. The difference is that 
Chinese liberals' works are written not only by words but also by tears, 
suffering and even blood; that is, Chinese liberals witnessed and suffered 
from the failures of the Maoist project in practice, while Niebuhr 
successfully predicted them. The Great Leap Forward in 1958 which aimed 
at the establishment of a "People's Commune" resulted in the end in the 
deaths of millions from hunger. The Learning-From-Lei-Feng movement 
in the 1960s finally created a hypocritical Chinese nation. The Cultural 
Revolution in attempting to go against revisionism led to catastrophes for 
the Chinese people. These assertions are common comments among a 
majority of Chinese intellectuals. For example, Hu Ping argues that the 
catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution was worse than that of civil war 
because it created perverse lives.92
During the Cultural Revolution, they also witnessed the following 
representative forms of evil: pleasure at the bad fortune of others, whether 
deserved or not; enjoyment of being a free-rider who seeks advantages from 
the community while not doing his or her share for it; envy, with hostility, 
of the greater good of others and willingness to deprive them of their 
greater benefits. Further, those such as Lin Biao who strove for supreme 
power willingly did wrongs such as deception, hypocrisy, and even killing; 
evil-doers were happy to dehumanize their victims before destroying them, 
with or without even putting on a cloak of morality or pretending to act in 
the public interest.9  ^ It is the above intellectual background that leads 
Chinese liberals to take the problem of evil seriously.
9^See China Spring, July 1988, 50; Jin Guantao, 1990, Yan Jiaqi, 1986c, 1991a.
93This is what Milo (1984, ix) calls preferential wickedness where agents of wicked acts do 
not believe that what they do is right; but rather, do which they believe to be wrong because 
they prefer some other end (or self-interest, in general) to the avoidance of moral
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Now I turn to the Chinese liberal redefinition of "human nature," 
their ideal of politics and their solution to Chinese political problems. First, 
liberal-m inded Chinese intellectuals have rejected the Marxist belief that 
hum an nature can be m oulded at will by exposing it to proper external 
conditioning, agreeing w ith Hobbes that hum ans contain ineradicable 
selfish instincts. They seem to arrive at the same conclusion as social 
scientists in the former Soviet Union in the 1960s that hum an nature 
cannot be changed (Davis, 1963, 1). To say that hum an nature cannot be 
changed is m isleading as argued below; but what does m atter here is the 
underlying effort of Chinese liberals to legitimize individual interests, and 
the recognition that political institu tional design has to m eet basic 
individual needs, physical and social. Moreover, the question concerning 
the wickedness of hum ans has led Yan Jiaqi to the other question of the 
design of institutions, the finest and most subtle inventions. Now Yan Jiaqi 
seeks for an external rem edy, ie., to focus on how to change external 
conditions and how systematically to establish institutional constraints on 
evil. This is very close to H um e’s idea that since it is impossible to change 
or correct anything m aterial in our nature, the utm ost we can do is to 
change our circumstance and situation, and render the observation of the 
laws of justice our nearest interest, and their violation our most remote 
interest (Hume, 1949b, 237).
Chinese liberals are also rethinking the role of economic institutions 
in m oulding "human nature": these institutions are lim ited in the sense 
that institutions m ight influence hum an actions in various ways, bu t we 
cannot expect that sound institutions can actually extinguish selfish actions. 
Chinese liberals provide a further argum ent against the Chinese Marxist 
environm entalist view of hum an nature: it can lead to either autocratic or 
dem ocratic  po litica l in s titu tio n a l design . This am bigu ity  in the 
environm entalist view of hum an nature does not allow for a solid 
intellectual foundation for democracy. However, although some liberals 
such as Jin Guantao reject the economic environm entalist view, they fall 
ironically into, to some degree, a cultural environm entalist view which 
suggests that traditional Chinese culture has determ ined Mao's effort to
wrongdoing. Or it is what Kant calls moral evil which is the corruption of the human heart, 
that is the propensity of the will to maxims which neglect the incentives springing from the 
moral law in favour of others which are not moral (Kant, 1960, 25).
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create a utopian society (see, Jin, 1990). Further, to reject Marxist economic 
determinism does not imply that the environmentalist view of human 
nature is totally wrong. In fact, institutional design does presuppose 
elements of the environmentalist view of "human nature" in that well- 
established institutions can change, or at least, influence human actions.
Second, given the pessimistic view of humans inspired by Hobbes, the
ideal of complete perfection of a political system as well as a human being
under full-scale constructivism is thought by Chinese liberals such as Jin
Guantao, Yan Jiaqi, Hu Ping, and Su Wei to be both impossible and
undesirable; and there can be no repose for humanity in a "good society"
9 4defined once and for all, nor transparency of society to itself. 
Perfectionism, a teleological theory, presupposes that its proposal is unique 
and the best in the world, thus to maintain its superiority it denies the 
existence of other doctrines and the rights of others. Consequently, it has led 
unconsciously to totalitarianism and autocracy in China.9  ^ Contrary to the 
perfectionist view of politics, the object of politics now, in Jin Guantao's 
view, is not happiness, but liberty; and a perfect value is not a principle 
necessary for design of actual and rational society (Jin, 1990, 31). Human 
beings are not divine; therefore their actions cannot escape the stain of self- 
interest and evil. Political achievements of democratic institutions must in 
consequence always be limited, fragmentary and incomplete. Democratic 
institutional design is not a final and perfectionist solution to the problem 
of evil, but is better than the autocratic way of dealing with the problem of 
evil. Also, as Hu Ping argues, the democratic election system can not ensure 
that the best persons are elected; however, it can ensure that people are 
capable of casting out bad persons by their votes (Hu Ping, China Spring, 
July 1988, 50). Chinese liberal-minded intellectuals, therefore, look to the 
democratic system as a relatively better political system, or in Hu Ping's 
(1988, 178) terms, a "possibly good system" rather than "the best possibility",
94Ding Xueliang, Feng Shengping and Su Wei have criticized Chinese perfectionism in 
political thought. See, Democratic China, No. 2, 1990, 42, 44, 48, also see Jin Guantao, 1990. 
95Hu Ping, 1988, 174-8, Ding Xueliang, Democratic China, No. 2,1990, 46; Jin Guantao, 1990, 
31; Yan Jiaqi, Democratic China, No. 2, 1990, 31-2; and Zhang Hao, 1989, 231. In comparing 
Chinese moral perfectionism with German race perfectionism, I think that while the former 
provided a justification for the Party to deny the rights of those who were regarded as 
immoral; the latter provided a justification for the Nazis to fight to "liberate" mankind 
from the "rule of subhumans," and to eliminate forever certain "races" such as Jews from the 
surface of the earth.
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to avoid the worst consequences associated with the evil of human 
behaviour.^
Third, Chinese liberals have opposed the Maoist "moral approach" to 
politics.97 The reason they reject Mao's "moral approach" is their shared 
disappointm ent in the "social experiment" in which Mao Zedong 
attempted to mould "the new socialist man" by mobilizing and 
indoctrinating the masses. In reality, the so-called "new socialist man" 
turned out to be a hypocrite: an altruist in appearance, but inwardly still 
predominantly motivated by innate drives such as self-interest and self­
protection. And after all, this "social experiment" proved so cruel that it was 
undertaken at the cost of millions of people's lives; it has totally ignored 
individuality, privacy and self-respect, and finally it has forced the Chinese 
to behave in ways defined by the instructions of Maoism and the Party.98 In 
this respect, Jin carefully argues that the Learning-From-Lei-Feng 
Movement was a moral elitism that still allowed the masses to pursue 
selfish interests; it consequently set a limit on utopian perfectionism. The 
Red Guard Movement in the 1960s forced people to overcome selfishness 
and foster public spirit. It nevertheless failed in the end, and this has 
destroyed moral elitism and created a social catastrophe (Jin, 1990, 26-7).
Now Chinese liberals such as Yan Jiaqi view a power-check system and 
a divided social structure in a civil society, rather than broad ethical 
imperatives, as the most effective means of resolving the problem of evil 
and of maintaining political order (Yan Jiaqi, 1986c, 1991a, 54-8). They would 
no longer rely on human beings doing good of themselves, but restrict 
them in such a way that they could do minimal harm under well- 
established institutions. This change in Chinese intellectual mentality has 
been demonstrated in the strong criticisms by Chinese intellectuals of Li 
Xiangnan, a heroic, honest and upright cadre in the Xinxin TV series in 
1984 and of the neo-authoritarianism in 1988 both of which carried too
96Also See Su Wei, Democratic China, No. 2, 1990, 44.
97In traditional China, there were various ideas of hells which often show that Yamluor, 
ruler and judge of the Chinese hell, can see one's sins from the terrace, sins are reflected in the 
mirror, and evil persons are in the cangue, etc (Elvin, 1991, 41-2, Eberhard, 1967, 24-59). Given 
that, if one assumes that humans are evil, one can still rely on religious persuasion. However, 
since the ideas of hells have been declining, the institutional remedy adopted by Chinese 
liberals is desirable and feasible.
98See Ding Xueliang , Democratic China, No. 2,1990, 42, 44.
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many messages in favour of the traditional idea of the rule of honest and 
upright officials.99
2. Liberal Views of Evil
I should first acknowledge the following points. (1) The concept of evil is 
controversial and it is difficult to agree on what evil is.100 (2) There are 
difficulties with the slippery notion of evil when it is applied actually in a 
concrete situation. (3) It is impossible to formulate a concept of human 
nature which is able to constitute an intellectual basis for institutional 
design. (4) Chinese liberal-minded intellectuals also have no unified 
conception of evil; each usually has his or her own individual 
understanding of evil. In order to avoid the controversy about evil, what I 
would like to do here is to describe Chinese liberals' views of what is not 
evil and what is regarded as evil. Then I will formulate an implicit concept 
of evil in terms of the violation of rights.
The Maoist communists believed that self-interest is the source of evil 
and that moral destruction lies deep in the self of the individual as a sort of 
"original weakness".101 Now, most Chinese liberal-minded intellectuals 
such as Yan Jiaqi, Hu Ping and Jin Guantao (and to some degree, even Deng 
Xiaoping, see Chapter 2) share the view that if self-interest does not take the 
form of first-person dictatorship — everyone is to serve my interests — it 
should not be regarded as evil but rather as an undifferentiated energy 
which might, therefore, be seen as neutral in the sense that it can become 
either a positive or negative force depending on the direction of the 
guidance of institutional arrangements (Yan, 1988, 98-9). Hence, Hu Ping 
believes that any revolutionary project which goes against individual 
interests will fail in the end. To seek to advance personal interests is not 
necessarily evil, rather those who block this are doing evil (Hu Ping, China 
Spring, April, 1988, 59, June, 1988, 52, and July, 1988, 4). Jin Guantao also
"For a critique of neo-authoritarianism, see Liu Jun & Li Lin, 1989, Part 2.
100For example, Kant (1960, 24-5) distinguishes natural evil from moral evil; Milo (1984, ix) 
distinguishes perverse wickedness from preferential wickedness; Schmitt (1976, 96) regards 
evil not only as dangerous, corrupt, weak, cowardly and stupid, but as rude, instinctive, vital 
and irrational. Rawls (1971, 439) remarks, what moves evil humans is the love of injustice; 
they delight in the impotence and humiliation of those subject to them.
Further, wine, anger, women, and money are seen as four "enchantments of self- 
destruction", see Elvin, 1991, 41.
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argues that once rules, private interests and social differences are denied, 
some problems associated with self-interest might be overcome, but society 
itself will be destroyed. The social problems arising from concern with 
private interests can only be resolved through the establishment of new and 
fair institutions and of meta-rules which define how we change rules (Jin, 
1990, 31). What is more important is that, while Maoism attempts to 
demolish private ownership on the ground that it creates and preserves 
private and individual motivations, Chinese liberals favour a privatisation 
programme on the ground that private interests are legitimately justified 
and are enormous energies for productivity.
Yan Jiaqi (1988, 92-8) defines evil as imperfection, corruption, weakness 
and being liable to make mistakes. He gives the following examples as evil: 
abuse of power, corruption and uncivilized service. Yan also cites 
Machiavelli's ideas that human nature is, generally speaking, evil; that 
people can be supposed to be often beset by folly and wickedness, ordinary 
depravity, and impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of 
irregular and violent propensities; and that the Prince does not need to 
keep his word (Machiavelli, 1961). Yan further argues, that what 
Machiavelli did was to reveal the absence of regularity in political behavior. 
Today, Yan continues to argue, it has become increasingly possible, through 
the use of scientific methods, to study movements that are without 
regularity; and through procedures and the institutionalization of politics, 
to avoid large-scale, organized violence and war (Yan, 1988, Chap. 10). It is 
the awareness of the worst consequences of the combination of evil 
behaviour and unlimited power that led Yan to the idea of democratic 
institutions. Yan (1986c) quotes Madison but does not mention his name: if 
people were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern the ruled, neither external nor internal controls on government 
would be necessary (Madison, 1961, 322). Yan's view of evil stated above is 
universally characteristic in the sense that everyone can potentially be evil.
While Yan Jiaqi presupposes the idea of potentially universal evil, Liao 
Xun (1987) rejects this. Liao has argued that assuming that human beings 
are potentially evil does not mean that all people are actually evil, but that 
anyone who holds power will become evil if there are no inbuilt checks on 
that power. In Liao's understanding, evil applies narrowly to the power
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holders rather than to the masses. This is of great significance for different 
types of institutional design (I will discuss this in Section 4).
Hu Ping emphasizes that evil ought to be distinguished as actual and 
potential. The Maoist communists failed to make a distinction between 
actual and potential evil so that they even punished those who were 
regarded as potentially evil. For Hu Ping, liberal institutional design should 
minimize potential evil at a psychological level, and prevent it from 
becoming a destructive force in political life. However, civil and criminal 
penalties are not imposed on potentially evil persons, nor are such people 
denied their rights in the name of controlling potential evil (Hu Ping, 1988). 
This feature of liberal institutional design differs from that of autocratic 
institutional design which attempts to suppress all potential evil by 
depriving individuals of civil and political rights.
Hu Ping also locates evil not only in human actions but in specific 
organization and ideology. Hu regards totalitarian institutional 
arrangements as evil because they favour a structure of over-centralized 
power and deny civil and political rights. The original purpose of autocracy, 
as Hu argues, was to do good, but it monopolized the power to do good, and 
prevented others from doing good. This led to the suppression of others 
who were willing to do good, and consequently created evils (Hu Ping, 
China Spring, May 1988, 33). Also, as Friedman (1989, 173) correctly 
observes, Maoism can be understood as an attempt to avoid certain evils 
perpetuated in Stalinism. Maoism, however, misidentified the source of 
those evils. Mao saw his "opponents" as willingly taking the "capitalist 
road" and looking for supreme power. Furthermore, Jin Guantao (1990, 29- 
30) points out, Mao even regarded political rules, regulations and 
bureaucratic organs as so called "bourgeois rights" and as sources of 
"revisionism"; consequently it led to the smashing of Party and 
governmental organizations during the early period of the Cultural 
Revolution.
The over-centralized power which, in the Maoist view, is needed to 
demolish all evil, is nothing more than an institutionalized evil, or evil
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structure102 in the sense that the rationalized party organization justified by 
ideology does have at its disposal the means to carry out any immoral act 
and to anaesthesise the moral sensitivities of those whom it makes its 
agents. In other words, the Party is capable of mobilizing respectable and 
rational actors in the service of an evil action. Worse still, people in 
positions of power and in public office do not feel guilty because even if 
they do wrong, they take the view that if they refuse to do it, others will not. 
Thus they continue to do what might be regarded as evil. As a result, the 
new and strongest centre of political power created new occasions for and 
temptations to injustice. This was also true of Nazi Germany; the holocaust, 
as Bauman comments, was a rational project of social engineering. Its evil 
lay not in irrational outbursts of racist feeling, but in the mobilization of 
bureaucracy and technology in the service of a totally evil and calculated 
purpose, the extinction of six million Jews (Bauman in Rex, 1991, 168).
Further, Hu Ping (1988) identifies the evil of the official Chinese 
ideology. Maoism holds an absolute idea of goodness associated with the 
ideal of a communist society. The pretension of scientific rationality in 
Maoism denies the validity of moral law and private ownership in terms 
of historical materialism, and prefers "substantive justice" to procedure, 
revolutionary cause to individual liberty and life. Consequently it denies 
the rights of others to have their own dissident views of goodness and evil. 
Thus the denial of the rights of others and even killing can be justified in 
terms of the revolutionary enterprise; similarly the failure to keep a 
promise can be justified in terms of substantive justice. For example, that 
Wang Shiwei, a liberal-mined intellectual, who attempted to maintain his 
own independent position, was killed was seen as justified because Wang 
did not obey the Party and he wanted "bourgeois freedom" in the Yanan 
Rectification Movement. Also, that the Red Army sold opium in 
Manchuria in the 1930-40s was again seen as justified by the need to raise 
money in support of the revolutionary enterprise.
We may claim that this is an ideological evil which is associated with 
the notion of salvation, and with the utopian ideal of the perfect human. It 
sought a perfect system but unfortunately did create evils. The Maoist
10^One of the wall-poster headings in the democratic movement in 1989 was "the evil of the 
Stalinist political system". See Gittings, 1990, 270.
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doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in reality led to an absolute 
monopoly of power. Communism is made more dangerous than Nazism 
in the sense that its utopian illusions provide a moral facade for the most 
unscrupulous political policies and for those who have evil motivations to 
do whatever they want (also see Hu Ping, China Spring, April 1988, 58). 
Even worse, those such as the Red Guards who beat their teachers to death 
in the Cultural Revolution, did not think what they did was evil, rather it 
was for the good of the whole society. They should have felt very guilty 
indeed, but felt nothing of the sort at that time.103 What had facilitated, 
justified and even created this perverse consciousness was Mao's goal-based 
morality. As Madsen correctly argues, Maoism with its emphasis on 
absolute purity and selfishness in fact precluded any kind of moral order. In 
the interest of absolute morality, it led to absolute immorality (Madsen, 
1984). The history of the Communist movement reveals that dissidents 
were tortured and killed in the name of defending the Marxist faith (Hu 
Ping, China Spring, May 1988, 33). And, a moral indoctrination movement 
has forced the Chinese to confess their "sin", that they have not yet rid 
themselves of their self-interests. It is this guilt mechanism that serves to 
control evil among the populace: it makes people feel guilty, therefore they 
always think that they are in error rather than that the Party makes 
mistakes.10^
Drawing on the above idea of organizational and ideological evils, I
would like to elaborate on the implicit idea of evil held by Chinese liberals;
that is, any doctrine, organization and action which has the actual capacity
to deny, violate and deprive others of basic civil and political rights except
105when a reasonable limitation on rights is needed is regarded as evil. The 
reasons are:
103 A similar case is that of Eichmann who played a major role in the Final Solution of six 
million Jews. He was not a dirty bastard in the depths of his heart. He did not feel guilty 
before the law. Rather he declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life 
according to Kant's moral precepts, and especially according to a Kantian definition of duty. 
He though he was a law-abiding citizen. Arendt comments that Eichmann gives us a lesson of 
the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil (Arendt, 1963, 18, 120, 231).
104See Orville Schell, Human Rights Tribune, Vol. 2, No. 3, June 1991, 30. This guilty 
mechanism reminds us of the practices of confession and penitence organized by the church in 
the Middle Ages. See Jean Delumeau, 1990.
105As for the issue of limitation on rights, see Chapter 4 and He Baogang, 1991c.
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(1) The nature of the evil of Communist organizations and ideology, and 
the first step towards evil in Communist China, was in fact to deny, violate 
and deprive others of their rights.
(2) Most evil behaviours evidence, at least, minimally the feature of 
violation of rights by such means as arbitrary arrest and torture.
(3) This idea of evil is formulated in order to struggle against the tyranny 
of Communist rule. That is the reason why the concept of evil in terms of 
violation of human rights is similar to Locke's concept of tyranny in which 
political power is said to be exercised in the absence of rights.106 Also, this 
understanding of evil implies and favours the idea of a rights-based 
morality which I will discuss in Chapter 7.
(4) This conception of evil does not approach the Christian idea of original 
sin, or the Marxist ontological view of evil as being opposite to goodness. It 
allows for moral pluralist views of evil; for example, the question of 
whether or not abortion is an evil is open to debate. Given the fact of 
pluralist societies, it is difficult to agree on one definition of evil. 
Nevertheless, a minimalist view of evil as denial of rights has to be 
accepted at a meta-theoretical level, because it itself defends the idea that 
human beings have the right to have even their own views of evil as long 
as they accept the trump of rights. If one denies the trump of rights, then he 
or she risks being deprived of the right to have his or her own view of evil; 
because the official Chinese Marxist ontological view of good and evil 
would not allow people to question the doctrine itself on the basis that the 
doctrine claims to be absolutely true and provides a correct answer for them. 
Here one of the the great intellectual virtues of the liberal conception of evil 
is that it is favourable to institutional protection of the rights of all and is 
not sympathetic to despotism when compared with the Chinese Marxist 
view of evil.
106Locke states that tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a 
right to. See, Locke, 1956,100. Locke's concept of tyranny, see Hindess, 1994, Chapter 3.
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3. Justification for Taking Evil as a Starting-Point^7
Yan Jiaqi, Hu Ping and Liao Xun have rejected the assumption of the 
goodness and perfection of human nature which has facilitated Mao 
Zedong's attempts to seek a perfect utopian society, and which led ironically 
to evil consequences during the Cultural Revolution. This rejection is on 
the grounds of ineradicable selfish instincts, the utopian nature of 
perfectionism, the danger of a partial check system and the ineffectiveness 
of the moral approach which Section 1 has already discussed. The further 
question raised here is what is wrong with Mao’s idea of goodness where it 
concerns institutional design. There are, at least, the following problems. 
First, if one thinks that goodness is the greatest and highest value, he or she 
would regard it as universal; in other words, those who think that they 
represent goodness would require it to be increasingly acceptable by 
members of the community. Obviously, for Chinese communists the ideal 
of a communist society is a great goodness for China. The CCP, therefore, 
has been imposing the value of a communist society on the Chinese both by 
propaganda and by force when faced with resistance. To force people to 
believe in this value and to make self-sacrifices for it is moved by the 
universalization of goodness and easily justified by such an apparently good 
intention.
Second, Mao's assumption of goodness has led to destruction of virtue 
in totalitarian institutional design. Let me examine the social logic of this 
assertion. Mao's assumption of goodness implies a notion of hierarchical 
moral order, by which I mean that virtuous and honest people are supreme 
over "dishonest" people (see Section 1). Hence moral persons have a 
legitimate duty to enlighten these "evil" persons and deserve to rule over 
them. According to these ideas, totalitarian institutions are designed in 
favour of so called moral persons who have political privileges to mobilize 
the masses and who have a justification for ignoring the rights of "immoral 
persons". That was exactly what the vulgar class determinism (which I have 
mentioned in Section 1) did in the early period of the Cultural Revolution; 
that is, it was the moral obligation of members of the good classes to remain 
segregated from members of the bad classes and continuously hold them
lO^Also see Appendix.
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suspect, even when their behaviour appeared correct. Members of the good 
classes may also humiliate and physically punish them at the slightest 
provocation (See, Dittmer and Chen, 1981, 112-3, 115). As a result, protection 
of the rights of "bad class" is ignore, and even overridden. Also, the so- 
called moral persons tend to be corrupt because of a lack of institutional 
checks. In the end, a moral crisis occurs: people no longer believe in a 
"revolutionary morality"; a moral vacuum emerges and virtue is destroyed. 
This is exactly what has happened in contemporary China.
Having learnt a lesson from the use of goodness as a starting points, 
Yan Jiaqi, Hu Ping and Liao Xun have supposed potential evil rather than 
goodness as a premise for democratic institutions and looked for a relatively 
better system rather than an ideally perfect political system.
However, the three writers have justified the idea of potential evil in 
different ways. Yan Jiaqi’s justification is normatively oriented. For Yan 
Jiaqi (1986c), the supposition of potential evil is not a question of whether or 
not human beings are born evil or good; this in fact is a meaningless, old 
scholastic question. The supposition of evil is indeed more about finding a 
normative starting-point than probing the truth of human nature, because 
both the ideas that humans are evil and that humans are good have 
empirical evidence in everyday life; what does matter is the utility of 
assuming the existence of evil action as an intellectual premise (Yan Jiaqi, 
1986c). Liao Xun provides the practical argument that the supposition of 
potential evil helps us question all, even national heroes, veteran 
revolutionaries of great distinction and "great people". It also compels us to 
design an institutional check system to control evil, and fair institutional 
arrangements to help transform evil into a positive force in political life 
(Liao Xun, 1987, 8-9). Hu Ping's justification of the idea of potential evil is 
very careful and takes a balanced position. Hu argues that the design of a 
cadre system should be based on the assumption that power-holders tend to 
be corrupt, rather than the ideal of "honest and upright officials". On the 
other hand, Hu argues that to select and appoint cadres one needs to look at 
whether or not persons are honest and upright (Hu Ping, China Spring, 
June, 1988, 53). Further Hu (1990b, 42-3) argues that democratic politics is not 
merely based on the assumption of evil, as I will discuss later.
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The above justifications by the three writers are occasional and 
unsystematic. To reconstruct their ideas of justification, I would like to 
provide the following systematic, coherent and synthetic justification. Hegel 
(1967, 231) has argued that the Christian doctrine that humans are by nature 
evil is loftier than the other which takes them to be by nature good, because 
the doctrine of original sin holds that humans are free agents capable of not 
allowing themselves to be determined by natural impulse. However, Hegel 
(1967, 175) has rejected the attempt to take the merely negative as a starting- 
point and to exalt to the first place the volition of evil, because the evil­
starting-point approach is hostile to his favouring of the unification of 
powers. I disagree with Hegel's rejection of the approach, but agree with his 
idea of the strength of the doctrine of evil. Nevertheless I hold different 
arguments for the supposition of potentially universal evil.
(1) Holmes (1990, 283-5) has investigated Hume's justification for the 
assumption of universal self-interest: that to say aü individuals are 
motivated by self-interest is to universalize the status of the common 
human among other seventeenth-and eighteenth-century thinkers. To 
acknowledge the legitimacy of interests is to say that all citizens, no matter 
what their socially ascribed status, have concerns that are worthy of 
attention. This justification is relevant here. Institutional design requires 
formal justice of equal treatment, that is, people should be equally treated 
not only in the sense that people have the same rights and opportunities 
but also in the sense that aH. persons ought to be supposed to be evil. 
Political morality then would matter less with a presupposition of 
universal goodness, and more with a supposition of universal evil, because 
while the former favours a partial check system; the latter leads to the idea 
of complete check system.
(2) Human behaviour is fundamentally uncertain and contingent in 
different times and different contexts. However, there is a constitutional 
arrangement that aims to reduce the degree of uncertainty. In this respect, 
Chinese liberals have chosen democratic procedures and the protection of 
basic human rights so as to ensure a minimal degree of security and 
certainty in political life. Further, they have also adopted the worst case 
strategy in order to rule out the worst outcome from uncertainty. In relation 
to the problem of uncertainty, there are cognitive limits to knowing who is 
evil and good. As well we have the problem of defining a criterion for
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distinguishing good from evil due to our disagreement about moral issues. 
Given the uncertainty of human behaviour, the limits of knowledge and 
disagreement about moral judgments, one strategy is to assume, as Hume 
did (1964, 117-9), that everyone ought to be supposed to be a knave. This 
strategy provides us with a simple model to address the serious and 
fundamental problem of evil involved in institutional arrangements, and 
to help us to focus on the issue of how political stability can be sustained in 
the worst situation. It highlights the worst possible consequences of evil 
such as civil war. This awareness of the above problem can force us to keep 
eternal vigilance over evil, because victory against evil is never final.
Take the example of security checks. All people who travel by airplane 
are required to pass through an X-ray door and to put their personal bags on 
a check machine. What does this mean? It implies that each person is 
assumed to be one who might carry a weapon. In fact, it is well known that 
only a very marginal percentage of people will risk doing so. But technically 
since we cannot tell those who carry weapons from those who do not carry 
weapons, everyone is assumed to be a potential weapon carrier so that all 
are subject to checks by a set of security arrangements.
(3) The supposition of potentially universal evil certainly is exaggerated in 
being applied to humans universally as part of the character of the race (see 
Kant, 1960, 24). Exaggerated or not the supposition has its value. As this 
claim assumes that even those who attempt to deal with the problem of 
evil could potentially be evil, there would be no excuse for attempting to 
deprive others of their rights under the guise of resolving the problem of 
evil.
(4) The supposition of potential evil strengthens our fundamental 
scepticism of any perfect political system, and finally helps us realize the 
limitations of politics. It also excludes Platonic and Confucian efforts to seek 
for perfection of politics, because the evil side of human action sets 
powerful limitations on moral and political perfectionism. Consequently, 
this supposition of evil leads Chinese liberals such as Ding Chu, to a belief 
that we would rather have two evil people who check each other than an
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angel without check.!08 jn short, the supposition of evil is reasonable and 
useful in democratic political thinking.
In placing quotation marks around the term "human nature," Yan 
Jiaqi indicates his reserve in using this term. Hu Ping is more explicit in 
arguing that the idea that human nature is evil is a necessary but not 
sufficient basis for democracy, although he still uses the term "human 
nature" in his writings. Here I would make the point clearly: the idea of 
potential evil does not assume the idea that human nature is evil Further, I 
would argue, the notion that the concept of human nature is of value for 
democratic thinking should be rejected on the following grounds:
(1) Any intellectual foundation for democracy in terms of human nature 
is misleading, because the assumption that humans have an essence is 
unproved; and there is no proof of a fixed human nature, or of a fixed 
correspondence between human nature and normative supposition. It is 
impossible for one to sum up one or two essences of human nature and to 
apply these in all places and all times.
(2) There is no need for theories of democracy to get "bogged" down in the 
hopeless morass of the question of the existence and character of human 
nature. To assume the potential for evil action rather than the evil of 
human nature is enough for us to argue for democratic institutions.
One charge that might be brought against the above supposition of 
potential evil is that this supposition is only an emotional reaction to 
Communist rule. This might be extended by the assertion that if the 
Chinese Communist rule were to end, the idea of evil might die away. Thus 
the Chinese liberals' search for a deep foundation for democratic theory 
would appear at best precipitate. An opponent might even draw support 
from the fact that the problem of evil is less discussed by current Western 
political theorists such as John Rawls than by classical political theorists 
such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume and the Federalists.
This charge is not convincing because the concept of potential evil 
employed by liberals such as Hu Ping is not only opposed to the Chinese
108C/ima Spring, No. 79, December 1989, 37.
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Communist rule, but to the abuse of democratic powers among democrats 
overseas. The concept of potential evil is a useful tool with which to 
analyze the serious problems associated with the process of transition to 
democracy. However, the charge raises an interesting question: if 
contemporary Western political theorists are less interested in the problem 
of evil, does this constitute a reason to reject the use of the concept of evil 
held by Chinese liberals? Further, why has Hu Ping quoted the writings of 
Hobbes and Locke, and Yan Jiaqi cited Madison without appealing to the 
writings of contemporary political theorists such as those of John Rawls? In 
other words, why are Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi more interested in classic than 
contemporary Western political theories?
Take the example of the limits to John Rawls's idea of the original 
position being applied in China. Rawls has discussed the evil man (1971, 
439) envy (1971, 80-1, 530-41), the free-rider (1971, 267-70), egoism (1971, 124, 
136, 354, 388, 570), the militant man and action (1971, 367), the intolerant's 
exploitation of allegiance to equal liberty (1971, 388) and deception and 
hypocrisy (1971, 570). However, all consideration of the evil side of human 
action is excluded in Rawls' idea of the original position because, in Rawls' 
theory of justice, the choice of a conception of justice should not be affected 
by accidental contingencies and certain psychological propensities (Rawls, 
1971, 530). For example, the issue of envy is not discussed until the two 
principles of justice have been chosen (Rawls, 1971, 531). As a result, Rawls 
rejects the place of the notion of evil in his idea of the original position and 
presupposes that human beings have a potential sense of justice. This 
rejection sets limits on the applicability of Rawls' ideal of the person and of 
well-ordered society in China. If the feasibility of the ideal of the person, as 
Rawls argues (1980, 534), is limited by the capacities of human nature, I 
would argue that Rawls's conception of the original position is limited by 
his absence of the idea of evil. As Hu Ping has argued, if the psychological 
motive of being eager to excel in everything is introduced in to Rawls's idea 
of the original position, some people might choose to be wrong-doers rather 
than favour the two justice principles.109 The fact that Rawls has not given 
enough attention to the conception of evil limits the application of his idea 
of the original position in the countries where the problem of evil is an
1°9Hu made this point in my interview with him in New York on 10th January 1993.
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exigent issue in political life. That is why Rawls has not been quoted by 
Chinese liberals such as Hu Ping in their consideration of the problem of
evil."110
Conversely, on the issue of evil, classical political theories are more 
relevant to Chinese liberals than John Rawls's theory of justice because of 
the nature of the Chinese social context. There are obvious parallelisms in 
the argument against absolutism in the writings of John Locke and that 
against totalitarianism in the writings of Hu Ping, and in considering of the 
issues of how to prevent civil war and how to establish federal democracy 
in the writings of the Federalists and of Yan Jiaqi respectively.
It should be made clear that the above discussion of the justifications of 
the supposition of potentially universal evil does not reject the assumption 
of a portion of honest and virtuous people as meaningless; in fact this 
assumption can help to explain the feasibility of the institutions designed 
for potential evil.
Take the problem of the feasibility of an institutional check system. 
Possibly, evil people have an interest in obeying rules in a co-operative 
game, otherwise they will suffer or somehow lose. But we can not expect 
that evil persons will strictly comply with rules that they agree to set up in a 
non-cooperative game. And nothing in the nature of evil persons will 
inspire conformity to normative rules. Thus we design a coercive 
institution forcing evil persons to obey rules. Nevertheless, if coercers such 
as policemen and judges themselves are evil, how can we ensure that the 
coercive institution will work, and how can we ensure that institutionally 
protected rights will be respected?
Although this problem has no easy solution, it might be resolved, or at 
least reduced, as Yan Jiaqi argues, by the division of powers -- a method of 
counterpoise which is capable of the skilful counterbalancing of refractory 
and separately antagonistic evils. This is similar to Madison's (1961, 322)
110It should be made clear that Hu’s and my argument is not against Rawls's theory itself but 
against the use of Rawls's idea of the original position in China. It is unfair to charge Rawls 
with failing to take the problem of evil into account, because the issue of civil war and the 
danger of totalitarianism, which are major concerns for Chinese liberals, are not problems for 
him. Also, Rawls's general defence of the priority of equal liberties is relevant to Chinese 
debates over political values which I have often cited in my work.
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argum ent that ambition m ust be made to counteract ambition; and the 
interests of hum ans m ust be connected with the constitutional rights. By 
increasing the price of doing harm  as well as rew arding doing good, 
democratic mechanisms indeed help to reduce evil. They also contrive an 
artificial identification of private and public interest. This can make 
conflicting private interests subservient to the public interest (Yan, 1988, 97- 
9). Thus in framing a political constitution, we can construct a relatively 
good whole out of bad parts.
Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi also employ the notion of goodness as a solution 
to the above problem . W hile recognizing that the establishm ent of 
democracy in China necessitates an analysis of evil hum an action, they 
believe that hum an beings are capable of goodness. They argue further that 
it is this goodness on which the possibility of dem ocracy in China 
d e p e n d s .111 Hu Ping, who insists on a high place for noble values and 
goodness in dem ocratic theory, argues that the fact that dem ocratic 
institutions are devised to deal with the problem of evil does not imply that 
democratic politics is merely based on the supposition of evil. Hu continues 
to argue that the idea that democratic institutions are merely based on the 
assum ption of evil is one-sided, incomplete and dangerous, and those who 
hold that idea m isunderstand the W estern liberal theory of democracy and 
the idea of original sin. Hu is aware that given that all people are evil, and 
that in stitu tions are operated  by evil persons, logically dem ocratic 
institutions can not guarantee basic hum an rights, and the only choice is 
autocracy. Inspired by M adison, Hu favours the m iddle case112 where all 
individuals are neither devils nor angels; it is this m iddle case that makes 
democratic institutions feasible and necessary (Hu Ping, 1990b, 42-3, 1991b, 
118).113 Thus Hu Ping's position is in line with Alexander Hamilton (1961, 
458) who has pointed out, "the institution of delegated power implies that
m See Hu Ping, 1988, 268; 1990b, 43; Yan Jiaqi, 1986c; 1987, 287-91. Also see Democratic China, 
No. 1, 1990, 6-7; Zhongyang ribao, Taiwan, 15 May 1990.
11^The idea of the middle case fits well with the Chinese people’s view that the majority of 
human beings are good and that only a minority are evil. For example, with the Chinese, a 
high proportion selects the Good orientation and a lower proportion the evil orientation. In a 
survey conducted in rural Taiwan in 1983, 49.5% of the responses of farmers characterized 
human nature as mostly good, 20.7% a mixture of good and evil, 14.9% all good, 11.0 % 
neutral, 4.0 % mostly evil, and 0.0% all evil. See, Jiang, 1987, 241.
113Hu also informs me of this in his letter to me.
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there is a portion of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a 
reasonable foundation of confidence".
Yan Jiaqi holds the same view as Hu Ping. Yan argues that the concept 
of "goodness" still serves as a starting-point for the advocacy of good public 
spirit, and awareness of this goodness is necessary for implementing good 
institutions and laws. Furthermore, only through public media rather than 
administrative power can a good public spirit occur (Yan Jiaqi, 1986c).
It should be made clear that the role of the notion of goodness 
employed by Chinese liberals is different from that of the Maoist one; it does 
not serve as a main starting-point as Maoism did for democratic 
institutional design. Also, as Yan Jiaqi (1986c) claims, the notion of goodness 
is discussed by him in the context of institutionalization rather in the 
context of moral education.
4. Evil and Neo-Authoritarian Institutional D esign^*
If the idea of evil is taken as a starting-point for institutional design, does 
this necessarily lead to democratic thinking? While Yan Jiaqi is silent on 
this question, Hu Ping (1991b, 118) realizes that there is no simple and single 
logical connection between the conception of evil and democratic 
institutional design. Also, there is a gap between ethical foundation and 
practical institutions. Further, Liao Xun clearly argues that if the concept of 
evil is to constitute a starting-point for institutional design, it should at least 
be remembered that it can lead to either autocratic or democratic 
institutions. As Liao (1987) observes, while autocratic institutional design 
aims to hinder the evil of the masses, democratic institutional design 
attempts to hinder the evil of the power-holders. Here it is interesting to 
mention that both dictatorship and anarchy, according to Schmitt, also 
appeal to the idea of evil. Donoso Cortes believes that in the face of radical 
evil the only solution is dictatorship; while with the aid of the axiom of the 
good human and corrupt government, an anarchist argues that all
114Too many Chinese essays have argued for and against neo-authoritarianism. See Cheng 
Yishen 1989; Liu Jun and Li Lin 1989; Ma Shuyun 1990, Rosen, 1993 and Sautman, 1992. Here I 
limit my discussion of neo-authoritarian institutional design to how it concerns evil.
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governments must be opposed for the reason that every government is a 
dictatorship (Schmitt, 1985a, 66).
Hobbes’s absolute government, Machiavelli's (1961) powerful and 
skilful prince, Schmitt's (1985a) commissarial dictatorship and Han Fei's 
over-centralized government (He, 1990b), all share a common idea: given 
that human beings are basically evil and dangerous, a stable political order 
is possible only under a strong man (or a sovereign authority) sufficiently 
powerful to control the evil of human behaviour and to coerce free riders 
into doing their part so as to avoid the war of all against all. Today, Chinese 
neo-authoritanians such as Zhang Binjiu (1989) follow the above tradition. 
Zhang fears that democratic institutions may provide an open channel for 
civil strife. The alternative is, according to Zhang, a neo-authoritarian 
government characterized as a model of semi-centralized power so as to 
maintain social order in the transitional period.
Zhang's neo-authoritarian project assumes that the Chinese are selfish, 
aggressive, destructive, liars and tend to be free-riders; in short, they are not 
ready for democracy.115 It also assumes that cadres are willing to seek 
supreme power at all costs; and that only a few enlightened leaders are 
good. The means to resolve the problem of evil, in the authoritarian view, 
is to centralize political power in the hands of a few enlightened leaders. 
The consequence of this could be to deprive the masses of civil and political 
rights, as is made clear in the above argument. Thus while neo­
authoritarian institutional design attempts to deprive the masses of civil 
and political rights; it aims to grant and protect economic rights of the 
masses so as to ensure economic development.
This project of a neo-authoritarian government creates the following 
problems:
(1) The greatest weakness of an authoritarian institutional arrangement is 
that it invests individual power in one person or a few who are 
presupposed to be good people. As Hu Ping argues, it will certainly lead to 
autocracy and will not necessarily lead to enlightened rule. This in fact
n 5 This assumption is certainly wrong. I have examined the emergent democratic culture in 
China. See He, 1992b.
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depends on personality and historical fortuitousness (Hu Ping, 1988, 176; 
1990a, 151-63 ). And if leaders become evil, the people have no rights or 
institutional mechanisms to use against them, and the institutions will be 
so prone to corruption and inefficiency. The assumption of new 
enlightened leaders who are good is too optimistic about human nature. 
Imperfection, I argue, is inherent in human action. As Hume has already 
argued convincingly: "those whom we trust for rulers, do not immediately 
become of a superior nature to the rest of human beings. We may often 
expect, from the irregularity of human action, that they will neglect even 
the public interests in the execution of justice, and be transported by their 
passions into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition" (Hume, 1949b, 251).
(2) Authoritarian institutional arrangements would potentially create 
social and political disorder due to the lack of institutions and proper 
procedures to deal with the evil of leaders. There might be also the evil of a 
permanent succession crisis that continually threatens chaos or even civil 
war when a ruler dies in an authoritarian system.116
(3) While allowing limited freedom in economic life, the authoritarian 
institutional arrangement still attempts to maintain ideological control and 
to suppress the aggression of the masses. Thus there is still a lack of 
institutional channels to "release" the aggression; a rational management of 
aggression is still a serious problem. If chance allowed, as in the case of the 
death of Hu Yaobang and the subsequent popular demonstration in 1989, 
suppressed aggression would turn out to be a destructive force.117 As Pye 
(1988, 128) points out, when disorder prevails, passion gets out of hand, 
aggression surfaces and panic is likely.
In short, as Yan Jiaqi (1992c, 313-7) argues, neo-authoritarianism is 
nothing but a modern version of an enlightened autocracy. The Beijing 
Massacre in 1989 proves its impracticality. What China needs is the
116I acknowledge that although democracy is defined by Yan Jiaqi as fair procedures, with 
general rules that permit a peaceful succession, the problem of succession is far from being 
resolved at this stage of the process of democratization.
117Feng Shengbao points out the negative effects of the students' demonstration in 1989 and 
argues against the strategy of creating "a political earthquake", see Zhishi fenzi (Chinese 
Intellectuals), Vol. 6, No. 4, 1991, 56.
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impersonal authority of the constitution and law which fully protects civil 
and political rights, rather than a personalized authority.
5. Arguments For Democratic Principles and Institutions
The fact that Communist ideology first attempted to resolve the problem of 
evil but in the end became a new source of evil raises the following 
question or requirement, that is, how does the liberal-democratic idea or 
principle overcome the problem of being abused by a despot while not 
constituting a new source of evil? Here, the principles of the priority of 
equal liberty and of fair procedures meet the above demand and serve us 
best as a guide to democratic institutional design.
Hu Ping (1988, 1991a), echoing Berlin, has argued that the Marxist idea 
of positive liberty is to be condemned not only because of what it entails but 
also because it has been used to provide a specious disguise and basic 
theoretical foundation for brutal tyranny (see Berlin, 1969, 131, and Hu Ping, 
1991a, No. 4, 51). Of course, the ideas of equal liberty and fair procedures 
have sometimes been used in that way. But nevertheless these two ideas 
have their own capacity to resist being abused by trouble-making 
intellectuals and politicians to justify social evil and leave us significantly 
less vulnerable to such temptations. The reason is that the principle of the 
priority of rights over truth, as Hu Ping argues, is capable of defending the 
right to be wrong118 (Hu, 1988, He, 1991b). Conversely, Chinese Marxist 
ideology, which is claimed to be a science of ideas, emphasizes the priority 
of truth over rights, thus it is potentially capable of depriving others of their 
rights, particularly those who hold dissident views in terms of truth, the 
explanatory power of which is manipulated by the Party. Chinese Marxist 
ideology, therefore, has the inherent fault of hierarchy and lacks an internal 
mechanism against being abused by a despot (also see Madsen, 1984).
While Hu Ping often argues for the idea of the priority of liberty, Yan 
Jiaqi always focuses on proceduralism. For Yan, the principle of fair 
procedure is capable of withstanding abuse and correcting mistakes because 
it contains a self-correcting procedure. Yan further argues that we need not
118Wang Juntao has also defended the right to make counter-revolutionary statements, 
including those which are against the Party (Gittings, 1990, 154).
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appeal to the direct or strategic use of brutal force, but rather to a set of 
prescribed procedures as a court of appeal that is free from coercion (Yan, 
1986a, 1988, 1989). This idea of Yan's is the same as Habermas' idea that to 
settle disputed claims participants test a problematic validity claim with 
reasons, and only with reasons (Habermas, 1984, 25).
In short, the ideas of the priority of equal liberty and fair procedure are 
not compatible with any totalitarian claim to truth, in particular, with any 
despotism. Consequently these can help to reduce the number of cases of 
abuse although the use of theories depends on the user rather than the 
theories themselves.119
The record of Chinese communist institutional design to deal with the 
problem of evil raises the following questions or requirements: how does 
liberal democratic institutional design resolve the problem of evil, in 
particular the problem of institutional evil, while not constituting a new 
evil? Liberal democratic institutional design based on the minimalist 
conception of evil in terms of violation of rights meets the above demand 
in the following ways.
(i) For an institutional guarantee of rights: The democratic way to 
control evil is to provide an institutional guarantee of political liberties 
so as to restrict attempts to violate the liberty and lives of others. 
However, the difficult question is, if we know that evil persons might 
abuse rights in order to do evil things, do we have the right to deprive 
evil persons of civil and political rights? Should evil persons still 
enjoy rights granted by a liberal constitution? Here the assumption that 
some people are evil and others are good does not provide a moral 
justification for "the good person" to deprive "the evil person" of his 
or her rights, because such good people are also supposed to be 
potentially evil. The claim that all humans are potentially evil denies 
the right of the "good person" to deprive others of their rights. There is 
no legitimate reason for depriving evil persons of their rights in terms 
of potential evil; to do this is to risk depriving all of us of our rights.
119I acknowledge that no matter how well theories are constructed, there is still the 
possibility of abusing the theories at a practical level. For example, Locke's notion of the 
autonomous and rational person in his theory of rights was abused to justify depriving 
colonized people of their rights.
146
Also if potentially evil persons are granted civil and political rights, 
and if an evil person attempts to do bad things to other evil persons, he 
or she will be resisted by these evil persons who have rights to fight 
back. It is the institutional protection of the rights of all (including 
potentially evil persons) that might counterbalance the refractory and 
separately antagonistic evils. The great security against evil consists in 
giving to good persons as well as to evil persons the basic political right 
to resist encroachments on their rights by other evil persons. As to the 
question of do we have the right to limit the rights of actual evil 
persons, the answer is yes, because evil persons violate the principle of 
equal rights and they do harm to others. ^ 20
(ii) For a power-check system: Evil people might manipulate law­
makers to deprive others of their liberties. The state itself might be 
perhaps the greatest threat to the individual's liberty. Thus 
institutional devices to divide and separate powers are favoured by 
Chinese liberals such as Yan Jiaqi, to struggle against state excesses, as 
well as against the evil of elite manipulation. Montesquieu (1989, 155, 
187) has argued that political liberty is present only when power is not 
abused; and that it is formed by a certain distribution of the three 
powers, so that one cannot abuse power. The converse of 
Montesquieu's thesis is true when applied to China. The CCP has 
united legislative power with executive power; thus there are no 
liberties although liberties are granted by the Constitution, because the 
Party that makes laws will execute them. Also, when the Party 
commands the legal power of the judge which is not separate from 
legislative power or executive power, the power of the Party over the 
lives and liberty of the citizens was and will continue to be arbitrary, 
for the judge is both the legislative and the executive, and is capable of 
the use of force. It was a lack of division of power and of democratic 
institutions within the Party that, as Wang Huning (1986) establishes, 
caused the Cultural Revolution. That is why Yan (1988, 1989) advocates 
the fourfold division of power in China as a major task of political 
reform: between the people and the State, between the Party and the
120I will discuss the grounds and the rights of liberal governments to repress anti- 
constitutional parties in Chapter 6.
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government between the government and social organizations, and 
finally between the central and local governments. Yan Jiaqi (1989) and 
Hu Ping (1988) have also emphasized the importance of the freedom of 
the press and of civil society, which are seen as socially separated 
powers. Whether or not liberty will be preserved depends less upon 
the niceties of constitutional construction than upon the extent to 
which there are independent sources of power in civil society. As Yan 
(1988) realizes, Watergate has demonstrated that the press is capable of 
acting as the fourth branch of government, though it may be more 
effective as a means of checking power than as a contributor to viable 
government if freedom of the press is guaranteed. In conclusion, the 
principle of preventing evil, as Liao Xun (1987) argues, favours a 
power-check system and should be a guide for current political 
reforms.
(iii) For restrictive and regulative institutions: Democratic institutions 
which have been seen by Chinese liberal-minded intellectual such as 
Su Wei (Democratic China, No. 2, 1990, 44) as means to deal with or 
control evil can fall into two kinds. A restrictive institutional design 
attempts to control evil through the use of types of coercion such as 
civil and criminal penalties; a regulative institutional design attempts 
to have evil play a positive role and to nurture civil virtue which is 
seen to be law-abiding.
(1) Restrictive institutions: The effects of some rulers' innate drives, 
such as the pleasure of aggression and destruction, and the tendency to 
corruption, can be effectively checked by the construction of a set of 
political institutions, i.e., through constitutional checks and periodic 
elections, so as to prevent these drives from "getting out of hand", and 
hence, prevent or set a limit on, as Yan (1986c) argues, a combination of 
evil and power. Democracy reduces the ability of rulers to hide errors 
so as to continue in a a destructive direction and thereby to compound 
errors into disasters, as Mao did in 1959, manufacturing the most 
deadly famine in human history (Friedman, 1993b). Watergate and the 
resignation of Nixon have demonstrated that when evil people in 
high positions, even the president, abuse the public trust placed in 
them, the multiple checks in a government of divided powers can 
bring such people down.
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(2) Regulative institutions or institutional guides: It is evident that we 
can not eradicate potentially evil instincts, but we are capable of 
controlling evil by an alteration of its direction!2!. Well-established 
institutions can compel evil people do good things. On the part of evil 
leaders, the politically open competition systems are so constituted that 
they can aggregate the self-interested rationality of non-virtuous 
politicians to nevertheless achieve virtuous ends in political life. Thus 
lust for power can be guided adroitly to serve the public in well- 
established institutions. Zhang Junhong (1989, 32), the general secretary 
of the Democratic Progress Party in Taiwan, argues for institutions 
which properly guide the fight for political achievements rather than 
the struggle for narrow interests. It might also be argued that although 
the problem of evil does pose difficulties for Chinese democratization, 
evil persons, under institutional constraints and historically fortuitous 
conditions, might well choose to play the democratic card and push for 
Chinese democratization.
However, liberal dem ocratic institutional arrangem ents, I 
acknowledge, can not guarantee the functions discussed above because evil 
persons might find ways to get round the rules. Nevertheless, democratic 
institutions are able to provide a self-correcting mechanism against being 
abused if this occurs. Thus democratic institutions retain the internal 
potential to avoid the possibility of becoming a new evil, or to correct 
mistakes if needed. As Keane argues, "... democratic procedures provide 
citizens who are affected by certain decisions with the possibility of 
reconsidering their judgments about the quality and unintended 
consequences of these decisions. Democratic procedures sometimes allow 
the majority to decide things about which they are blissfully ignorant. But 
they also enable minorities to challenge blissfully or stubbornly ignorant 
majorities, to bring them to their senses" (Keane, 1992, 127).
Conclusion
Chinese liberals such as Hu Ping, Yan Jiaqi and Liao Xun have identified the 
serious problems of evil in Chinese political life, particularly Hu Ping who
121 For the idea an alteration, see, Hume, 1949b, 197.
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has highlighted ideological and organizational evil in Chinese Communist 
society (Section 2). They implicitly hold a minimal conception of evil in 
terms of violation of rights. They have also justified the exaggerated 
supposition of potential evil, or the principle of preventing the evil of 
pow er-holders, as a "negative" foundation for Chinese dem ocratic 
institutional design (Sections 3 & 5).
Hu Ping and Liao Xun have realized that there is no close or direct 
logical link between democratic institutional arrangements and the concept 
of evil (Sections 4 & 5). There are links between different conceptions of evil 
and different institutional designs. Based on the assumption of the evil of 
the Chinese, an authoritarian institutional arrangem ent is put in place but 
this rem ains unacceptable (Section 4). N evertheless, draw ing on the 
supposition that all hum ans are potentially evil, Chinese liberals such as 
Yan Jiaqi and Hu Ping have argued for the principle of the priority of equal 
rights and fair procedures as a solution to the problem of official ideological 
evil and for the guidance of democratic institutional design (Section 5). In 
taking account of the conception of organizational evil, they have argued 
for institutional protection of liberties through division of powers; they 
have further argued for regulative and restrictive institutions respectively 
(Section 5). They have also argued that not only are democratic institutions 
desirable, those institutions are feasible through counterpoise mechanisms 
and the assum ption of goodness of hum an behaviour (Section 5).
Yan Jiaqi (1986c) has remarked on the significance of the awareness of 
evil in terms of breaking with the traditional moral approach to politics. 
This significance, however, should not be understood as a mere recognition 
of evil, because traditional Chinese legalists such as Han Fei have based 
their autocratic institutional design on the philosophical notion of evil (He, 
1990b, H u Ping, China Spring,  June, 1988, 54); and because even 
Confucianism has acknowledged the evil side of hum an action although 
such acknowledgem ent is incomplete, secondary and inconsistent (Zhang 
Hao, 1989). The significance should be understood in these terms: Chinese 
liberals successfully link the m inim alist conception of evil in terms of 
violation of rights to democratic institutional design, and this link which 
this chapter attem pts to explore and develop represents a breakthrough in 
Chinese democratic thinking.
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CHAPTER 6
Challenge of Exception to Procedural Democracy: 
Constitutional Emergency Power
This chapter has three goals. (1) It defends the idea that procedure and the 
rule of law are a foundation for democracy by discussing and overcoming 
the challenging problem of the exception. (2) It aims to provide a theoretical 
basis for revising articles concerning emergency power in the 1982 
Constitution. (3) It examines and criticizes the arguments in Schmitt's 
theory of the exception and formulates a basic liberal idea of the exception.
Exceptions introduce some degree of uncertainty into constitutional 
life. The effect of exceptions is the belief that political life rests upon an 
insecure foundation if the ultimate courts of appeal are rules allowing for 
exceptions. In other words, if an exception is allowed, which means that 
some laws are not followed by some people at some times and places, this 
weakens rules and undermines the coherence of proceduralism which 
requires that procedures and rules have to be followed by leaders and 
masses at all times and in all places.122 The problems raised by exceptions 
are also serious in a transition to democracy; failure to deal with 
emergencies will lead to a failure of democracy and a restoration of a 
totalitarian regime.
In dealing with the above problems, there are at least three competing 
positions. One extreme position allows of no exception. This is the case of 
Yan Jiaqi's proceduralism which presupposes that a decision in the legal 
sense must be derived entirely from the content of a norm or procedure.122
122The idea of proceduralism is assumed by constitutionalists such as Justice David Davis 
who states that "the Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally 
in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all 
times, under all circumstances." See Murphy, 1986,1192.
12:1 Also the work of Brennan & Buchanan fails to pay attention to the problem of the 
exception. For example, they talk about generality of rules (1985, 29) and claim that 
constitutional analysis attempts to include all the relevant constraints (1985, 17). On the 
other hand, they defend constitutional proceduralism well at a methodological level. Their 
defence of constitutionalism or normativism can be summarized as follows. We require rules in 
society because without them, life would indeed be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short", 
and all the world would surely fight. Rules would operate over a long sequence of plays in
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As Yan Jiaqi asserts, "the idea of 'legal rule' is to establish the idea that laws 
are supreme; political parties, the government, enterprises, organizations, 
and individuals all have to obey the law without exception" (Yan, 1991a, 87, 
emphasis added). This position is understandable because there were too 
many exceptions to laws under Chinese communist rule, and because the 
emergency articles of the 1982 Constitution were abused to suppress the 
students' demonstration in 1989, and lacked restraining influence upon the 
party dictatorship. However, I reject the position primarily because it cannot 
deal with complex problems of the transition period. Sections 3 & 4 will 
justify this rejection. Another extreme position allows exception without 
specifying conditions and plays down the importance of rules. Schmitt's 
theory is a good example, which I will discuss in Section 3.124 A middle, 
moderate liberal position allows some exceptions with specifications of 
conditions under which exceptions are justified, while defending the 
highest authority of constitution and rules. This position, as it applies in 
states of emergency, attempts to revise the articles concerning emergency 
power and to improve the system regulating states of emergency rather 
than abolish it. This position also sees the application of states of emergency 
as a devised instrument to defend democratic and legal order in a particular 
situation. The moderate liberal position will be discussed in Section 4.
This chapter adopts Keane's proceduralist definition of democracy: 
democracy comprises procedures for arriving at collective decisions in a way 
which secures the fullest possible and qualitatively best participation of 
interested parties and their representatives. Democratic procedures include 
equal and universal adult suffrage in constituencies of various size; 
majority rule and guarantees of minority rights; the rule of law; 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of assembly and expression and other 
liberties (Keane, 1992, 124). Exceptions to rules, in this chapter, refer to states 
of exception or states of emergency which may be used to justify actions to 
suspend civil liberties, legislative functions, regulations and common law,
which the fortunes of each player would be somewhat uncertain (1985, 17). Processes 
according to certain rules are of independent value; adherence to certain values provides 
information about the normative status of outcomes (1985, 18).
124I choose Schmitt because Schmitt's theory of the exception is a sophisticated insight into 
the problem of exception in the transitional period; and his theory is a systematic and 
influential explication of the exception problem, and presents powerful arguments for the 
necessity of establishing a new strong authority.
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as well as to suppress particular parties and movements. Further, the 
emergency power is, in Locke's (1956, 82) view, "prerogative", a power to act 
according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the 
law, and sometimes even against it.
The chapter is in four sections. Section 1 briefly introduces four cases of 
states of exception by describing emergency articles in the Constitutions of 
P.R. China, Republic of China, Germany and the US. This provides a basis 
for a theoretical discussion in the later sections. Section 2 examines the 
nature of the problem of the exception associated with the rules of the game 
in a transition to democracy. Section 3 reviews and discusses Schmitt's 
theory of the exception. Section 4 outlines liberal ideas of the exception and 
defends the coherence of proceduralism and constitutionalism. It initially 
discusses the hierarchic and conditional approaches to dealing with the 
problem of exceptions, then briefly examines competing concepts of 
justification for exceptions.
l.Cases of Exception
Here I first describe articles regulating emergency power in several 
constitutions, then turn to practices of the employment of states of 
exception. I will not discuss the historical backgrounds in detail because that 
is beyond the scopeof this chapter.
Case 1: Temporary Provisions in the Republic of China (1948)
In the history of Chinese constitutionalism, the 1946 Constitution 
contained well-designed provisions concerning the state of exception. 
Article 39 of the 1946 Constitution specified that "the President may, in 
accordance with law, declare martial law with the approval of, or subject to 
confirmation by, the Legislative Yuan. When the Legislative Yuan deems it 
necessary, it may by resolution request the President to terminate martial 
law." Further, Article 43 specified that:
In case of a natural calamity, an epidemic, or a national financial 
or economic crisis that calls for emergency measures, the 
President, during the recess of the Legislative Yuan, may, by 
resolution of the Executive Yuan Council and in accordance with 
the Law on Emergency Orders, issue emergency orders,
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proclaiming such measures as may be necessary to cope with the 
situation. Such orders shall, within one month after issuance, be 
presented to the Legislative Yuan for confirmation; in case the 
Legislative Yuan withholds confirmation, the said orders shall 
forthwith cease to be valid (Blaustein, 1992, 6).
However, the above articles and even the 1946 Constitution were 
unfortunately suspended by Chiang Kai-shek in 1948. As the First National 
Assembly convened, "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of 
Communist Rebellion" were enacted on May 29 1948. Although not in the 
form of a constitutional amendment, the Temporary Provisions radically 
altered the 1946 Constitution, and enhanced the powers of the President, 
Chiang Kai-shek. They made the office largely free of legislative control, and 
were later further amended to eliminate the limit of two presidential terms. 
See the following Articles of Temporary Provisions:
Article 1: The President during the Period of Communist 
Rebellion may, by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, take 
emergency measures to avert an imminent danger to the security 
of the State or of the people, or to cope with any serious financial 
or economic crisis, without being subject to the procedural 
restrictions prescribed in Article 39 or Article 43 of the 1946 
Constitution.
Article 3: During the Period of Communist Rebellion, the 
President and the vice President may be re-elected without being 
subject to the two-term restriction prescribed in Article 47 of the 
1946 Constitution.
Article 10: The termination of the Period of Communist Rebellion 
shall be declared by the President (Blaustein, 1992, 27-9).
The above provisions had a longer life than the 1946 Constitution 
itself. They remained in effect until December 25 1990, when President Lee
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Teng-hui officially announced the revocation of the "Tem porary 
Provisions" in Taiwan. 12^
Case 2: The Declaration of Martial Law in China (1989)
Emergency power was specified in Paragraph 16, 17 & 18 of Article 31 of 
the 1954 Constitution: that is, the standing committee of the NPC had 
power "(1) to decide, when the National People's Congress is not in session, 
on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of an armed attack on the 
country or in fulfilm ent of international treaty obligations concerning 
common defence against aggression (Paragraph 16); (2) to decide on general 
m obilization or partial mobilization (Paragraph 17); (3) to decide on the 
enforcem ent of m artial law  throughout the country or in particular 
provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central 
governm ent (Paragraph 18)".126 This emergency power article was deleted 
in the 1975 C onstitu tion .122 Paragraph 12 of Article 25 of the 1978 
Constitution, however, repeated Paragraph 16 of Article 31 of the 1954 
C onstitution, bu t did not adopt Paragraphs 17 & 18.*28 In the 1982 
Constitution, Paragraphs 18, 19 & 20 of Article 67 re-adopted the three 
Paragraphs of Article 31 of the 1954 Constitution. What is more important is 
that Paragraph 16 of Article 89 of the 1982 Constitution grants for the first 
time to the State Council the power to declare martial law in some areas of 
provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the control 
of jurisdiction of the central governm ent.12^
On May 20th 1989, Paragraph 16 of Article 89 of the 1982 Constitution 
was invoked by Li Peng's government to declare martial law in some areas 
of Beijing. However, there is a question of whether the declaration was 
constitutionally justified. For students and intellectuals, the declaration of
12:)On April 22,1991, the National Assembly adopted a series of Constitutional Amendments, 
one of which is a provision for the exercise of emergency powers by the President in Taiwan. 
126Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa 1954 (The Constitution of People's Republic of China 
1954). Beijing: People's Press, 1954,12.
I27Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa 1975 (The Constitution of People's Republic of China 
1975). Beijing: People’s Press, 1975.
128Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa 1978 (The Constitution of People's Republic of China 
1978). Beijing: People's Press, 1978,18.
129Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa 1982 (The Constitution of People's Republic of China 
1982). Hk: Shanlian shudian, 1982, 20-1, 26.
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martial law was illegitimate because Article 67 of the 1982 Constitution 
specified that only the legislative power, the standing committee of the 
NPC, is able to decide on the enforcement of martial law throughout the 
country or in particular provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities 
directly under the central government. A further question is concerned 
with who is the overriding authority according to the 1982 Constitution. If 
Hu Jiwei, the former editor of People's Daily and a member of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress, and others, had successfully 
convened an emergency sitting of the Standing Committee of the NPC and 
had had the order of the declaration of martial law withdrawn, the 
following question would occur. Who, the Standing Committee of NPC or 
the State Council, had the overriding authority to decide on martial law or 
to withdraw it? The 1982 Constitution does not specify this clearly.
Case 3: The State of Exception in Germany (1933)
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution specified that:
If a state does not fulfil the duties imposed by the Reich 
constitution or the laws of the Reich, the Reich president may enforce 
such duties with the aid of armed forces.
In the event that public order and security are seriously disturbed 
or endangered, the Reich president may take the necessary measures in 
order to restore public security and order, intervening, if necessary, 
with the aid of armed forces. To achieve this goal, he may temporarily 
suspend entirely or in part, the stipulated basic rights in articles 114, 
115,117,118,123,124, and 153.
All measures undertaken in accordance with Sections 1 and 2 of 
this article must be immediately reported to the Reichstag by the Reich 
president. These measures are to be suspended if the Reichstag so 
demands" (Bendersky, 1983, 74-5).
It is argued that Hitler acquired power not through the use of Article 
48, but because it was not used against him (Bendersky, 1983,185). However, 
Hitler did use Article 48 to maintain and strengthen his power and to 
establish his dictatorship. The Nazis made effective use of the political 
premiums inherent in the legal possession of power to suppress their
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opposition and to achieve their party goals. Along with the Nazi campaign 
of terror and intimidation, Hitler was abusing his control of the state 
apparatus, particularly the authority of Article 48, in a way that previous 
presidential chancellors would never have been allowed. Emergency 
decrees instituted during early February 1933, placing tight restraint on 
freedom of the press and public meetings, were followed by the decree of 
February 28, which virtually suspended all basic rights. By purging the 
communists and intimidating the other parties, the Nazis acquired a legal 
mandate in the March elections. And Hitler acquired the necessary two- 
thirds majority in the Reichstag under Article 76 to pass an Enabling Act on 
March 24, 1933. Under this act, which was to last for four years, laws could 
be passed not only by the Reichstag, but by the government itself, thus 
eliminating the separation of powers. Equally significant, laws decreed by 
the government could deviate from the constitution so long as they did not 
violate the rights of the Reichstag, Reichsrat, and the office of the president. 
On 31rd March 1933, Hitler's cabinet passed a law for the coordination of the 
states with the Reich, through which all state governments (except the 
already Nazified one in Prussia) were dissolved and reorganized without 
elections. These new Nazi-controlled governments could deviate from state 
constitutions and pass laws without the consent of their legislatures 
(Bendersky, 1983, 196-7,199).
Case 4: Lincoln’s Use of the Emergency power in the US
Section 9 of Article 1 of the American Constitution explicitly 
authorizes suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case 
of rebellion or invasion if public safety requires it. Moreover, the 
Amendment Documents provided for suspension of several safeguards for 
individual rights. For example, the Third Amendment allowed quartering 
of troops in civilian homes during wartime, "in a manner prescribed by 
law"; and the Fifth Amendment allowed suspending of the right to 
indictment by grand jury of members of the militia "when in actual service 
in time of war or public danger," and allowed the government to take, 
"with just compensation," private property for public use (Tucker, 1981, 905, 
914; Murphy, 1986,1176, 1232).
One example of the suspension of individual rights was the Merryman 
case. On May 25, 1861, John Merryman, a state legislator, who stayed at his
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home, was arrested by union troops under control of the Com manding 
General, George Cadwalader. Cadwalader, who was authorized by President 
Lincoln, had power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in 
proper cases; or in other words, the power to arrests and detail, w ithout 
resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he 
m ight deem dangerous to the public safety. Chief Justice Roger Brooke 
Taney, however, argued that the location of emergency power in Article 1 
meant that only Congress — subject to the usual presidential veto ~  could 
authorize suspension. He therefore ru led  that the President had no 
authority to suspend the writ and thus could not authorize anyone else to 
do so. President Lincoln, nevertheless, defended himself in his message to 
Congress on July 4th, 1861, saying that the President could do so on his own 
to fulfil the obligations imposed on him by Article 2 to "take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed" and to "protect and defend the Constitution". In 
August 1861, Congress gave retrospective approval to Lincoln's suspension 
of habeas corpus but did not authorize future presidential suspensions. 
Lincoln again acted on his ow n in Septem ber, 1862. In March, 1863, 
Congress finally authorized the President to use his own judgm ent in 
suspending habeas corpus, bu t im posed certain restrictions when the 
P resident exercised this au thority  w ithin states loyal to the Union 
(M urphy,1986, 1184-91).
The above cases can be illustrated in Table 1.
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Table 1: The Emergency Power Articles and Their Effects in PRC, ROC,
Germany and the US
People's Rep- 
blic of China
Republic of 
China
Germany U. S
Articles Articles 67 
and 89 in the 
1982
Constitution
Articles in 
Temporary 
Provisions 
(1948)
Article 48 in the
W eim ar
Constitution
Section 9 of 
Article 1, the 
third & fifth 
Am endm ents
W ho
im plem ents
it?
NPC or the 
State Council
the President the president Congress or 
the President
Limits on use 
of emergency 
power
no
statem ents
procedural 
restrictions of 
the 1946 
C onstitution 
were 
rem oved
im m ediately 
report-ed to the 
Reichstag by the 
president; 
measures are to be 
suspended if the 
Reichstag 
dem ands.
legislative 
approval, the 
Suprem e 
Court's 
review, time 
& space 
lim its
Rights
suspended
part and all part and all part and all a very few
C onstitution
suspended
unclear yes yes no
In conclusion,
(1) while both the Constitutions of P. R China (1982) and the US were 
am biguous in specify ing  w ho im plem ents em ergencies, both the 
Constitutions of R. O. China and W eimar Germany grant the president 
power to implement emergencies.
160
(2) The Temporary Provisions of P. O. China (1948) had only weak and 
nominal constraints such as "by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council," 
and the 1982 Constitution of P. R. China did not specify restrictions on the 
employment of emergency power; while there are limiting conditions such 
as legislative approval, the supreme court's review, and time and space 
limits in the Constitutions of Weimar Germany and the US.
(3) In terms of effects of the implementation of emergency power, the 
American record is certainly better than that of the other nations. It has 
never suspended the Constitution in its entirety and only rarely invoked 
Section 9 of Article 1. More importantly, the use of emergency power in the 
US left general constitutional rights intact. Contrarily, during the 
emergencies, basic rights and even the constitutions of the Republic of 
China (1946) and Weimar Germany were almost suspended.
2. The Problems of Exceptions in a Transition to Democracy
The above four cases of exception occurred in different contexts of transition 
to democracy. In the case of the People's Republic of China, emergency 
power was used to suppress the 1989 democratic movement. In the cases of 
Nazi Germany and Chiang Kai-shek's China, emergency powers were used 
to close the door to democracy and to establish and maintain dictatorship. In 
the case of the US, the emergency power was used to maintain the unity of 
the US and the federal system in the Civil War. All of this highlights the 
importance of the exception in transitional periods, and requires us to 
analyze the nature of the problem of the exception in a transition.
A transition to democracy can be defined as a movement from a state 
of affairs in which constitutional rules are so discredited that nobody is 
committed to them, to one in which constitutional rules attract the 
commitment of a few members of the elite and are complied with by other 
members of the elite for their personal security and interests. In other 
words, a transition to democracy, by nature, is a shift from the gun to rules 
as the most appropriate way to resolve basic political conflicts. Thus these 
rules become able to regulate political life and the constitution becomes an 
overriding authority above executive authority. There are enormous 
difficulties for a new liberal government in establishing the rules of the 
game in the transition to democracy. Particularly, China will face the
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following predicament. On the one hand, the frequency of exceptions will 
lead to the discrediting of the constitution and create enormous difficulties 
in establishing constitutionalism. On the other, if any exception is denied, it 
will be difficult for a liberal government to maintain social order and to 
realize constitutionalism. The following discussion will elaborate on this 
predicament.
During the transition to a liberal system, there is more open social and 
political conflict for supreme power than in the old totalitarian system 
where struggles for supreme power were more covert. Everyone is now able 
to anticipate being a supreme leader, and ambitious persons willingly seek 
that position through election and procedures. At the same time, these 
ambitious persons may abuse and violate rules blocking their road to 
power. Given that an institutional check system has not yet been established 
fully, in this critical situation, such persons may appeal to armed force as a 
final and decisive means to settle political disputes. Thus, the most 
universal phenomenon in a transition period is that states of emergency 
and martial law are often invoked to violate human rights (such as torture, 
disappearances and virtual abolition of procedural guarantees and lack of 
independence of the judiciary). This is done to try to perpetuate 
dictatorships, to suppress democracy and to attack fundamental freedom as 
shown in Section 1 about. Worse still, in Latin America, the states of 
exception in effect became the rule, acquiring permanent status, and 
becoming the essential judicial support of a "new order" so that judicial 
debates were excluded, legislative powers were reduced, and the police, 
administrative regulations and military tribunals became the principal 
mechanism of social control. And most states of exception were arbitrary 
and merely a pretext in the interest of the dominant regime. Thus, some 
Latin American jurists even advocate the total suppression of the rules 
authorizing states of emergency (Zovatto, 1990, Alvarez-Garcia, 1981).
The violation of rules might be justified by the so-called rapid and 
radical social changes of the transition, which make laws and regulations 
unstable and unreliable. People often seek solutions outside legal channels, 
and even sacrifice the requirement of proceedings so as to deal with the 
complex issues of the transition. For example, in China, the nature of the 
problem of breaking a promise in a contract lies not only in one party failing 
to keep the promise, but in the unfairness of the social conditions under
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which the contract was made. When the social conditions changed, so did 
the content of the contract; and difficulties for maintenance of the contract 
occurred. Thus some Chinese people often use this situation as an excuse to 
withdraw from a legal proceeding, and seek a more flexible solution to deal 
with the conflict of interests regarding whether the contract should be kept. 
Thus rapid and radical social changes become a justification for not 
complying with rules.
There are negative effects of exceptions on constitutional rules. To 
admit any exception at all to a rule is to open up the possibility of an ever 
increasing proportion of exceptions, and open up the way to that rule's 
destruction. The occurrences of exceptions also increase the difficulty of 
making and checking judgments about whether exceptions are justifiable 
and this may lead more and more people to discredit rules. For example, Li 
Peng's government might have used constitutional and legal methods in 
dealing with the 1989 crisis, but it used instead arms and tanks to crack 
down on the students' demonstration. As a result, the 1982 Constitution 
was much more discredited than before, because in a critical situation, it was 
the gun rather than the Constitution that finally decided the outcome of the 
1989 events.
On the other hand, there is a need to see the state of exception as a 
instrument devised to defend democratic and legal order in a transition 
period, as suggested by Case 4 of Section 1 above. The really difficult 
problem associated with the process of realizing the rule of law and 
procedural democracy is that the aim of procedural democracy is to replace 
the "rule of man" with the "rule of law", which implies a limitation on 
personal authority. Now, in the case of China, while legal-rational authority 
has not been established fully, paternalistic authority appears to have been 
eroded in the transition period. It follows that the positive elem ents^0 of
130pye has discussed some positive elements of paternalistic authority as such: (1) there is 
the possibility for great flexibility in policies. Leaders can change direction without fear of 
losing their constituents' support; (2) paternalistic authority can have the great advantage 
in that it avoids a basic dilemma of political development that appears under more 
legalistic forms of authority; (3) although paternalistic authority usually has a way of 
avoiding accountability, it can also heighten peoples' sensitivities concerning whom they 
should turn to if they want to get something done; (4) the autonomy of leadership in policy­
making can also be translated into longer term perspectives in policy practices (Pye, 1985, 
332-4).
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paternalistic authority seem to have disappeared in the past ten years. 131 
This may have created a situation in which there are new problems such as 
distortion of liberty, and burden and abuse of procedure, and in which there 
is a lack of a strong state to deal with the complex problems and to maintain 
social order. If that is the case, there is no hope for the establishment and 
maintenance of the highest authority of procedure. Further, even if the 
market becomes predominant in the Chinese economy and even if it takes a 
capitalist form, which is very probable, there is a continuing need for a new 
form of strong state to tackle fundamental economic and social problems. 
As the events of the late 1980s in China demonstrated vividly, the 
transition process was fraught with instability and tensions arising from the 
growing complexities of the policy process, conflicts between old and new 
interests, threads to economic security and growing social inequality 
(White, 1994). A strong state with strong personal and executive authority is 
thus needed to deal with complex difficult problems and to defend the 
authority of the constitution when it faces challenges in the transition 
period in order to manage the transition to democracy. This strong personal 
authority will require emergency power provided by the constitution on 
exceptional occasions. This is vital for the establishment and preservation 
of procedural democracy provided that a strong authority is limited and 
regulated by just institutional arrangements and that this authority 
complies with the principles of justice and procedures.
Yeltsin's appeal to "special presidential rule" is a good example of the 
demand for a strong authority which requires the emergency power of 
president so that the president can control and reduce social conflicts in the 
transition.132 We leave open the question of whether Yeltsin's appeal is 
constitutionally justifiable, the point is that the emergency power is vital for 
a successful transition, because emergencies do occur, and a new liberal state 
has to live through periods of real and present danger that may threaten not 
merely the stability of a new liberal government or the normality of
131 For example, the former general secretary, Zhao Zhiyang concerned himself with short­
term policy-making, rather than long-term policy-making; his concern was confined solely to 
his own term of office. My friend, Wang Xiaolu, a reformer, who has met Zhao Zhiyang, told 
me that he was impressed by Zhao's short term perspectives when Zhao replied to Wang's 
report.
13^On Yeltsin's emergency power, see Michael Dobbs, "Green Light for Yeltsin Plan," 
International Herald Tribune, 1-2 Nov. 1992, p. 1.
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constitutional life, but even the physical survival of the state and its 
population. The question, therefore, is now about the wise design of the 
articles regu la ting  em ergency pow er. It is well know n that m ost 
constitutions have such articles. A computerized comparative study of 142 
constitutions in the world before 1975 shows that, 31 constitutions contain 
provisions concerning suspension of (part of) the constitution, 47 deviation 
from (part of) the constitution, 17 both suspension and deviation, and 47 
have no such provisions (Maarseveen, 1878, 83). Section 1 above shows that 
the constitutions of PRC, ROC, Germany and the US have some provisions 
for suspension, or relaxation of part of the constitution during emergencies. 
This is also true for the 1982 Spanish Constitution, European and Latin 
American constitutions and similar charters in Portugal and Brazil.
However, there are serious problems associated with the emergency 
pow er articles of the 1982 C onstitution of PRC. First, the provisions 
concerning emergency power of the 1982 Constitution are ill-designed in 
the sense that these articles did not set limitations on the employm ent of 
emergency power and did not specify who has the overriding authority to 
implement it (Section 1). Second, if the collapse of the Chinese Communist 
Party occurred, w hich m ay im ply the invalid ity  of the com m unist 
constitution, at least for anti-communists, there will be no such provisions 
available if there is not enough time to draft and pass a liberal constitution. 
This is evident in Russia where Yeltsin's justification of his decree of 
"special presiden tia l rule" d id  not come from the form er com m unist 
constitu tions b u t from the claim that the Congress is dom inated by 
conservative comm unists who fail to do their duty  and even conspire to 
overth row  a dem ocratic governm ent.*33 On the other hand, Yeltsin's 
a p p ea l to "p re s id e n tia l ru le" w as deem ed  by the  C ongress 
u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l .  This raises the question of w hether the former 
com m unist constitution can provide an overriding authority over how to 
resolve a crisis in the transition period. I will not discuss this question in 
detail here, because further discussion of this im portant question is beyond
133$ee Australian, 22-5 March, 1993.
134Article 121 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR specifies that the presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR has power to proclaim, in the interests of the defence of the 
USSR, martial law in specific localities or for the whole country and general or partial 
mobilization. See, William B. Simons, 1988, 380.
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the scope of this present enquiry. Here, I simply hold the conservative view 
that the form er com m unist constitu tion should be revised and be 
m aintained rather than abolished insofar as there is not enough time to 
draft and pass a liberal constitution. Given this assumption, my concern is 
now the question of redesign of articles regarding emergency power in the 
constitution. Here I should make clear that a w ell-designed article 
regulating emergency power cannot resolve the complex problems of the 
transition, but it provides a due procedure to resolve crises.
The above discussion raises the issue of justification of exception at a 
theoretical level. If a liberal governm ent whose sole concern is equal 
political liberty is threatened by a former com m unist party  movement 
which looks likely to attain power again, what should the liberty-concerned 
governm ent do? Should it honour or respect the liberty of the communist 
movem ent to advance its cause w ithin the existing law? Or should it be 
prepared to deny the liberty of the communist movement for the sake of 
preserving constitutional order and prom oting liberty overall? It is well 
known that the former members of the Communist Party have questioned 
Boris Yeltsin's order that the activities of the Communist Party be banned 
in Russia claiming he violated the principle of equal political rights. Does 
the liberal government have a right to make an exception of the intolerant, 
and  even rep ress those w ho are form er com m unists and  an ti­
constitutionalists in order to maintain social and political stability? If the 
answer is yes, does an exception really underm ine constitutionalism? How 
does proceduralism  constitute a solid foundation for democracy given the 
existence of exceptions? How do we defend constitutionalism  when an 
exception is m ade? Can and how  do we distinguish  justifiable and 
unjustifiable exceptions in defending constitutionalism? Who decides that 
an emergency exists? Who imposes the exception? Who may implement it? 
W ho m ay term inate it? W hat lim its exist during  the em ergency on 
governm ent au thority? Do courts rem ain in session? W hat are the 
problem s associated w ith the em ergency pow er articles in the 1982 
Constitution? And finally, how do we design and revise these articles? The 
following sections will address these questions.
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3. A Critique of Schmitt's Theory of the Exception
Schmitt's political theory of the exception was conceived to justify 
banishing the extreme political movements of the Nazis and the 
Communist party which threatened the Weimar constitutional order from 
the political arena. Schmitt feared that existing electoral methods could be 
and would be exploited by revolutionaries of the left and right in their quest 
for power. He also believed that the Reich president, armed with 
constitutional emergency powers, could prevent a total collapse of political 
order or a seizure of power by extremists. The political outcome, however, 
was far from what Schmitt expected: the emergency powers were partially 
employed several times in the 1920s-30s, but they did not save the Weimar 
constitution after all. Ironically, Hitler invoked Article 48 to establish his 
dictatorship and finally destroyed the constitution. More ironically, Schmitt, 
who urged the employment of emergency power to prevent the Nazis from 
coming to power, turned to serve Hitler and became a prominent "crown 
theorist and jurist" of the third Reich in 1933. The questions raised from the 
above historical facts, are, can Schmitt's theory of the exception be attributed 
to his support for Hitler? What then is wrong with this theory?
The concept of the exception, in Schmitt's theory, should be regarded 
as a "universal concept central to political knowledge" (Slagstad, 1988, 116). 
An exception can, according to Schmitt, at best be characterized as a case of 
extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like (Schmitt, 
1985, 6). Thus the exception is seen as a dangerous situation or worst case 
that guides Schmitt to an unlimited authority. Further, Schmitt's type of 
exception can be described as statist, presidential and authoritarian; the 
president whose duty is to maintain the existence of the state, has the 
unlimited power to suspend the constitution but not to abrogate it in the 
case of an exception.
Schmitt's type of the exception is characteristically statist. In Schmitt's 
thought, the state has remained the crucial element. Only the state can 
guarantee the basic human and social requirements of order, peace and 
stability which are prerequisites for freedom. Under a constitutional system, 
according to Schmitt, the state must determine the enemies of the 
constitution and prevent their acquisition of power. The core of Schmitt's 
position is that maintaining the existence of the state in times of crisis has
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priority over any legal norms. Anti-constitutional parties are to be 
controlled and if necessary suppressed primarily because they threaten the 
state which the constitution upholds.
Schmitt's type of the exception is also characteristically presidential. 
Schmitt perceived the president as the defender of the Weimar state and 
constitution. One political party, in Schmitt's view, cannot determine the 
legality or illegality of another; only a neutral force, the Reich president, can 
make such a decision (Bendersky, 1983, 161). He further interpreted powers 
of the Reich president as those of a "commissarial dictatorship" granted by 
Article 48 of the constitution. The President is the sovereign who decides on 
the exception" (Schmitt, 1985, 5) and can designate the domestic enemy. The 
force of law is not derived from the force of legal norms, but from decisions 
made by the President.
Further, Schmitt's type of the exception is characteristically 
authoritarian. It was argued by a majority of jurists in 1924 that the 
constitutional limitations on presidential emergency powers were clearly 
enumerated in paragraph two of Article 48, and that the president could 
suspend only the seven constitutional articles specifically listed in the 
paragraph. But for Schmitt, the emergency powers granted to the President 
by Article 48 were not limited. Schmitt's legal arguments rested on a 
significant ambiguity in the wording of Article 48 and on his interpretation 
of the basic intent of this provision. The first sentence of paragraph two 
stated that the president could take "necessary measures" to reestablish 
public order and security, whereas the next sentence listed seven articles he 
may suspend to achieve his goal. But as Schmitt pointed out, in times of 
crisis "necessary measures" might entail the suspension of other 
constitutional articles. Therefore, he concluded that the second sentence 
could not serve as a limitation on the first (Bendersky, 1983, 74-6). Thus 
Schmitt argued that the precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional 
competence in the case of the exception must necessarily be unlim ited 
(Schmitt, 1985, 7). What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited 
authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order 
(Schmitt, 1985, 12). Further, Schmitt argued, the sovereign authority can 
stand outside, transcend, and not need to base decisions on, the normally 
valid legal system although he (she) is bound by, and belongs to legal
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norms. In such a situation it is clear that the state remains, whereas law 
recedes (Schmitt, 1985, 7, 12).
Schmitt provided the following arguments for his type of the 
exception. The argument of uncertainty or limits of information about 
emergencies holds that the exception, in Schmitt's view, cannot be 
circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law (Schmitt, 
1985, 6). The precise details of an emergency, it is argued, cannot be 
anticipated. Nor can one spell out what may take place in such a case, 
especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency, or how it is to 
be eliminated (Schmitt, 1985, 6-7).
Further, Schmitt presented the argument of the priority of decision for 
the following three reasons.135 First, rules do not sustain themselves, rather 
they depend on something such as force that is provided but not rule- 
grounded. Second, the legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm in 
an exceptional time (Schmitt, 1985, 10). Finally, normativism cannot be 
normative in the sense that a president and a jurist by his (or her) own free 
will makes value assessments (Schmitt, 1985, 20). Here, Schmitt's line of 
thought presupposes a kind of summary conception of rules, that is, 
decisions made on particular cases are logically prior to rules and a 
sovereign authority is, in principle, always entitled to reconsider the 
correctness of a rule and to question whether it is proper to follow it in a 
particular case.
Schmitt also presented the argument of the inadequacy of procedures. 
As Schmitt asked, how is it logically possible, that a norm is valid except for 
one concrete case that it cannot factually determine in any definitive 
manner? (Schmitt, 1985, 14). For Schmitt, the problem of the exception 
evidences the incoherence of proceduralism, challenges the validity of legal 
norms, shows the uncertainty of political behaviour, and finally points to 
legal contradictions in an exceptional time. The procedural enterprise
135Schmitt himself realized the limits of decisionism and he said that, in his Preface to the 
Second Edition of Political Theology in 1933, the decisionists always run the risk of missing 
the stable content inherent in every political movement. The consideration of this risk leads 
Schmitt to the addition of institutional concepts such as institutional guarantees and 
pluralism to the other two types of juristic thinking - normativism and decisionism (Schmitt, 
1985, 2-3).
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proposed by liberal constitutionalists such as Hans Kelsen who attempted to 
banish the exception and regulate the exception as precisely as possible, 
according to Schmitt, is impractical and inadequate. For Schmitt, to comply 
with formal procedures always delays quick decisions on an exceptional 
occasion; while an emergency requires a quick decision and substantive 
correctness of existing rules, it, therefore, requires an unlimited authority. 
The procedural enterprise, or rationalist effort, in Schmitt's view, is seen as 
no match for any serious problem concerning the independent meaning of 
the decision. The conclusion drawn by Schmitt is thus:
A philosophy of concrete life must not withdraw from the 
exception and the extreme case, but must be interested in it to the 
highest degree. The exception can be more important to it than 
the rule, not because of a romantic irony for the paradox, but 
because the seriousness of an insight goes deeper than the clear 
generalization inferred from what ordinarily repeats itself. The 
exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves 
nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the 
rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception 
(Schmitt, 1985, 15).
Now I turn to the critiques of Schmitt's theory of the exception. 
Among other theoretical problems, there are two wrong assumptions in 
Schmitt's theory of the exception and his criticism of proceduralism: the 
exception is the antithesis of the norm; and decision is prior to norms. 
Schmitt is wrong to see exceptions to rules as a negation of rule-based 
governance. First, there are confusions and contradictions in Schmitt's idea 
of the exception, and these undermine the coherence of his arguments. 
According to Sartori (1989, 65, 69), Schmitt equivocates between the 
heuristic-logical understanding of the "exception" and a juristic-factual 
connotation (exceptional times met by exceptional powers). When Schmitt 
says that "the exception is more interesting then the rule," that "the rule 
proves nothing; the exception proves everything," he is doubtlessly 
referring to the heuristic meaning in which Ausnahme (exception) is the 
non-normal, the non-frequent, and thus Ernstfall, the extreme possibility. 
Ausnahme (exception) can also be applied to exceptional times, "exceptional 
circumstances," and by this route conceived juridically, in a constitutional 
frame of reference, as a state of exception. Here, the "exception" no longer
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Stands in contradiction to "normal," but to the "norm" (legal norms). But 
this, in a juristic sense, has little to do with the argument that "the 
exception is more interesting then the rule," that "the rule proves nothing; 
the exception proves everything" (Sartori, 1989, 68). More seriously, 
Schmitt's heuristic use of the exception is incompatible with his juristic use 
of the exception in the sense that the extreme possibility of the heuristic 
exception denies the whole set of rules; while a state of exception in a legal 
sense still maintains part of the rules. To put it another way, since, as 
Schmitt argues, the exception remains accessible to jurisprudence because 
both elements, the norm as well as the decision, remain within the 
framework of the juristic (Schmitt, 1985, 12), it is not reasonable for Schmitt 
to claim that the exception is more interesting than the rule, and that the 
rule proves nothing at an heuristic-logical level. Since, as Schmitt argues, 
the exception has a systematic, legal-logical foundation (Schmitt, 1985, 5-6), 
and the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristic 
sense still prevails (Schmitt, 1985, 12); it is not reasonable for Schmitt to 
stress only that the exception is everything which leads him to deny the 
importance of the rules.
There are also confusions in Schmitt's idea of legal paradox. For when 
Schmitt claims that the sovereign authority has a right to stand outside, 
transcend, and does not need to base decisions on the normally valid legal 
system, Schmitt actually refers to particular rules. When Schmitt argues 
that the sovereign is bound by, and belongs to the legal system, Schmitt 
actually refers to the overall framework of the legal system which includes 
general meta-rules. There might be tensions between particular rules and 
meta-rules in an exceptional time, but there is no legal paradox at the 
bottom line; because then, to suspend one particular rule or legal regulation 
is to defend and maintain the whole legal system and meta-rules. When 
Schmitt talks about legal paradoxes, he simply adopts confused dialectics, 
and fails to distinguish particular rules from meta-rules; this leads him to 
produce "fictional" legal paradoxes.
Second, Schmitt's argument of uncertainty or a limit of information is 
not convincing. Schmitt's idea of an unlimited authority derives from his 
consideration of the limit to information about the precise details of an 
emergency. And this limit to information may also be seen by Locke as "the 
legislators not being able to foresee and provide by laws for all that may be
171
useful to the community" (1956, 81). Does this limit to information about 
the precise details of an emergency justify the idea of unlimited authority? 
For liberals, the answer is definitely no, because the limit to information 
about the precise details of an emergency leads liberals to the consideration 
of the uncertainty of the consequences of the use of the power to make an 
exception. It is the fear of abuse of procedure, in particular of the power to 
make an exception that leads liberals to argue for restrictions on the 
emergency power of the government so as to reduce the harm that the 
government might inflict on the people. As Locke agues that "when 
mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make use of this power 
[prerogative or emergency power] for private ends of their own, and not for 
the public good, the people were fain by express laws to get prerogative 
[emergency power] determined" (1956, 83). Thus liberals would argue that 
although it is impossible to predict or to specify in advance what emergency 
might arise, what can and must be specified in advance is to preserve the 
ruleness of the rule. It is in the face of the limit to information that 
institutional devices such as rights protections and division of power are 
needed to overcome problems of the limits of reason (See, Hardin, 1988, 76, 
115). Or in Rawls's terms, the assumption of the veil of ignorance (lack of 
information about how the various alternatives will affect rational persons' 
own particular cases so that they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on 
the basis of general considerations) leads rational persons in the original 
position to choose the two justice principles and well-designed institutions 
rather than unlimited authority (Rawls, 1971, 136-42).
Further, a serious problem associated with Schmitt's reasoning is that 
there is a contradiction in Schmitt' argument for a commissarial 
dictatorship in relation to the limits of reason. Schmitt argues that a 
sovereign dictatorship utilizes a crisis to abrogate the existing constitution 
in order to bring about a "condition whereby a constitution [that the 
sovereign dictator] considers to be a true constitution will become possible," 
whereas a commissarial dictatorship endeavours to restore order so that the 
existing constitution can be revived and allowed to function normally 
(Schmitt, 1985, xix). Here, Schmitt willingly presupposes that the 
commissarial dictatorship will restore the constitution. Since, as Schmitt 
says, in his discussion of the theory of the exception, we cannot anticipate 
the form of an exception, it is not reasonable to claim that we can anticipate 
that a commissarial dictatorship will maintain the constitution, and that a
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Sovereign dictatorship can correctly decide what is normal and abnormal.136 
As Sartori remarks, although Schmitt's presidential system is juridically 
circumscribed, his concept of sovereignty cannot be contained, as Schmitt 
maintains, within juristic limits. The monopoly of decision, in its linkage 
with the 'exception', inevitably paves the way to the limitless, absolute 
ruler (Sartori, 1989, 70).
Third, Schmitt makes a mistaken assumption about the priority of 
decision. To make an exception requires a quick decision but not the priority 
of decision. A quick decision does have relative autonomy, but is still 
limited by meta-rules at the bottom line. In fact, Schmitt does not altogether 
reject meta-rules, as he claims that the exception remains accessible to 
jurisprudence and the sovereign belongs to the normally valid legal system 
though he (she) stands outside it when he (she) makes an exception 
(Schmitt, 1985, 7, 12). Also although a quick decision made by a president 
without complying with certain rules is justifiable, as Case 4 of Section 1 
shows, it needs to be consented to by the senates later. If decision is given 
priority, making a decision is more important than how a decision is made. 
As Schmitt says in quoting De Maistre, "It is definitely not in our interest 
that a question be decided in one way or another but that it be decided 
without delay and without appeal" (Schmitt, 1985, 56). Implications of the 
priority of decision are: first, to make a decision is to be free from meta­
rules; second, when a wrong decision is made, the sovereign can avoid 
being accused of error because there is no higher authority to review the 
decision; and finally a wrong decision even can acquire legal validity 
according to the theory of the faulty act of state (Schmitt, 1985, 31). These 
three implications contain seeds for all forms of dictatorship and are the 
enemy of constitutionalism.
The dangers of Schmitt's idea of the priority of decision lead us to 
consider the liberal idea of the priority of rules, that is, rules are pictured as 
defining practices, and the rules of practices are logically prior to particular 
cases (Rawls, 1964, 24-7). This is so because there cannot be a particular case 
of an action falling under the rule of a practice unless there is the practice. 
To engage in a practice, to perform those actions specified by a practice,
136As for criticism of the actions of a 'commissarial dictator' faced with the state of the 
exception, see Schwab, 1989,125, Samples, 1987, 213.
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means to follow the appropriate rules. The priority of rules or the trump of 
rules is also evidenced in the application of meta-rules in everyday political 
life. Although there have been different justifications and explanations of 
rules, they still play roles in everyday political life. The meta-rules, through 
a mechanism of reward and punishment, function as a kind of political 
education which reinforces the priority of rules.
To hold the idea of the priority of rules does not, as Rawls suggests, 
imply that there cannot be an exception to rules. Schmitt is right to argue 
that a particular situation can be an exception to particular rules. Rawls's 
statement that a particular case cannot be an exception to the rule of a 
practice is misleading in the sense that he suggests a solution of mere 
qualification or further specification of the rule (Rawls, 1964, 24-7) rather 
than a solution of suspension, adjustment and redesign of the rule.
I would like now to examine Schmitt's idea of the unlimited 
authoritarian type of exception. Schmitt presupposes the view that there 
must be somebody at the top of the power structure who is able to make a 
quick decision so as to avoid the worst consequences in an exceptional time. 
However, for liberals, the worst political crisis and a situation where we are 
uncertain about the exception do not provide a sufficient justification for 
the idea of an unlimited authority rather than lead us to argue for the ideas 
of division of power and of institutional checks. It is the authoritarian 
political institution that liberals fear, because the undivided and unlimited 
sovereign is nothing more than one of the causes of the worst consequences 
for human beings. Thus, liberals take the view that sovereign authority 
must be divided into legislative, executive and juristic powers. Who is 
allowed to have the power to make an exception is not determined by a 
particular situation but by meta-rules. Neither a president nor a judge has 
supreme power although the power balance may shift.
Further, there is a tension between Schmitt's idea of an unlimited 
condition under which an exception can be made, and his justification of 
the exception. According to Schmitt, the existence of the state is undoubted 
proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm. Schmitt claims 
that the state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of 
self-preservation. The exception remains, nevertheless, accessible to 
jurisprudence because both elements, the norm as well as the decision,
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remain within the framework of the juristic (Schmitt, 1985, 12). At the same 
time, in Schmitt's theory of the exception the precondition as well as the 
content of jurisdictional competence in such a case must necessarily be 
u n lim ited  (Schmitt, 1985, 7). Thus in Schmitt's theory, a sovereign 
authority can determine what actually is an exception, and even decide 
what is normal or abnormal. Thus a contradiction arises: in Schmitt's 
justification of the exception, a sovereign authority is still limited by the 
framework of the juristic; while in Schmitt's assertion of the unlimited 
conditions under which an exception can be made, a sovereign authority is 
totally free to make a subjective and arbitrary exception. Also Schmitt's 
argument that an exception is characterised by the suspension of the entire 
existing order is incompatible with his justification that the exception 
remains accessible to jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, there are intellectual merits in Schmitt's theory of 
exception. First, Schmitt is right to argue that if the constitution itself is in 
danger or is revoked, there will be no proceduralism at all. Hence, to make 
an exception to some rules so as to maintain the constitutional order is 
necessary. Second, it is right for Schmitt to argue for a quick decision on an 
exceptional occasion. Third, Schmitt also is right in pointing out certain 
conditions (the normal situation) under which norms are valid; one of 
these conditions is the acceptance of the legitimacy of the constitution and 
hence adherence to what are commonly known as the rules of the game. 
Fourth, Schmitt's practical critique of normative constitutionalism does 
raise difficult problems such as the validity of legal norms for liberals who 
hope to implement the principle of proceduralism. But Schmitt cannot go 
so far as to claim that these problems are themselves a convincing reason to 
dismiss normative proceduralism. It is wrong to deny the normative 
approach, or to dismiss proceduralism by means of exaggeration of the role 
of the problems of procedure in political life. Schmitt should have chosen 
the road of redesigning rules when facing the challenge of the exception. 
Unfortunately, Schmitt suggested the wrong direction.
4. Liberal Views of the Exception
There are basically two approaches, namely, hierarchic and conditional, to 
deal with the problem of exception. Rules allowing for exceptions cannot 
function as ultimate courts of appeal primarily because they are sometimes
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overruled. Consequently there must be rules which do not allow for 
exceptions and which perform the function of fundamental principles for 
resolving all clashes between rules. The hierarchical approach, therefore, 
holds that rules can be ranked in a hierarchic way so that meta-rules are 
distinguished from particular rules and that meta-rules take precedence 
over particular rules. While meta-rules do not admit of an exception, 
particular rules do. Thus, meta-rules function as the principle for guiding 
how to change rules or redesign rules if we face the challenge of the 
exception. As far as constitutional change is concerned, meta-rules can be 
exemplified as follows: both in Australia and in Switzerland, altering the 
Constitution requires not only the approval of the legislature but also of a 
majority of all the electors voting in a referendum and also a majority of 
electors in a majority of the States in the federation; and in the United 
States amending the Constitution requires the approval of a two-thirds 
majority in each house of Congress, and thereafter acceptance by a vote of 
the legislatures of three-quarters of the states.
The hierarchic approach further holds that to make an exception is to 
suspend, adjust or redesign particular rules, the practice of which has to 
comply with meta-rules. The bottom line is that the above meta-rules 
regulating constitutional changes should not be suspended. This is also true 
of the whole constitution; otherwise meta-rules are in danger. Thus, under 
truly extraordinary conditions, parts of the constitution might be 
suspended, but the whole constitution and its commitment to 
constitutionalism could not be legitimately suspended. In other words, a 
liberal government must observe such basic requirements as respect for the 
worth and dignity of each citizen, though it may, as a temporary measure, 
suspend some rights. Further, liberals would never make an exception to 
the principle of fair procedural justice. Equal political liberties, as Rawls 
asserts, cannot be denied to certain social groups on the grounds that their 
having these liberties may enable them to block policies needed for 
economic efficiency and growth. Nor could a discriminatory selective 
service act be justified ( in time of war) to raise an army (Rawls, 1982, 8-9). In 
other words, the priority of liberty implies in practice that a basic liberty can 
be limited or denied solely for the sake of one or more other basic liberties, 
and never for reasons of public good or of perfectionist values (Rawls, 1982, 
9).
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Contrarily, if an exception to meta-rules or a suspension of the whole 
constitution is allowed, there is an incompatibility between this kind of 
exception and proceduralism. Schmitt's idea of suspension of the 
constitution in its entirety indeed contradicts proceduralism because the 
suspension of the whole constitution implies that meta-rules no longer 
exist so that the fundamental procedure regulating constitutional change is 
denied. However, this theoretical contradiction results from the denial of 
the idea of meta-rules. If meta-rules are distinguished from particular rules, 
the former do not admit of exception, while the latter admit of and imply 
exception. This is the way to defend the coherence of proceduralism. This is 
also the fundamental procedure for making exceptions; if the procedure is 
followed, the exception can be deemed consistent with proceduralism. An 
exception to certain particular rules does not contradict meta-rules, because 
according to these meta-rules, an exception is made. Thus the liberal 
argument about exceptions is in fact the argument about meta-rules 
themselves. This allows liberals to resist the idea that exceptions exist apart 
from rules. In this manner, the Schmittian contradiction can be resolved. 
Schmitt's theory of the exception, therefore, as it applies in a state of 
emergency or crisis, does not disprove the principle of procedure.
The above ideas can be concretely illustrated through discussion of the 
case of Lincoln's use of emergency power which did not contradict 
proceduralism and an equal chance before law. As President Lincoln argued, 
his exception, namely, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, was 
justified by Article 2 of the American Constitution, and was also approved 
later by Congress. Further, when the writ of habeas corpus was suspended 
on an exceptional occasion, meta-rules still played a major part in the sense 
that they provided a procedure to resolve political conflict between 
President Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney. Rules, therefore, ought not as 
Schmitt suggests to be lightly discarded; nor are they of little value. Even 
Schmitt himself acknowledges, the exception remains accessible to 
jurisprudence and the sovereign belongs to the normally valid legal system 
though he (she) stands outside it when he (she) makes an exception 
(Schmitt, 1985, 7, 12). It, therefore, is wrong for Schmitt to draw the 
simplistic conclusion that the norm is destroyed in the exception. In 
making an exception, the sovereign can still be defending and maintaining 
the importance of rules and the constitution as a whole.
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Not only is there no incompatibility between exceptions and 
proceduralism, but exceptions are an essential element of proceduralism. 
Proceduralism, according to the hierarchy approach, leaves a space for an 
exception to particular rules. This space is open to new particular situations 
and brings these under the practice of meta-rules; this space, therefore, helps 
to increase the capacity of proceduralism to deal with unpredictable crises. 
Far from weakening rules, exceptions help preserve them; they are a device 
which enables us to resolve conflicts between rules. Thus the rules and 
their exceptions occupy the same plane, the relationship between the power 
to create exceptions and the basis for doing so becomes an essential element 
of the extent of rule-based constraint itself. The power to make exceptions 
does not undercut the primary force of the rule itself (Schauer, 1991, 893-9).
Because the applications of states of exception were abused to violate 
human rights and even destroy constitutions, as shown through cases 1, 2 
and 3 in Section 1, it is now more important to examine the rules for states 
of exception than to focus on Schmitt's interpretation of the significance of 
the exception and on the question of compatibility between exceptions and 
proceduralism. This leads us to the conditional approach which holds that 
we can list the conditions under which the employment of exceptions are 
limited and justified; or we can formulate the rules for making exceptions; 
the exceptions failing to comply with these rules are regarded as 
unjustifiable. Here I am now opposed to Schmitt's idea of an unlimited 
exception which fails to examine the rules for exceptions. Constitutional 
regimes of exceptions are in fact constitutional rules for making exceptions 
in exceptional circumstances. The rules are thus: an emergency which is 
defined as a time of actual war or armed rebellion, or a danger to the 
security of the state and public life; legislative implementation of exceptions 
or delegation of authority to presidents along with other restrictions such as 
Congress's approval; the judicial review of an emergency decree after the 
event of emergency. Also, further conditions under which an exception can 
be made are as follows: permitting restrictions on an anti-constitutional 
party must be justified by the evidence of possible failure of the constitution 
and of the absence of reason of an anti-constitutional party; and it must be 
guided by the principles of justice. As Rawls claims:
A more stringent condition is required: there must be some
considerable risks to our own legitimate interests. Thus just
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citizens should strive to preserve the constitution with all its 
equal liberties as long as liberty itself and their own freedoms are 
not in danger. They can properly force the intolerant to respect the 
liberty of others, since a person can be required to respect the 
rights established by principles that he [she] would acknowledge in 
the original position. But when the constitution itself is secure, 
there is no reason to deny freedom to the intolerant (Rawls, 1971, 
218-9).
To apply the above rules and conditions in China, the problem 
associated with Articles 67 & 89 concerning emergency power in the 1982 
Constitution is that the rules are not stated fully or clearly. The most serious 
problem is that these rules did not set limitations on government authority 
to employ emergency power. The remedy, which is open to further 
discussion, is to revise these articles or to draw up new articles concerning 
emergency power. In the near future, Chinese constitutionalists will 
probably adopt and modify Articles 39 and 43 of the 1946 Constitution in the 
following ways: to specify circumstances such as a time of actual war or 
armed rebellion, or a danger to the security of the state and public life that 
calls for emergency measures; emergency measures must be approved by, or 
be subject to confirmation by, the Congress; resolution of the executive 
must comply with constitutional rules; an emergency order shall, within 
one month after issuance, be presented to the Congress for confirmation; in 
case the Congress withholds confirmation, the emergency order shall 
forthwith cease to be valid.
If a dispute over an emergency order occurs, there is a question of who 
is to be given the power to explain and justify an exception for the sake of 
equal liberties. Schmitt answers that the president has such a power. As he 
says, rules do not implement themselves and procedure cannot tell you 
what will happen; and that the legal idea cannot translate itself 
independently is evident from the fact that it says nothing about who 
should apply it (Schmitt, 1985, 31).
Locke provides another answer. "Between an executive power in 
being, with such a prerogative, and a legislative that depends upon his will 
for their convening, there can be no judge on earth; as there can be none 
between the legislative and the people, when they have got the power in
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their hands, design or go about to enslave or destroy them. The people have 
no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on 
earth, but to appeal to heaven" (1956, 85).
I am opposed to Schmitt's presidential power to explain and justify 
exceptions. There is a danger of that power being abused if the executive 
alone is aw arded this power. Executive power should not be allowed to 
have power to explain and justify exceptions, rather it should only have a 
duty to follow the rules for states of exception in the constitution. This is a 
lesson from Mao Zedong's m anipulation of procedures. Mao was astute 
enough to employ a "form" of democracy, procedures and "consensus" to 
serve as a tool for m aintaining his political power. For example, Mao 
manipulated successfully the time, place and people for party conferences in 
which Mao could hopefully gain a majority of votes. One reason why Mao 
successfully m anipulated procedure is that he had unlim ited power, in 
particular, the power to make an exception and the power to explain it; this 
was also due to the weaknesses of institutionalization in the Chinese 
political structure.
I agree with Locke's answer that the people have a right to appeal to 
heaven. But, practically speaking, the pow er to explain and justify an 
exception for the sake of equal liberties should lie with the suprem e court, 
but the successful operation of this power depends on a well-established 
pow er-check system  such as a division of the three pow ers and the 
autonom y of the judicial system. These are institutional mechanisms and 
insuperable limitations to governmental abuses of emergency power.137
Now I w ould like to conclude this section by briefly commenting on 
competing conceptions of the justification of exceptions. Schmitt justifies 
the power to create exceptions in the name of social order and the existence 
of the state. Section 3 has already discussed the theoretical problem  
associated w ith Schmitt's justification. Here the practical problem  is that 
there are risks in this kind of justification, because the exception-creating
137I acknowledge that there are problems with court review. For example, in the Irish 
practice of exceptions, emergency resolutions cannot be reviewed by the courts, because they 
are not part of the Bill. An Emergency Bill, however, can be refereed to the Supreme Court 
under Article 26 procedure but the scope of the court's scrutiny will be limited. See J. Kelly, 
1984, 162-8.
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power is identical with the power to apply the purpose of social order and 
with the existence of the state rather than the constitution or rules, or takes 
these purposes as in fact being the rule. This kind of justification easily 
contributes to the abuse of states of exception because the subjective 
interpretation of what is the existence of the state has no objective criteria. 
The danger in this kind of justification is self-evident in Hitler's use of the 
justification for his dictatorship.
For liberals, when constitutional parties have the power to make 
exceptions, the primary objective is, in Rawls's view, to establish a just 
constitution with the liberties of equal citizenship. As Rawls states:
It should be noted that even when the freedom of the intolerant is 
limited to safeguard a just constitution, this is not done in the 
name of maximizing liberty. The liberties of some are not 
suppressed simply to make possible a greater liberty for others. . . .
. This is done for the sake of equal liberty under a just constitution 
the principles of which the intolerant themselves would 
acknowledge in the original position (Rawls, 1971, 220).
In other words, if an anti-constitutional party's complaint about being 
suppressed refers to an equal stance before the law, then an anti- 
constitutional party has no title to complain when it is denied equal liberty. 
It may have the right to complain not as a right to complain on behalf of the 
intolerant, but simply as a right to object whenever a principle of justice is 
violated.
In conclusion, there are three criteria to distinguish justifiable 
exceptions which imply limitation on rights, and unjustifiable exceptions 
which imply derogation of human rights: (1) for the sake of equal liberties 
or to make possible a greater liberty for others; (2) to comply with rules for 
exceptions, or to comply with meta-rules; finally (3) to maintain the 
constitution which should not be suspended entirely. Thus, any action by 
authorities that exceeds such limits would be unlawful. That would be the 
case if the exceptional measures last longer than the specified time limit, as 
suggested by case 1 of Section 1 above; if they are manifestly irrational, 
unnecessary or disproportionate. Although Hitler claimed that his 
abandonment of freedom of speech and press was justified by Article 48, in
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the end, he destroyed the Weimar constitution. This is the case of an 
unjustifiable exception.
Conclusion
The problem of the exception is interesting, challenging and important, in 
particular, during a transition to democracy. Successful transition to 
constitutional democracy depends on, among other things, a wise design of 
a constitution which has provisions or rules not only for the protection of 
basic liberties but also for exceptions so that the constitution has a capacity to 
deal with uncertainty and crisis. It, therefore, is worthwhile for Chinese 
constitutionalists such as Yan Jiaqi to take the difficult problem of the 
exception into account, rather than denying it, in their political thinking. 
For example, Articles 67 & 89 regulating emergency power in the 1982 
Constitution in China should be revised in a way that specifies the 
restrictions on employment of emergency power and the conditions under 
which the particular rules may rightfully be put aside.
Schmitt's heuristic-logical and juristic-factual understandings of the 
concept of the exception create confusions and theoretical contradictions. 
His authoritarian, presidential, unlimited type of exception is also 
dangerous and risky in constitutional life. Schmitt's argument that the 
exception is the antithesis of the norm fails because to make an exception is 
to suspend, adjust and redesign particular rules in accordance with meta­
rules. His argument that decision is prior to norms also fails because to 
make an exception does not require the priority of decision but a quick 
decision which is still constrained by the priority and importance of meta­
rules.
While the argument advanced in this chapter rejects Schmitt's theory 
of the exception, this is not to trivialise the problem of exception. In 
response to the challenge of the exception, liberal constitutionalists attempt 
to distinguish meta-rules from particular rules, and to adjust and redesign 
particular rules rather than to abandon the whole constitution and 
proceduralism. In this direction, we resolve the political problems of 
exceptions; and extend the field where procedure can apply and finally 
enhance the degree of political order and stability. Further, the liberal type 
of exception is conditional and limited with constitutional restrictions,
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division of pow er and the independence of the judiciary; and the 
justification for making an exception is provided by the doctrine of equal 
liberty rather than the principle of Schmittian statism.
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CHAPTER 7
Infusing a Rights-based Morality into Political Institutions
Chinese liberals such as Yan Jiaqi and Hu Ping have explored the social and 
political nature of rights-based morality, the political dimension to 
morality, rather than morality in general; that is, political institutional 
arrangements should be based on a morality which is characterized by 
urgent recognition of the following: equal liberties, institutional protection 
of rights and fair procedures for democratic institutional design. This is 
what might be called the project of infusing rights-based morality into 
political institutions in China. 138 The present study has analysed that 
project by showing how the liberal idea of rights provides a rights-based 
foundation for a moral critique of established political power in China 
(Chapters 1, 2 and 3) as well as for constructive guidance for political 
institutional arrangements (Chapters 4 ,5  and 6).
This chapter attempts to summarize and synthesize occasional and 
fragmentary discussions of moral issues presented in the previous chapters. 
It examines the moral foundation of liberal theory of democracy in China by 
discussing the idea that Chinese Marxist, goal-based morality and the 
traditional sage's conception of morality should be taken out of Chinese 
politics; while rights-based morality should be infused into political 
institutions in China. This chapter is not so much an historical account of 
the decline of Chinese Marxist, goal-based morality and the rise of rights- 
based morality as partly a sociological and largely a philosophical analysis of 
these. The aim of this chapter is to defend the necessity and the importance 
of that project in Chinese political life.
I should say right at the beginning that the project of infusion of 
morality into politics in my present work is not one that concerns the 
moralization of individuals, rather it is a question of seeking moral 
principles that are to guide institutional design for a particular form of
138The term, "Infusing morality into politics" is borrowed from Goodin, 1992,168.
139Goodin has examined two ways - moral and political tracks - to motivate behaviour of 
individuals, see Goodin, 1992.
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g o v e r n m e n t . The institution of politics is, first of all, the democratic 
institution of a civil state -- the use of passions against passions, power 
against power, threat against threat.
The chapter is in four sections. Section 1 presents a general picture of 
the infusion of the procedural conception of morality into politics and the 
removal of the sage's conception of morality from Chinese politics. Section 
2 rejects the argument of the independence of politics from morality and 
argues for the moral principle of fairness. Section 3 dismisses the practical 
argument concerning the catastrophic consequences of infusing politics 
with moral principles by distinguishing between goal-based and right-based 
moralities. Section 4 rejects the cultural relativist argument and argues for a 
normatively minimal international morality.
1. Infusion and Removal of Moralities
In ancient and contemporary China, power was and is used to set an 
example of moral rectitude so that the conduct of all individuals should be 
exemplary. In this way, virtue was to be upheld and the consequence would 
be a peaceful, harmonious society rather than a society mobilized for 
mundane problem-solving. Politics was to be solely a matter of ethics, not 
the use of power to maximize values (Pye, 1985, 56). There is a long history 
of the admixture of Chinese morality and government; means and ends 
have become indistinguishable, and not only was and is ethical conduct the 
guide for government, but government was and is there to improve the 
ethical conduct of all (Pye, 1985, 63-4).
What is involved in this mix of politics and morality is the Chinese 
sage’s conception of morality; this demands that human beings be altruists 
and sages who are the first to be concerned with the world's troubles and 
the last to rejoice in their own happiness. This kind of morality maximizes 
seeking for the highest ideal of the moral state.
140Here my colleagues and myself are more interested in moral principles for institutional 
design than in those for individuals, see the introduction of our Chinese translation of John 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice (co-translators with He Huanhong & Liao Shengbai, published 
by Social Science Press, Beijing, 1988).
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Liberal institutional design does not require the sage's concept of 
maximizing of virtue. There are at least three reasons for this. First, the 
very essence of rule by moral example is anti-politics; that is, it precludes 
the kinds of activities associated with using power competitively in support 
of different values. Instead, rule by moral example favours the ideal of a 
static, conformist social order. Everyone is expected to know what the moral 
standards are that have to be shared by the entire community in order to 
achieve the passive state essential for such a style of governance. Those who 
are safely included in the elite could engage in debates about alternative 
definitions of virtue, but for society as a whole there should be conformity 
and consensus. Yet, precisely because the norm of stylized rule allows no 
concessions to the realities of contention, the counternorms of officialdom 
have to allow scope for devious tactics, intrigue, subtle ploys, and ingenious 
dissimulation among those certified as the most virtuous. Thus the life of 
officialdom was and is built upon the foundation of hypocrisy (Pye, 1985, 
42). Furthermore, the Chinese cultural belief that rule should be by virtuous 
persons and not by impersonal laws makes it difficult for the Chinese to 
institutionalize authority since they are reluctant to invest power in 
impersonal arrangements (Pye, 1985, 200).444
Second, institutional arrangements are less likely to be implementable 
the more they demand of people. Liberals, in adopting the assumption that 
humans should be assumed potentially evil or knavish, take a pessimistic 
view of the effectiveness of the sage-moral appeal. Probably, one who is 
seriously committed to the democratic enterprise would be willing to 
sacrifice his or her time, salary and even life. But we cannot really expect 
that moral rules of this kind will be followed, and cannot expect too much 
of the average person. Although the sage-moral approach may also admit of 
the assumption that most persons will not be sages, it assumes that all 
people are, by nature, potentially moral sages, and thus encourages people 
to make self-sacrifices.
Third, one of the purposes of democratic institutional design is to 
avoid the negative consequences of a totalitarian system, the great flaw of 
which is that its operation depends on personal morality. Thus correctly
141Yan Jiaqi expressed a similar argument in my interview with him on December 18th, 1992 
in Paris.
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modelled constitutions such as liberal or republican institutional 
arrangements function independently of the manners of humans and the 
goodness or badness of rulers, making it in the interests of even a bad 
person to act for the public good (Hume, 1964, 99). The science of politics, 
therefore, is not concerned with manners and morals, but with the 
balancing of separate interests and the skilful division of power in order to 
best secure public interests (Forbes, 1975, 227). Institutional design should 
economize on virtue (see Brennan & Buchanan, 1985) in the following two 
senses: (1) The social contract from which it derives assumes an impersonal 
model unconcerned with the best virtues. (2) Fair procedures on which 
liberal institutional design are based aim to regulate how institutions (and 
rules of law) operate, rather than to regulate how individuals behave 
virtuously. Thus the sage’s moral appeal constitutes neither a starting-point 
nor a guiding principle for democratic institutional design. Consequently, 
the institutions should not be seen as tools to produce ideal human beings 
as defined by one doctrine or one organization, but rather as an instrument 
of rational control in the management of evil.
The above project of liberal institutional design can be seen in the 
Chinese intellectuals' advocacy of the separation of politics from the official 
ideology. Just as the West separated politics from religion in the period of 
secularisation, China, it is argued, needs to separate politics from the official 
ideology and its morality; and this separation is a hallmark of political 
modernity. With this attempt to free politics from the official ideology, 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, initially there needs to be a 
radical desacralisation of the Chinese official ideology, followed by the 
search for a new relationship between ideas and politics as well as between 
morality and politics. An official ideology must carry respect for the 
autonomy of philosophy as an intellectual activity and, just as importantly, 
it must desist from relying on the power of the state in order to control 
opinion and thought (He Baogang, 1988, 41-2). At the same time, liberal 
institutional arrangements need to build on a rights-based morality, at least, 
on a procedural conception of morality.
Just as Hume sought for a new conception of virtues, as did the moral 
philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Chinese liberals 
have sought for a procedural morality which constitutes a basis for 
proceduralism. The procedural conception of morality emphasizes rule-
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following and fair procedures; as David Hume (1949a & b),142 J. S. Mill143 
and Adam Smith144 see it, the virtue of justice is nothing but a disposition 
to obey the rules of law. The procedural conception of the good person is 
also not seen as the Confucian good person, but, as Montesquieu (1989, xli) 
argues, the politically good person who loves the laws and procedure and 
who acts from love of the law and procedure. Thus the procedural 
conception of morality and the good person is less demanding than the 
sage's conception in the sense that it only requires a minimal criteria: 
people have to follow the rules of the game.
This minimal demand facilitates the feasibility of institutional design, 
because institutional arrangements are more likely to be implementable the 
less they demand of people. The possibility and operation of democratic 
institutions also depend on the procedural view of morality; otherwise 
democratic institutions cannot work. Liberal institutional design, therefore, 
presupposes the procedural conception of virtue, or institutionalized 
morality in the sense that it does not stress that people should behave 
virtuously but require people to follow rules through institutional devices 
such as the mechanism of reward and punishment. For example, Mill's 
morality is composed of "coercive rules", i.e. rules that indicate when 
coercion may be used to compel or punish (Gaus, 1980, 266).
Now it is time to examine a possible tension in Chinese liberals' 
thought. Although Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi have advocated procedural 
morality, they have unconsciously retained vestiges of traditional moral 
idealism. They share implicit assumptions about goodness: (1) The 
democratic enterprise should be guided by those who are concerned only 
with the interests of the people and less with personal interests; leaders of 
democratic movements, therefore, should be, and can be, moral sages. (2) It 
is the critical and creative intellectual, and not the political ruler, who 
represents, advocates and holds to truth and social justice. The power of
142Also see Macintyre, 1982, 216.
143According to Mill, moral uses of "right" and "wrong" depend upon an act's conformity to, or 
violation of, fairly general moral rules (Gaus, 1980, 267).
144Smith argues that to be virtuous equates with rule-following. See Macintyre, 1982, 218. 
145See Yan's conversation with Zhu Gaozheng, Z hongyang ribao, Taiwan, May 15, 1990; and 
Hu’s conversation with Zhu Gaozheng , in Hu Ping, 1988, 238-66, also see, China Spring, 
August, 1990, 20-1.
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Chinese intellectuals is based on, or comes from morality and 'cultural 
capital' rather than from class, property or political position. The role of 
intellectuals is to point out the right path of politics and this role has more 
status than that of political leaders (see, He, 1991a).
If these assumptions are taken as an intellectual basis for institutional 
design, then they undermine the claim in their argument for democratic 
institutions that human beings are self-interested, further undermine the 
principle of equal liberty at the institutional design level, and possibly deny 
the civil and political rights of peasants in the process of democratisation in 
terms of the superiority of intellectuals. This possible theoretical tension in 
the Chinese liberal theory of democracy comes from the absence of a 
distinction between morality as virtues (sages) and as rules (procedures). If 
this distinction is made, the sage's conception of morality is taken out of 
democratic institutional design, and the procedural conception of morality 
is adopted at the institutional design level. The contradiction is then 
resolved, because the procedural conception of morality recognizes the 
legitimacy of self-interests and social conflicts which are seen as a 
permanent feature of human life. The theoretical tension also stems from 
an absence of a distinction between institutional design and practical moral 
advocacy. The former does not require the sage's view of morality, but 
rather the procedural conception of morality. The moral advocacy calls for 
the moral sentiment to deal with practical problems such as factional fights 
among democrats. And it may be useful in reducing tensions among 
democrats and speeding up the process of democratisation if all the Chinese 
democrats were "sages". While the good intentions of Hu and Yan are 
highly laudable, the political results are likely to be dubious, and after all, 
this moral advocacy has to be rejected at the institutional design level in 
order to avoid or dissolve the inbuilt tension at a theoretical level.
2. Procedural Principle that Should be Fair
The project of infusing procedural morality into politics is evident in Yan 
Jiaqi's idea of procedural democracy. Yan’s normative proceduralism 
presupposes a close association between constitutionalism and subjectivism 
or humanism in ethics; that is, constitutional democracy must be based on 
the basic humanist notion that individual human beings are the ultimate
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ethical units (Yan, 1988, 63-4, 1991a, 144-5). Thus his procedural proposal 
presupposes a moral dimension of politics.
Those Chinese who hold a nihilistic attitude to morality, as revealed in 
the slogan of the "death of Lei Feng" which equates with the death of God 
in the West, might argue that there is no need to discuss morality in 
Chinese political life at all. This position might be supported by the 
argument of the independence of politics from morality. Drawing on 
Schmitt (1976), they might argue that the crucial political distinction is that 
between friend and foe. The political foe need not be morally evil or 
aesthetically ugly. The friend-foe antithesis is seen as independent of other 
antitheses, such as good and evil in morality. Politics is further seen as 
autonomous only in the sense that the validity of political categories is 
independent of morality. Politics is then a battle to conquer and retain 
political power, impatient of all normative bonds (see Schmitt, 1976, 25-37, 
also see Slagstad, 1988, 114-6, Hirst, 1987, 26-7). Thus proponents of this line 
of argument dismiss Yan’s moral effort as naive and idealist. Moral 
idealism is perceived as failing to understand the essence of politics: moral 
principles do not guide and regulate political life, rather they are always 
manipulated by politicians in their own interests.146
No doubt, the nature of politics is the conflict between foe and friend 
and the struggle over competing values within or outside a political 
community. However, friend-foe politics does not exclude the moralistic 
and normative aspect of politics. Friend-foe politics can be incorporated in 
or subordinated to, a constitutional-democratic framework, because those 
who understand politics in friends-foe terms might well choose to respect 
rules and encourage others to respect rules in the hopes of minimizing 
their potential losses. Furthermore, a democratic constitution itself is 
devised to address and resolve the enduring problem of conflicts of 
interests. The key issue is how to deal with such conflicts. For a liberal, these 
conflicts can be resolved or controlled by commonly held norms and 
compromise within just institutional devices. No matter who is friend or
146For example, new elites which are often composed of the children of Party veterans have 
adopted a Machiavellian immoral position in politics. See "Realistic Responses and 
Strategic Choices for China after the Soviet Coup", which is discussed by David Kelly, 1992, 
5-6.
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foe, he or she has to comply with an appropriate procedure to deal with 
basic conflicts in political life.
At this point, there is a challenge to proceduralism in the theoretical 
problem of the abuse of procedure; that is, the procedural principle exists 
independent of the decisions it will produce. A purely procedural principle 
would legitimate the adoption of a policy imposing any deprivation, such as 
deprivation of property, or of equal opportunity in politics, in employment 
or in education, provided only that it is supported by procedure specified by 
the decision rule. This is a theoretical defect of formalistic proceduralism 
(Fishkin, 1979, 214).
Yan's idea of proceduralism indeed fails to address the above question 
of the theoretical weakness of pure proceduralism. Here, Rawls's idea of 
normative constructivism is employed to overcome Yan's shortcoming, to 
defend the ideal of procedural democracy.
Turning to the question of the principle of procedure being abused in 
practice, I would argue that in order to protect everyone from such 
deprivations and to overcome the theoretical defect of proceduralism, a 
principle which is not merely procedural would be required. In this context, 
Rawls's deontological theory of the priority of rights and his idea of pure 
procedural justice is suitable for this task. To put it very simply, a principle 
should take rights as "trumps"; and procedure should be fair in terms of 
equal political opportunities or the principle of equal liberties. This 
procedural fairness can help us to decide on adjudicative procedures when 
we have exhausted the arguments showing procedures to be more or less 
apt to yield reasonable determinations. If a fair procedure is set up, the 
outcome is likely to be fair,149 whatever it is, provided that the procedure 
has been properly followed. Thus pure procedural justice constitutes a 
normative basis for procedural democracy.
147I acknowledge different understandings of fairness in the Western political theories, and 
tensions between fairness as mutual benefit and fairness as impartiality. For a utilitarian 
concept of fairness, see, Robert Goodin, 1976, Chapter 6. For a discussion of tension between 
theories of justice, see, Brian Barry, 1989.1 adopt Rawls's conception of justice as fairness in 
my present study.
148More discussion, see Gaus, 1991.
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H um an beings need procedural fairness to regulate their actions. 
When procedural politics is not fair, then political force justified by so- 
called procedure becomes a mere brutal solution; thus procedure becomes a 
tool in the interests of a minority of politicians. It is im portant to stress 
again that the Chinese considerations of procedural fairness result from the 
tragedy of the Cultural Revolution, and from the historical lesson that 
theoretical justifications of the violation of human rights always depend on 
the denial of the principle of equal liberty (I have discussed this in Chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 6). The fact that procedures have been abused through "autocratic 
rules of law" or "rules by law" certifies that it is necessary to implement the 
principle of pure procedural justice and a real rule of law (for a definition of 
the rule of law, see Rawls, 1989, 254) to protect and maintain liberty. To do 
so, the crucial thing is that procedure and law must themselves be just. That 
a constitution should be just, therefore, is the foundation of the rule of law. 
It is here that Rawls's liberalism appeals as a fundam ental solution to 
procedural and legal problems in China; that is, by securing basic rights and 
liberties, and assigning them a due priority, the most divisive questions are 
taken off the political agenda (Rawls, 1989, 253, also see 1987, 21). W ithout 
this fundam ental reconsideration and solution, China will repeat its old 
m ode of rule by law. It is here that Rawls's liberal norm ativism  indeed 
apprehends the fundam ental problems pertaining to a moral foundation 
for sound politics and better political arrangem ents for society. Political 
liberalism wisely identifies the most urgent value, equal liberties: a fair 
procedure is set up, any principles agreed to will be just (Rawls, 1971, 136); 
and if the institutions of the basic structure are framed according to the 
value of equal liberties, intractable conflicts are unlikely to arise (Rawls, 
1987,16).
3. The Rights-based Political Morality
One might argue that the project of infusing politics with moral principles 
has led to catastrophic consequences in China: Mao Zedong's appeals to a 
m oral m ovem ent so as to change the old face of China did result in 
tragedies during the Cultural Revolution. Such moralistic appeals actually
149I acknowledge that institutional arrangements such as markets, legal regulations and 
decision rules of unanimity can not guarantee fair outcomes.
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comforted and caused people to back Mao’s dictatorship. If moral appeals 
could serve the mere task of providing solace to the supporters of Mao's 
dictatorship, that is more than enough to give us pause in our project of 
trying to infuse morality into politics.
One easy reply would be to distinguish, at this point, between the "true 
morality" which we hope to infuse into politics and the "pseudo-morality" 
on which Mao's rule relied. The counter-examples of Mao's pseudo­
morality and the like should not necessarily give us pause, this argument 
would go, because Mao and his supporters were not really acting on moral 
principles — on true moral principles — at all. The objection, therefore, is not 
to the infusion of moral principles into politics but rather against the 
infusion of false moral principles.
However, this strategy of distinction between true and false moralities 
is intellectually unsatisfactory. It poses, in Goodin's (1992, 163-4) view, 
genuine problems on two levels. First, the distinction between true and 
false moralities appeals to practices so as to identify true morality and reject 
false morality. Since those employing this device will never be prepared to 
say what is a true moral principle until they see how it turns out in practice, 
they are never in a position to say in advance what morally we should do. 
The second relating to the first is an institutional design-problem posed by 
such an approach. If we do not know what the right principles are until we 
see how they turn out, we can never set things up in such a way as to 
guarantee that the right principles are put into practice in the first place. 
People trying to design the system so that the right principles are put into 
effect will simply be chasing their own tails, if this line were adopted. On 
that account, the whole project of infusing morality into politics would 
become a logical impossibility.
Given this lack of success in distinguishing true and false moralities, a 
distinction among the rights-based, duty-based and goal-based moralities is 
employed to avoid the question of true or false and to focus on the question 
of the most urgent value. This alternative strategy, I suggest, is useful in 
defending the project of infusing morality into political institutions.
Ronald Dworkin (1977, 171-2) has suggested a "tentative initial 
classification" of political theories into goal-based, rights-based, and duty- 
based theories. Such a theory might be goal-based, in which case it would
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take as fundamental some goal, such as improving the general welfare (for 
example, utilitarianism); it might be rights-based, taking as fundamental 
such as some right, the right of all humans to the greatest possible overall 
liberty; or it might be duty-based, taking as fundamental some duty, such as 
the duty to obey God's will as set forth in the Ten Commandments.
In adopting Dworkin’s classification, J. L. Mackie (1984, 168-81), has 
applied it to moral theories generally and claimed that morality should be 
rights-based. He also shows that the moral theories of Mill and Rawls are 
rights-based. In taking up this classification, I would like to claim that the 
official Chinese m orality is goal-based m orality in the sense that the 
establishm ent of com m unist society is taken as the prim ary g o a l.* ^  
Conversely, the new morality advocated by Chinese liberals is a rights-based 
morality.
The practical argum ent against the project of infusing morality into 
politics fails because it rejects and condemns aU morality and ideology as 
providing a potential weapon for totalitarianism, and fails to recognize the 
fundam ental fact that the Chinese liberals' ideas of rights are totally 
different from those expressed in Chinese Marxist morality. The goal-based 
Chinese Marxist morality shows concern for what is taken to be the interest 
of society as a whole such as national glory; however, it overlooks rights, 
and has even become a tool used to deprive people of their rights. The 
official goal-based morality dem ands that individuals should be sacrificed 
for the well-being of collective interests. W hat is more, this kind of morality 
even denies the right to complain about m aking such a sacrifice (see 
Chapter 4, also see Yang Guang, in Widor, 1981, 94). Conversely, Chinese 
liberals are rights-oriented in a way that defends natural rights and rejects 
any idea that denies civil and political rights (Chapters 4 and 5). Chinese 
liberals have chosen natural rights as a sound starting-point for political 
morality: rights should take priority over truth, goals and duties (Chapters 
3, 4 and 5).
lSORigby & Feher have discussed goal rational-legitimation in communist regimes. They 
argue that legitimacy in Soviet society reflects the goal-rational character of its social 
order. The validity of orders issued by the rulers is derived from the validity of the 
principal social goals that the authorities claim to represent and promote. See Rigby and 
Feher, 1982.
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There is much literature to support a right-based morality. As Gregory 
Vlastos (1984, 19, 41-77) argues, rights have priority over considerations 
such as utility or desert because they reflect the conditions under which it 
becomes possible for an agent to recognize and act on considerations such as 
these. Waldron also argues that rights have special importance, an 
importance which warrants overriding other values and ideas whenever 
they conflict with the protection of rights. A right is nothing but a particular 
interest: it is assigned a greater weight than ordinary interests and therefore 
counts for more in utilitarian or other welfarist calculation. Also, the 
interests protected by rights are given lexical priority over other interests 
(Waldron, 1984, 14-15). Again, as Mackie (1984, 171) argues, "rights have 
obvious advantages over duties as the basis and ground of morality. Rights 
are something that we may well want to have; duties are irksome. . . . Duty 
for duty's sake is absurd, but rights for their own sake are not". In short, 
the principle of the priority of equal rights serves us best as a guide to 
democratic institutional design (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
There are three points that must be clarified if rights are to be a 
starting-point for political morality.
(1) I have argued in Chapter 4 that the idea of equal natural rights 
constitutes the source of all rights; a multiplicity of rights derive from 
fundamental natural rights. As Hu Ping (1991a, No. 4, 51-2, 56-7) argues, 
civil and political rights are inviolable, universal and superior to economic 
and social rights which are historically determined and contingent upon 
concrete circumstances. When conflicts between rights occur, the principle 
of the priority of fundamental rights over economic and social rights 
should take effect.
(2) Theoretically, it is possible to derive both duties and rights from basic 
goals as is done in consequentialist arguments, and it is also possible to 
derive both goals and rights from duties as is done in Kant's categorical 
imperative. However, a rights-based morality begins with basic rights from 
which both goals and duties can be derived. It does not reject moral goals, 
but constitutes a premise from which we set up as a political goal that
151 For more discussion of the comparative merits of right-based, goal-based and duty-based 
theories, see Mackie, 1984.
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institutional arrangements should respect and protect human rights and 
liberty and recognize the proper autonomy of citizens. Thus, if a rights- 
based political morality is infused into politics, it logically requires that 
democratic institutions should grant rights to good people as well as to 
potentially evil people so as to ensure a counterbalance mechanism that can 
effectively control and manage the problem of evil (Chapter 5). To protect 
equal human rights thus becomes the first and most important goal of 
democratic political institutions (Chapter 4). At the same time, one of the 
goals of the democratic state should be to dismiss utopian goals such as 
realizing a communist society.
(3) Rights-based political morality also does not ignore moral obligation, 
but constitutes a premise from which human beings have the duty to 
respect the rights of others. If A has the moral right to do X, then A has a 
duty to take responsibility for doing X. If A is also protected in doing X, it 
follows that others are morally required not to interfere or prevent him or 
her. I have emphasized that one who enjoys rights has a duty to respect the 
rights of others, and importantly has a duty to follow the rules of the game 
(Chapter 4). The complete fulfilment of the different kinds of rights 
involves the performance of multiple kinds of duties; for example, the right 
to physical security implies a duty not to eliminate a person's security, a 
duty to protect people against deprivation of security by other people and a 
duty to provide for the security of those unable to provide for their own (see 
Shue, 1980, 52-3). Also as seen above, the procedural conception of morality 
is distinguished from the sage's conception of morality; the former requires 
that procedure itself should be fair and that people have a duty to obey the 
rules.
Now let me make a comment on fears regarding the project of 
infusing politics with morality. As Goodin suggests, one might fear the 
general effects of "moralizing" politics, and the sorts of attitudes people 
may, as a result, take toward their political opinions. The fear is that people 
will come to regard most of their political opinions as if they were matters 
of high moral principle, whether or not they really are. The further fear is 
that people will, in consequence, become increasingly adamant, inflexible, 
and intolerant even in the smallest matters of politics. Most particularly,the 
fear is that people's treating political opinions as if they were sacred values 
in this way will, from time to time, lead them to support the egregious
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excesses of a Hitler or a Stalin or a Mao or a Pol Pot. And even if matters 
stop well short of that, regarding political opinions as sacred values 
generates non-negotiable demands of a sort that ordinarily prove utterly 
intractable to ordinary political processes; what cannot be settled by 
bargaining is left to be resolved by other, more bloody means. Such are the 
fears of those who resist the proposal to infuse morality into politics 
(Goodin, 1992, 166-7).
These fears are reasonable if goal-based morality is infused into politics, 
which might produce the above negative effects that people fear. However, 
those who have these fears have no objection to a rights-based morality and 
democratic mechanisms that Chinese liberals have been advocating. Their 
objection is instead to the tendency toward inflexibility and intolerance that 
comes from introducing the unifying official Chinese goal-based moral 
principles into politics. Nevertheless, those who are committed to a rights- 
based morality argue in the opposite direction: For Rawls, the principle of 
utility presumably requires some sacrifices for the sake of others. But his 
two principles of justice have a definite advantage: rational persons run no 
chance of having to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of their 
lives for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others (Rawls, 1971,176, 180).
Here I do not adhere to the view that political institutional design 
based on the rights-based moral principle is always to the good. Following 
Goodin (1992, 165), I support a weaker claim: political institutional design 
based on the rights-based moral principle in political life usually works out 
to the good. It usually does not lead to a Holocaust, or the Killing fields, or 
any such horror. This is an empirical claim, not an analytic one. Being a 
mere empirical claim, it can only be contingently (rather than necessarily) 
true, and that, in turn, means that it may well prove to be false — certainly 
in particular instances, and perhaps in general. Just like Goodin, I hope and 
believe that is not the case, though. There seem to be many good grounds 
for supposing that the rights-based moral principles and democratic 
mechanisms (which I have described in Chapter 4 and 5) will help to 
prevent such tragedies as the Cultural Revolution, rather than causing 
them. Also, a rights-based political morality is capable of withstanding abuse 
because it contains an internal mechanism of self-corrective procedure and 
principle (Chapters 4 & 5), and because rights, in R. Dworkin's (1984) view, 
are "political trumps" held by individuals. In short, although the matter of
197
use of theories depends on the user rather than the theories themselves, 
Rawlsian rights-based morality and fair procedures can help to reduce the 
number of cases of abuse, while the official Chinese goal-based morality 
lacks an internal mechanism against abuse by a despot
4. Against a Cultural Relativist Argument
A Chinese cultural relativist would not accept the project of infusing 
morality into politics because of his or her rejection of a universal doctrine 
of right-based political morality. }ulia Tao claims that the Chinese way of 
thinking about the self and about moral agency is in stark contrast to the 
image of the self as a bearer of rights in the deontological conception. She 
further suggests the inadequacy of the moral individualism of a right-based 
morality and argues for an alternative view of morality which places 
importance on the intrinsic value of collective goods and on membership 
in a society (Tao, 1990). Thus, a Chinese culturalist would like to infuse 
Confucian duty-based morality into politics.
Drawing on Julia Tao's argument, a Chinese cultural relativist might 
argue that rights-based political morality is too alien to be applicable in 
China. Morality, in a cultural relativist's view, is something which is rooted 
in the particular practices of actual communities. So the idea of seeking to 
uncover abstract principles of morality by which to evaluate or re-design 
existing societies is, it is argued, an implausible one. There are, in a cultural 
relativist's view, no universal principles of morality or justice discoverable 
by reason. For a cultural relativist, to seek to apply rights-based political 
morality in China is to look for the wrong thing: universal principles to 
serve as solutions to universal (or at least generalizable) problems — the 
problem of the nature of the best form of political association. The truth of 
the matter, it is argued, however, is that there is no such rights-based 
political morality except in the minds of liberal philosophers.
I disagree with the above idea, but I would like first to acknowledge the 
following: (1) Cultural relativism is true as an empirical description of the 
moral practices of diverse cultures around the world. Indeed there is a great 
deal of moral diversity in different cultures (see Renteln, 1989). (2) Cultural 
integrity and national identity, as cultural relativists always claim, should 
be maintained within a community. (3) Cultural relativism is also useful in
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stressing differences, in encouraging creativity and in challenging the
152dominant Western thought.
At a theoretical level, the cultural differences between China and the 
West is not the problem that Julia Tao has suggested. As Kukathas argues 
well, cultural diversity does not preclude the possibility of moral criticism 
or of developing universal moral standards. Nor does it make it impossible 
to compare moral values, or to acquire moral knowledge (Kukathas, 1994). 
Further, the fact of moral diversity across cultures by no means entails the 
sceptical conclusion that there are no rational grounds for favouring a 
minimal international morality. At least, we should acknowledge and 
support a substantive moral theory of human rights to provide minimal 
standards and protections that governments must provide for their citizens, 
as formulated, for example, in the United Nations Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights. For example, rights of personal security (freedom from 
arbitrary arrest, torture, or death) should be respected by different cultures. 
The minimal international morality is seen in Rawls's universal character 
of justice as fairness at least two ways. First, it extends to the international 
society and binds all its members, the nation-states; and second, insofar as 
certain of a society's domestic institutions and policies are likely to lead to 
war or to expansionist aims, or to render a people unreliable and 
untrustworthy as partners in a confederation of states or in a cooperative 
arrangement, those institutions and policies are open to censure and 
sanctions of varying degrees of severity by the principles of international 
justice. Here violations of what are recognized as human rights may be 
particularly serious (Rawls, 1989, 252, footnote No. 46). Without this 
minimal international morality, it would be hard to know how to begin to 
talk about rights at all.
At a practical level, the problem associated with cultural relativism, in 
the context of Chinese practice, is that such relativism has always been used 
as an excuse to abuse rights or to confuse the issues at hand. Further,
1:>2See David D. Buck, 1991. For examples, Akos Ostor's (1984) challenge to the Western 
concept of the market.
153For example, the Chinese government uses the idea that human rights are circumscribed 
by historical, social, economic and cultural conditions to argue against international 
condemnation of the Beijing Massacre in 1989.
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there are the following four types of evidence against the above cultural 
relativist argum ent. First, most Chinese liberal intellectuals, like liberals 
both in Poland and Yugoslavia (see Walicki, 1988, 22-3; Gligorov, 1991, 20-1), 
follow w hat Pogge (1986) calls the trend of "the new global liberals," 
favouring what he calls "the global institutional scheme"154 and regarding 
liberalism as a universal doctrine. The Chinese, among other peoples, are 
culturally universalistic in their belief in hum an rights and democracy. 
There are common points between W estern and Chinese conceptions of 
rights, such as the belief in the social usefulness of free speech. Both 
liberals in the West and in China share a certain level of recognition of 
rights, a level of institutional guarantee of rights and a level of the 
substructure of philosophical assum ption that a concept of social justice 
m ust take persons as the ultimate units of moral concern. For example, Yan 
has argued that humanism, democracy, hum an rights, freedom and so on, 
belong to an essentially universal culture (Yan, 1988, 59-66); Fang Lizhi also 
argues that the idea of hum an rights is a common treasure shared by the 
global com m unity just as science is (Williams, 1991). This fundam ental 
agreem ent constitutes a basis for us to agree on a minimal international 
m orality.156
Second, importantly, the rights-based morality is also rooted in China 
in the sense that it is dem anded by Chinese democratic practice. The 
Chinese dem and for just principles lies not only in philosophy but also in 
Chinese politics. Chinese liberals' search for a better form of political 
association  arises from  w ith in  the Chinese political com m unity , 
particularly after the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese 
liberal philosophers w ould follow Rawls in asking the same questions 
about possible abstract principles of morality by which to evaluate or design
1;>4A1so see Beitz's (1979) cosmopolitan conception of morality, Shue's (1980, 120) idea of 
universal subsistence rights.
155$ee Nathan in Edwards, 1986,163.
156Here, I think, Daniel Kane's observation that Chinese intellectuals favour universalism 
while Western intellectuals favour relativism is misleading because it underestimates the 
universal attitude among Western intellectuals and the cultural relativist attitude among 
Chinese intellectuals. See, Daniel Kane, 1991, 68-72. Also Nathan (1991b) shows the 
difficulty of explaining why an originally western concept of human rights is valid for 
China. However, I think, the difficulty can be overcome in the context of the common position 
between Chinese liberals and Western liberals rather than in the context of different 
positions between the Chinese government and liberals.
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democratic institutions and a sound governmental structure. Chinese 
liberals' acceptance of the universal truth of rights-based political morality 
is of relevance and of great significance to the Chinese political community.
Also the idea of infusing rights-based morality into political
institutions also mirrors the development of the emergent economic civil
society in China,157 as fairness is required by the development of market
economics in China. Under Mao’s planned economics, the state often took
what it wanted from enterprises without a return gain, through the so-
called yiping erdiao (gratis transfer of materials). With the development of
market economics in Deng's time, a rudimentary norm of fairness, that
each of us must be prepared to give as well as to take, has gradually taken
root in economic life and become guaranteed by legal regulations. For
example, Article 5 of the Development of Contract Law was set up especially
to guard against the practices of "absolute egalitarianism and gratis transfer
of materials. Also, the development of contract economics together with
the legal regulation of contract in China requires a further ethical norm of
fairness: people must be morally obliged to keep their agreements, even
159when all their gains are in the past and all their costs in the future.
Third, there is an emerging international law of human rights which 
sets standards for all states, and the Chinese are moving toward acceptance 
of this international law. Furthermore, the current Chinese government 
does recognize the importance of human rights and appraises highly the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Chapter 4, also see Beijing 
Review, Nov, 4-10, 1991).
Fourth, the idea of infusing the rights-based morality into politics is 
not arbitrary at all; nor is it purely speculative. Rather it in fact mirrors the 
development of the moral and ideological lives in China, that is, the crisis 
of the official morality and the growing demands, in the past decades, for
I57wu Guoguang (1990) has examined China’s ten-year reform, particularly rural reform, in 
terms of a liberalization process.
158"Economic Contracts must be made in the principle of equality and mutual benefit, 
agreement through consultation and compensation of equal value. Neither party is allowed 
to impose its will on the other, and no unit or individual is allowed to interfere illegally." 
See Youzhi Yu, 1986,193-212, esp, 203.
lo9For the relationship between fairness and economics, see Goodin, 1992, 23-4.
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protection of human rights in China. In other words, the rights-based 
morality seems to be an attractive and promising alternative to other forms 
of morality -- the official goal-based morality and traditional Chinese 
underground morality. The crisis of Chinese Marxism and its morality is 
well-known. Here I would like to stress two points. First, the old control 
mechanisms of the official goal-morality have lost their former effect. There 
was a revival of virtuocratic control mechanisms in the late 1980s, when 
the Party stressed moral education as one of the top priority issues before 
and after 1989, and stated that improving morality among youth was a 
decisive factor in creating China's future. However, the conflict between 
traditional socialization methods and the emerging democratic demands 
concerning socialization that we find in modern society, and the danger of 
technocratisation and even a form of industrialization of morality, have 
made official Chinese morality ineffective (Bakken, 1989). Second, the 
vacuum of faith among the Chinese which followed the death of Maoism 
was filled by traditional values such as Hao han (the good man),Gemenr 
(mateship), and Yiqi (the honour of the Hao han tradition) in the language 
of the Chinese underworld. However, these values, as Jenner (1992, 193-208) 
correctly points out, have always been too destructive to build something 
new. They glorify gangsterism and help to cement bonds among criminal or 
rebel gangs. Given the problems associated with the above two kinds of 
morality, Chinese liberals think that it is worthwhile for China to 
implement a rights-based morality in political life.
Conclusion
Democratic institutional design does not require a sage’s conception of 
morality, or a Chinese Marxist, goal-based morality. But it would be wrong 
to take this further and argue that no form of morality constitutes a 
normative basis for democratic politics. Contrarily, I have argued for a right- 
based morality as being a solid moral foundation for Chinese liberal 
institutional design; and a procedural conception of morality as an actual 
basis for well-founded democratic institutions.
I have examined and rejected a number of arguments against the 
project of infusing politics with morality. The argument of the 
independence of politics from morality fails because the problem of the 
abuse of procedure intrinsically requires the moral remedy that procedure
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should  be fair. The practical argum ent concerning the catastrophic 
consequences of infusing politics with moral principles fails because it fails 
to distinguish between goal-based and rights-based moralities. The cultural 
relativist argum ent fails again because empirical moral diversity does not 
exclude a norm atively m inimal international m orality and because a 
un iversal doctrine of rights-based morality is rooted in today's Chinese 
politics.
PART THREE
PRECONDITIONS FOR LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY
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CHAPTER 8
The Cultural Conditions: Dual Roles of Political Culture
One might argue that liberal democracy is impossible in China because of 
antidemocratic Chinese culture (for example, see Jenner, 1992). Thus the 
current Chinese political culture is seen as an obstacle to Chinese 
democratisation although it is occasionally seen as a resource favouring 
democratisation. But to adopt either view as a sole perspective is to initiate a 
simplistic analysis. Synthetic investigation of the negative and positive 
cultural elements and their dual roles in the process of realizing the 
Chinese liberal idea of democracy is the goal of this chapter.
Yan Jiaqi (1988, 1989) points out the basic cultural problems pertaining 
to democratisation: while China lacks the ideas of 'division of power' and 
"check of balances", she has a negative legacy of ethical politics that a good 
society under the "rule of man" is based on the idea of "perfection of 
leaders". Also Hu Ping argues that the necessary condition for democracy is 
a commitment to the idea of democracy. If we believe in democracy, in Hu's 
view, it will work in China, and if we do not believe in democracy, it will 
not work in China (1988, 188-95). Hu observes that there is a major 
difference between democracy and autocracy: politicians in democratic 
regimes believe in the basic rules, choosing their means in compliance with 
the given democratic rules; whereas in totalitarian regimes they are not 
committed to fair means and will stop at nothing in their struggle for 
political power (1988: 247-9). This chapter attempts to develop further the 
above ideas of Yan and Hu concerning cultural conditions for Chinese 
democracy.
I follow Pye's definition that political culture is the set of attitudes, 
beliefs, and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process 
and that provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern 
behaviour in a political system. A political culture is the product of both the 
collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members 
of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private 
experiences. A political culture is not fixed and transcendent but changeable
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and entangled in reciprocal relationships with various social, economic and 
political in stitu tion s.^
This chapter comprises six sections. Section 1 briefly reviews theories of 
the cultural conditions for democracy as a basis for later discussion. Section 
2 investigates new, positive cultural elements for democratisation in China. 
Section 3 examines the possibility of the conscious adoption of democratic 
rules. Section 4 discusses the Chinese political cultural limits to democracy. 
Section 5 examines the cultural problems or difficulties associated with 
Chinese democratisation. To further examine the cultural problems, Section 
6 briefly investigates the case of the role of fear in Chinese democratisation.
1. The Relationship between Culture and Democracy
Democracy requires widespread acceptance of such values as dignity, 
autonomy, respect for persons, belief in individual rights and commitment 
to democratic procedures; it also requires virtues such as reasonableness and 
a sense of fairness, a spirit of compromise, a readiness to meet others 
halfway, mutual trust among members of the society, and a willingness to 
tolerate diversity and conflict among groups (Pennock 1979, 236-59; Rawls 
1989, 17, 21; Huntington 1984, 209; Hu Ping 1988, 188-95, 247-9).161
160For definitions of political culture, see Almond and Verba (1963, Chap. 1), and Pye, 1965, 
7; 1966, 104-5; 1985, vii-viii, 19; 1988, 5-10. Pye's concept of political culture has two major 
problems: cultural determinism and psychological reductionism (see He, 1992c). However, 
Pye's cultural approach can still be defended in the context of the Chinese democratic 
enterprise. The fact that China has experienced a continuing cultural debates since 1984 
highlights the importance of cultural factors. To dismiss the importance of political culture 
in Chinese studies is to be ignorant of the above fact and its meaning; and such ignorance will 
prohibit contact with the fundamental issues in modem and contemporary China. Pye offers 
three major reasons for the exceptionally dominant role of cultural factors in Chinese 
political life: (1) The strangely potent mixture of Confucianism and Leninism seems to agitate 
passions and arouse visions. (2) Confucian Leninism places supreme value not just on ideology, 
but on highly moralistic versions of ideology. (3) The study of political culture is important 
for understanding Chinese politics because of the unique relationship between the primary 
institutions that are so important in socializing the Chinese and the public institutions of 
national politics (Pye, 1985, 32). It follows, I think, that (1) personalistic and paternalistic 
politics in China has to be clearly analysed by psychological investigation. (2) The process 
of transformation of modern Chinese politics has to be analyzed through examination of 
different values and cognitions among different social groups. As a conclusion here, I quote Pye 
that any form of political analysis is inevitably premised upon fundamental notions about 
human nature and human society. Any attempt to analyze or discuss political life must 
involve psychological and sociological assumptions (Pye, 1988, 7). See He Baogang, 1992c.
161 Here it does not imply that people, in particular politicians, are indeed committed to 
these values and beliefs, but they have to behave, due to cultural and institutional
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Huntington (1984, 209) also sees that a culture that is more monistic and less 
tolerant of diversity and compromise, highly values hierarchical 
relationships and extreme deference to authority, greatly stresses the need to 
acquire power, and underemphasises the need to accommodate others, is 
more likely to have authoritarian rule and to be less conducive to 
democracy.
Here I would like to summarize the five important points in the body 
of literature on conditions for democracy, which I have taken as a base for 
my exploration of the relationship between Chinese political culture and 
democratisation.162 First, it is a mistake to claim that if favourable cultural 
conditions for democracy are met, democracy will emerge. Favourable 
cultural conditions are not sufficient in themselves for democratic 
development.
Second, among favourable cultural elements for democracy, according 
to Rustow (1970, 362), only a conscious adoption of, and habituation to, 
democratic rules (or in Hu Ping's term (1988, 188-95), a commitment to the 
idea of democracy) is indispensable to the genesis of democracy (this may be 
called a hard condition for democracy). A small circle of political leaders 
skilled at negotiation and compromise is also required for the formulation 
of democracy.I62 The virtue of reasonableness and a sense of fairness, a 
spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway should be seen 
as a favourable cultural conditions for maintaining stable democracy, rather 
than as strict preconditions for the genesis of democracy (these favourable 
cultural conditions may be called soft conditions for democracy). However, 
the absence of one powerful favourable condition, or conversely, the 
presence of a powerful negative condition that overrides the presence of
constraints, in a way that suggests they believe in them even if at a deeper level they remain 
sceptical. I thank Barry Hindess for this clarification.
acknowledge that there are differences among Western theories of preconditions for 
democracy. It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to consider what these differences 
matter and to critically examine their respective arguments.
l^Rustow (1970, 362) also rejects what are sometimes proposed as preconditions of democracy, 
for example, high levels of economic and social development, or a prior consensus either on 
fundamentals or on the rules.
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otherwise favourable conditions, may prevent democratic development 
(Huntington 1984, 214).
Third, democratic culture is not a given that comes before democracy. 
Consensus on fundamentals or on the rules is an implausible precondition, 
because the acceptance of these is logically a part of the transition process 
rather than its prerequisite. Rustow (1970, 362-3) quotes and agrees with 
Bernard Crick's idea that the moral consensus of a free state is not 
something mysteriously prior to or above politics; it is the activity (the 
civilising activity) of politics itself. In other words, favourable cultural 
conditions have to be, and can be met in the process of democratisation.
Fourth, political culture is not a transcendent force that affects and 
decides democratic politics but is affected by democratic politics. A 
democratic system that facilitates and encourages compromise breeds a 
tolerant culture while an unforgiving and repressive totalitarian system 
breeds a culture of intolerance and suspicion.164 Further, democratic politics 
and political culture are also affected by a number of other factors: higher 
levels of economic well-being; the absence of extreme inequalities in wealth 
and income; greater social pluralism, including, in particular, a strong and 
autonomous bourgeoisie; a more market-oriented economy; and, greater 
influence vis-a-vis the society of existing democratic states. According to 
Huntington (1984, 214), some combination of some of these preconditions is 
required for a democratic regime to emerge, but the nature of that 
combination can vary greatly from one case to another.
Fifth, according to Nathan (1990b, 308), what is required in the realm of 
culture or ideology for democracy to flourish are not replicas of specific 
Western values, but values that perform similar functions in supporting 
democratic institutions. In this perspective, the question is not whether key 
Western values find exact equivalents in China, but whether the Chinese 
tradition contains values that can potentially serve as their functional 
equivalents in supporting democratic institutions. It is further argued that 
while the Chinese tradition does not necessarily contain functional
164I have discussed elsewhere three models of interplay between cultural and institutional 
causal factors. See He, 1992c.
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equivalents of all the values needed for democracy, it contains strong 
versions of some of them (Nathan 1990b, 309).
2. The Cultural Basis of Chinese Democracy
Before identifying new cultural elements for Chinese democratisation, I 
simply presuppose basic features of the current Chinese political culture as 
follows. First, it is difficult to identify Chinese political culture as 
Confucianism, communism or something else. Chinese culture is a mixture 
of different value systems, such as Confucianism, legalism, communism, 
nationalism, liberalism, and so on. Second, Chinese political culture is as 
heterogeneous as the European. It has split, and continues to split, into 
segmented parts. Third, traditional Confucian and contemporary 
communist cultures have been declining, although some intellectuals 
attempt to reconstruct them. Anti-traditional and anti-communist attitudes 
are so popular with the younger generation as to suggest a possible 
discontinuity of Chinese political culture, although the patterns of China's 
past, as Pye (1988, 25) observes, will continue to serve in shaping the course 
of China's modernisation. Fourth, there are cultural clashes in China 
between Marxism and liberalism. The major cleavage in Chinese political 
culture today may not be between the advanced intellectuals and the 
backward masses, but between a people ready for more freedom and political 
leaders afraid to grant it (Nathan 1990a, 191). Fifth, the pattern of cultural 
change in China is in the fragmentation of old cultures and the 
proliferation of new values, attitudes and attendant behaviour. This is 
leading Chinese intellectuals to redefine the normative dimension of 
politics and democracy.
One might argue that Chinese culture does not meet the above cultural 
requirements for democracy in that it contains too few democratic ideas, and 
too many "feudal elements" to suit democratic institutions. Drawing on 
this, one might argue further that it is impossible to produce democracy in 
China because favourable cultural conditions do not exist. This claim is 
misleading, for:
(1) It is highly culturally determinist (Hu Ping, 1991a, No. 4, 50).
(2) It fails to distinguish between hard and soft cultural conditions for 
democracy as discussed in Section 1.
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(3) It ignores the fact that culture is generated by human activity, and as 
such it is constantly being regenerated (Dittmer 1983, 23); it presupposes the 
view that it is impossible for Chinese people to overcome weaknesses of a 
cultural-psychological nature; it also ignores the fact that China's culture is 
changing.
(4) The assumption that China's culture does not meet the cultural 
conditions suited to democracy is wrong, because there were democratic 
institutions in modern China and there is indeed an emerging democratic 
culture in contemporary China.
Mark Elvin's (1969) study of the first formally democratic political 
institution of the gentry, the City Council (1905-1914) in Shanghai, as well 
as Fincher's (1968, 1989) studies of representative institutions from 1909 to 
1913 at the local, provincial and national levels in China, reveal that the 
traditional Chinese social order had a considerable adaptive capacity to meet 
the demands of the modern world (Elvin 1969, 60).165 There were several 
positive ideologies at that time which supported democratic institutions, 
such as the idea of leaders who would come from, and represent, the local 
community, the principle of complying with rules, and the idea of local self- 
government. However there were also negative cultural elements which 
blocked the development of democratic institutions, such as factionalism 
and intolerance of open and public competition for power. These factual 
records of the working gentry democratic institution and representative 
institutions prove that there was a possibility for Chinese culture to create 
and support democratic institutions, and that Chinese culture had the 
adaptive capacity to meet the demands of democratic institutions. These 
also disprove the thesis that there is no hope for China to establish a 
democratic system because of the antidemocratic nature of its culture. But 
the records do not confirm that Chinese culture, without adaptation and 
transformation, can maintain and support democratic institutions.
165The revolution of 1911, according to Elvin, was indirectly the beginning of the end for the 
Shanghai Council (Elvin 1969, 58), though Fincher (1968, 1989) sees the 1911 Republican 
revolution as a precedent for progress. Elvin (1983, 158) and others (eg Nathan 1976) have 
argued that the revolution ultimately wiped out for several generations China's peaceful 
and organic progress towards a modem and democratic future.
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Since the May Fourth m ovem ent, there has been a new cultural 
emphasis on democracy and science. This emphasis is such that it has been 
constituting a new tradition and resource in which the Chinese democratic 
m ovem ent has its base. In the 1930s, the Journal of the Independent 
Forum, contributed to by Hu Shi, Tao Xisheng and Hu Taowei, advocated a 
democratic constitution while rejecting the "new autocratic proposal" put 
forward by Ding Wenjiang and Jiang Yanfu (Cheng Yishen 1989, 87-117). 
Also in the 1950s, there was the Journal of Free China insisting on the 
establishment of an oppositional party against the ruling party dictatorship 
in Taiwan. Recently, the New May Fourth Manifesto issued by the Beijing 
Students' Federation in 1989 declared that democracy would bring to bear 
the collective wisdom  of the people for modernisation while allowing the 
full developm ent of each individual's abilities and the protection of each 
individual's interests (Nathan 1991a, 33). For a hundred  years, Chinese 
intellectuals have been seeking to reconstruct the Chinese cultural 
structure. This has been achieved in so far as ideas of the rule of law, 
hum an rights and parliam entary  dem ocracy have acquired a general 
acceptance among intellectuals (Lin 1988, 58, 291-2). The new Chinese 
intellectual tradition contains many of the building blocks of a more liberal, 
pluralistic theory of rights, and the new opening to the West has made 
many of the resources of foreign intellectual traditions available for fresh 
consideration (Nathan in Edwards 1986, 164).
If the central purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to transform 
C hina's political culture by replacing the traditional man w ith a new 
socialist m an (Dittmer 1977, 67; see also Gray 1979), then this was not 
fulfilled. The failure of the C ultural Revolution (1966-1976) has revealed 
the weaknesses and shortcomings of the Chinese communist system, and 
discredited Mao Zedong's ideal of "proletarian democracy". This has led to 
the rise of the radical and liberal views on dem ocracy and freedom 
(Chapters 1 and 3). Among those with liberal views are Wei Jingsheng, Hu 
Ping and Yan Jiaqi, whose ideas I have discussed in Chapter 3. The views of 
Wei Jingsheng (1981) represent an individualistic vision of democracy; 
those of Hu Ping (1988) support the idea of democracy characterised by the
166In the new democratic tradition, liberal democracy should be distinguished from populist 
democracy, or in Talmon's (1970) term, totalitarian democracy, which ironically led to 
communist totalitarianism in China.
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priority of liberty over other political values; while those of Yan Jiaqi (1988, 
1989) encompass an institutional and procedural notion of democracy 
characterised by parliamentarianism, and the paramount importance of 
procedures and constitutionalism (He Baogang 1991b).
In the early 1980s, a number of respected Chinese Marxist theorists
began to advance humanist revisions of orthodox Marxism and to engage
civil society discourse so as to explore democratic implications in Marxism,
although Marxism in China today is officially used only to support the non-
pluralist concept of socialist democracy. In their wake, Shen Yue (1990, 44-
51), a mainland scholar, has recently shown that Marx's distinction between
"bourgeois" and "civil society" was obliterated in the process of translation,
resulting in general suppression of the second. Shen Yue's effort represents
a rather isolated Chinese Marxist rediscovery of the value of the citizen and
of civil society. Liu Zhiguang and Wang Shuli (1988) have also argued that
the notion of civil society leads to the idea of equal rights, and the idea that
the citizen has rights independent of the state. Wang Juntao, a major
intellectual figure in the events of 1989, also emphasises the constitutive
167role of human rights in his recent work, On Citizenship.
Jin Guantao, a theoretical historian and philosopher; Yan Jiaqi, a 
political scientist; and Fang Lizhi, a physicist, have established what was in 
China a new role for science as a basis for "civil discourse". Civil discourse 
signifies an arena in which, despite the existence of an ideological authority, 
politics and social norms are treated not as givens but as objects of inquiry, 
dispute and even rejection (Buckley 1989). As well as science, a parallel 
discourse on "culture" — re-evaluating tradition and modernity, East and 
West — emerged as an arena in which positions could be taken in apparent 
independence of political constraint. In the summer of 1988, the television 
documentary series He Shang (Premature Death of the Yellow River, or 
River Elegy) was shown in prime time and caused a sensation. River Elegy 
exploited the fact that science and culture had become topics of civil 
discourse. It called for "a democracy based on the middle class", and claimed 
that the intellectual stratum could gain autonomy by allying itself with the
167For further information on Wang Juntao see Macartney (1990). See also Min Qi (1989), 
whose book is dedicated to Wang and others.
168Buckley derives his line of thought from Thomas F. Glick (1988, xi).
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em erging m anagem ent professionals, the small entrepreneurs and the 
media (Kelly 1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 1991b).
In 1989, Chinese intellectuals and students m ounted a struggle for 
freedom of speech and a realm of free social and cultural space between 
people and governm ent. Li O ufan (1989, 64) has in terp reted  the 
consequences of the student movement in 1989 as an emergent "public 
space" (suggested by Habermas), at least at the psychological level. The 
Beijing dem onstrations of 1989 placed m any positive attributes of 
democracy on display. They showed a capacity for public spiritedness, 
spontaneous public order, and tolerance, although there were some aspects 
of authoritarianism  and intolerance, and there was a lack of flexible 
compromise by the intellectuals and the students (Nathan 1990a, 197).
A national sample survey in 1987 also confirmed that many attributes
169of democratic culture already existed. In the survey, 73 per cent of the 
people believed that serious defects in the Chinese political system were the 
principal reason for the under-developm ent of China and 75 per cent 
expressed hope that the Chinese people w ould have freedom  and 
democracy (Min Qi 1989, 81, 179; see also Tables 2 and 3).170 The survey 
suggests strong political consciousness and appreciation of the importance 
of political participation. In a somewhat differently phrased question "are 
you willing to talk about political problems and why?", about 57 per cent 
replied "willing" and specified their reasons as "talking about politics is a 
form of participating in political affairs", "is my right", "because of my 
interest", "politics is so important" and "because of necessity for my work" 
(Min Qi 1989, 233). The survey also shows that out of 1,720 respondents 57 
per cent agreed that politicians should believe in the basic rules, choosing 
the appropriate rules and complying with those rules; whereas 43 per cent
169In July and August 1987, the Beijing Institute of Socioeconomic Studies carried out a massive 
survey of Chinese political cultural beliefs. About 500 university students were employed and 
trained to collect data on Chinese people's political attitudes and beliefs in twenty-two 
provinces and cities. More than 3,200 survey samples were obtained resulting in more than 
7,400,000 pieces of survey data (see Min Qi 1989). The survey is informative and should be 
used, but is not reliable. A study of survey research, see Rosen, 1991.
170The survey reveals a sort of "Chinese democracy complex" which contains ideas somewhat 
contradictory to the Western view, but represents a viable Chinese synthesis favouring 
democracy of a certain sort.
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agreed that politicians should not be committed to fair rules (Min Qi 1989,
188).
Table 2: Chinese People’s Opinions of Current Chinese Democracy
Per cent agree
1. China is deficient in democracy and freedom
at present, which are the necessary conditions for 
modernisation. 17
2. China has, to some degree, democracy at present
but this should be improved upon. 58
3. China doesn't need democracy yet, the most 
important thing we should do now is develop
the economy. 8
4. China has established a socialist democracy at a 
high level already, it is unreasonable to demand
further democracy and freedom. 4
5. The people who advocate democracy and freedom 
have ulterior motives, because the Four Modern­
isations and Deng's reform require harmony
between the people and the Communist Party. 7
6. Others 6
Source: Beijing Ribao (Peking Daily), 12 February 1988 (n = 3,200); also Min 
Qi 1989,181.
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Table 3: Chinese People's Cognition of What Democracy Is
Per cent agree
Average W IEW I C P
1 . Under the guidance of a centralised
leadership. 25 20 12 21 40 25
2. To widen the avenue for consulting
people's opinions. 19 24 27 16 18 18
3. The People are the masters
of the country. 12 16 10 7 7 19
4. The minority should submit to the
m ajority. 5 0 3 4 4 9
5. Elites make decisions for the people. 11 16 18 10 6 9
6. People can elect their leaders. 7 10 5 8 6 2
7. People can effectively participate in
controlling the social arrangement. 11 2 7 20 12 7
8. To separate and limit the political
powers. 3 1 2 6 4 1
9. Others 1 1 2 1 1 1
10. No idea about that. 6 7 13 4 2 9
Source: Beijing Ribao (Peking Daily), 12 February 1988 (n = 3,200).
W represents workers; IEW, individual enterprise workers; I, intellectuals; 
C, cadres (a general classification, cadres (ganbu) might be considered as the 
whole membership of the organisation and bureaucratic administration); P, 
peasants.
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Despite the failures of Chinese democracy in the 1920s and Yan Jiaqi's 
effort to establish proceduralism in 1989, the idea of constitutionalism 
persisted after 1924 and persists today as is suggested by the vast literature on 
constitutionalism and democracy. Constitutionalism was, and still is, the 
dominant set of assumptions to which the defence of political action has to 
be referred. That some may have appealed to constitutionalism half­
heartedly or cynically does not alter the fact that it has made and makes 
sufficient sense to enough people to serve as the touchstone of political 
discussion (see Nathan 1976, 19). Thus the category "basis of legitimacy" has 
to be filled with the concepts "democracy" and "constitutionalism".
3. The Conscious Adoption of Democratic Rules
As to the necessary precondition of a conscious adoption of democratic 
rules, it seems that the current CCP does not mean to adopt what are 
commonly known as the "rules of the game". However, there is a possibility 
of playing the democratic card by some factions within the CCP.
The process of democratisation in China, I believe, entails moving 
away from a denial of the democratic principle to recognition of it as a 
modus vivendi. If we follow Rawls's (1987, 18) suggestion, we might 
suppose that at a certain time, as a result of various historical events and 
contingencies, the rules of the game have come to be accepted as a mere 
modus vivendi. This acceptance has come about, we may assume, in 
much the same way as the acceptance of the principle of toleration as a 
modus vivendi came about following the Reformation, at first reluctantly, 
but nevertheless as providing the only alternative to endless and 
destructive civil strife. The above supposition was proved in Taiwan by the 
ruling party and Jiang Jingguo who did play the card of democratic rule as a 
modus vivendi in their own interests. It is also likely to prove true of 
mainland China in the near future. It is probable that some groups within 
the regime in China will see sponsoring change in the direction of
171 Hayek, Gutman, Larmore and Rawls also have different views of the liberal order as 
modus vivendi (see Kukathas 1989, 225-7).
217
democracy as a way of improving their power position against other factions 
(Nathan 1990a, 207).172 I will discuss this in detail in Chapter 10.
4. The Cultural Limits to Democracy
Stated summarily, on the one hand, Chinese hierarchical, authoritarian, 
and elite, personalised political culture is inhospitable to democracy, and 
has been conducive to authoritarian rule; on the other hand, traditionally 
based Chinese values, such as the morally autonomous individual, the 
absolutely just ruler, the responsibility of the government for the people's 
welfare, and the ordinary person's responsibility for the fate of the nation, 
have served as the main justification for the growth of a pressure 
movement demanding democratisation in a Schumpeterian direction 
(Nathan 1990b, 308-11, 384; also see Hu Ping, 1991a, No. 2, 35). The following 
discussions focus only on the cultural limits.
In Confucian culture the government had to proceed on the basis of 
harmony rather than conflict (which leads to suppression of dissidents and 
renders compromise morally repugnant);^3 the interests of the collective 
must not be challenged by lesser groups and individuals (which is less 
favourable to the action of individual citizens); and, finally, rights have to 
be treated as something granted by the state, not inhering in the person 
(which is less favourable to the institutional protection of individual rights) 
(Price 1990, 252-3; Cotton 1990, 8). Confucian culture was also 
consummatory in character. That is, intermediate and ultimate ends were 
closely connected, and conceived of as a total entity, no part of which could 
be changed without threatening the whole. Thus Confucian culture was 
more resistant to change, and when change came in one significant area of 
the culture, the entire culture was thrown into question or was displaced
172As to the conditions under which the leaders in power smay be willing to devolve their 
power to a democratic system, see Przeworski (1988). The political elite's willingness to 
negotiate compromises on their most basic disagreements is necessary for democratization, see 
Higley & Gunther, 1992
173One may argue that the need for harmony makes compromise a necessity in Japan. This 
might be true. However, in the Chinese case, because there is no institutional arrangement for 
political opposition, the search for harmony leads to suppressing dissidents so as to maintain 
a voice which unifies the whole nation. If there is legitimate institutional arrangement for 
political opposition and recognition of, and respect for, different voices, the need for harmony 
may favour a compromise strategy dealing with conflicts of competing interests.
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and destroyed (Huntington 1984, 208).174 Confucian influences are apparent 
in authoritarian attitudes and practices in China today.
The most serious problem lies in people's, in particular leaders', 
subjective understanding of the nature of power and legitimacy, and in 
their expectations of authority. If a political culture in a society makes power 
rather than equal liberties the primary virtue of social institutions and of 
everyday life it is very difficult to establish and maintain democratic 
institutions. In this respect Pye's scholarship makes a great contribution to 
the analysis of China's cultural problems associated with its own 
dimensions of power, authority and legitimacy, which constitute the 
refractory blocks with which democracy has had to be built. Pye (1985, 183) 
argues that most Chinese started with the ideal that all power should 
emanate from above, from the centre, from a single supreme power. Most 
Chinese leaders believe that diversity and a pluralistic power structure lead 
to social disorder and do not foster more creativity or ensure faster 
modernisation (Pye 1985, 189). Any surfacing of autonomous power 
groupings has been taken as a sign of dangerous centrifugal forces (Pye 1985, 
189). The conception of legitimacy held by some Chinese is favourable to 
unchecked authority, and unfavourable to the competitive political 
structure. Legitimate power is believed to be omnipotent and 
omnicompetent. Rulers should be paternalistic. Some Chinese prefer a 
system in which they can confidently depend on a paternalistic authority 
(Pye 1985, 197-8). Both in the past and under communism there have been 
no codifications of the rules concerning how informal types of power 
operate. The dilemma of power in China stems from the initial belief that 
rule should be by (virtuous) men and not by (impersonal) law -- a cultural 
belief which makes it difficult for the Chinese to institutionalise authority 
since they are reluctant to invest power in impersonal arrangements (Pye 
1985, 200). Chinese ideology constitutes an obstacle to the rational use of 
power. Power in the Chinese political system remains a crude, blunt 
instrument, generally inappropriate for a government striving to solve the 
complex problems of modernisation (Pye 1985, 208). It has always been easy
174There are positive elements in Confucian culture. As de Bary (1983) remarks, individualist 
and liberal elements exist in the Confucian tradition. And there is also, in Lin Yusheng's 
(1988) view, the possibility of combining the Confucian idea of 'jen', through creative 
transformation, with Western liberalism.
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for the Chinese to establish bureaucratic hierarchies because they have an 
instinct for recognising fine status differences (Pye 1985, 209). However, Pye's 
work may be limited in the sense that he does not pay enough attention to 
the changes in intellectuals' views of power, authority and legitimacy (see 
Yan Jiaqi 1988, 1989; He Baogang 1991a).
In order to further highlight cultural limits to democracy I turn to a 
cultural explanation for the failure of democracy in modern China, by 
drawing on relevant arguments in the works of Pye (1985, 186-8), Price 
(1990, 251-5), and Nathan (1976, 224). The failure of Chinese democratic 
institutions in modern China can certainly be due to the lack of support 
from democratic ideas and values. There have been cultural problems with 
democrats themselves. Values and habits of thought and action deeply 
rooted in a distinctively Chinese cultural tradition have precluded a 
genuine commitment to democracy and its prerequisites. The advocates of 
democracy have themselves, therefore, neither fully understood nor 
implemented the necessary kinds of political pluralism, individual 
freedom, and limits on the powers of leaders and the state (Price, 1990, 224). 
The pro-democratic writings of revolutionaries and constitutionalists have 
sometimes had an antidemocratic potential (Price 1990, 251; Gray 1979, 207). 
These writers have been preoccupied with the problem of avoiding the 
divisive dangers of democracy as they have sought to escape the trammels 
of autocracy (Price 1990, 251). Thus they have doubted the liberal solution 
and turned to a totalitarian solution. As Pye (1985, 188) observes, Chinese 
culture has favoured a centralised form of legitimate power, which has 
caused the failure of the democratic movement in modern China.
The above cultural problems have negatively influenced democratic 
activities in modern China. The early republicans had hoped to avoid 
conflict by gathering consensus around a constitutional process. But the 
institutionalised parliament just provided an open channel for conflicts 
among factions; the process mandated by any republican constitution was 
precisely a process of conflict among the Zhili clique, the Duan Qirui faction,
175Here I limit my consideration only to cultural factors. I acknowledge that many factors, 
such as a sullen, desperate peasantry and a fragmented military scattered over a vast, poorly 
integrated national landscape, the unfavourable terms on which China entered the world 
market, and the Japanese invasion, caused the failure of democracy.
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the Anfu club and the Communications clique. The factional kaleidoscope 
turned in the end to civil war in the 1920s and resulted in the decisive 
alienation of most Chinese, including politicians, from the constitutionalist 
faith. Not unnaturally, practising politicians resorted to the tools at hand -- 
their subordinates, colleagues, schoolmates, and others tied to them by the 
hierarchical and personalistic values of their political culture. They formed 
factions, and consequently found themselves trapped in a frustrating and 
self-defeating political process (Nathan 1976, 1-3, 221-4). Suspicions and 
an im osities betw een constitu tionalists and revo lu tionaries certainly 
weakened the cause of democratic governm ent. While these two camps 
could agree in theory on the value of a responsible cabinet system, they 
failed to unite in insisting on the implementation of key elements of that 
system (Price 1990, 252). An inherited propensity to factionalism constituted 
an imm ense obstacle to the establishm ent of constitutional governm ent, 
and persuasive evidence of this has been offered for the immediate post- 
Yuan Shikai period in particular.
5. The Cultural Obstacles to Realising Democracy
Today Chinese political culture poses a set of problems not only for Chinese 
leaders hoping to m aintain the comm unist system, but also for Chinese 
liberals struggling for democracy. Here I limit my consideration to the latter 
only.176
Generally speaking, the current cultural problem s associated with 
dem ocratisation  in China can be called "w enhua shifan" (a cultural 
dislocation, or anomie). W ang Yihua (1989, 35-9) argues that in China an 
established value system has been discredited by its association with a hated 
political regime, but no new value system has emerged to take its place. 
W ang also identifies three chief problems: (1) opposition, particularly by 
those inculcated in the proletarian dictatorship, to the culture of social
176It is obvious that the political thinking of leaders is limited by Chinese culture. This has 
been researched by some scholars such as Lucian Pye. However, the negative impact of 
Chinese political culture on current Chinese liberals needs to be studied, therefore I focus on 
liberals rather than leaders. Also cultural, institutional and sociological approaches 
certainly present different views of what the problems associated with democratisation in 
China are. Here the cultural approach attempts to identify a set of cultural problems. I will 
explore institutional and sociological problems in a separate study.
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rationality emanating from the West. The latter includes democratic 
politics, popular participation, etc.; (2) demoralisation of the younger 
Chinese generation by Western hedonism, leading to self-hatred and 
hopelessness, and escapism, through drink, gambling and discos; (3) the 
devaluation of instrumental-rational culture which supports the 
development of science and technology. Few see any prospect in pursuing 
technical skills and careers. In line with Wang's analysis, I consider the 
cultural problems in two categories.
The first category of problems relates to the question of democratic 
goals and values. There has been widespread scepticism about democracy in 
China. The advocacy of democracy in China has been associated with 
debates over authoritarianism in the past as well as today (Cheng Yishen 
1989; Liu Jun and Li Lin 1989; Ma Shuyun 1990). In the democratic 
movements overseas, neo-authoritarianism is advocated as a feasible 
solution to the current political problems in China (Democratic China 1990, 
nos. 4, 5). Today Chinese intellectuals repeat the old questions about the 
validity and applicability of democracy in China and on China's capacity to 
achieve democratic goals. More seriously, antidemocratic proposals easily 
attract strong support from traditional Chinese political culture in various 
forms of arguments and doctrines, while democratic proposals may gain the 
support of new Chinese cultural elements, but the support is very weak. 
Thus, Chinese political culture has narrowed and facilitated certain options 
and the forms of solutions to the current crises in China: the democratic 
option is not seen as a strong one, or the best, while the authoritarian 
option appeals as an ideal.
Among Chinese democrats there is a tension between their conscious 
commitment to the values of democracy and liberty and their unconscious 
authoritarian personalities. In other words, while they demand democracy 
at the conscious level they also seek for a new authoritarianism as a
*77I have met and talked with many Chinese democrats overseas. Some of them remark 
openly that China needs a form of neo-authoritarian system rather than an elective one. It 
seems to me that few are really committed to democratic values. One thing that has struck 
me is that a reason why some have joined democratic organisations overseas was to have 
justifiable evidence to apply for permanent residence in Western countries. In this respect I 
feel the democratic movements overseas, to some degree, are surreptitious "migration 
movements".
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solution to the problems of Chinese politics. In particular, there are 
authoritarian attitudes inculcated in the very process of socialisation (Pye 
1968, 1985; Price 1990, 224). In this respect, Mao Zedong's autocratic 
personality has greatly and negatively influenced the democrats overseas. 
Although Chinese intellectuals reflect on and criticise Mao's thought as 
internalised in every Chinese mind, it is difficult to get rid of the 
authoritarian personality. The crucial problem is that unconscious 
authoritarian personalities, due to a lack of cultural and institutional 
constraints on these personalities, will lead democrats towards a neo­
authoritarian system when they face a set of problems stemming from the 
process of Chinese democratisation. Contrarily, although there are also 
authoritarian attitudes in Western democratic countries, these attitudes are 
so constrained by the existing democratic institutions that it is less likely 
that authoritarian personalities would play a decisive role in creating a neo­
authoritarian state if similar problems should occur.
The second category of problems lies in the process of democratisation 
and relates to the operation of democratic institutions in China. Democratic 
institutions must work within the cultural environment, and democratic 
institutions will function only if people comply with their rules. In this 
respect there are the following cultural difficulties for the establishment of 
democracy in China:
(1) Tolerance is a virtue of freedom and is a recognition of the autonomy 
of others. However, China lacks tolerance of institutionalised opposition 
and dissent. There is also a lack of democratic consensus, in particular, of 
believing in and complying with democratic rules, and widespread 
scepticism about democratic rules being applicable to China. As Yuan 
Zhiming remarks in quoting Bo Yang: four Chinese gathering together 
cannot cooperate unless there is an autocrat (see Democratic China 1990, 
5:21). The most serious problem is that there is a tension between 
democratic consensus and the principle of freedom in the Chinese context,
178
17®For example, Yuan Zhiming, my friend and the former chief editor of Democratic China, 
moved from the vague liberalism of River Elegy to explicit support for 'new 
authoritarianism' in the year following his exile after the crackdown (see Democratic China 
1990, 4:49, 5:19-23). For further discussion of the authoritarian Chinese personality, see Min 
Qi 1989, 166-77.
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that is, use of political liberties tends to undermine consensus if liberties are 
not constrained. Although, indeed, there are factional compromises in 
Chinese political life, Chinese politics is very weak in arriving at 
institutional compromise. Democracy, in Przeworski's view, cannot be a 
result of a substantive compromise, but it can be a result of an institutional 
compromise: substantive outcomes are shaped by institutions and the 
guarantees can only be institutional (Przeworski 1988, 64, 71).
(2) The cultural problems of consensus and compromise can be traced to 
deeper psychological predispositions. As Pye (1990a, 162) argues, the 
management of aggression is a basic problem in Chinese political culture in 
which there is an inability to compromise publicly; so any conflict arouses 
hate, and it becomes almost impossible to disagree politically without 
becoming disagreeable. Pye (1990b, 58) further argues that a persuasive sense 
of overpowering obligation has meant that there can be no compromises in 
Chinese cultural attitudes towards power and authority. Also, shaming in 
Chinese culture is a potent weapon for both authorities and the weak. But 
there is no way of compromising in a battle of shaming; the struggle can 
only intensify (Pye 1990a, 172-4).
(3) Chinese envy also undermines social cooperation. "Oriental envy", in 
Chinese terms, tends to pull down those who have a large index of primary 
social goods. The Chinese communist view of egalitarianism has been 
internalised in the psyche of the people. This legacy of psychological 
egalitarianism is an obstruction to the implementation of liberal democratic 
policies. Such policies, if they do not take equality into account, are likely 
to fail in practice, and may create unequal distribution of social welfare. This 
may, in turn, constitute a source of social unrest and of revival of neo­
authoritarianism. Ideally, a social welfare system should be introduced into 
China, but unfortunately it is difficult to implement this because of the 
heavy financial cost.
179Egalitarianism does not necessarily lead to authoritarianism. Nevertheless Mao has 
carried out egalitarian policies to maintain a totalitarian system. The legacy of 
egalitarianism has dual roles: besides the negative one discussed in the text, there might be 
a positive role if egalitarianism is modified to support social welfare reform so as to 
maintain social stability.
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(4) Radical polarisation of Chinese Leninist-Confucianism and Western 
liberalism, along with the desperate destruction of traditional and 
communist Chinese culture, make it difficult for liberal virtues to develop. 
Most young intellectuals have aimed at eliminating traditional and 
communist cultures. Such action is rooted in the unbearableness of 
individual powerlessness and isolation. The destruction of the communist 
culture is the last, almost desperate attempt to save themselves from being 
crushed by the Chinese political system.
(5) Finally, force rather than reason is often seen as a final solution to 
political conflicts in traditional and communist political cultures (for 
example, Mao's slogan that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun); 
this poses the most difficulty for democratic proceduralism which 
presupposes reason as a final authority.
6. The Roles of Fear in the Transitional Period
While the Chinese have other psychological problems, here I will focus on 
the role of fear in Chinese democratisation because of its centrality. In a 
transitional period, social conflicts are common and normal. These 
conflicts, in the liberal view, are believed to be a necessary condition of 
politics, and are supposed to proceed, and to be resolved, within the 
democratic institutions which are able to integrate overlapping conflicting 
interests. However, most Chinese are not used to these normal social 
conflicts, and often regard them as abnormal and destructive. The 
psychological fear of social disorder easily leads to a new 
authoritarianism.180
In his comparative study of the post-authoritarian system, Pye (1990c, 
13-14) calls for an investigation of the association of fear with political 
repression, and of likely reactions to the lifting of terror. In Taiwan and 
Korea, as Pye suggests, the receding of fear of state power seems to ignite 
hope, which in turn creates increased enthusiasm and activism; in Russia
180One of my colleagues, Rong Jian, the author of Minzhu lun, who strongly opposed neo- 
authoritarianism before the June 4th 1989 events, and was active in the Beijing Association of 
Intellectuals, told me in April, in Beijing, that China needed an authoritarian system 
because he felt during the popular movement in 1989 that China would succumb to social 
unrest if it lacked a strong authority.
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fear may be followed by cynicism at the core of which lies passivity; in 
mainland China, fear has taken on the role of threat. This interesting topic 
of fear raised by Pye needs to be studied further in the context of the 
Tiananmen incident in 1989.
Su Xiaokang (1990, 15-21) has elaborated on the complex role of fear in 
the process of Chinese democratisation. First, the Chinese intellectuals' fear 
of the CCP's terror made them less inclined to participate in the protest 
movement at the early stage and more worried about negative 
consequences of the protest movement. Su himself attempted to avoid 
joining in the protest movement before April 1989. Second, rationality can 
stem from fear as tolerance came from mutual fear in the history of the 
West. In Su's view, the reason that the students adopted a reasonable and 
moderate strategy is that they feared the danger. It was fear that produced 
their political wisdom. The non-violent strategy adopted by the students 
was not due to the students’ innocence, but rather to their clear judgment of 
the strength of the Communist Party. Unfortunately, when the government 
made a concession to dialogue with the students, this small success led to 
the collapse of reason among the students. Fear became "obtuse" and 
political wisdom thus clouded. The idea that fear helps to produce 
reasonableness may, in Su's view, also apply to the leadership. No matter 
how strong it is, the current regime which overrode the constitution is 
likely to experience fear. Such fear may bring the leaders to a more rational 
stance. Third, according to Su, fear has a double effect; while it leads you to 
reason, it also causes you to lose your moral courage. The most tragic thing 
in the Chinese communist system is the fact that Chinese intellectuals have 
lost their moral courage due to their fear of repression by the CCP. In Su's 
view, Chinese intellectuals were unable to persuade people to believe in the 
importance of compromise; more seriously, they no longer felt fear in 
Deng's "velvet prison", and did not alert the people to the need for fear 
until the Tiananmen incident. This is the greatest weakness of Chinese 
intellectuals — the incompetence of their rationality.
Conclusion
The nature of the political culture itself is often seen by commentators as 
the cause of democracy failing to take root in China; the antidemocratic 
elements of that culture being overemphasised while the democratic
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elements are underemphasised. This chapter has shown the new emergent 
democratic culture in China, and examined the application of the ideas of 
democratic culture in China to the current state of play, including the 
possibility of the democratic card being played by factions within the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The chapter has also examined the 
cultural problems associated with Chinese democratisation such as cultural 
anomie, unconscious authoritarian personalities, the legacy of 
egalitarianism, the radical polarisation of Chinese culture, difficulties of 
institutional compromise and the irrational control of aggression and fear.
There are clearly many hopeful signs of positive cultural elements, but 
there are also many negative ones. Evaluation of the relative strength of 
these conflicting tendencies is difficult to make at the level of an empirical 
study. However my impressionistic evidence reveals that while the 
antidemocratic culture is stronger at present than the democratic culture, 
the new Chinese democratic culture is likely to gather strength in the 
future. If we ask what could be done to strengthen the one and impede the 
other, the solutions to the above cultural problems, as Yan emphasises, lie 
not only in cultural reconstruction, but also in institutional reconstruction 
of Chinese political structures and organisations (Yan 1988, 1989).
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CHAPTER 9
Social Conditions: Dual Roles of Semi-Civil Society
A pluralist and self-organizing civil society independent of the state is often 
assumed to be an indispensable condition for democracy. It is also assumed 
that successful transformation to democratic politics depends upon the 
development of a civil society. If there is no strong civil society, there will be 
no emancipation and no democracy in the modern world (John Keane,
1988, 31-62; Gouldner, 1980, 371). As the Philippines experience illustrates, 
civil society makes the democratic transition much more irreversible, and 
reduces the prospect that authoritarian forces (old or new) may overthrow 
or somehow capture the new democracy (Diamond, etc., 1987, 43). Thus the 
assumption of the positive influence of civil society on democracy is made. 
However, the danger from a violent and overpoliticised civil society has 
been addressed by some writers (Chung-Si Ahn, 1991; Cohen and Arato, 
1992, 57), which suggests a negative effect of civil society on democracy in 
the process of democratisation. Thus, the question of the dual roles of civil 
society in a transition to democracy needs to be synthetically studied.
In the studies of Chinese politics, a growing body of literature 
recognizes the emergence of civil society in Deng's China as fact (Ostergaard,
1989, Nathan, 1989 & 1990a, White, 1989, 1990 and 1993; Gold, 1989a, 1990, 
Strand, 1990, McCormick, 1992, He & Kelly, 1992a) albeit some writers deny 
that (see Solinger, 1992). Some writers even suggest that civil society has 
already developed into a factor in Chinese politics and will essentially 
dictate a new dimension of Chinese political development (Nathan, 1989, 
McCormick, 1992) as is evidenced in Taiwan, in which civil society has 
provided ample resources for generating democratic forces (Chen Tunjen, 
1989, 1990). The prospect of Chinese democratic politics is thus seen in terms 
of whether China is able further to develop and strengthen the existing civil 
society. Yet, the question of how a civil society impacts on Chinese 
democratisation remains to be answered.
This chapter attempts to examine the actual and potential positive and 
negative roles of civil society in the context of Chinese democratisation. It 
has three goals. The first discusses the actual positive impact of civil society
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on Chinese democratisation by revisiting the 1989 Democratic Movement 
from the perspective of civil society. The second explores the potentially 
positive and negative roles of civil society in the process of democratisation. 
The third discusses potential roles of civil society discourse and the public 
sphere in Chinese democracy.
The chapter adopts a conventional definition of civil society as de facto 
autonomous organizations that are independent of direct political control 
by the state and the Party. It further follows McCormick's (1992) definition of 
it as autonomous organization, entrepreneurial activity, or an autonomous 
public sphere. Three areas of civil society — economic civil society referring 
to autonomous organizations and entrepreneurial activities, political civil 
society referring to an opposition organization and movement, and cultural 
civil society referring to the discourse of dvil society and its relative public 
sphere — are distinguished for the purpose of discussion of roles of civil 
society.
I have rejected both a social structural determinism and a simple link 
between the new civil society and social behaviour in discussing the role of 
civil society in the process of democratisation.^^ It is misleading to adopt a 
monolithic conception of the positive role of civil society for 
democratisation. The roles of civil society vary in the different stages, such 
as initiation, consolidation and completion of democratisation (see Cohen 
& Arato, 1992, 50). Since Chinese politics is still under the control of a neo­
authoritarian state, this chapter focuses only on the roles of civil society in 
the initial process of transition to democratic politics.
This chapter is in four sections. Section 1 investigates how an emergent 
civil society influenced Chinese democratisation before and after the June 
4th events of 1989. Sections 2, 3 & 4 respectively examine the possible 
positive and negative roles of civil society in the process of Chinese 
democratisation from the points of view of autonomous organization,
1811 owe this idea to Barry Hindess' critique of social structural analysis. Hindess (1989, 13- 
17) argues that social structure does not operate outside of, and above, actors, but rather 
through the decisions of actors. Actors normally have a variety of forms of assessment of 
their situation available to them. The variety of forms of assessment of their situation also 
depends on a variety of practices and conditions. There are, therefore, complex 
interconnections between social structure and actions.
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entrepreneurial activity, and civil society discourse as well as an 
autonomous public sphere.
1. Positive Effects of Civil Society on the 1989 Democratic Movement
I should say at the beginning that factors such as the split in the leadership, 
economic problems, corruption, new cultural enlightenment and the 
weakness of political institutions as well as international support played 
major roles in the 1989 Democratic Movement. Here I examine only the 
role of civil society in Chinese democracy. On the whole, the influences of 
civil society were much weaker than other factors in the 1989 Democratic 
Movement. However, civil society was a new and important factor which 
needs to be weighted significantly.
In the past decade, the authority of the CCP has been declining and the 
Party has been forced to carry out reforms and "open door" policies for its 
survival. These have created an opportunity for the revival of Chinese civil 
society (White, 1989 & 1993, Whyte, 1992, McCormick, 1992). There were 
emergent autonomous organizations before the June 4th events in 1989. 
These included specialized academic associations and clubs, such as the 
Young Economists' Association, the Beijing Stone Group and its Institute 
for Social Development, the Beijing Social and Economic Research Institute, 
the Academy of Chinese Culture, the Capital Steel Research Institute, and 
the Happiness Bookstore. They also included the Shanghai World 
Economic Herald, and new academic journals such as New Enlightenment, 
which in 1988 evaded the party's control system for periodicals by 
registering itself as a book series. It should be noted that these autonomous 
organizations by that time had attained the status of 'legal persons' with the 
protection of statutory rights. Also, the essence of civil society lies in the 
growth of new social structures such as those seen in the private sector and 
autonomous social and cultural organizations.
These new institutionalized civil structures had a self-contained reality 
with forces and purposes of their own as soon as they were established. In 
terms of institutional need, the new structures demanded more free space 
and further liberalization in the interests of those who were within the new 
structures. For example, Wan Runnan, a former director of the Stone com­
pany, was an active advocate of privatisation, and vigorously defended the
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Stone enterprise as having been from the start a vehicle for political 
action.182 Those within the new structures also demanded influence over 
decision-making; they no longer willingly accepted conditions under which 
they had no voice. For example, Cao Siyuan who was trained in the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science, specializing in political science and law, pushed 
bankruptcy legislation before the National People's Congress in 1984. He left 
government employment to head the Beijing Social and Economic Resear­
ch Institute (SSDRI) in 1988, where he called for far-reaching political refor­
ms.
Although the term 'civil society' was not widely used as a self-referent 
by the students, intellectuals and workers, what the urban populace of 
China in 1989 was demanding, in short, was no less and no more than 'civil 
society', a political 'space' that would not be controlled by the authorities, 
and that would provide people with a bit of leverage vis k vis the 
authorities (Unger, 1991b, 5). This was an attempt to institutionalize the 
political opposition movement. As Ostergaard (1989, 40) asserts, "the 
sudden, massive spread of civil society must have been regarded as a severe 
threat to the Party's monopoly." It was precisely these demands, harmless 
though they might appear, that seem to have frightened the old leaders 
such as Deng Xiaoping. From the beginning to the end, they felt they needed 
steadfastly to refuse to give that recognition. Thus the 1989 Chinese 
Democracy Movement is best understood as the expression of fundamental 
conflict between a state with totalitarian intentions and an emerging civil 
society (McCormick, 1992).
The point of view of civil society indicates that the agent or the subject 
of the transformation must be an independent, or a self-organizing society 
aiming at structural reform. This suggests a new type of social actor. There 
are signs that the idea of civil society has transformed the behaviour of 
writers, such as Wang Juntao and Rong Jian, who took part in the 1989 
Democratic Movement claiming that they wanted to be free and 
independent rather than official scholars.
182See a series of discussions on "the economic efficacy of the Stone" in Jingji ribao, Aug 15, 30, 
Sep 3, 1988; "Wan Runnan dui waijie piping de huida" (Wan Runnan replies to his critics), 
Jiefang zazhi, no. 2 (February 1990), 82-4; interview with Shi Zhenrong in Lianhe bao (Tai- 
bei).
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More importantly, new social structures were 'social actors' playing an 
important role in Chinese democratisation. To put it another way, the 
democratic movement in 1989 gained wide and strong support from 
various autonomous social, economic and cultural organizations, including 
even the official Trade Union Federation which donated 100, 000 yuan to 
the Tiananmen demonstrators; the Democracy Wall movement of 1978-9 
lacked this type of support. It was more difficult for the Party to suppress a 
civil society than a movement without deep organizational roots. This was 
one reason why the Party had to use the army to close down the 1989 
Democratic Movement while it only arrested Wei Jingsheng and a few 
others so as to end the 1978-9 Democratic Wall Movement. The existence of 
various autonomous organizations made this difference. The following 
autonomous organizations were important in 1989: the Beijing Federation 
of Autonomous Student Unions comprising representatives of 
autonomous organizations established on many Beijing campuses, the 
Beijing Association of Intellectuals established by Yan Jiaqi, Bao Zunxin and 
others, and the autonomous associations of workers which formed 
throughout China (Gold, 1990, 196-211).
To elaborate on the above point, I would briefly discuss the role of the 
Stone group and the activity of the Stone Social Development Research 
Institute (SSDRI) under Cao Siyuan. Cao was the leading force in a meeting 
of Beijing intellectuals which tried to warn the government about im­
pending chaos in April. Following the declaration of martial law in May, 
Cao and Hu Jiwei, the former editor of Peoples Daily and a member of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, tried to convene an 
emergency sitting of the NPC to have the order withdrawn. Cao's arrest just 
prior to the massacre, on June 3, was at the behest of Li Peng and Yang 
Shangkun, who regarded the right to convene the NPC as the prerogative of 
the Politburo. It has been argued that the Stone company simply provided 
the SSDRI under Cao with a budget and left him to carry out his own pro­
grams (Liu Ruishao, 1989, 249-51). While it is difficult to establish this, his 
actions supported the aims of the intellectual movement as a whole, rather 
than Stone as a private corporation, in attempting to force the regime to live 
up to its pretensions and allow wider freedoms.
The Beijing Social and Economic Research Institute (SERI) was a 
similar case. SERI was the organizational base of Wang Juntao and Chen
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Ziming. Shao Qun describes SERI as an "independent kingdom" under the 
nose of the Communist Party, and as not receiving a cent of state funding 
(Shao, 1990, 10-13). Wang and Chen, its leaders, have been described by close 
observers as "professional revolutionaries." During the democratic 
movement, they organized secret meetings to help and guide student 
leaders. They were the behind-the-scenes 'ringleaders' who received 
sentences of thirteen years in February 1991.
After the June 4th events of 1989, economic civil society has placed 
constraints on the will of leaders and has certainly narrowed options 
available to leaders to resolve current crises. In East Europe, as Rose 
rejoicingly argues, even if military coups occurred all across the region 
tomorrow, the new rulers would find it impossible to resurrect the 
apparatus of totalitarianism. A Stalinist system is not built easily; to destroy 
a civil society would require the use of brutal force for a long period of time 
(Rose, 1992, 13 ). This is also true of China. It was difficult for Li Peng's 
government to go back to Mao’s centralised planned economy, although it 
wanted to do so in the latter half of 1989. Since the events of June 4th, the 
reason why the CCP still carries out economic reforms is that if it fails to do 
so, there will be an economic decline. For the Party, to destroy economic 
civil society costs too much, while to allow its existence and development 
will improve the economy, whereby the CCP may gain performance 
legitimacy. In other words, for leaders, to protect and develop autonomous 
economic organizations is one way to improve the economy, because the 
private sector has played an active role in promoting production and 
increasing both employment and state revenue. Thus, for China, a more 
effective check against the troublesomeness of the state is to strengthen an 
existing economically based civil society. However, it must be noted that 
although the return to Mao's totalitarian control is impossible, this does not 
imply that China will necessarily go towards democratic politics. In reality, 
China has been developing towards a neo-authoritarian state where 
economic autonomous organizations are allowed to exist, but political 
opposition is prohibited.
Also autonomous private and joint enterprises provided democrats 
with a relative safeguard after the June 4th events. Those who came out of
233
jail, after being jailed for their participation in the democratic movement in 
1989, could easily find jobs in private or joint enterprises. 183 have been
in jail for taking part in the democratic struggle has in fact become a much 
better certification than academic qualifications, because people in private 
and joint enterprises are sympathetic to those who have been in jail and 
respect them as heroes in the anti-communist shadow of Chinese culture.
Significantly, many young intellectuals are giving up their academic 
careers and are joining private enterprise, as are those currently released 
from jail after being imprisoned for their involvement in the democratic 
movement in 1989. Those whom I have met told me in Beijing in April 
1991 that their objective is: "to become rich and influential in the economic 
area first, then go back to the political battle". Some even thought that to 
further develop an economically based civil society was a swift way to 
achieve democracy in China. Here, there is an interesting parallel with the 
former Soviet Union where the "neo-liberal" youth chose not political 
opposition, but business. As Rumiantsev observes:
characteristically, many of the Soviet informal activists 
subsequently chose to engage in enterprises in the co-operative or 
mixed sectors. Farsighted organizers of co-operative enterprises 
have close ties to the democratic movements. New entrepreneurs 
are joining ranks with those politicians who uphold ideas in 
favour of privatizing parts of the economy and organizing a 
genuine pluralism of forms of ownership (Rumiantsev, 1991,
117).
2. The question of Autonomous Organizations
The development of civil society is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for democratic politics. Although emergent civil society provides us with an 
opportunity to proceed towards democratisation, it will not necessarily lead
183i was impressed by this in Beijing in February in 1991. My friend, Rong Jian who took 
active part in the Beijing Association of Intellectuals, happily showed me an official notice 
on which it says that Rong was dismissed from the membership of the Party. To be dismissed 
from membership of the Party is regarded as a good thing in the anti-communist shadow 
culture. Rong’s experience in the student movement in 1989 and this punishment helped him 
find a wonderful job in the tecju shibao in Hainan.
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to democracy. What is at stake is the nature or salient features of civil 
society. If the characteristics of civil society are sharp inequality, internal 
conflicts and violent tendencies, these will hinder the development of 
democracy. We, therefore, need thoughtful wishing (Lowenthal, 1986) 
rather than wishful thinking which should give way to a rational 
recognition of the problems associated with the autonomy of civil society, 
the ambiguous role of entrepreneurs and the problems associated with the 
discourse of civil society and the public sphere in the process of Chinese 
democratisation. These matters will be discussed in following sections.
The distinctive and enduring pattern of relations between the state and 
society in the history of China, in Fincher's view, can be described as 
vertically parallel structures with horizontal intersections (Fincher, 1989, 
89). The state 'above' is seen as operating 'at bottom' through its effect on 
the personality structure of individuals; while 'societal' forms extended to 
the highest levels — the Manchu rulers were in fact an imperial clan of 
between seven and eight hundred people (Pye, 1985, 58-9). Given that, the 
development of civil society in Chinese history was characteristic of what 
Zhu and I call the model of combination of officials and merchants, that is, 
civil society was entangled with the state in a way so that its development 
depended on the power of the state (Zhu Ying, 1990, 37-44). If there was a 
lack of support from high officials, civil society was unlikely to develop 
under the constraints of this model.
This is also true in contemporary China. The sons and daughters of 
officials have made use of the chance given by reforms and rushed to 
establish various companies (gongsi). Their strong relationship (guanxi) 
with high officials has helped them to develop their businesses quickly and 
easily. Most business people have actively sought out this kind of close 
involvement with influential people to make doing business easier and 
more secure. This has led inevitably to a distinctive feature of Chinese civil 
society, namely, an overlapping or entangling with the state, in various 
forms and in different degrees. According to one report, 60 percent of 
private entrepreneurs in rural areas were originally management or supply- 
and-marketing staff in state or collective enterprises, or cadres in production 
teams or brigades. Officials and personnel in key units such as the state 
supply bureau are often involved, less directly, in positions as consultants,
235
or directors, or they have relatives employed in such enterprises (Young, 
1991, 119-20, Solinger, 1992).
Take the common characterization of the Stone Group as part of civil 
society. Institutions such as the Stone, as Nathan (1989, 21, 1990a, 181-2) sees, 
have had a somewhat ambiguous relationship to the CCP. Most of them 
have been nominally attached to some part of the CCP organizational 
network, but they have operated independently. In fact, the state and these 
institutions are so overlapping that they cannot be separated into two 
distinctive areas. The Stone has been under the jurisdiction of the former 
Shijiqing (Evergreen) people's commune (now an administrative district). 
The Jing Hai company has been a unit under the Institute of Computer 
Science of the Academy of Science. Such organizations can be properly des­
cribed as semi-official institutions. Their autonomy was and remains 
compromised by their reliance on political interests backing them, interests 
clearly within the state. The Stone had connections to the sons and 
daughters of the political elite of the CCP, who enabled it to obtain soft 
loans, or goods produced in the state-owned manufacturing sector below 
market prices. It also had close ties to Zhao Ziyang, which was demonstrated 
in the movement in 1989. However, the nature of the ownership of the 
Stone group is blurred. Some view it as a kind of combination of public 
ownership and private management. Some regard it as a private enterprise.
There indeed exists a rough distinction between the state and civil 
society in China; the former is official, the latter is minban and has its own 
power and right to run its businesses. Qin Benli, who was once chief editor 
of the World Economic Herald, argued that the newspaper was not created 
and run by the party and the government, but rather by the World 
Economic Association of China and the Institute of World Economics, the 
Academy of Social Science of Shanghai; and importantly, he noted that the 
finance of the newspaper was self-raised with independent accountants 
assuming sole responsibility for its profits and losses. On the other hand, as 
Liu Jie, a deputy-director of the Department of Propaganda in Shanghai, 
argued, World Economic Herald was official, because the publication of the 
World Economic Herald was permitted by the Department of Propaganda in 
Shanghai in 1980; and appointment and removal of Qin Benli, being a high 
official, could be decided by the Communist Party in Shanghai (China 
Spring, No. 97, 1991, 51). On the whole, there are two sides of the World
236
Economic Herald : relative autonomy and relative dependency. It is this 
feature of overlapping and partial autonomy that deems Chinese civil 
society a semi or quasi-civil society.
The nature of Chinese quasi-civil society can also be seen in the 
perceived role and nature of the legal system. The legal system is seen as an 
instrument of the party, so that its autonomy remains problematic. If there 
is less space for the autonomy of law, it is less likely that there will be a 
normatively regulated civil society independent of the state. If the 
development of the private sector affects the predominance of public 
ownership in the national economy, the Chinese leadership is likely to 
adopt tight measures to restrain its development. The party can change legal 
regulations so as to suppress the development of civil society. In this 
respect, legal protection for private enterprises is fragile. As Susan Young 
remarks: "A Constitution which was altered so easily to include private 
business can just as easily be altered to take it out again. In any case, legal 
guarantees are of only limited relevance to daily life in China” (Young, 1991, 
130). The notable thing is that private enterprises have only an inferior legal 
status; the private sector merely supplements the public economy. The 
division between legal and illegal business also is a fine one, largely 
dependent on the politics of the time. There is evidence that the number of 
private businesses decreased in some places from late 1985 to mid-1986, a 
period that coincided with a crack-down on economic crime (Wang 
Zhonghui, 1990, 93). Also, between 1989-April 1990, about 8.600 private 
businesses were suspended, 4.500 had licences revoked, and many others 
were penalized (Beijing Review, April 15-21, 1991, 6). The crack-down on 
illegal businesses and tax evasion in 1989 was felt as even more of an attack 
on legal private business than previous attacks had been (Young, 1991, 7).
Obviously, the overlapping structure discussed above has a negative 
effect on democratisation. If my impression is not wrong, it seems that most 
business people, particularly those involved in foreign trade, are quite 
happy with the current loosening policies of Li Peng’s government; they 
recognize the existing situation as being favourable to business. The 
overlapping of private enterprise with the power of the state is at issue here 
because those who get support from high officials will lose their business 
contacts if the CCP loses power. There is a potential danger of corporatism in 
which some business people and the state make deals without thinking of
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the interests of other groups. The new entrepreneur class, in particular the 
sons and daughters of high officials connected with the power of the state, 
will transform political power into private property through privatisation 
programmes although they might eventually demand more freedom. This 
potential development may hinder the development of civil society and 
Chinese democratisation.
It is misleading, however, to see this overlapping structure, or relative 
autonomy, as a serious limit to democratic politics while ignoring possible 
positive effects. Here I would follow the idea of Montesquieu and 
Tocqueville that independent associations for non-political purposes form 
the basis for the fragmentation and diversity of power within the political 
system (see, Taylor, 1990, 115, 117). Thus, it is crucial to see how civil society 
plays its role within such an overlapping structure. There are some 
advantages of this mixed structure. One advantage was to provide 
associations with much greater political resources which can then be used to 
push for democratisation. This was the case with the Stone and the official 
trade-union. Another example was the Hunan and Sichuan People's Presses 
which published many books introducing Western ideas of democracy. 
Also, the relatively autonomous associations w ithin an overlapping 
structure may play a much bigger role than those outside the government 
in checking political power and influencing decision-making. For civil 
society, a way to influence politics and to check the Party is to play its role 
within the overlapping structure, because there is a trade-off between 
autonomy and influence. This trade-off is evidenced when leaders of social 
organizations, as White observes, often feel that the best way to increase 
their influence is to get closer to and become meshed with state and Party 
organs, compromising their autonomy in the process (White, 1993). 
Although society, as Nathan observes, is beginning to infiltrate the Party" 
(Nathan, 1990a, 5-6), actors and leaders of autonomous organizations seem 
to learn by their failure that they cannot achieve their own goals without 
recourse to the Party and the state.
In short, the overlapping structure of the state and semi-civil society 
may hinder radical transition to democracy, but may also provide pressures 
and checks on the state if civil society plays a proper role within many levels 
of the polity.
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3. The Ambiguous Role of Entrepreneurs
Historically, the anti-imperialist Chinese bourgeoisie did not play the role 
that the bourgeoisie played in opposition to the government in European 
history. The emergence of what Marie-Claire Bergäre terms "the nearest 
thing to an autonomous society" between 1911 and 1927 was an urban 
society dominated by an united front of business circles, well structured and 
inspired by a modernist and pro-Western intelligentsia (Berg£re, 1986, 240). 
For them, the State was indispensable to the constitution of society, and it 
thus was necessary to restore governmental authority. Despite the fact that 
this meant giving up the autonomy they had acquired thanks to economic 
expansion and the decline of the bureaucratic apparatus over the preceding 
years, they worked towards that end (Berg£re, 1986, 226).
In today's China, the role of the entrepreneur in Chinese political life is 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the Stone group did support the democratic 
movement in 1989. At the moment, private operators are at a disadvantage 
in that they have no legitimate access to subsidized commodities and lack 
the influence and prestige of a state unit when seeking supplies. They are 
also fearful of being classed as capitalists if the political wind shifts (also see 
Gold, 1989b). Also, private enterprises are encouraged by the government 
only as part of a reform program. The fortunes of private businesses are 
therefore tied to those of the reform program as a whole. In this respect they 
wish China to push for further privatisation and democratisation which 
will enhance their legal, economic and political status, as evidenced in the 
case of the Stone Group, SERI and similar bodies in the 1989 democratic 
movement. Thus the motive of the entrepreneur's propensity for 
democracy lies in, as O'Donnel (1973) argues, an instrumental calculation 
aimed towards gaining power via changing the rules of the political game 
and thereby displacing vested power holders.
On the other hand, for the time being, Chinese entrepreneurial 
activities seem to be compatible with a neo-authoritarian state under the 
current soft policy of the Party. An atomised and commercialised civil 
society is less interested in democratic politics than in a neo-authoriantarian 
regime, because the former brings about uncertainty while the latter creates 
favourable conditions for business. For them, this is a lesson from East 
Europe where radical transition to democracy led to disorder and economic
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chaos. In the case of private business people in Wenzhou, they seemed to 
welcome the democratic political movement less. They did not support the 
student demonstrations in Wenzhou, rather they demanded political 
stability within which they could make their profits.184 Remarkably, some 
business people in Beijing rethought their support for the student 
movement in 1989 after the events of June 4th, and arrived at the 
conclusion that they should not have supported the students because the 
student movements had destroyed a healthy economic environment for 
business growth.
There is also the ambivalent attitude of private business people 
towards the state. On the one hand, they hope that the Chinese government 
will have a powerful position in international relations, and therefore 
support a strong state authority; they also wish the state to provide them 
with resources and funds as much as possible. On the other hand, they 
demand a policy of deregulation: less taxation, and further economic 
flexibility and privatisation. Also those who are supposed themselves to be 
members of civil society have ambivalent attitudes towards civil society (He 
& Kelly, 1992a). They tend more towards cooperation with the state rather 
than defence of the autonomy of the civil society to which they belong 
when their position changes from being that of the suppressed to that of the 
superior.
This is also true in Taiwan. Cheng's study shows that the democratic 
political opposition was supported and led by professional intellectuals and 
entrepreneurs. Small and medium enterprises provided these 
oppositionists with both funds and fallback positions. However, after the 
ruling regime committed itself to political liberalization and embarked on 
an accelerated democratic transition, more political entrepreneurs chose the 
route of the reformed ruling party. Their financial and electoral support for 
the Democratic Progressive Party began to wane as that party increasingly 
resorted to social mobilization and exploited social conflicts to elicit the 
support of workers. Finally, entrepreneurs have begun to underscore the 
importance of political authority as private interests challenged state power 
(Cheng, 1989, 1990, 7-9, also see Wang Zhenhuan, 1991, 62).
184See "Guanyu Wenzhou wenti de diaocha baoeao", Guowuyuan yanjiushi sonruueiian, No. 
49, December 2nd, 1989.
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In conclusion, it is difficult for us and even for business people 
them selves to define the political role of the entrepreneur class in the 
process of democratisation because their decisions and actions depend on 
concrete social conditions and on their various judgments of situations.
4. The Problems Associated with Civil Society Discourse and the Public 
Sphere
Around 1987-1989, the liberal idea of civil society was popular in Chinese 
in tellectual circles. W hile Liu Zhiguan and W ang Suli (1988) used 
"gongmin shehui" in 1988 and Shen Yue (1990) "shimin shehui” in 1987 
and 1990, the other writers such as Wu Jiaxiang, Fang Gang and Rong Jian 
did not use such terms to discuss civil society, but employed other terms 
such as "profession society," "grey market" and "a centred-society." These 
express basic ingredients of the liberal notion of civil society such as 
individual rights, individual autonomy, voluntary associations, the public 
sphere and free enterprise. This was also true of the writers Shen Yue, Liu 
Zhiguan and W ang Suli who used the works of Marx and Rousseau 
respectively. In short, this was a conceptual shift from the idea of 
totalitarian society to the liberal idea of civil society. Also, this conceptual 
transfo rm ation  was achieved th rough  the follow ing processes and 
m echanism s: discovery of the value of civil society; exposure of the 
negative consequences of "mass society;" and criticism of the apparent 
incoherencies of the dom inant official ideology (I have discussed Chinese 
liberal ideas of civil society in detail elsewhere, see He Baogang, 1993e).
After the events of June 4th 1989, some Chinese intellectuals overseas 
a ttem pted  to link dem ocratic m ovem ents overseas into a version of 
T im othy G arton Ash's Type B185 as happened  in Poland w here the 
institutionalisation of civil society was the democratic opposition's strategy 
in the second half of the 1970s (Rumiantsev, 1991, 117). They adopted and
185For Ash (1989, 246), civil society describes two different things: (A) the entire range of 
social associations, ties and activities independent of the state, from glee clubs to Charter 77, 
from samizdat to breviaries, and from private farmers to homosexuals; (B) more narrowly, 
and more politically, the products of that strategy of ’social self-organization' that was, 
broadly speaking, adopted by the democratic oppositions in Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia in the mid- to late 1970's. For them, the reconstitution of 'civil society' was 
both an end in itself and a means to political change, including, change in the nature of the 
state.
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highlighted the Gramscian model of civil society which is seen as an 
opposition movement, a democratic strategy and an antagonism between 
the state and society. The autonomous organizations overseas also 
established direct connections with various international human rights 
associations to create what might be seen as "a transnational-civil society".
The significance of the discourse of civil society is this: to talk about 
civil society is to enquire into a new political theory of the state and to 
articulate a normative project for liberalization and democratisation. For 
liberal intellectuals, a society independent of the state should be developed 
so that the power of the state would be limited. They believe, under civil 
society, the dispersion of economic power means that political and legal 
power cannot be monopolised, and that checks and safeguards against the 
abuse of power are able to operate. These ideas certainly will acquire 
influence to alter the nature and workings of existing institutions because 
the idea of civil society has already been taken up by opposition 
organizations overseas and can potentially be taken up by the reformer 
faction within the Party as discussed in Section 5 of Chapter 10.
However, there are at least two problems associated with the discourse 
of civil society concerning its potential role in Chinese democracy (I have 
discussed this in detail elsewhere, see He Baogang, 1993e). The first is the 
idealized notion of civil society which assumes that once civil society is 
established, a harmonious and democratic society will occur. This notion 
should be discarded. Any civil society has the inherent potential for 
disruptive conflicts among competing interests and traditions of behaviour. 
The idea, therefore, is not a useful tool for dealing with practical problems 
and even makes people doubt the value of civil society and democracy.
The second is the Gramscian model of civil society, which has 
evidenced theoretical and practical problems (for a detailed discussion, see 
He Baogang, 1993b). Let us first look at a theoretical problem associated with 
the Gramscian model of civil society in Eastern Europe. Civil society first 
was used as an anti-politics strategy. The Solidarity movement was 
interpreted as a struggle of society against the state (Arato, 1981, 23-4). When 
the members of Solidarity came to power in 1989, a new problem arose: 
those who were the members of civil society now became officers of the
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state. This leads to the disappearance of the demarcation between the state 
and civil society. As Piccone put it:
Upon taking power, civil society ideologists quickly adjusted to 
the corporatist politics dictated by the communist power structure 
(in Poland). Then, after it became obvious that there were no 
Soviet tanks propping up the various local communist regimes, 
they rediscovered the virtues of politics-as-usual, while 
attempting, like the careless sorcerer's apprentice, to control the 
demonic forces they had unwittingly released. The major 
components of the long-projected reconstitution of an 
autonomous civil society, the working classes, are now 
increasingly joining forces with the remnants of the old 
bureaucratic apparatus to contain the detrimental consequences of 
these economic reforms necessary for dismantling the system of 
central planning (1990, 15, also see Cohen & Arato, 1992).
The second practical problem is that the violent tendency of some 
political and social movements threatened the transformation from a neo­
authoritarian state to democracy. Here I would like to emphasize that the 
Gramscian model of civil society favours and supports the violence strategy 
for democratisation. Violence arising from civil society is a danger to 
democracy. The case of the 1989 Democratic Movement demonstrates that 
the Chinese students and populace were civilian and peaceful. But there 
was also a call for violent revolution from the Beijing Workers 
Autonomous Federation. Whether Chinese civil society moves towards 
non-violence or violence is uncertain and contingent in the future.
As the discourse of civil society emerged, so did a space for public 
sphere activities in 1989 (also see Section 2 of Chapter 8). Tiananmen Square 
in 1989 can be seen as an arena of the public sphere where political issues 
could be expressed, discussed and criticised, and public opinion turned into 
a political force (Calhoun, 1989, Li Oufan, 1989). People in the Square 
removed politics from the exclusive domain of the Party into the realm of 
the public. Newspapers and television stations were also important arenas 
of the public sphere. Although genuine freedom of the press lasted only 
three days, while journalists were able to tell the truth, their power of 
mobilization of the populace was so great that they raised popular
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awareness of the student demonstration and strengthened the resistance 
against Martial law.
This brings about a problem of mobilization. If a civil society does not 
mobilize, it cannot play a major role in the process of democratisation. On 
the other hand, there is always a high level of mobilization in Chinese 
politics. A highly mobilized civil society may produce popular, radical and 
romantic politics rather than democratic politics. Romantic and polarized 
politics may also intensify the political struggle and make political 
concessions and negotiations more difficult. In the case of the 1989 
Democratic Movement, the failure of the autonomous student 
organizations to make concessions has heightened both the propensity and 
the legitimacy of military-bureaucratic intervention, to the point where 
these elites have come to see it not only as their right but their duty to guard 
and guide the political process out of chaos. Now Chinese democrats have 
learnt the lesson that political negotiation is necessary for the transition to 
democratic politics. If the Cultural Revolution created tolerance, the June 
4th events may create consensus for negotiation.
Conclusion
Civil institution building beyond the vigilant eye of the Party and the secret 
police is well under way albeit in its infancy. A semi-civil society has 
developed into a real basis for political pluralism, and has contributed to 
political changes during and after the democratic movement of 1989. 
However, the major problem is that the supremacy of the state over civil 
society has been a source of difficulty for democracy. On the whole, nascent, 
weak, ineffective, emergent civil society constitutes a very weak check on 
the abuse of state power. It is still unable to resist military-bureaucratic 
cooperation and repression. At the moment, Chinese society is not able to 
combine all social forces to make itself a powerful counter-balance against 
the state. Only when social associations and organizations at the grass roots 
level penetrate the whole Chinese nation, can a civil society be a powerful 
check on the power of the state. Up to now, civil society has not added up to 
enough to enforce the transition to democratic politics. Nevertheless, it will 
develop in the next decade and become a major factor influencing the 
direction of Chinese politics.
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The positive influence of an emergent civil society on Chinese 
democratisation can be summarized in the following ways: structural 
demands for democratisation, civil society as a political goal and as social 
actors supporting and pushing the 1989 Democratic Movement, 
institutional constraints on the will of the leadership, and a safeguard for 
democrats. However, the roles of Chinese semi-civil society in Chinese 
democratisation are twofold: it is a force for democracy and a safe refuge for 
democrats; while it can also be a conservative force which demands stability 
rather than transition to democracy. In short, the roles of civil society in 
Chinese democracy are ambiguous and contingent. Consequently, the actual 
political roles of the Stone Group, SERI or similar bodies in the process of 
Chinese democratisation, remain vague in the future. Whether or not they 
will support neo-authoritarianism is an open question.
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CHAPTER 10
Conditions of Leadership: Legitimacy and Democracy
This chapter investigates the search for new foundations of legitimacy by 
Deng's leadership and examines changes in legitimating techniques in 
relation to the move towards democratization in China after 1978, and 
particularly since 1989. The central objective is to investigate the 
relationship between legitimacy (old and new forms of legitimation) and 
democracy in contemporary China. The purposes of this Chapter are (1) to 
identify changes in the conceptions of legitimacy, particularly new 
adjustments of the legitimating techniques; (2) to assess the impact of these 
changes on the direction of political development by examining the 
possibility of playing the democratic card by reformer factions within the 
CCP; and finally (3) to discuss the limits and the problems associated with 
the Party's search for new legitimacy.
Lucian Pye (1968, 1985, 1988) has already studied in detail the 
development of Chinese concepts of legitimacy and the changes they have 
gone through. David Goodman (1987), Womack (1990, 20), Friedman (1991, 
162-3) and Bill Brugger (1989) have also worked on the Party's search for 
legitimacy in China from 1978 to the middle 1980s. These works are creative 
and useful in providing a basis for exploring the legitimacy issue. However, 
their relevance is confined to a certain period; thus much work still needs to 
be done on tracing new developments in legitimacy since 1989. Also since 
Jan Pakulski (1993) and I (He Baogang 1991a) have already examined 
theoretical frameworks whereby to analyze the legitimacy issue, this chapter 
focuses more narrowly on practical issues of legitimacy, in particular on the 
subject of legitimacy in the eyes of leaders, and on the object of legitimacy, 
the question of good regime and leaders.
Legitimacy in this chapter refers to the foundation of governmental 
power as it is exercised both with a consciousness on the government's part 
that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of 
that right. Legitimation refers to the process, mechanisms and techniques 
which secure the validity of the authority of governmental power.
246
This chapter is in six sections. Section 1 examines the crises of the 
official orthodox Marxism and Maoism and of the legitimacy of the system. 
This serves as a basis for the discussions which follow. Section 2 briefly 
examines Deng's various modes of legitimation. Section 3 discusses new 
trends of legal-rational legitimation and problems associated with that 
legitimation. Section 4 investigates the Party's effort to seek a new ideology 
and a new model of legitimation by studying the case of the official 
discourse of human rights. It also examines the political significance, and 
the limits, of the official recognition of human rights as a political goal. 
Section 5 examines Deng's political use of the economic aspect of civil 
society as a new art of rule and a new legitimating source. Section 6 further 
explores a possible step by which reformer factions within the Party would 
legally recognize political opposition movements in order to gain a form of 
legitimacy in post-Deng China.
1. The Crises of the Official Ideology and Legitimacy
Communist ideological commitments can be summarized as follows.
(1) The economic strategy of development is socialism, requiring 
nationalization and collectivization of the economy.
(2) The political vehicle of development is "proletarian dictatorship", 
requiring a virtual monopolization of state power by the ruling Communist 
party.
(3) The ultimate objective of development is a classless Communist 
society, requiring the creation of a new "socialist man" through continued 
class struggle and repeated efforts to establish a uniform collectivist 
consciousness in place of competing individual or group interests.
(4) The world context of development is seen as an unremitting struggle 
between capitalist and socialist systems, requiring constant preparation for, 
and participation in, opposition to capitalism (Townsend, 1974, Schurmann, 
1988).
These ideological commitments were successful in legitimizing Mao's 
authority, and were dominant and widespread during the Cultural
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Revolution. But, the degree to which people believed in those ideological 
commitments is still open to debate.
Through the official ideology, Mao Zedong and his ideological 
colleagues seemed to have hit upon a belief system that struck a positive 
chord in the psyche of the Chinese people and were thereby able to inspire 
them to extraordinary sacrifices. Two aspects of Mao's essential message 
sprang from a common psychological source. At one level he spoke to a 
belief in the inherent goodness and greatness of the Chinese people; on 
another level he justified hatred and depicted enemies against whom 
uninhibited aggression could be channelled (Pye, 1985, 323).
However, theoretically, Maoism as the means for ideological 
legitimation of society has limitations: as a ritualized dogmatic quasi­
religion, Maoism is too impoverished; and, as a rational ideology, it is 
constantly endangered by the reality to which it is increasingly irrelevant. 
Further, the official ideology may serve as a source of both justification and 
critique of the system or regime. For example, the concept of "people as 
master" has been and will still be used to justify the CCP, but it also can be 
used to support and justify demands for Western democracy.
In reality, the first crisis in Mao's authority was caused by an economic 
crisis, the failure of the Great Leap Forward, which was so severe as to shake 
the faith of the peasantry in the Party and in Mao himself. Even more 
disillusioning were the consequences of the Cultural Revolution which led 
the masses, intellectuals, ordinary Party members and bureaucrats to doubt 
the official ideology and the final goal, and to become more pragmatic and 
individualistic. Post-Mao China has been marked by open disbelief in the 
superiority of socialism, widespread contempt for those wishing to join the 
Party, a view of officials as a self-seeking exploitative class, and pervasive 
political indifference. In the 1980s, what Chinese officials called crises of 
faith, confidence, and trust reflected not only the lingering disillusionment 
of the Maoist era but also problems generated by the emerging post-1976 
policies.
Since 1978, in order to ensure the legitimacy of the CCP, particularly of 
Deng’s leadership, and to permit himself greater latitude for pragmatic
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experimentation, Deng has conducted serious theoretical debates about the 
criterion of truth, 186 which have led to a movement towards intellectual 
emancipation and consequently undermined Maoist ideology. Official 
Marxism and Maoism have also been eroded and challenged by Chinese 
intellectuals. In the early challenge, roughly between 1977-1982, social 
values embodied in the ideological commitments, such as the people being 
masters of their country, truth, and respect for human dignity, gradually 
ceased to serve as the official legitimizers in goal-rational legitimation. But 
these values were also used by dissidents to question and criticize the 
legitimacy of the system and the regime. For example, Li Yizhe's group and 
liberals such as Wei Jingsheng and Hu Ping used Marxist terms and 
theoretical framework in their political discussion (Chapters 1 and 3). 
Between 1984-1989, some Chinese intellectuals attempted to move beyond 
Marxism and introduced liberal-democratic ideas, advocating privatization 
of the economy, a limitation on central power by means of a programme of 
decentralization, the abandonment of the traditional personality and the 
creation of a type of modern, open and aggressive man, and finally the 
merging of the West and the East. This movement demonstrates the 
communist failure to inculcate Marxism into a popular W eltanschauung, 
and yet this failure, if anything, seems to have increased the Chinese 
communists' reliance on Marxist ideological-doctrine, as has also been the 
case with Eastern European communists (See, Pakulski, 1987, 139).
When old tenets have lost all credibility, a revamping of the prevailing 
ideology is urgent. In China, in order to resolve the ideological crisis, the 
humanist Marxists, such as Wang Ruoshui (1985), Gao Ertai and Xie Dezhen 
reinterpreted, between 1982-1984, the Marxist concept of alienation, and in 
their search for renewal turned to the young Marx and the philosophy of 
hum an em ancipation to underm ine the prevailing orthodoxy. 
Nevertheless, they have still retained many of the old socialist dogmas and 
refused to make a total break with the communist system. At the same time, 
the conservative Chinese leaders repressed the Humanist School in 1982- 
1984. As a result, the goal of reconstruction of Marxism eventually failed 
and the humanist Marxists were criticized by both orthodox Marxists, like
186Brugger has outlined changes in official ideology since the Third Plenum of late 1978, see 
Brugger, 1989, 2-12,18-26.
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Deng Liqun, and rejected by the young radical intellectuals. The result was 
the loss of the Chinese leaders' first chance to save or reconstruct Marxism, 
and the emergence of a dissident counterculture rejecting the system 
entirely,187 which led to a deepening of the crisis in orthodox ideology.
An alternative strategy to resolve the ideological crisis was to carry out 
ideological reform. In 1987 several young scholars in the Institute for 
Political Reform organized a number of papers which discussed ideological 
reforms in East Europe, the Chinese traditional ideological control system, 
and, more importantly, the possibility of establishing a flexible arrangement 
for ideological control. A separation of ideology and administrative politics 
was also proposed as one of the necessary elements of political reform (He 
Baogang, 1988). In 1989 some Chinese intellectuals insisted that ideological 
reform should be carried out thoroughly, and that private newspapers 
should be allowed to exist.188 Further, some intellectuals argued that China 
needed a transformation from "religious ideology" (based on faith, power 
and myth) toward " academic ideology" (based on reason and reality) and a 
structure of open and alternative ideologies (Xie Xianjun, 1989).
However, again, this second chance to carry out ideological reforms was 
lost, as the regime cracked down on the student movement with tanks in 
1989 (also see Pan Mingxiao (Michel Bonnin), 1990). The ferocity with which 
Deng's regime dealt with the students' movement showed that the political 
authority was manifestly incapable of coping with the problems and 
demands of modernization. Legitimacy always needs competence; nothing 
so shatters the mystique of authority as helplessness (Pye, 1968, 6).
Since the June 4 Incident of 1989, the CCP has made an effort to 
strengthen ideological control over universities, press, and the mass media. 
A number of conferences were held between 1989-1990 to carry out 
ideological control. Many articles appearing in Guangming Daily stressed 
that more attention should be paid to ideological work, and ideological 
work should be strengthened (August 4, 1989); powerful and professional 
political thought education teams should be established in universities (July
187Vladimir Tismaneanu describes the same phenomena in Eastern Europe, see Tismaneanu, 
1988.
188see Shijian jingji daobao (World Economic Herald), May 8, 1989.
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21, 1989); and the major focus for political thought education should be the 
Four Principles (July 23, 1989). Also, a number of articles emphasized 
ideological themes: the privatization of the economy as counter­
revolutionary (July 28, 1989); class struggle as it exists in the primary stage of 
socialism (July 22, 1989, by Zhao Guangwu and July 24, 1989, by He 
Xianping); the clear distinction which needed to be made between 
capitalism and socialism, and the need for China to stick to the socialist road 
(August 7, 1989). These developments have led Dittmer (1989, 15) to 
conclude that the CCP after 1989 has translated very serious and complex 
problems into the moral and ideological terms with which its members are 
more familiar.
On the other hand, since the June 4 Incident in 1989, the Party has still 
proclaimed reformism and the principle of human rights (discussed in 
Section 3). This is a kind of new ideology created and insisted on by Deng to 
re-build Chinese communist legitimacy and to avoid the coming revolution 
in China. 189 it seems that there will be a third chance for the Party to 
undertake an ideological renewal, which is already under way, and that this 
will be continued in the near future, particularly in post-Deng politics 
(discussed in Section 6).
2. Various Modes of Legitimation under Deng
Deng's regime has faced many more crises of legitimacy than that of Mao’s. 
First, the Communists under Mao were not content to base their claim to 
legitimacy upon their ideological message. They sought further to justify 
their power by responding to the profound cravings for dependency on the 
part of the Chinese masses. Their goal was to promise a secure existence, 
based upon job security, the "iron rice bowl," and most of the necessities of 
life at below-cost prices (Pye, 1985, 197, also see, Townsend, 1967, 195). And 
Mao did succeed. In the early years of Chinese communist rule, the 
satisfaction of personal needs, the guarantee of the individual’s physical and 
cultural reproduction led large masses of people to accept the legitimacy of 
the CCP as they enjoyed certain beneficial aspects of political obedience in a
189in fact, reformism provides a very limited political justification. As Friedman (1985, 44) 
argues, "one matter that weigh against the reformers is that their wisdom seems heresy in 
the Leninist tradition. Therefore the reformers cannot readily legitimate their policies."
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tangible way. Contrarily, Deng's reform policies, which attempt to break 
with the "iron rice bowl", have created new problems, such as inflation and 
unstable security. These problems have destroyed the social eudaemonic 
legitimation on which the Party's claim to legitimacy was based. Second, 
Mao's regime did not evidence much corruption, while there has been 
widespread and serious corruption in Deng's regime. This led some people 
to assert in the 1989 student movement that they would rather have Mao's 
dictatorship without corruption than Deng's reforms with widespread 
corruption. According to the Chinese idea that moral order is the basis of 
legitimacy (that is, rulers or cadres should be more virtuous than anyone 
else and therefore deserve to rule), Deng's leadership has completely lost its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. Third, while Mao's legitimacy had 
charismatic roots, and Mao obtained a significant degree of charismatic 
authority; Deng's regime lacks such charismatic legitimacy.
In summary, Deng has faced difficulties in employing such old modes 
of legitimation as the charismatic, goal-rational or teleological and 
eudaemonic. In order to overcome these difficulties, Deng has taken 
various measures as deliberate strategies for legitimising both the Party 
organization and the exercise of state power. The most noticeable is legal- 
rational legitimation, a new mode of legitimation, which is increasingly 
becoming the dominant mode of legitimation in China (discussed in next 
section). And official ideology still plays a part in the effort to regain the 
legitimacy of the Party, but is increasingly losing its primary centrality in 
what is becoming a mix of modes of legitimation.
Deng has drawn on the following alternative sources of legitimation. 
First, maintenance of political stability was and is used as a tool by the Party 
for its claim to the legitimacy of its rule. The rationale is that "those who 
restore social order have absolute right to control;" this rationale is often 
seen in the current mass media in China. Post-communist crisis and social 
chaos in eastern Europe has been also used by the current Chinese regime to 
support and strengthen its claims to legitimacy. This may work at a social 
psychological level; that is, the masses' fear of "primitive power" or "social 
disorder" can concentrate the collective mind and make legitimate 
authority appear preferable even when that authority is considerably less 
than ideal (Pye, 1985, 33).
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Second, Deng's regime has issued substitute claims to legitimacy, such 
as reference to the current economic achievements, the social 
representativeness of the CCP and the NPC, the desirability of certain 
policies such as the open door policy, the moral and intellectual 
qualifications of new leaders, the public interest , nationalism, welfare 
measures, consumerism, and the rising standard of living. Here, the current 
economic crisis in Russia has often been contrasted with the successful 
economic achievements under Deng's leadership. For Deng, legitimacy 
depends on the efficiency of the government. Nevertheless, economic 
efficiency and the satisfaction of material needs do not necessarily give rise 
to consent to the regime by the masses, as those who have become better off 
in the past decades still complain and criticize the government. Further, 
performance legitimation is unstable, for if economic performance gets 
worse, the degree to which legitimacy is gained will decrease.
Third, Deng's regime has also gained mass compliance by obtaining 
compulsive compliance based on fear, expediency, fatalism (lack of 
alternative) and sheer discipline. This included the employment of the 
army and police to crack down on the students' demonstration in 1989 and 
coercive measures of repression and punishment of those who took part in 
the demonstration after June 4th. As Dittmer argues, according to Deng 
Xiaoping's conceptualization ~ namely, that legitimacy is based on the 
credibility of the threat to use violence — the crackdown of the 
demonstration in 1989 should have bolstered legitimacy (Dittmer, 1989, 15). 
Further, Deng's paternalistic conception of democracy is not one that 
requires legitimation through such procedures as general election; and his 
conception of democracy is also one that can endow the use of coercion 
against popular opposition with its legitimating justification (see Chapter 2). 
However, the role of coercion is very limited in achieving effective 
legitimacy. It may produce unintended consequences: decreasing legitimacy 
rather than increasing it, obtaining a very limited surface compliance rather 
than winning free support from the masses. It further runs counter to the 
establishment of popular legitimacy and undermines any claim to popular 
support.
The various legitimating techniques which Deng has used do not make 
a cohesive basis for legitimation. Deng's pragmatism constitutes a new basis 
of legitimacy according to which performance has become a powerful
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legitimising weapon. This contradicts Deng's emphasis on sticking to both 
the Four Principles and reformism as the guiding principles for ideological 
work. Due to the lack of a coherent basis for legitimation, and the two 
mutually contradictory sources of legitimation (ideology and pragmatism) 
associated with the following contradictory principles — one accepting the 
role of the center and the other allowing for a spontaneous market 
mechanism — the system is in a state of permanent legitimation crisis.
This contradiction can be seen in the following dilemma faced by Deng's 
regime. On the one hand, if reforms are reduced or canceled there will be 
more challenges to Communist legitimacy and a greater possibility of revol­
ution. On the other hand, if there is less ideological control, there will be 
further decentralization of the central Party's power and more development 
of civil society. In other words, reformers attempt to avoid the coming 
revolution, but reform actually accelerates what it aims to avoid and makes 
the coming revolution much more dangerous for the system than it would 
otherwise be. This is why Deng and other Chinese leaders vacillate between 
ideology and pragmatism. On the one hand, Deng and other Chinese leaders 
have a great need for ideology. Ideology has been important, not only as a 
guide for action but also as a way of legitimating the moral claims associated 
with leadership. More importantly, it can be used to protect the discussion 
of politics from the very threatening possibility that explicit talk could lead 
to the chaos associated with factional strife (Pye, 1985, 204). On the other 
hand, in practice the leaders seem to ignore the content of ideology; they do 
what advances their self-interest without amending the substance of their 
ideology (Pye, 1985, 206).
3. A Move towards Legal-Rational Legitimation
There is a dynamism to legal-rational legitimation. When a goal-rational 
legitimation — the validity of orders issued by the rulers is derived from the 
validity of the principal social goals that the authorities claim to represent 
and promote — decreases, the leaders are increasingly interested in 
emphasising the legal-rational mode of legitimation (see Holmes, 1992). 
Deng's China has been undergoing legal and institutional construction 
since 1978. A highly institutionalized legal system has been built up which 
functions as the basis of "socialist legality". There has also been a legal 
awakening in which both the Party leadership and the masses have seen
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that the "rule of law" is a sound alternative to the former disastrous "rule of 
persons". During Deng Xiaoping's leadership, law has advanced beyond the 
instrumental functions of Marxist political rule. Law has increasingly been 
seen as a channel for economic modernization and as the legitimate means 
of resolving conflicts and regulating social order (Lo, 1989, 413).
The Chinese leaders have made vigorous efforts to revitalize and 
strengthen China's legal system since 1978 (Baum, 1986, Yu Youzhi, 1986). 
They introduced the terms of office in China, in an effort to limit the tenure 
of leading officials. They have regularized the CCP meetings, separated party 
and state, implemented electoral procedures, and recognized the legitimacy 
of conflicting interests in society. Also, the various formal Party norms, 
rules and constitutions, such as minority rights and collective leadership, 
have been taken seriously by the elite as an indication of how the system 
and leader should operate. There has been an observable trend in the legal- 
rational mode of legitimation from arbitrariness towards regularization and 
"norms" in the communist states. There is also growing the legal 
professionalism, which enhances the legal competence of judicial organs, 
and an improvement in legal consciousness among the general public.
What is more important is the change of the legal system from 
suppression of civil society to protection of it, albeit in a limited form. Over 
the course of a cyclical, stop-start process of liberalization and repression, the 
party retained its supremacy in determining the outcomes of legal disputes 
in which it had a direct interest. But there was a discernible retreat from day- 
to-day interference in a broad category of cases which had recourse to newly 
promulgated civil law (Lo, 1990). This apparent move towards formal 
legality and rationality is evidenced in the recognition of private ownership 
and the enforceability of a capitalist commercial relationship. Formal 
legalism was adopted as a necessary mechanism to support the introduction 
of contract to a centralized economy (Findlay & Chiu, 1991, 81). Private 
enterprises are buttressed by a new system of institutionalized legal 
safeguards. The Constitution was altered in 1982 to confirm the role of 
individual businesses, and in 1988 to cater for large private enterprises as 
well. The government also made a new legal regulation in which it states 
that the private economy is a supplement to the socialist collective 
economy. The state protects the legitimating rights and interests of private 
enterprises (Article 3). Private enterprises are allowed to establish their own
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associations (Article 5). In Articles 20 and 21, private enterprises are entitled 
to enjoy the following rights: the right to inherit properties, the right to 
decide on their internal organs and institutions, the right to employ and 
dismiss employees, the right to decide on salaries and use of profits, and the 
right to decide on the price of goods and criteria of charges in accordance 
with state price regulations (Shangyebu bangongting, 1989, 302-5). A private 
entrepreneur whose rights are infringed on also has the legal institutional 
safeguard of appeal to the courts. The law of Civil Procedures which was 
promulgated in 1982 opened for the first time the possibility of bringing 
lawsuits against administrative organizations. The law of Administrative 
Procedures, coming into effect as of October 1, 1990, invests Chinese citizens 
with the legal right to bring lawsuits against government officials and bring 
administrative organizations under legal scrutiny (Beijing Review, Apr 29- 
May 5,1991,14).
Further, law is now seen generally as a legitimate channel by which to 
redress grievance (Lo, 1989, preface). The Chinese government now 
recognizes that rallies and demonstrations can be effective alternatives in 
resisting bureaucracy and corruption, in helping the government to reduce 
mistakes in decision-making and in maintaining a healthy work-style. They 
may function as "safety valves" of society, letting out resentment and 
preventing negative moods from accumulating and exploding (Findlay & 
Chiu, 1991, 71). The new public demonstration law in China expresses a 
subtle shift in discourse and emphasis. The "maintenance of order and 
social stability" is replaced by the protection of citizens "in exercising their 
rights" as the principal purpose of the law in revised Article 1. In Article 2, 
reference to opposition against the "Chinese Communist Party and the 
socialist system" (referred to in the draft) has been removed (Findlay & 
Chiu, 1991, 74).
However, the personalisation of politics is still dominant in the 
Chinese communist state, and the goal of legal-rational legitimation has not 
been reached. Also, Teiwes claims that the Chinese regime is not based on 
legal-rational authority and the position of leader has not been strongly 
defined in legal-rational terms. Deng’s move toward legal rationality is 
impressive but uncertain and ultimately flawed (see, Teiwes, 1984, 55-58). 
Deng still remains above the institutional arrangements and the rule of law 
and there is no institutional guarantee to prevent him from violating the
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Party rules. Power in Deng's time is still residing in the person of high 
officials and not in their offices or in institutions. The degree to which 
power is still personalized and not institutionalized in constitutionally 
defined offices can be seen in the fact that the former general secretaries of 
the central party community, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, were ousted 
from their office by Deng and other conservative leaders, such as Chen Yue 
and Yang Shangkun.
4. The Rights Legitimation
Chapter 4 has already discussed three new elements associated with the 
official Chinese position in the White Paper on human rights: the 
acknowledgement of the protection of human rights as a major goal of the 
government, the acknowledgement of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as an international or universal enterprise, and the silence on 
Marxist class and economic analyses of human rights. What is important is 
that the Chinese government has made concessions on the issue of human 
rights since the 1989 Democratic Movement in China. Practically, the 
human rights issue in China is now open to discussion and to investigation 
by foreign countries; for example, Australian, Swedish and French human 
rights delegations have been invited in by China. Also, Fang Lizhi and 
wives of dissidents such as Su Xiaokang and Yuan Zhiming have been 
allowed to go overseas. Importantly, the so-called internal affair of human 
rights has in fact been internationalized: and international pressures do 
have a positive impact on improving the human rights situation in China. 
For example, where international pressure identifies an individual, the 
person is protected (Woodman, 1992, 16-7). These facts indicate a 
fundamental change in governmental rule or method of rule in the sense 
that the Chinese Government is now learning how to play the card of 
human rights. As a western diplomat suggests, China has become more 
sophisticated in handling its critics.190
Now it is easy for us to recall Deng's early denial of "western human 
rights" as "bourgeois". Why has the discourse of human rights now 
acquired a legitimate status in the White Paper , and undergone a shift in
190Yvonne Preston, "China takes initiative on human rights criticism", Age, 18th September, 
1991.
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Status from a domestic issue to a diplomatic or international issue? A 
simple answer, according to an official source, is that to open the discussion 
of human rights is useful in fighting challenges from the West, in carrying 
out patriotic and socialist education, in developing studies of the Marxist 
theory of human rights, and finally in promoting democratic and legal 
construction in China (Renmin ribao, 27th January, 1992). Another 
explanation is that the Government is responding to the US Human Rights 
Report by the US State Department on February 1, 1991, in order to gain 
economically from the West and to improve the image of the CCP in 
international com m unities.19! Here, I would like to argue that to protect 
human rights is in the interest of the membership of the Party in terms of 
their personal security if a political event like the collapse of the communist 
rule in the former Soviet Union should occur in China. Also, I would like 
to stress that the discourse of human rights has now become a new 
legitimating tool. This is because the old legitimating weapons such as 
official ideology, nationalism (see Friedman, 1993a) and neo-traditionalism 
(that is, the present political order is legitimated by identifying it with an 
earlier phase of the same order) have become less effective.
The White Paper on human rights shows changes in its conception of 
legitimacy, particularly in its new adjustment to legitimating techniques. It 
is an effort to re-establish, after 1989, a theoretical basis of legitimacy: a move 
from the utopian goal of communist society to the rhetorical goal of 
protection and improvement of human rights. This new weapon, what I 
would like to call rights legitimation is a mix of ingredients: a new ideology, 
performance factors, nationalism and the international discourse of human 
rights. It can be characterized by the following four features.
(1) Rights legitimation takes the form of Chinese nationalism rather than 
the form of individualism. Rights to life, liberty and the security of a person 
are first understood as the right to subsistence which is closely associated 
with Chinese nationalism. According to the White paper, it was imperialist 
powers such as Britain, France, Japan, the US and Russia that waged wars on
191 There have been various responses to the White Paper. Western critics and Chinese 
dissidents overseas are very sceptical. For example, Yan Jiaqi has criticized the White 
Paper, see, 1992, 49; Yi Ding's criticism, see Minzhu zhongguo (Democratic China Monthly), 
1992, No. 2, 21.
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varying scales against China, causing immeasurable loss of life and property 
damage and destruction during the 110 years from 1840 to 1949 (Beijing 
Review, Nov. 4-10th, 1991, 21). And the discourse of human rights, in the 
official Chinese view, serves as a new legitimising tool for imperialism to 
use to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Conversely, the 
official Chinese rights legitimation emphasizes that the preservation of 
national independence and state sovereignty and the freedom from 
imperialist subjugation are the most fundamental conditions for survival 
and development of the Chinese people ( Beijing Review, Nov. 4-10th, 1991, 
12). In this understanding, Chinese nationalism is interpreted as a version 
of the urgent right to subsistence. This nationalism associated with the right 
to subsistence might prove powerful given the Chinese people's memory 
of, and hatred towards, imperialist subjugation in modern Chinese history.
(2) Rights legitimation is also a new ideological renewal in terms of the 
new phrase, "the right to development". The right to development is a 
collective right which has priority over individual rights. According to this, 
if the Chinese government pushes for economic development, a neo­
authoritarian government and its suppression of civil and political rights 
would be justifiable (Renmin ribao, Jan 27, 1992). In line with this view, 
Hua Sheng, an economist, criticizes Hu Ping, the former president of the 
Chinese Alliance for Democracy: if Hu were more concerned with living 
conditions in which ordinary people live than with individual rights such 
as freedom of speech, which only intellectuals enjoy, he would give up his 
search for a liberal government in China (China Spring, No. 3, 1992, 80-7).
This ideological renewal reflects changes in ideological legitimation. 
The old elements of ideological legitimation are reasons connected with the 
existence of a revolutionary state; the sociological formula that the Party is 
the best representative of the interests of workers and peasants, and the 
dialectical assertion that only the Party is able to know how to solve 
conflicts. These elements are now declining, gradually giving way to the 
discourses of human rights and reformism.192
19-Current Chinese leaders are very utilitarian. In the past 10 years, instrumental 
rationality, with the idea of catching up with neighboring countries in economic 
performance, has acquired greater appeal for the ruling elite. Substantial ideology has been 
decreased in the economic and diplomatic areas although it is still being maintained in the
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(3) Rights legitimation is a version of performance legitimation in terms 
of its claim that the Chinese government and people have spared no effort 
to safeguard hum an rights and steadily im prove their hum an rights 
situation, and have achieved remarkable results (Beijing Review, Nov. 4- 
10th, 1991, 8). Not surprisingly, the White Paper does not m ention any 
violation of hum an rights under Chinese communist rule, in particular 
during the Cultural Revolution. Instead, the White Paper claims that the 
Chinese people have gained extensive political, economic and social rights, 
that China’s judicial work has guaranteed human rights, and that citizens 
have enjoyed freedom of religious belief. This performance legitimating 
claim will fail at the practical level because those who have suffered abuse 
of hum an rights in China will not believe such propaganda.
(4) Rights legitim ation seems to draw  support from the international 
discourse on hum an rights. W hen the Chinese regime faces crises of 
legitim acy, it looks to external or international resources to gain its 
legitimacy. To say that the Chinese regime's actions and policies meet 
international standards is one way to legitimize the regime. This is a hidden 
m otive for the Chinese governm ent to appraise highly the Universal 
Declaration of Hum an Rights as a universal enterprise. This development 
is also influenced by the fact that the Chinese economy is becoming more 
and more internationalized, and so are Chinese politics. The official 
acknowledgement of international discourse of hum an rights has two-sided 
implications. On the one hand, it provides a theoretical weapon for Chinese 
leaders to fight off challenges from W estern countries. According to the 
White Paper, the ideas of the right to subsistence and of the right to 
developm ent enrich the concept of hum an rights; and because of this 
enrichm ent, China makes its contributions (Beijing Review, Nov. 4-10th, 
1991, 43). And the current official Chinese views are seen as representative 
of th ird  w orld  view s in general. China, India, M alaysia and other 
developing countries share the idea that the right to subsistence and the 
right to developm ent are most urgent, while the idea of civil and political
political area. For example, in the 1970s, Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, opposed certain trade 
policies in terms of Mao's ideology; in the 1980s, the impact of Mao's ideology on economic 
policies has decreased. Also, after the events of June 4th 1989, people could put up a large 
amount of money as bail for those who had been put in jail.
260
rights merely mirrors the developed world, and is therefore, narrow and 
limited in the way it can be applied to the undeveloped world (Renmin 
ribao, June 5, 1992). Further, the Chinese government certainly can justify 
its suppression of dissidents in terms of the idea that state sovereignty is a 
basis of human rights A93 On the other hand, the official acknowledgement 
of international discourse of human rights constitutes a basis for 
international dialogue and cooperation between Chinese and Western 
governments, on which a positive interplay between the Chinese and other 
countries may be hopefully expected, as suggested by the fact that China has 
accepted the universal enterprise of human rights, and that China is now 
welcoming investigation into its own human rights situation by foreign 
countries.
The effects of Chinese official rights legitimation remain open to 
further empirical investigation. However, I would like briefly to analyze 
some problems associated with the official Chinese rights legitimation.
There are at least three serious problems associated with the official 
Chinese views of human rights; and these problems might make this new 
legitimising tool ineffective. First, there are tensions between universal 
(international) and particular (internal) aspects of human rights in the 
White Paper. Either their commitment to the international aspect of 
human rights undermines their argument for the idea that the human 
rights issue is mainly an internal affair; or their argument for human rights 
as an internal affair indicates that their commitment to the international 
aspect of human rights is only rhetorical and a useful card to play. 
Furthermore, there is the fact that the official Chinese commitment to 
international cooperation on human rights implies that there are rational 
grounds for favouring a minimal international morality; that is, at least, we 
should acknowledge and support minimal standards and protection that 
governments must provide for their citizens, as formulated, for example, in 
the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights. For example, 
rights of personal security (freedom from arbitrary arrest, torture, and death) 
should be respected by different cultures and regimes. The Chinese 
government, as it claims, is opposed to torture and strictly forbids extorting
193See the speech of Jin Yongjiang, ambassador to UN, Renmin ribao, Nove 24,1991.
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confession by torture or corporal punishment. China has signed and later 
ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Beijing Review, Jan 28-Feb, 1991, 16). 
The acceptance of this minimal international morality by the Chinese 
government undermines their claim that the human rights issue is mainly 
an internal affair.
The second problem is that the Chinese government holds double­
standards on human rights: one criteria to deal with international pressure, 
and another criteria to deal with internal pressure from Chinese dissidents. 
For example, the Chinese government has, so far, not internally publicized 
foreign visits to investigate human rights issue in China. Also, in dealing 
with its dissidents, the Chinese government holds double standards: for 
example, those who have an international reputation, such as Fang Lizhi, 
are relatively better treated than ordinary dissidents. These practices 
contradict the rhetorical claim made by the Chinese government that the 
Chinese people enjoy equal rights before the law, and further lead the 
masses to doubt the Party’s commitment to the principle of human rights.
The third problem is that so called "collective rights" is a tool for the 
Party to suppress internal dissidents and to wage an ideological war against 
external international pressures. To regard the "collective rights" as primary 
is to affirm the existing structures and to overlook individual rights. 
Further, to apply the idea of "collective rights" of China as a whole to its 
internal minorities, raises a new problem: the rights of minorities are 
overlooked and even sacrificed. Here, the following argument by Kukathas 
from a different intellectual background is perfectly applicable to China: 
cultural rights, a form of collective rights, may not favour minorities. 
"Minorities within a cultural community which might over time form 
quite different coalitions with other interests may find that their interests 
are to a significant degree subject to control by the large rights-bearing 
community" (Kukathas, 1992, 114). The above practical functions of the idea 
of "collective rights" in China lead ordinary people to doubt the integrity of 
the Party's commitment to the principle of human rights. In conclusion, the 
incoherence of official views of human rights set self-limitations on the 
likely effectiveness of this new legitimising weapon in practice; and the new 
human rights legitimising weapon also lacks a solid foundation in theory.
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5. Civil Society and the Arts of Rule
There are signs that Deng's regime has already used the state-civil society 
schema as a new legitimating source and the basis of a new art of rule, 
although the Party has limited the scope of civil society to the economic area 
and has not used the term " civil society" as yet. This requires us to 
investigate the logic of political use of the economic aspect of civil society in 
contemporary China for (the definition of civil society and the distinction 
between economic and political civil society, see Chapter 9). Here, it is 
necessary to see legitimacy as the arts of rule rather than to discuss whether 
the CCP is or is not legitimate. This is because while the latter is only a 
moral condemnation in most cases, the former allows us to explore the 
potential political development towards democratic politics. The key issue is 
that to recognize autonomous political opposition and to carry out genuine 
elections are important in institutionalizing the legitimacy of the regime. 
This is also a critical break-through point in the current deadlock of the 
Chinese process of democratization. The question then is why the political 
aspect of civil society has not been recognized by Deng's regime.
Communist hegemony over mainland China radically reinforced the 
age-old tradition of unitary, non-competitive politics, and created a highly 
centralized, highly dependent society. The Maoist state was active in 
shaping the institutional social structures; while Chinese society was 
peculiarly passive toward its government. This kind of relationship 
between the state and society, however, could not prevent the tragedies of 
the Cultural Revolution, from which Deng Xiaoping has learnt that it is 
ineffective to run the country through the penetration of the power of state 
into all aspects of social life. As Deng said:
It is not good to have an over-concentration of power. It hinders 
the practice of socialist democracy and of the Party"s democratic 
centralism, impedes the progress of socialist construction and 
prevents us from taking full advantage of collective wisdom. 
Over-concentration of power is liable to give rise to arbitrary rule 
by individuals at the expense of collective leadership, and it is an 
important cause of bureaucracy under the present circumstances 
(Deng, 1983,303).
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Thus although Deng has been afraid of loosening controls, total 
control is no longer his dream; Deng has consciously rejected totalitarian 
temptations as unrealistic, as feeding the spirit of resistance, and at the same 
time, as creating dangerous illusions. Instead, for Deng, to withdraw the 
power of the state and to allow social space is not only easier but a much 
better way to rule China. There are at least three rationales for that. First, if 
individuals and local units are granted some degree of autonomy, they have 
incentives to produce, thus this can promote productivity. As Deng claims, 
the various localities, enterprises and production teams should be given 
greater powers of decision regarding both operation and management so as 
to encourage initiative and creativity (Deng, 1983, 157). This is a way to 
increase performance legitimacy.
Second, totalitarianism has entailed for the rulers the dreadful 
consequence of being responsible for absolutely everything. In other words, 
under Mao"s totalitarian control, any mistakes are due to the Party, because 
the Party controls everything. Also as Deng identifies, there has been the 
problem that in theory, there is collective responsibility; in fact, this means 
that no one is responsible (Deng, 1983, 162). But, if one allows a certain 
degree of autonomy, individuals and local units are at least partly 
responsible for whatever they have done. Thus Deng says that we must 
extend the authority of managerial personnel. Whoever is given 
responsibility should be given authority as well (Deng, 1983, 163). This is 
also a way to get around the problem of the legitimacy crisis.
Third, relatively autonomous social organizations can, as White 
argues, be seen as a new form of intermediary linkage between state and 
society whereby the state may attempt indirectly to control society to a 
varying degree. As Xue Muquiao has argued, intermediate organizations 
could become part of a new system of "indirect" economic regulation. Such 
organizations, in Xue"s view, are valuable because they help to prevent the 
potential anarchy of the market and serve as a bridge between the state and 
the enterprises (White, 1993). In this respect, relatively autonomous 
organizations constitute an indirect control mechanism from the point of 
view of the state.
These reasons have led Deng's China to economic reform which has 
resulted in a weak civil society, and to the allowance by the Party of a
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limited social space for relatively independent organization and expression 
in civil society in the economic area. For Deng, this is a wise form of exercise 
of political power. The political use of a limited degree of social autonomy 
or "civil society" plays a central role in determining a new way of how to 
govern: that is, of finding the appropriate techniques for Communist rule. 
Deng’s use of the strategy of social space is a key to understanding why civil 
society in the economic area was and is still allowed to exist and develop 
and why the Party has shifted from total control of society to a loosening of 
that control (for legal aspects of this, see Section 3).
However, in the past ten years, autonomous activities in the political 
area have partially depended on the tolerance of former reformers such as 
Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Although political rights, to some degree in a 
limited form, are granted and protected by the 1982 Constitution and new 
legal regulations, the current existing legal system makes no provision for 
legitimising open opposition movements.
This restriction on the political aspect of civil society can be partially 
explained by Deng's conception of legitimacy. As Pye argues, Chinese leaders 
believe that diversity and a pluralistic power structure lead to social disorder 
and do not foster more creativity or ensure faster modernization (Pye, 1985, 
189). Any surfacing of autonomous power groupings has been taken as a 
sign of dangerous centrifugal forces (Pye, 1985, 189). Thus this Chinese 
leaders' conception of legitimacy is favorable to a neo-authoritarian system, 
and unfavorable to a competitive political structure. Further, there are 
practical considerations in Deng's political thinking. For Deng, politically 
autonomous organizations mean social disorder; this is a lesson that Deng 
has learnt from the experience of the Cultural Revolution. And to 
legitimise political opposition means to commit political suicide, a lesson 
he has learnt from the experience of the events of Eastern Europe in 1989.
The above argument can be concretely illustrated by discussing the case 
of the political dialogue, an implicit "social contract" between the 
government and the students in 1989. On the part of the students, the 
dialogue meant that the government, to some degree, recognized the 
legitimacy of the students' demonstration; and the students hoped to 
institutionalize this legitimacy through the dialogue. On the part of the 
government, the dialogue gave it a chance to adopt a kind of social
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legitimation -- a legitimsation, based on a fundamental distinction between 
state and civil society, which is a particular property of the system, and 
which is "handed over" to those in power by society (see Palma, 1991). 
However, in the end, the dialogue was unsuccessful. There are, among 
other things, at least two reasons concerning the leaders' concept of 
legitimacy for this failure.
(1) Ideological factors (e.g. the myth that those in power represent social 
interests) may act as an obstacle to an essential precondition of political 
dialogue.
(2) There was an anxiety that social and political stability would be 
destroyed, and the efficiency of the economy in particular would decline 
were political opposition to be legitimized. At the root of these doubts lay 
the conviction that social harmony and congruence of interests are a 
precondition for stability and efficiency in complex organizational systems. 
Now the question is whether the next generation of leadership will change 
the concept of legitimacy and accept the above social legitimation.
6. Basic Issues of Legitimacy in Post-Deng Politics
Deng's efforts to regain legitimacy will leave complex legacies for successors 
to Deng. On the one hand, the developments of legal-rational legitimation, 
the ideological renewal of the human rights issue and the political use of 
the economic aspect of civil society are positive sources of legitimation on 
which successors to Deng can draw. On the other hand, there are 
inconsistent and self-contradictory modes of legitimation, such as a tension 
between ideology and pragmatism, which will undermine successors' 
efforts to gain legitimacy. In particular, the following challenging problems 
are posed for successors.
(1) The June 4th incident, combined with the growing serious problem of 
corruption, has led to the most serious mass legitimacy crisis in Chinese 
communist history. Thus the successors to Deng will be confronted with a 
more troublesome crisis of legitimacy than that which confronted the suc­
cessor to Mao. The successors to Deng will have on their hands an even 
more eroded ideology and a population with far more individualistic, and 
hence conflicting, ambitions (Pye, 1988, 164).
266
(2) There will be succession crises in post-Deng politics. The passing of 
Deng Xiaoping will certainly bring significant changes in politics in general 
and in legitimating techniques in particular as happened with the passing of 
Mao. Here is a link between the legitimacy issue the succession problem. 
Just as the main legitimacy problem at the time of succession after Mao was 
the question of ideology, the problem for Deng's successions will be what to 
do about substantive politics. Compared to Deng, successors to Deng have 
neither revolutionary achievements nor personal authority over the army. 
They will have to seek alternative effective measures to gain legitimacy for 
their leadership.
(3) The contradiction between the political use of the economic aspect of 
civil society and the political restriction of the political aspect of civil society 
undermines the self-legitimation of the Party. Further, it is always 
insufficient for the Party to claim its own legitimacy. A political system can 
never create the foundation for itself, it has to receive it from society. To 
resolve this contradiction is to follow the logic of the open policy; that is, to 
further open political channels and to allow an opposition party to exist. 
This is a task for the next generation of leaders within the Party.
There is a prospect that the reformer faction within the Party, 
including Li Ruihuan and Zhu Rongji, may see political civil society and 
election as a new source for their legitimacy in a post-Deng era (also see He, 
1991a &c 1992b). The current power arrangement may be favorable to this 
possibility. Since the 14th Party Conference and the Eighth National 
People’s Congress, all five political bureau members occupy major positions 
in the Party, government and military. For example, Li Ruihuan is the 
chairperson of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), the national top advisory body; Qiao Shi is the chairperson of the 
NPC Standing Committee. It is argued that this kind of power arrangement 
returns to the old pattern of the Party's control and moves away from the 
original proposal of the separation of the Party and government; this, to 
some degree, is true. But, equally, it can also be argued that this arrangement 
makes the NPC and the CPPCC more important than before. It might be 
expected that Li and Qiao will strengthen and use these two bodies in order 
to gain their own legitimacy just as Peng Zhen did before. There are four 
further reasons for the above possibility.
267
(1) The trump card of the Beijing incident. It is difficult for those such as 
Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, who were individual members of the apparatus 
of the repression, to recognize their mistakes and to adopt democratic rules. 
There also seems an implicit rule that those who were involved in the 
Massacre in 1989 are unlikely to be successful successors to Deng. Further, 
the June 4th incident has re-legitimised Zhao Ziyang, provided an 
alternative government within the party, and opened a political 
opportunity for those who want to be the new rulers. It would be beneficial 
for those, such as Jiang Zemin, Li Ruihuan and Zhu Rongji, who did not 
participate in the brutal repression of the students, to play the trump card of 
the Beijing incident, say, to revalue the students' movement in 1989 so as to 
oppose their rivals and to achieve supreme power for themselves.
(2) Party History. To play the card of democracy has been a tradition in 
Party history. During his power struggle with Liu Shaoqi, Mao advocated 
the idea of the Paris model of democracy in order to mobilize mass support 
for himself. Deng also did the same thing when he was struggling with Hua 
Guofeng over supreme power. These facts allow us to envisage that the 
more astute successors to Deng will lay claim to mass legitimacy, and play 
the democratic card as a possible tactic, seeking to improve their power bases 
(He Baogang 1991a, 36-7, 40). It can be further argued that the chances of 
success will be greatest if it is a dominant faction which uses 
democratisation to try to solidify its power against weaker rivals (Nathan 
1990a, 207).
However, both Mao and Deng withdrew their cards of democracy and 
suppressed democrats after they succeeded in strengthening their power. 
The metaphor of playing the card of democracy implies that the leaders are 
not seriously committed to the principle of democracy. This suggests a 
possibility of abusing and even destroying democratization. This question 
will be open to future political development.
(3) The Cost-Benefit Analysis. It is likely the reformer faction within the 
Party will use the cost of a conflict with civil society as a deterrent to hard­
liners, just as Zhao Ziyang attempted but failed to do in 1989. To use the 
election system is one way to legitimise the reformer faction within the 
Party. This may be used to get rid of hard-liners as has been successfully 
done several times, channel politics away from the ebullience of civil
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society, win international support, and perhaps even to win elections by 
dividing the opposition and being rewarded by the electorate. Much more 
importantly, political opposition is not seen as a political nuisance, but as a 
systemic necessity; and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe is not 
seen as a function of too much opposition, but of not enough.
Of course, there is a potential risk: an opposition might be able to 
mobilise the masses so that the Party will lose power. And other potential 
costs are that pressures from the opposition will be so great that the Party 
finds it difficult to make decisions; the previous benefits which the Party has 
enjoyed might be lost. However, if the benefits of the legal recognition of an 
opposition party are much bigger than the costs of the denial, this will 
increase the chance for the reformer faction within the Party to take the 
political initiative. After the events of June 4th in 1989, the leaders could 
learn a lesson from the brutal repression of the students' movement; that is, 
that such repression has a high cost. According to Dahl's (1971, 15) axioms — 
the likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as 
the expected costs of suppression increase; the more the costs of suppression 
exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive 
regime ~ some reform groups within the regime might make concessions 
when they face oppositional protest.
Here the key is that the successors to Deng might take the above costs 
and benefits into account. Equally, it is also crucial for the next generation of 
leaders to adopt the new conception of the basis of legitimacy in the 
interplay of political forces among competing interests under pressure from 
the shift in the macro-political balance of power between center and 
localities. The rise of coastal regions’ power is well known; and individual 
and local interests have also gained legitimate status in the political 
bargaining process. These developments suggest that there emerges a new 
mode of legitimation — establishing political legitimacy is based on the 
interplay of political forces among competing interests. This process is now 
under way. It will continue in post-Deng politics. Thus, we may expect to see 
that China will undergo a legitimacy shift, from being based on a moral 
order to being based on the political process, or the interplay of political 
forces among competing interests.
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(4) Taiwan's Successful Lesson. This is the experience of Taiwan where 
although the DDP has won around 30% the votes, the ruling party still 
maintains its rule. Although the situations are different in Taiwan and 
China, this experience might play an exemplary role for the reformer faction 
within the Party in China. In particular, if further economic achievements 
in the 1990s increase the confidence of the reformer faction within the Party, 
the possibility of the recognition of an opposition party will increase.
Conclusion
Deng's legitimacy has moved decisively away from goal-rational and 
charismatic bases toward a mix of legal-rationality, performance, coercion, 
official nationalism, and international standards. The move toward legal 
rationality is progressive and impressive but ultimately flawed. The case of 
the official discourse of human rights certifies an ideological renewal and a 
move towards the international enterprise of human rights, but the 
incoherence of the official Chinese views of human rights set self­
limitations on the likely effectiveness of this new legitimating weapon in 
practice. Deng has already used the state-civil society schema as a new 
legitimating source and the basis of a new art of rule, but this applies only to 
the economic area and not to the political area.
Astute successors to Deng might see the legal recognition of political 
opposition and political use of election and civil society as a legitimator for a 
new form of social control in the new leaders' political interests. They will 
be more confident in their competence and authority if they are elected. 
They will be cleverer and make less mistakes than before if they draw on the 
criticisms of the opposition. The system, the state and their leadership will 
be more stable than before if the established democratic institutions release 
the ebullience of the masses. They may find that society is more easily 
controlled than before if procedures and laws are established and followed. 
They will feel secure even when they are removed by election if 
institutional protection of human rights provides them with minimal 
personal security. In short, if there is a shift from the concept of moral order 
as a foundation of legitimacy to the institutionalized concept of legitimacy 
by such means as referenda and election, and particularly if some leaders are 
committed to the rules of the game and democracy as an institutionalised
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source of legitimacy, we may see a democratic break-through in the near 
future in China.
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CONCLUSION
This conclusion not only recapitulates earlier conclusions but also expands 
on those conclusions. It will raise further questions to be studied, and 
acknowledge the limits of my thesis. It is in two sections. Section 1 reflects 
on the issue of Chinese liberal theory of democracy. It initially summarizes 
the major theoretical problems associated with the Chinese liberal ideas of 
democracy and suggests proposals by which to revise and modify liberal 
ideas of democracy. Then it focuses on the intellectual foundation of the 
Chinese liberal theory of democracy, and finally discusses the liberal idea of 
limitation on liberties. Section 2 reflects on the issue of Chinese 
democratization. It initially discusses political implications of the three 
models of democracy for future political developments in China, then 
addresses the issue of the feasibility of liberal democracy, and finally 
summarizes what I see as the major practical considerations for the 
implementation of the liberal ideal of democracy.
1. Reflections on Chinese Liberal Theory of Democracy
I. Problems with Chinese Liberal Ideas of Democracy
Throughout this study, I have discussed theoretical problems associated 
with Chinese liberal ideas of democracy. For example, Wei's idealized and 
over-simplified view of democracy does not provide any clues to how 
liberal democracy can be achieved in practice in China (Chapter 3). And 
there are tensions between the democratic ideal and elitism, as well as 
between the principle of equal rights and the scientific positivism in the 
work of Yan Jiaqi (Chapter 3). Here I would like to point out the following 
theoretical problems which may hinder the rethinking of institutional 
design and development of democratic strategy in China.
The first of the major problems is a rebellious conception of negative 
liberty which only emphasizes "being let alone" and "non-interference". 
This rebellious libertarian view of negative liberty proves unsatisfactory in 
discussing how to protect the rights of those who might be accused of being 
the "enemy" of democracy and freedom; how to keep a balance between 
individual rights and social obligations; how to deal with the conflicts 
between rights; and how to justify the priority of rights and limits on rights
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at the same time (Chapters 4 & 6). It seems that this rebellious concept of 
negative liberty is more useful in struggling against totalitarianism than as a 
guiding principle in managing state affairs.
The second serious problem is that both Hu Ping and Yan Jiaqi have 
unconsciously retained vestiges of traditional moral idealism such as the 
sage's conception of morality. If this kind of moral idealism is taken as an 
intellectual basis for institutional design, then it undermines the claim in 
their argument for democratic institutions that human beings are self- 
interested, further undermines the principle of equal liberty at the 
institutional design level, and possibly denies the civil and political rights of 
peasants in the process of democratisation because of the implied 
superiority of intellectuals (Chapter 7).
The third problem associated with Yan's proceduralism is that it seems 
to ignore the exception problem and fails to address a theoretical defect of 
formalistic proceduralism (Chapter 6). Thus Yan's idea of democracy would 
fail to defend the idea of procedural democracy if it were put into practice.
The fourth problem is that liberal thinkers such as Hu Ping seem to 
overlook the issue of the participatory dimension of democracy and the 
issue of a new class. Given the current dynamic economic development in 
China, there emerge new problems brought about by capitalism, such as 
social-economic exploitation, unequal distribution of welfare and resources 
and widening social gaps. However, some Chinese liberals seem to overlook 
the consequences of economic liberalism, and particularly those concerned 
with the operation of the right to property. To protect the right to property 
in Chinese economic life means, at times, that political privilege turns into 
economic privilege given the corruption of power and the absence of fair 
rules. Thus economic privilege leads to unequal competition and injustice. 
On this matter, it is worthwhile for Chinese liberals to learn from the 
radical view of populist democracy. Populists have raised the idea that the 
rights of workers and peasants to participate in political affairs should be 
institutionalized. They have also highlighted the problem of the new class 
and the social gap between "a privileged class" and ordinary people.
To overcome the above theoretical problems, Chinese liberals, I 
suggest, need to take the issue of an intellectual foundation as well as the 
liberal doctrine of the limitation of liberties into account, as will be
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discussed later. They also need to shift from wishful thinking about 
democracy and rebellious feelings towards the political system to a 
substantial analysis of the problems and of possible solutions to them. Here,
I would like to stress that Chinese liberals need to complement liberal ideas 
with modified values of socialism, rather than to throw out the social baby 
with the socialist bathwater. White (1994) has observed that liberal minded 
intellectuals such as Su Shaozhi have already sought a form of social 
democracy which steers a middle course between the Scylla of Marxist- 
Leninist state socialism and the Charybids of untamed capitalism. White 
also argues:
The most likely scenario is a form of state capitalism along East 
Asian lines with a competitive political institution that might still 
be dominated by a hegemonic political institution, a capitalist 
economy with a high degree of state involvement and a society 
permeated throughout by clientelist networks. However, while 
such a combination promises to be economically dynamic, it also 
carries the potential of the kinds of social-economic exploitation 
and inequalities characteristic of such societies. While some 
elements of Chinese state socialism — such as basic welfare 
services, job security and relatively egalitarian income 
distribution — might have reflected the actions of a quasi- 
patriarchal Party-state and posed problems from the point of view 
of economic efficiency, they are also valued attributes of a 
humane society (White, 1994).
II. Intellectual Foundation
Chapter 3 has concluded that the conceptions of natural rights, evil and 
proceduralism constitute intellectual and moral foundations for Chinese 
liberal democracy. However, the central challenge to liberal intellectual 
inventions is that these concepts of human rights, evil and proceduralism 
lack a solid foundation. One might argue that Chinese liberal ideas of 
human rights are so premature that they cannot serve as a foundation; that 
the supposition of universal evil faces the difficulty of rendering democratic 
institutions inoperable because every one is evil; and that constitutional life 
rests upon an insecure foundation if the ultimate courts of appeal are rules 
allowing for exceptions.
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The thesis has argued against the above challenges and defended the 
liberal intellectual constructs, and, in particular provided arguments that a 
secure foundation exists for a liberal theory of democracy. Chapter 4 has 
pointed out two inconsistent arguments of Chinese liberals. First, Wei 
Jingsheng's argument that human rights are inherent is incompatible with 
his argument that human rights are contingent on social conditions. As 
Wei argues, basic political rights, such as freedoms of speech, assembly, 
association, the press, religion, movement, and the right to strike should be 
unrestricted within their various spheres. At the same time, Wei 
contradicts this by arguing that human rights only exist in relation to other 
things and relate, directly or indirectly, to their environment. Thus, it is 
argued that human rights are limited and relative rather than unlimited 
and absolute. To overcome this contradiction, as Yan Jiaqi recommends, 
there is a need to distinguish between basic natural rights such as civil and 
political rights and secondary rights such as economic and social rights; and 
that natural rights should have priority over economic and social rights, 
and do not depend on political, social and cultural conditions and can be 
realized right now (Yan Jiaqi, 1992a, 50). Yan's argument implies that 
secondary rights can be limited in certain circumstances.
Second, there is a problem with Hu Ping's view of natural rights. Hu 
emphasizes the priority of rights and freedom over truth, but his 
understanding of the priority of rights and freedom over truth is not based 
on the idea of natural rights. Due to his lack of an idea of natural rights, Hu 
justifies freedom in terms of social utility.194 Hu's utilitarian argument is 
insufficient to justify rights and may be incompatible with the liberal 
arguments if social utility is used to argue for deprivation of rights.
To defend the value of freedom and rights, a philosophical idea of 
natural rights is needed; and the idea that liberty is the source of all rights 
should be emphasized. The idea of contract also is needed to justify rights as 
a "trump" card overriding the purposes of government and other public 
agencies. Here, according to Heller, the law of natural right (according to
194In Hu's letter to me, he explains that since the ideas of natural rights and of natural law 
were too alien to be acceptable among the populace in the 1970s, he decided to use more 
utilitarian arguments for freedom of speech. This implies that Hu himself favours the idea 
of natural rights.
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which all humans are born free and are equally endowed with reason) is the 
axiom, the self-evident starting point of the whole enterprise of human 
rights, and is the source of all rights.195 Heller further argues that rights 
stand in a hierarchical relation to each other; there are basic ones and 
inferred ones and only the highest have an absolute moral claim (Chapter 
4).
Chapter 5 has discussed Hu Ping's argument concerning the problem of 
evil. Hu Ping is aware that if all people are evil, and all institutions are 
operated by evil persons, logically democratic institutions can not guarantee 
basic human rights, and the only choice is autocracy. Inspired by Madison, 
Hu favours the middle case where all individuals are seen as neither devils 
nor angels; it is this middle case that makes democratic institutions feasible 
and necessary (Hu Ping, 1990b, 42-3, 1991b, 118; also see Appendix). Thus Hu 
Ping's position is in line with Alexander Hamilton's (1961, 458) who has 
pointed out: "the institution of delegated power implies that there is a 
portion of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable 
foundation of confidence". Also, Hu Ping is explicit in arguing that the idea 
that human nature is evil is a necessary but not sufficient basis for 
democracy. In order to avoid some theoretical problems, I have argued that 
the idea of potential evil does not assume the idea that human nature is 
evil. Further, I have argued that the notion that the concept of human 
nature has value in democratic thinking should be rejected on the 
following grounds:
(1) Any intellectual foundation for democracy in terms of human nature 
is misleading, because the assumption that humans have an essence is 
unproved; and there is no proof of a fixed human nature, or of a fixed 
correspondence between human nature and normative supposition. It is 
impossible for one to sum up one or two essences of human nature and to 
apply these in all places and all times.
(2) There is no need for theories of democracy to get "bogged" down in the 
hopeless morass of the question of the existence and character of human 
nature. To assume the potential for evil action rather than evil human 
nature is enough for us to argue for democratic institutions (see Appendix).
195whether or not the law of natural right is self-evident is a debatable issue.
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Chapter 6 has outlined two approaches, namely, hierarchical and 
conditional, to deal with the problem of the exception. Rules allowing for 
exceptions cannot function as ultimate courts of appeal primarily because 
they are sometimes overruled. Consequently, there must be rules which do 
not allow for exceptions and which function as a fundamental principle for 
resolving all clashes between rules. The hierarchical approach, therefore, 
holds that rules can be ranked in a hierarchical way so that meta-rules are 
distinguished from particular rules and meta-rules take precedence over 
particular rules. While meta-rules do not admit of an exception, particular 
rules do. Thus, meta-rules function as the principle for guiding how to 
change rules or redesign rules if we face the challenge of an exception. If 
meta-rules are distinguished from particular rules, the former do not admit 
of an exception, while the latter admit of and imply an exception. This is the 
way to defend the coherence of proceduralism. This is also the fundamental 
procedure for making exceptions; if the procedure is followed, the exception 
can be deemed consistent with proceduralism. An exception to certain 
particular rules does not contradict meta-rules, because according to meta­
rules, an exception is allowed.
The conditional approach holds that we can list the conditions under 
which the employment of exceptions is limited and justified; or we can 
formulate the rules for making exceptions; the exceptions failing to comply 
with these rules are regarded as unjustifiable. Constitutional regimes of 
exceptions are in fact constitutional rules for making exceptions in 
exceptional circumstances. The rules are thus: an emergency which is 
defined as a time of actual war or armed rebellion, or a danger to security of 
the state and public life; legislative implementation of exceptions or 
delegation of authority to presidents along with other restrictions such as 
Congress's approval; the judicial review of an emergency decree after the 
event of an emergency. Also, further conditions under which an exception 
can be made are as follows: permitting restrictions on an anti-constitutional 
party must be justified by the evidence of possible failure of the constitution 
and of the absence of reason of an anti-constitutional party; and it must be 
guided by the principles of justice.
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III. Liberal Doctrine of Limitation on Rights
To protect, develop and improve equal human rights some regulations and 
limitations on some rights are necessary. But the ruling party suppresses 
human rights and imposes arbitrary limitations, while the opposition 
organizations seldom address the problem of legal limitations. It is, 
therefore, difficult to arrive at a consensus of definite limitations on rights 
through institutional norms. In order to resolve the above problem, liberals 
have to engage with the difficult questions of why and how and under what 
conditions some liberties have to be limited in order to achieve equal 
liberties in the process of democratisation. Now I summarize the arguments 
about limited liberties discussed in the thesis.
In Chapter 2, I have criticized the Chinese paternalist limitation on 
liberties.
(1) The starting point and purpose of the paternalistic limitations on 
liberty are, theoretically, for the sake of the collective's interests, security and 
equality; but in practice, they may be used only in the interests of the power 
elites.
(2) The conditions under which paternalist authority encroaches on 
liberties are loose, unexplicit and unlimited; and are subject to the 
paternalistic subjective will which plays a significant role in limitations on 
liberty.
(3) There is a tension between limitations on individual freedom and 
"socialist democracy". And there are more tensions between non-liberty and 
equality than between liberty and equality. Without personal freedom, there 
can be no equal rights and opportunities or even an equal distribution of 
welfare and resources. The people's lack of liberty inevitably invites and 
maintains paternalistic political privileges and political inequality in the 
whole society, which in turn inevitably enlarges or deepens the unequal 
distribution of welfare and resources; there is, therefore, no guarantee of 
equality and justice.
In Chapter 4, I have also criticized the Chinese liberals' silence on, or 
slight attention to, the issue of limitation on liberties. I have argued that at 
the individual level, individuals enjoy personal freedom and the right to
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privacy, and that state interference is unnecessary provided the right to 
privacy does not lead to self-harm or harm of others. This sphere of the 
individual life sets a strict limit on the power of the state. Nevertheless, the 
proper scope of power of the state is in public life where conflicts between 
rights occur. Freedom demands constraints on the rich to prevent corrupt 
government and to prevent the poor being interfered with by the rich. A 
restriction of liberty comes from the demand for just social arrangements 
and distribution of rights as well as the reduction of injustice which already 
exists (Rawls, 1971, 244-5). For example, we place a restriction on the liberty 
of the rich to buy and manipulate public media. Only through this 
limitation can the ideal of equal human rights be realized. The key resides 
in democratic institutional limitations on rights. That is, if the state 
substitutes ordered and reasonable interference for arbitrary interference 
with individuals, it increases freedom. The extent to which state 
interference increases and promotes rights will depend on democratic 
institutions, procedures and the extent of wisdom displayed in the 
interference; and procedures and wisdom cannot be determined beforehand 
by rulers. There is, therefore, a vital connection between rights and liberty 
on the one hand and democratic government and procedures on the other, 
inasmuch as democracy is an effort to ensure that government shall only be 
exercised subject to popular control and criticism.
Chapter 5 has argued for restrictive institutional design allowing for 
the control of evil through the use of coercion such as civil and criminal 
penalties. This also implies that limitation on some liberties is needed to 
deal with the problem of evil. In Chapter 6, I have argued that a liberal- 
government has the right to suppress anti-constitutional parties; this 
suppression does not contradict proceduralism and equality before the law. 
The reason for the repression of anti-constitutional parties is that anti- 
constitutional parties deny basic liberties and constitute a threat against a 
just constitution. If the constitution itself is in danger, there will be no 
proceduralism at all. Hence, to make an exception so as to maintain the 
constitutional order is compatible with proceduralism which presupposes 
the authority of the constitution. Also permitting restrictions against an 
anti-constitutional party must be justified by evidence of possible failure of 
the constitution and of the absence of reason of the anti-constitutional party; 
and it must be guided by the principles of justice. Also such restriction is a 
legal limitation. Specification of conditions may help to avoid abuse of the
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right to make an exception, and can ensure that to make an exception will 
lead to maintenance of proceduralism.
To sum up, in Rawls’s view, "the limitations on the extent of liberty 
are for the sake of liberty itself and result in a lesser but still equal freedom" 
(Rawls, 1971, 247). The conditions for permitting such restrictions on 
liberties are clear, concrete and necessary, that is: "paternalistic intervention 
must be justified by the evident failure and absence of reason and will; and 
it must be guided by the principles of justice and what is known about the 
subject's more permanent aims and preferences, or by the account of 
primary goods (Rawls, 1971, 250)". Furthermore, by nature, such restriction 
is a legal limitation, as Rawls stresses the connection of the rule of the law 
with liberty. "Liberty. . . .  is a complex of rights and duties defined by 
institutions (Rawls, 1971, 329)." Further, "if the bases of claims (the rule of 
law) are unsure, so are the boundaries of men's liberties" (Rawls, 1971, 235).
Drawing on the above conclusions, I have argued against a rebellious 
conception of negative liberty because this conception only emphasizes 
'being let alone' and 'non-interference'; and it fails to deal with difficult 
problems in the process of realizing the ideal of human rights (Chapter 4). 
Instead, I strongly recommend Rawls' conception of liberty being applied in 
China; and I also suggest that Philip Pettit's (1990) republican conception of 
negative liberty might be an alternative intellectual basis for Chinese 
democratic institutional design (Chapter 4). In short, I hope that the above 
liberal idea of limitation on some rights can provide a theoretical basis for 
the consideration of stabilising policy in the process of democratization.
2. Reflections on Chinese Democratisation 
I. Implications of the Three Models
Part One of the thesis has recounted the three competing models of 
democracy. The radical model of populist democracy proposed by Yang 
Xiguang, Li Yizhe's group and Chen Erjin is characterised of a call for 
violent revolution; a particular form of government (the Paris Commune); 
the importance of the working class (workers' self-government) with 
reference to the issue of new class; and social ownership as a basis of 
democracy (Chapter 1). The official paternalistic model of "people's 
democracy" advocated by Deng Xiaoping is characterized by collectivism,
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limitations on political freedom, and the mixture of formalistic democracy 
and paternalistic authority (Chapter 2). The liberal model of democracy by 
proposed Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping, and Yan Jiaqi contains three common 
ideas: a predominant concern for human rights and freedom; the 
conviction that the principle of preventing evil is a theoretical basis for 
institutional constraints on power; and an emphasis on procedure, the rule 
of law and the rules of games (Chapter 3).
Part One has also shown that populists such as Yang Xiguang and Li 
Zhengtian, through self-criticism in later years, have themselves rejected 
the ideas of violence, the new class issue and direct control of state affairs by 
the working class, and have shifted their ideological commitment from the 
radical idea of populist democracy to the liberal one (Chapter 1). It has also 
argued that the paternalistic model of democracy is unsatisfactory both in 
theory and in practice (Chapter 2). It has concluded that the political liberty 
should be defended as the primary value in China; what is needed in China 
is liberal democracy — democracy based on respect for human rights and 
equal liberties.
The existence of the three models of democracy implies that the 
totalitarian control of ideology has failed and that there has emerged an 
ideological "market" where different models of democracy are able to attract 
different "customers". If these models of democracy are connected to 
propitious circumstances, structural forces and existing institutions, they 
will be decisive in shaping political developments and develop sufficient 
influence to alter the nature and workings of the system in China. Now, I 
would like to discuss the political implications of each model of democracy 
discussed above.
Although there is less likely to be a revival of the radical model of 
populist democracy in the near future, the model is able to attract groups 
socially disadvantaged by the reforms, and provide some radicals with a 
theoretical basis for the populist and revolutionary strategy for 
democratization. Insofar as the populists pose challenges and speak more 
directly to the issues of the new class and mass participation than liberals do, 
the radical idea of populist democracy will remain one of the major 
ideologies in the field of political thought in China in future. Particularly, if 
the current economic development intensifies social gaps and highlights
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the serious problem of unequal distribution of welfare, and if the regime 
fails to deal with the above problems, then further development of the idea 
of populist democracy and even a populist upsurge early in the next century 
is possible.
It is very likely that reformer factions within the Party will legally 
recognize political opposition movements and use elections as a form of 
legitimacy in post-Deng China. If this happens, the official paternalistic 
model of democracy will play a major part. It is able to attract leaders at both 
central and local levels and to offer a scenario that the Party will still retain 
its hegemony while political opposition is allowed (see Womack, 1990, 
White, 1994). This official model might also be attractive to some Chinese 
intellectuals, insofar as it, as a democratic strategy, attempts to utilize the 
existing institutions and habits and at the same time open them up to 
redirection and modification. Womack (1990, 29) even concludes that the 
party-state democracy presents a real possibility for a modern democratic 
base for Chinese politics. He further argues that "the competitive, multi­
party democracy of the West cannot be imported like a turkey factory. It 
requires a pluralism of societal forces and a stability of political expectations 
that simply do not exist in mainland China at the present time" (Womack, 
1990, 29). Womack's conclusion of the possibility of party-state democracy 
might be partially true, but his exclusion of the possibility of liberal 
democracy is misleading (I will discuss the reasons for that later).
The liberal model of democracy will have an important role in 
defining the future of China. The model appeals to the young generation of 
leaders seeking political legitimacy, to intellectuals looking for space in 
which they can safely explore and speak about the world around them, to 
peasants and others who simply want to pursue a livelihood without 
arbitrary state intervention (See McCormick and Kelly, 1993a). The bearers 
of liberal democracy have often been students, intellectuals and workers. 
But in the 1989 democracy movement, the new entrepreneurial or business 
strata also expressed their support for liberal democracy.
More importantly, the liberal model of democracy sets the terms of 
debates, acts as the explicit standards of comparison for political rationality 
and legitimacy, and provides an answer to the existing political problems. 
Further, if it becomes instrumental in shaping the ideal route for political
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development, it will influence the direction of political development in 
China.
However, political liberalism faces challenges from neo­
authoritarianism. The question of whether liberal democracy or paternalist 
democracy (in Womack's term, party-state democracy), political liberalism 
or neo-authoritarianism, will win out in post-Deng politics remains open. 
Further, the following questions need to be investigated empirically. In the 
forthcoming democratisation, how exactly will the above models impact on 
Chinese political life? Is there a possibility of an emergent new democratic 
ideology that will attempt to combine elements of the radical, official and 
liberal ideas of democracy? Or is there likely to be a mix of practices of liberal 
and paternalist democracy?
II. The Desirability and Feasibility of Liberal Democracy
There are three arguments for the undesirability of liberal democracy which 
the thesis has rejected. The first argument is that political liberalization 
would lead to social disorder, as it releases aggression and social evil 
emerges (Chapters 2 and 5). This argument fails, because equal liberties, 
which are protected and guaranteed by the legal system, help to produce 
both order and constructive conduct (Chapter 2). Further, the next 
generation of leaders might recognize that liberal democracy is both a form 
of legitimacy and a new way of social control (Chapter 10).
The second argument for the undesirability of liberal democracy is that 
procedural democracy is inadequate as it cannot handle the problem of the 
exception, particularly during a transition period (Chapter 6). This argument 
is also unconvincing. I have argued that a quick decision on an exceptional 
occasion is needed. But the problem of the exception is not a just-reason to 
dismiss normative proceduralism. It is wrong to deny the normative 
approach, or to dismiss proceduralism by exaggeration of the role of the 
problems of procedure in political life. To make an exception requires a 
quick decision but not the absolute priority of this decision. A quick decision 
does have relative autonomy, but is still limited by meta-rules at the bottom 
line (Chapter 6).
The third argument for the undesirability of liberal democracy is that 
individual democracy corrodes public morality, as it favours individualism
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and destroys collectivism and the harmony of community. Again, this 
argument fails. I have distinguished between the official Chinese morality 
and a rights-based morality. The former is a goal-based morality in the sense 
that the establishment of communist society is taken as a primary goal, 
while the latter is the new morality advocated by Chinese liberals. 
Individual democracy as advocated by Wei Jingsheng will indeed destroy 
the official goal-based morality. But it offers and promotes a rights-based 
morality which seems to be an attractive and promising alternative to the 
official goal-based morality (Chapter 7). As the development of market and 
contract economics based on individualism in China requires and helps to 
develop an ethical norm of fairness: people must be morally obliged to keep 
their agreements, even when all their gains are in the past and all their costs 
in the future.
There are also three arguments for the impossibility of liberal 
democracy in China which the thesis has rejected. The first argument is that 
Chinese culture is incapable of democracy. This argument fails because it is 
highly culturally determinist; it fails to distinguish between hard and soft 
cultural conditions for democracy as discussed in Chapter 8; it ignores that 
culture is generated by human activity, and as such it is constantly being 
regenerated; it presupposes that it is impossible for Chinese people to 
overcome weaknesses of a cultural-psychological nature; and finally, it also 
ignores that China's culture is changing. Chapter 8 has demonstrated that 
there emerges the new Chinese democratic culture which is likely to gather 
strength in the future. The whole thesis has also demonstrated that political 
liberalism is an integral part of current political culture in China, and that 
democratic culture is becoming an increasingly important factor in Chinese 
politics. However, the question of the percentage of the Chinese populace 
and of Chinese intellectuals who are committed to liberal values needs to be 
studied empirically. Also I have to admit that so far, in sociological terms, 
the commitment must be treated as conditional and partial only.
The second argument for the impossibility of liberal democracy is that 
China lacks a pluralist and self-organizing civil society independent of the 
state, which is often assumed to be an indispensable condition for 
democracy. This argument also fails as Chapter 9 has demonstrated that 
civil society has emerged in Deng's China; and that civil society did have an 
actual positive impact on the 1989 Democratic Movement. Also this newly
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emergent civil society provides a fertile bed in which political liberalism can 
thrive. However, I admit, a nascent, weak, and ineffective emergent civil 
society constitutes a very weak check on the abuse of state power; it is still 
unable to resist military-bureaucratic cooperation and repression.
The third argument for the impossibility of liberal democracy, which is 
often assumed in totalitarian theory, is that the Chinese totalitarian state is a 
self-enforcing power structure that cannot be reformed or transformed into 
something fundamentally better, or cannot democratize itself from within 
(Friedman, 1989, 171). Again this argument is misleading as it omits that 
there has been an inherent potential for democratization within the Party. 
Chapter 10 has shown that it is very likely that the next generation of 
leaders will play the card of democracy so as to gain legitimacy. There is also 
the possibility that the leaders will use existing democratic institutions and 
organs such as the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) in the process of democratization rather than 
dismantling the whole old power apparatus (Chapter 10, also see White, 
1994).
In conclusion, in China there are already democratic culture, civil 
society and reform factions within the Party who will play the democratic 
card (Chapters 8, 9 & 10). All this demonstrates that preconditions for 
democracy exist in China.196 The question is how these factors can interact 
at a favourable time so as to break the current deadlock of Chinese 
democratization.
III. Problems with Chinese Democratization
Under the guidance of the above principle of methodological 
complementarity, this thesis has not only examined the existing positive 
and negative conditions for Chinese democracy, but also discussed the 
practical problems associated with Chinese democratization. Now I would 
like to summarize the practical problems associated with Chinese 
democratisation in two categories.
196There is already a body of literature which has argued well that preconditions for 
Chinese democracy exist (Nathan, 1990a & b, Friedman, 1991, White, 1993). My thesis only 
supplements their arguments.
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The first category of problems relates to the process of democratization 
itself. There are problems such as the validity of law and the constitution, 
distorted forms of liberty, conflicts between rights and the burden of rights. 
The question of the validity of law and the constitution is crucial here. To 
protect human rights China needs a just constitution and law, but China 
has neither a just constitution and law nor well-civilized people who 
support the rule of law in China (Chapter 4). Here, China will face the 
following predicament. On the one hand, the frequency of exceptions to 
some rules will lead to the discrediting of the constitution and create 
enormous difficulties in establishing constitutionalism. On the other, if any 
exception is denied, it will be difficult for a liberal government to maintain 
social order and to realize constitutionalism. This is the difficult problem of 
the exception: whether or not a supposed liberal government has the right 
to make exceptions to rules and to suppress the political rights of anti- 
constitutional parties (Chapter 6).
Further, Chinese democratisation faces cultural problems such as 
cultural anomie, democrats with authoritarian personalities, the legacy of 
egalitarianism, the radical polarisation of Chinese culture, difficulties of 
institutional compromise and irrational control of aggression and fear 
(Chapter 8). Here, the most serious problem is that China lacks the tolerance 
and willingness to reach political compromise which are virtues of 
freedom. Now, after the events of June 4, 1989, Chinese democrats have 
learnt the lesson that political negotiation is necessary for the transition to 
democratic politics. Just as the Cultural Revolution may have indirectly 
created tolerance, the June 4th events may create consensus for negotiation 
(Chapter 9). Further, there has emerged a limited convergence on the 
human rights issue between the Chinese government and Chinese 
dissidents. This seems to constitute a minimal consensus for political 
dialogue between the Government and dissidents. However, to seek 
common ground while reserving differences is only rhetorical for both 
sides. It is difficult for the Chinese government and Chinese liberal 
intellectuals to reach an agreement about issues such as the order of priority 
of rights, institutional arrangements and philosophical assumptions 
because of their different political positions, different backgrounds and the 
different major problems concerned. These difficulties may undermine the 
possible basis for political dialogue (Chapter 4).
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The second category of problems concerns how the existing cultural, 
social and political conditions negatively affect Chinese democratization. 
Here, unconscious authoritarian personalities, due to a lack of institutional 
constraints on these personalities, will lead democrats towards a neo­
authoritarian system when they face a set of problems stemming from the 
process of Chinese democratisation. Contrarily, although there are also 
authoritarian attitudes in Western democratic countries, these attitudes are 
so constrained by the existing democratic institutions that it is less likely 
that authoritarian personalities would play a decisive role in creating a neo­
authoritarian state if these problems should occur (Chapter 8).
Further, the overlapping structure of the state and semi-civil society 
may hinder a transition to democracy. But, this overlapping structure, I 
have argued, may also provide pressures and checks on the state if civil 
society plays a proper role within many levels of the polity. Furthermore, 
the roles of civil society in Chinese democracy are ambiguous, contingent 
and twofold. It is a force for democracy and a safe refuge for democrats; 
while it can also be a conservative power which demands maintaining the 
status quo rather than transition to democracy (Chapter 9).
There are problems with the Party's search for legitimacy. The move 
toward legal rationality is progressive and impressive but ultimately flawed. 
The case of the official discourse of human rights certifies an ideological 
renewal and a move towards the international enterprise of human rights, 
but the incoherence of the official Chinese views of human rights set self­
limitations on the likely effectiveness of this new legitimising weapon in 
practice. Deng has already used the state-civil society schema as a new 
legitimising source and the basis of a new art of rule, but this is confined to 
the economic area and not to the political area. Even if the next generation 
of leaders play the democratic card, there is a possibility that they will 
withdraw the cards of democracy and suppress democrats (Chapter 10).
There are other important issues such as the issue of discontinuity and 
disintegration, the relationship between stability and democracy, the 
relationship between size of polity and democratic institutions, roles of 
social actors and political strategies such as timing and piece-meal 
evolution. Here, I think, the process of democratization needs to be 
managed through a stabilising policy in order to cope successfully with the
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complex problems. A radical overnight democratization will intensify social 
conflicts, create a situation in which the system will return to the old one, 
and destroy the chance to establish liberal democracy. Therefore, I fully 
support W hite's argum ent that any rapid move towards comprehensive 
democratization as advocated in the "big bang" argum ent would be highly 
problematic (see White, 1994).
However, I have not discussed the above issues in detail. This is 
partially because of the fact that Chinese democratization is in an early stage, 
or more precisely, in a deadlock at the moment; and partially due to the 
scope of my thesis. I hope that I will discuss them in a separate study.
In conclusion, one thing is certain that China will undertake a 
dem ocratic breakthrough in the future. It is not clear w hat m odel of 
democracy, liberal, paternalistic or popular, will be implemented in practice. 
How ever, we can be sure that no m atter w hat kind of the "Chinese 
characters" of democratisation, it will involve general election and some 
degree of proceduralism.
289
Appendix: An Analytical Investigation of Hume's Supposition of 
Knavery in Institutional Design
Hitler once said that a big lie is much more effective and persuasive than a 
small one, because it is more easily accepted as true. Lin Biao has said that 
one who attempts to do big things has to lie in political life. These views 
imply that to be a politician is to be a knave; and politics by its nature 
requires practices of cheating and lying. These justifications of deliberate 
knaves (one may compare this with sensible knaves discussed by Hume, see 
Section 3) highlight the serious problem of knavery in political life. Thus 
the wider topic of knavery and politics becomes urgent.
To design a check system so as to overcome the problem of knavery, 
first, one needs to assume knavish motivation in institutional design. In 
this respect, Hume, in line with other political writers such as Mandeville, 
has proposed a maxim that:
in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several 
checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be 
supposed a Knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, 
than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and by 
means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and 
ambition, co-operate to public good....It is, therefore, a just political 
maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the 
same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be 
true in politics, but is false in fact. But to satisfy us on this head, 
we may consider, that men are generally more honest in their 
private than in their public capacity, and will go greater lengths to 
serve a party, than when their own private interest is alone 
concerned (David Hume, 1964a, 117-9).
This is Hume's famous thesis, to which a body of literature refers 
(Brennan and Buchanan 1985, 59; Weale, 1989, 45; Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992a, 1992b; Goodin, 1982, 113; and Moore, 1977, 820); and which, 
unfortunately, has not yet clearly analyzed. The tasks of this paper are (1) to 
provide a clear definition of knavery, (2) to undertake an analytical 
investigation of the rationales and the problems of Hume's supposition,
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and finally (3) to analyze different uses and evaluations of Hume's thesis 
with reference to political institutional design.
In the paper, Hume's supposition will be understood as referring to the 
premise that every one ought to be supposed to be a knave. Also, Hume's 
project or thesis is seen as referring to the idea that rational institutional 
arrangements should be devised in such a way that opportunities for 
knavery are reduced, and that ideally knavish impulses can not only be 
prevented from producing ill effects but can be controlled and altered in 
direction to produce good, so that public interests will be respected and 
peaceful order can be maintained.
There is a distinction between the issues in Hume's own theory of 
knavery, and those in the evaluations and interpretations of Hume's 
supposition and thesis. Taking account of this distinction, the paper will 
initially deal with Hume's own theory of knavery, then turn to others' uses 
of it. The paper is in six sections. Section 1 reviews Hume's general views of 
human nature and politics, and gives a general intellectual background for 
Hume's supposition of knavery. Section 2 discusses Hume's definition of 
knavery. Section 3 initially examines Hume's own justifications in the 
context of his essay "Independency of Parliament", shows the insufficient 
nature of these justifications, then presents three alternative reasons for 
Hume's supposition of universal knavery. Section 4 addresses the paradox 
of Hume's thesis and examines theoretical problems associated with the 
supposition of universal knavery and Hume's own solution — the 
introduction of the assumption of virtues and honesty. Section 5 
formulates the Humean middle case as an alternative intellectual position 
for institutional design. Section 6 examines the impact of Hume's thesis on 
institutional design and the different interpretations, evaluations and uses 
of Hume's supposition of knavery in Australian academic life.
1. A Preliminary Review
Hume's articulation of the supposition of knavery can be traced to 
Mandeville who has argued that the best constitution provides against the 
worst contingencies and knavery (1969, 332). Hume expresses a similar view 
in his famous thesis of knavery. Elsewhere, Hume also argues that a 
constitution is good insofar as it provides a remedy against mal­
administration (Hume, 1964b, 108). Further, the assumption of knavery is
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administration (Hume, 1964b, 108). Further, the assumption of knavery is 
also employed by the Federalists to argue for a set of institutional devices 
such as bicameralism, judicial review, election, provision for salary of the 
President, term of office and veto power. 197
We need to place Hume’s supposition of knavery in the context of 
Hume's general view of human nature and politics. Hume (1949a, 5) thinks 
that, in order to march directly to the capital or centre of the sciences (logic, 
morals, criticism and politics) we need to march human nature itself. Thus, 
from his Treatise of Human Nature (published in 1739), we see that Hume 
has studied broadly a stock list of human motivations; among which, there 
are two important motivations: selfishness and limited generosity (1960, 
494). "It is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of men, alone 
with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice 
derives its origin"(Hume, 1960, 495). Hume (1960, 499-500) sums up as 
follows: "Self-interest is the original Motive to the Establishment of Justice: 
but a Sympathy with the public Interest is the Source of the moral 
Approbation, which attends that Virtue". Further, Hume explains the 
origins of the government in terms of these basic motivations. Hume (1960, 
537) argues that:
It is impossible to change or correct any thing material in our 
nature, the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and 
situation, and render the observance of the laws of justice our 
nearest interest, and their violation our most remote. But this 
being impracticable with respect to all mankind, it can only take 
place with respect to a few, whom we thus immediately interest in 
the execution of justice. ... Here then is the origin of civil 
government and society.
Later, in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary (published in 1742), Hume 
further explains how members of the British constitution were confined 
within the proper limits, and how this was consistent with our experience 
of human nature. Hume answers:
197I acknowledge that Machiavelli also influenced Hume on this matter. However, to discuss 
how Machiavelli and Mandeville influenced Hume, how Hume revised their ideas, and how 
Hume influenced the Federalists, is go beyond the scope of this paper.
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that the interest of the body is here restrained by that of the 
individuals, and that the house of commons stretches not its 
power, because such as usurpation would be contrary to the 
interest of the majority of its members. The crown has so many 
offices at its disposal, that, when assisted by the honest and 
disinterested part of the house, it will always command the 
resolutions of the whole so far, at least, as to preserve the ancient 
constitution from danger (Hume, 1964a, 120).
Not only does Hume explain the working of the British constitution, 
but he also attempts to discuss the questions of institutional design, such as 
the proper degree of court-influence and parliamentary dependence (1964a, 
121), and whether it was desirable for the British constitution to terminate 
in a popular government, or in absolute monarchy (1964a, 126). As he says, 
"most of these essays were intended to comprehend the designs both of the 
spectators and craftsmen "(1964a, 41, emphasis added). Thus this task of 
institutional design makes Hume face the problem of what motivation 
institutional design should assume. As we know from his famous thesis, 
Hume takes knavish and self-interested motivations for institutional 
design. Thus, a better discussion of what the need to be beware of knavery 
implies for specific checks in the system of government would help us to 
understand the Humean design of check systems in particular, and to 
investigate the issues of institutional design in general.
2. The Definition of Knavery
"Knavery" is often seen as being equivalent to private interest (Brennan 
and Buchanan, 1985, Pettit, 1993). This understanding is partly true, as 
Hume directly talks about "this interest" (private interest) following his 
introduction to the supposition of knavery. Also, the validity of this 
understanding depends on the interpretation of a key word, "and". As 
Hume’s thesis states, "every man ought to be supposed a Knave, and to 
have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest". Here, there is a 
question of the linguistic structure of the sentence: whether we can infer the 
equivalence of "knavery" and "private interest", or whether "and" can be 
viewed as a connective linking two independent clauses expressing 
independent but compatible ideas. Those who see knavery as private 
interest, regard "and” as having the function to explain what knavery is.
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However, "and” may also be interpreted as a connective which links two 
independent assumptions. This being so, Hume's thesis has two 
assumptions: knavery and private interest.
Leaving different linguistic interpretations aside, there are a few 
problems posed for those who see "knavery" merely as private-interest. 
First, this makes very hard to understand why Hume talks about honesty as 
a contrast to knavery. Hume's discussion of knavery and honesty does not 
make sense unless we think that Hume refers to knavery as being 
dishonour or cheating rather than merely private-interest. Second, Hume's 
institutional design has two different mechanisms. One is what is generally 
called "public use of private interest". The other might be called "public 
control of knavery". If "knavery" is seen as being merely equivalent to self- 
interest, this can justify "public use of private interest", but can not 
sufficiently justify "public control of knavery" in the Humean check system. 
To study the rationales of public control of knavery, the concept of knavery 
should be understood as deceit rather than merely self-interest. Third, if 
knavery is merely understood as self-interest, it is difficult to understand 
the rationale behind Hume's worst case strategy for institutional design.
"Knavery" has a specific sense. There are two ways in which "knavery" 
is used in Hume's writings. First, "knavery" is opposed to "honesty". There 
are two examples for this. (1) After Hume discusses the false assumption of 
knavery in private life, he immediately says that "men are generally more 
honest in their private than in their public capacity (Hume, 1964a, 118-9). (2) 
After Hume talks about a sensible knave, he immediately discusses the idea 
that honesty is the best policy (Hume, 1964b, 257; 1975, 282). Another 
supporting fact is that William Minto, in his article on Mandeville, suggests 
that The Fable of the Bees, should be called The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves 
Turn'd Honest (See Monro, 1975, 21). This classical use of knavery as a 
contrast to honesty clearly supports the above argument.
Second, "knavery" is identified with iniquity, infidelity, treachery, 
roguery and cheating. As Hume says, a sensible knave does an act of 
iniquity or infidelity (Hume, 1964b, 257; 1975, 282). Hume also claims that a 
knave purpose is to cheat with moderation and secrecy (Hume, 1975, 283). 
Thus, we may define knavery in two ways. Narrowly, knavery refers to 
intentions and acts of dishonour or deceit. Broadly, it refers to wicked
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intentions and acts of roguery or iniquity. Thus, knavery can be defined as a 
desire or action between preference and context of rationality. Given the 
conflict of interest between an agent A and an agent B, if agent A attempts to 
make agent B miserable or to worsen the situation of agent B by cheating, 
and even harming agent B in order to gain, maintain and maximize his (or 
her) interest (whatever it is), then agent A is regarded as a knave.
The above definition of knavery can be further supported by the same 
use of "knavery" by political writers such as Mandeville, to whom Hume 
refers in his famous thesis. As Mandeville states:
That is the best constitution which provides against the worst 
contingencies, that is armed against knavery, treachery, deceit, and 
all the wicked wiles of human cunning, and preserves itself firm, 
and remains unshaken, though most men should prove knaves 
(Mandeville, 1969, 331-2).
Since there is a body of literature discussing Hume's concept of self- 
interest and the idea of public use of private interests,198 this paper focuses 
narrowly on the problem of knavery and public control of knavery in 
political life. Also, I will not discuss, in detail, the question of the 
relationship between selfish and knavish motivations. I simply assume that 
the multitude of knaveries relates to selfishness. One complex link is, as 
Hume suggests, that one is willing to be a sensible knave in order to gain 
personal interest.
3. Justifications for the Supposition of Universal Knavery
Before discussing justifications of Hume's supposition, I would like to 
emphasise that Hume is far from justifying knavish motivations and 
encouraging people to be knavish, but rather he concentrates on a remedy 
to cure the problem of knavery and prevent politicians from being knavish. 
In other words, Hume's supposition of knavery is not in favour of vice. As 
Hume argues: "I am far from thinking that all those, who have depreciated 
our species, have been enemies to virtue, and have exposed the frailties of 
their fellow creatures with any bad intention (David Hume, 1964a, 151).
198For example, see Hirschman (1977) and Holmes (1990).
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Also, "to put knavery first" does not assume that knavery is above virtue. 
As Hume argues:
Treating vice with the greatest candour, and making it all possible 
concessions, we must acknowledge, that there is not, in any 
instance, the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above 
virtue... (Hume, 1964b, 256).
Contextual justifications: This is a kind of justification provided in the 
context of Hume's essay, "Independency of Parliament". After Hume 
introduces the supposition of knavery in "On the Independency of 
Parliament," he begins his justification with the argument that political 
actors tend to be more dishonest in political life than in private life (1964a, 
119). Thus, it is further argued that, "honor", which is commonly regarded 
as a great "check" upon mankind, is limited.1 "  As Hume says:
Where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a 
great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved of by 
his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he 
soon learns to despise the clamor of adversaries (Hume, 1964a,
119).
Elsewhere, Hume argues, "when men act in a faction, they are apt, 
without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in 
order to serve their party" (1964a, 110). Thus, factional interests, rather than 
private interests, are a more likely basis for certain kinds of excuses or 
pretexts underpining knavish behaviour.
As honor as a great check is suspected, Hume argues for a skilful 
division of power. As Hume argues, "by the skilful division of power, this 
interest (private interest) must necessarily, in its operation, concur with 
public, we may pronounce that government to be wise and happy. If, on the 
contrary, separate interest be not checked, and be not directed to the public, 
we ought to look for nothing but factions, disorder, tyranny from such a 
government" (Hume, 1964a, 119). Elsewhere, Hume argues that there
199This Hume's argument can be further supported by the argument that people are moved by a 
love of honour does not mean that they are not knaves. On the contrary, to be moved by the love of 
honour is not to be moved just by a love of the good and the right.
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would be a civil war, and we shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction, 
subdivided into new factions (1964a, 119, 126).
Hume continues to argue, the power of the crown is always lodged in a 
single person, and the power, which is too great in one hand, may become 
too little in another in a monarchy (1964, 119-22). Further, it is reasonable to 
imagine that the King may himself be a knave who is not attending to his 
duty but abusing his power. Thus Hume admits that "a limited monarchy 
admits not of any such stability [of a republican system]; nor is it possible to 
assign to the crown such a determinate degree of power, as will, in every 
hand, form a proper counterbalance to the other parts of the constitution" 
(Hume, 1964a, 122). Thus, Hume seeks and favours a republican control of 
knavery, a system where the authority is distributed among several 
assemblies or senates. As Hume claims:
All absolute government must very much depend on the 
administration; and this is one of the great inconveniences 
attending that form of government. But a republican and free 
government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular 
checks and controls, provided by the constitution, had really no 
influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad man, to act for 
the public good. Such is the intention of these forms of 
government, and such is their real effects, where they are wisely 
constituted (1964a, 99).
There is no problem with Hume's justification for the argument 
concerning the necessity of a republican check system.200 The problem 
associated with Hume's above argument lies in his insufficient and weak 
justification for the initial supposition of universal knavery. There are two 
reasons for this. First, to reject the idea of honor as a great check does not 
prove the necessity of the introduction of the supposition of universal 
knavery. Second, to assume a portion of knaves is sufficient to argue for the 
necessity of a check system and to support the principle of preventing evil. 
As we know that there are some knaves who create the political problem of 
knavery in political life, why does Hume introduce the un iversa l
200xhe idea of check in Hume's works can be classified into three parts: the principles of the 
countervailing passion (Hirschman, 1977, 20-31), of the countervailing political forces and of the 
countervailing institutions. Here, I discusses the third kind of check system.
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supposition that every one ought to be supposed to be a knave? Why does 
Hume exaggerate this supposition by applying it to humans universally?
This question leads us to look at Hume's justifications of the 
supposition of knavery in his other writings. I consider other Humean 
justifications in three categories: moral, sociological and methodological.
Moral Justification: This appeals to the principle of formal justice. 
Holmes (1990, 283-5) has investigated Hume's justification for the 
assumption of universal self-interests, arguing that to say all individuals 
are motivated by self-interest is to universalize the status of the common 
human among other seventeenth-and eighteenth-century thinkers. To 
acknowledge the legitimacy of interests is to say that all citizens, no matter 
what their socially ascribed status, have concerns that are worthy of 
attention. This justification is relevant here. Institutional design requires 
formal justice of equal treatment, that is, people should be equally treated 
not only in the sense that people have the same rights and opportunities 
but also in the sense that all persons ought to be supposed to be a knave. 
Conversely, the moderate assumption that some people are good and others 
are knaves undermines the requirement of equality. If this is taken as the 
basis of a political system, it implies a notion of hierarchical moral order 
that virtuous and honest people are supreme over "dishonest" people.
Sociological justification: This is concerned with different effects of the 
supposition of knavery and of the above moderate assumption, particularly 
with their implications for institutional design.201 The assumption that 
some people are good and others are knaves is dangerous as a basis for 
institutional design, albeit acceptable in private life.202 The reasons for this 
are as follows:
(1) It can imply, create and support the idea that some persons are so good 
that they do not need to be checked, or at least we can trust them sometimes
201 Hume has taken the issue of practical effects of moral theories into account. As He argues, "a 
man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he must confess, leads to a 
practice dangerous and pemidous" (Hume, 1964b, 253-4). Further, Hume argues, "if any austere 
pretenders approach her (a moral theory), enemies to joy and pleasure, she either rejects them as 
hypocrites and deceivers (Hume, 1964b, 254).
202I limit my rejection of this moderate assumption only to the institutional design level. At the 
explanatory level, this moderate assumption is useful, I will discuss this in Sections 4 and 5.
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without checking them. Thus, the moderate assumption seems to require 
only a partial check system and partial personal morality, and to require that 
politics should first seek for moral persons to be rulers.
(2) If one puts the assumption of virtue first, one may as well choose a 
benevolent despot or an intellectual sage who is assumed to hold a highest 
sense of morality. It is this partial check system and partial personal 
morality that has potential danger and that has often been used to justify 
despotic systems.
The assumption of virtue might even lead to destruction of virtue in 
totalitarian institutional design. Let me examine the social logic of this 
assertion.203 As argued above, the assumption that most people are 
virtuous and only a few are knaves implies a notion of hierarchical moral 
order that virtuous and honest people are supreme over "dishonest" 
people. Hence moral persons have a legitimating duty to enlighten these 
"evil" persons and deserve to rule over them. According to these ideas, 
totalitarian institutions are designed in favour so called moral persons who 
have political privileges to mobilize the masses and who have a 
justification for ignoring the rights of "immoral persons." As a result, the 
moralist notion of legitimacy is strong while the institutionalized notion of 
legitimacy is weak; and the protection of rights of everyone is ignored and 
even overridden. Also the so-called moral persons tend to be corrupt 
because of a lack of an institutional check. In the end, a moral crisis occurs: 
people no longer believe in a "revolutionary morality"; a moral vacuum 
occurs and virtue is destroyed. This is exactly what has happened in 
contemporary China.
Conversely, Hume's supposition that every one is supposed to be a 
knave doubts and excludes the neo-authoritarian solution to political 
problems such as corruption, because Hume's supposition is that no body 
should be trusted. Thus, Hume's worst case requires a complete check 
system, a well-constructed political machinery. Further, Hume's 
supposition of universal knavery is useful to warn against abuse of
203The fact that my argument appeals to the Chinese experience may be irrelevant to the 
Western doctrines of institutional design, such as Ayres's and Braithwaite's responsive 
regulation; but it may be useful in examining the question of how we can avoid a system which 
starts with the assumption of goodness but ironically in the end leads to destruction of virtues as 
in the case of the Marxist institutional design in communist countries.
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democratic power and the potential danger of the power of institutional 
designers. It also helps us to question all those national heroes of great 
distinction and even institutional designers.
Methodological justification: This is concerned with Hume's deliberate 
adoption of limited and selective assumptions about human nature and of 
the worst case strategy for institutional design. For Hume, assuming 
universal knavery constitutes an intellectual premise that is a 
methodological necessity.204 Hume’s supposition is indeed more about the 
need to find a normative starting-point than to provide a basis for probing 
the truth of human nature. As Hume uses the words such as "every one 
ought to be assumed" and "the maxim should be true"; these words indicate 
that Hume does not discuss an empirical question but instead adopts an 
intellectual position.205 Further, Hume says that "the maxim should be true 
in politics, but is false in fact;" that is to say, the universal supposition as a 
descriptive model is wrong, while the universal supposition as an 
analytical model is justifiable. Thus Hume's supposition should be 
understood as an intellectual construction which aims to establish an 
analytic model, rather than a descriptive model. This intellectual construct 
is open to theoretical justifications or philosophical reasonings rather than 
to empirical testing.
As a methodological necessity, Hume adopts limited and selective 
assumptions about human nature in political life. As he says, "men acting 
in groups or political parties consider only the interests of the party; every 
senate or court is determined by the majority and the majority of men are 
self interested; so that the psychology of the political person is relatively 
simple and uniform" (Hume, 1964a, 39-43, emphasis added). This simple 
and uniform motivation of political persons is assumed in order to set up a 
premise from which politics may be reduced to a science, and political 
consequences can be predicted. For Hume, a deliberate simplification 
enables us to construct mathematically tractable models of human 
behaviour. As Hume is confident in saying:
204For a methodological rather than an empirical defence of this kind of institutional design 
principle, see Brennan and Buchanan, 1985, 51.
20;>Surely, Hume does not adopt the concept of the state of nature, as he rejects it as being a mere 
fiction, an idle fiction (Hume, 1960, 493).
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So great is the force of laws, and of particu lar form s of 
governm ent, and so little dependence have they on the humors 
and tem pers of men, that consequences almost as general and 
certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the 
mathematic science afford us (Hume, 1964a, 99, emphasis added).
This is why Hum e simplifies hum an motivations in terms of self- 
interest and knavery. These assum ptions, however, do not suggest that 
Hume denies various and changing motivations, and Hume acknowledges 
that different societies and individuals exhibit different mixtures. Hume is 
cautious about the uniform character of the "self-interest" postulate;206 and 
he also presupposes the assum ption of virtue and honesty (which I will 
discuss later).20^
Im portantly, there are cognitive limits of knowing who is evil and 
good. As well, we have a problem of defining a criterion for distinguishing 
good from evil due to our disagreem ent about moral issues. Given the 
u n certa in ty  of hum an  behav iou r, the lim its of know ledge and 
disagreem ent about moral judgm ents, how  do we design institutions? 
Hume adopts the worst case strategy: "to pu t knavery first!" or in Judith’s 
term, "to put cruelty first" (Judith 1984). Hume's worst case can be seen as a 
possible world where every one ought to be supposed to be a knave and self- 
interested; thus if knavery is not controlled, separate interest is not checked, 
and is not directed to the public good, we may look for factions, disorder, 
tyranny and a civil war, and we shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction, 
subdivided into new factions (1964a, 119, 126).208
Take the exam ple of security checks. All the people who travel by 
airplane are required to pass through an X-ray door and to p u t their
206As for a discussion of Hume's argument against simplicity of human nature, see Stephen 
Holmes, 1990, 269-275.
207A discussion of Hume ideas of motivations, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of 
Motivation", Mind, Vol. XCVI, No. 381, January, 1987, 36-61. As for Hume's acquaintance with 
Newton, see James Noxon, Hume's Philosophical Development: A Study of his Methods, Oxford: 
the Clarendon Press, 1973.
208On this matter, Hume influenced the Federalists thinking on the worst case where people are 
often supposed to be beset by "folly and wickedness," "ordinary depravity," and "impulses of 
rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of irregular and violent propensities." Given this worst 
case, America, if not unified by constitutional arrangements, would be gradually entangled in 
wars (Hamilton, 1961, 65).
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personal bags on a check machine. What does this mean? It implies that 
each person is assumed to be one who might carry a weapon. In fact, it is 
well known that only a very marginal percentage of people will risk doing 
so. But since we cannot tell those who carry weapons from those who do 
not carry weapons, everyone is assumed to be a potential weapon carrier so 
that all are subject to checks by a set of security arrangements.
Hume employs the theoretical "worst case" for institutional design to 
combat the 'best case' scenario where people are supposed to be "angels".209 
Hume's scepticism about the best case of human nature is well known. For 
example, as to the view which exalts the human species, seeing its members 
as human demigods, Hume comments that "a delicate sense of morals, 
especially when attended with a splenetic temper, is apt to give a man a 
disgust of the world, and to make him consider the common course of 
human affairs with too much indignation" (Hume, 1964a, 151). He also 
comments that "the virtue and good intentions of Cato and Brutus are 
highly laudable; but, to what purpose did their zeal serve? Only to hasten 
the fatal period of the Roman government, and render its convulsions and 
dying agonies more violent and painful" (Hume, 1964a, 109). In relation to 
institutional design, if all people are honest, and do their duty, all 
governments would be good (Mandeville, 1969, 331-2). Or in Madison's 
words, if people were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels 
were to govern the ruled, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary (Madison, 1961, 322).
There are the following reasons for Hume's worst case strategy. First, 
according to Hume's imperfectionist view of human affairs, knavery 
appears to be a major problem in political life. As Hume asserts, although 
honesty being the best policy may be a good general rule, it is liable to many 
exceptions. For Hume, it is difficult to provide satisfactory and convincing 
arguments for honesty being the best policy (Hume, 1975, 283). On the other 
hand, a 'sensible knave' "may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will
209Although Hume is opposed to the best case, he acknowledges social benefits of it. As He says: 
"I must, however, be of opinion, that the sentiments of those, who are inclined to think 
favourably of mankind, are more advantageous to virtue, than the contrary principles, which 
give us a mean opinion of our nature. When a man is prepossessed with a high notion of his rank 
and character in the creation, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and will scorn to do a 
base or vicious action, which might sink him below that figure which he makes in his own 
imagination" (David Hume, 1964a, 151).
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make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any 
considerable breach in the social union or confederacy" (Hume, 1975, 282), 
Thus, for Hume, the actual existence of sensible knaves shows that the 
problem of knavery is expected to appear from time to time in political life. 
The introduction of the supposition of knavery, therefore, is necessary and 
justifiable at an institutional design level.
Second, Hume is concerned with fundamental limits of a particular 
politics where vices dominate and politicians can only cure one vice with 
another vice. As Hume claims:
Whatever may be the consequence of such a miraculous 
transformation of mankind as would endow them with every 
species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice, this 
concerns not the magistrate who aims only at possibilities. Very 
often he can only cure one vice by another; and in that case, he 
ought to prefer what is least pernicious to society (Hume, 1970, 31- 
2, emphasis added).
Third, for Hume, institutional design cannot eradicate the motivation 
of evil, or overcome sinful nature, but can control its effects. As Hume says, 
it is evident that we cannot change human nature but we are able to control 
evil by altering its direction (for the idea of an alteration, see, Hume, 1949b, 
197) in such a way as to transform bad motives into good results.
Thus, Hume's supposition of knavery is invented to justify a guiding 
principle of preventing evil for institutional design; according to this 
principle, a best form of a constitution should have the primary capacity to 
handle the worst case of evil behaviour.
It should be pointed out that the whole point of the above discussion 
of the justifications of universal knavery is to say that the assumption of a 
portion of honest and virtuous people can not be a basis for institutional 
design on its own; but this does not means that the assumption is 
meaningless (which I will discuss in Sections 4 and 5).
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4. The paradox and Limits of Hume's thesis
Hume himself acknowledges that the supposition of universal knavery is 
somewhat strange because that maxim should be true in politics, but is false 
in fact. Nevertheless, Hume regards it as a just political maxim. The issue 
that arises here is: why does Hume employ this seeming paradox as a 
premise for institutional design? Does this paradox undermine Hume's 
supposition of knavery and his famous thesis?
My answer is No. The reasons are as follow. First, Hume distinguishes 
"ought” and "is".210 Hume's claim that every one ought to be supposed to 
be a knave is different from the claim that every one is a knave. Hume’s 
idea of universal knavery is a supposition rather than a fact. It images a 
possible world where every one would be knavish. It does not describe a 
real world where everyone is a knave. According to this distinction, we 
should emphasise that Hume does not say that every one is a knave in real 
private life. Elsewhere, Hume clearly argues against the vulgar view of the 
actual existence of universal knavery:
The vulgar are apt to carry all national characters to extremes; and 
having once established it as a principle, that any people are 
knavish, or cowardly, or ignorant, they will admit of no exception, 
but comprehend every individual under the same censure 
(Hume, 1964a, 244, emphasis added).
Second, there is a fundamental difference between everyday private 
life and political life which Hume has distinguished. In private life, people 
may sometimes be honest, and may lie occasionally and be potentially 
dishonest when faced with personal losses or gains. However, Hume 
acknowledges that people are generally more honest in their private than in 
their public capacity (Hume, 1964a, 119). Further, the fact that the 
supposition of universal knavery is necessary in political life does not 
assume that everyone is a knave in private life. Also, the fact that 
politicians are assumed to be knavish in political life need not disturb
210Moore fails to make this distinction in his reading of Hume's thesis. As he says: the belief 
that constitutional government might be based on the assumption that politicians are capable of 
virtue is the most fundamental kind of error. In contriving and maintaining the constitutional 
arrangements of a government one should assume instead that, in politics, all men are vicious or 
corrupt (Moore, 1977,820).
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people, for as Hume claims, "it is hard to tell, whether you hurt a man's 
character most by calling him a knave or a coward" (Hume, 1964b, 281). 
Here I would claim that people are less unhappy regarding the supposition 
of knavery in political life than in everyday life, because such a supposition 
is far removed from everyday private life, and importantly the supposition 
of knavery deals with political life. That is why Hume says that the 
supposition of knavery is a political maxim.
These two distinctions matter a lot. If one sticks to an extreme position 
that every one is a knave so that it is assumed that there are no honest 
people, he or she will face the following problem. Although very well- 
designed institutions may reduce opportunities for being a knave, it is 
reasonable to imagine that Presidents, senators, justices or police whose jobs 
are supposedly to serve as part of the system of checks, are themselves 
knaves. In such a situation, it is impossible for him or her to retain 
confidence in the functions of institutions designed for the universal 
knavery. There is an obvious tension here between the confidence in the 
functions of institutions and the claim of the actual existence of universal 
knavery; because the latter would destroy the former in the sense that the 
sound operation of institutions depends on a certain portion of esteem and 
confidence in human nature.
Here, Hume's acknowledgement that the supposition of universal 
knavery is false in fact can be brought in to overcome the above problem. 
Further, Hume offers his answer: a well-designed republican system and a 
portion of honest and virtuous people. As he states:
In pure republics, where the authority is distributed among 
several assemblies or senates, the checks and controls are more 
regular in their operation; because the members of such 
numerous assemblies may be presumed to be always nearly equal 
in capacity and virtue: and it is only their number, riches or 
authority, which enter into consideration" (Hume, 1964a, 122, 
emphasis added).
Thus, Hume begins his supposition of knavery for designing check 
systems of government in his famous essay, "Independence of Parliament," 
but ends with the assumption of virtue of members of assemblies in order
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to explain the feasibility of a republican check system. This shows Hume's 
awareness that the premise of universal knavery is sufficient to argue for 
the necessity of institutional checks, but is insufficient to explain the 
feasibility of institutional checks. As Hume notices:
They [the forms of free and republic government] are the source of 
all disorder, and of the blackest crimes, where either skill or honesty 
has been wanting in their original frame and institution (1964a, 99, 
emphasis added).
Thus, for Hume, the possibility of a check system requires that 
particular identifiable people are known to be honest. As a result, the 
supposition of universal knavery is supplemented by the assumption that 
some people are honest and virtuous. This is done in Hume's famous 
thesis. This supplementary premise is able to sufficiently explain the 
feasibility of a republican check system designed for knavery. That is the 
logic for why Hume introduces, at the end of "Independence of 
Parliament", the assumption of virtue necessary for the operation of 
republican government.
There is no inconsistency between the supposition of universal 
knavery and the positive assumption of virtues and honesty, because the 
claim that every one ought to be supposed to be a knave carries with it the 
assumption that not all humans are knaves and that some are honest. To 
provide empirical evidence that people are honest does not constitute a 
reason to reject the intellectual supposition of knavery as discussed in 
Section 3. Furthermore, the supposition of universal knavery is an 
intellectual statement which serves as a normative principle justifying the 
necessity of republican check systems; the positive assumption of honesty 
and virtues is an empirical statement which serves as a tool to explain the 
feasibility of check systems. However, this positive assumption of honesty 
and virtues can not be used as a sole principle for institutional design as has 
already been demonstrated in Section 3.
So far, I have taken Hume's supposition seriously and justified and 
defended it as a principle for institutional design. Now I would argue that 
we cannot take it as central in Hume's political theory. There are the 
following limits to Hume's supposition of knavery.
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First, as argued above, the supposition of knavery is a kind of principle 
of preventing evil in institutional design. This supposition is not itself 
intended to promote the principle of virtues although it does not deny 
promoting the principle of virtues. Further, the preventing evil principle is 
only one principle of government. Other primary principles are public 
interest, right to power, and right to property. As Hume asserts, "upon these 
three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of right to power, and of right to 
property, are all governments founded, and all authority of the few over the 
many" (Hume, 1964a, 111). There are also secondary principles such as self- 
interest, fear and affection, which add force to the above primary principles, 
and determine, limit, or alter their operation (Hume, 1964a, 111). In short, 
Hume's thesis does not set up principles for all political institutional 
designs. Hume's supposition of knavery is concerned with only check and 
control systems. Further, if we suppose that political actors are silly, 
mediocre or malicious, different institutional designs would be required.
Second, there are, at least, two theoretical problems which challenge 
Hume's supposition or thesis. The fact that Hume fails to address these two 
problems evidences the absence of the capacity of Hume's supposition of 
universal knavery to explain the feasibility of an institutional check system.
(1) The first problem posed for the feasibility of institutions designed for 
knavery arises from the outside world. Although institutional 
arrangements are well able to handle many internal events, they cannot 
always control the effects of external events on internal politics; in 
particular, they cannot control and check knaves outside a particular 
political community. The viability of internal institutional arrangements 
that might be affected by relations with the rest of the world are always and 
inescapably under threat (Hindess, 1991,184-5).
(2) There is a problem of institutional deceit raised by the question of 
knavish institutional designers. Hume's supposition logically implies that 
institutional designers ought to be supposed to be knaves too and they
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might manipulate the information about institutions they have devised.
This leads to a consideration of the aspect of deceit in institutional 
arrangements. This aspect of deceit in institutional arrangements requires 
us to be cautious of the power of institutional designers. This also leads us 
to be concerned with the preconditions that would prevent such deceit from 
occurring. There are at least two necessary conditions: one is that designers 
themselves should be constrained by the institutions they have devised just 
as the American founding fathers were. Thus the enterprise of institutional 
design should adopt the divide and choice solution; institutions should be 
chosen by those who do not design institutions so as to ensure "a fair share 
of the cake". The other precondition is that protection of institutional 
arrangements works only insofar as retaliation is a serious threat. Everyone 
who has the vote can, through the threat of reciprocal retaliation, use it to 
make reasonably certain that others will not exploit them -- politically, at 
least — too badly (Goodin, 1992, 99). If the above conditions are not satisfied, 
the supposition of knavery is not compatible with the idea of the rational 
planning of sound political practices, because possible institutional deceit 
makes political checks on knaves impossible. Absence of discussion of the 
above preconditions certifies that there is something missing in Hume's 
reasoning about the logical link between the premise of knave and the 
operation of the principle of check.
5. The Middle Case for Institutional Design
So far, I have discussed Hume's initial supposition of knavery, his later 
introduction of the assumption of honesty and virtues, and the limits of 
Hume's thesis. All this leads us to a dynamic understanding of Hume’s 
famous thesis: it was a bold conjecture which political writers including 
Hume himself have advanced, which appears to have some degree of 
empirical support, and which can be used to help explain the working of the 
British constitution. Now the supposition of knavery is not final truth, it 
has its own limits, and it needs to be supplemented with the idea of virtues 
and honesty in order to explain the feasibility of Humean institutional 
design, as Hume himself recognizes.
211 It is not dear whether or not Hume's supposition of universal knavery excludes Hume himself 
and institutional designers. If so, this exclusion is certainly arbitrary and is contradictory to the 
supposition that everyone ought to be supposed to be a knave.
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Drawing on Hume's initial supposition of knavery, his later 
introduction of the assumption of honesty and virtues, and his idea that 
self-interest may produce both justice and knavery, and a limited generosity 
may produce virtues, we may reconstruct the Humean middle case as an 
intellectual position for institutional design.212 There is, I suggest, the 
middle case which lies between two extremes, the worst case where every 
one is a knave, and the best case where every one is an angel. The middle 
case also refers to an intellectually moderate attitude towards human 
motivations — neither flattering virtues nor exaggerating vices. It recognizes 
that there is a portion of knaves and a portion of angels within a political 
community although the percentage of knavish and honest persons vary in 
different circumstances. Further, the middle case constitutes the starting- 
point for Humean and Federalists' institutional design or the complex 
strategies that require both institutional and honor checks to deal with the 
abuse of power. The middle case attempts to create a world where we put 
some reliance on both: nurturing virtues through shaming and social 
honor, and reducing evil through law and markets.
Because people cannot be assumed to be generally angels, institutional 
checks are necessary. Also, because there are a portion of honest and 
honourable persons, honor and virtues are needed to help the working of a 
republican system although Hume distrusts honor checks. Thus we need to 
check all individual behaviors, and at the same time to encourage moral 
activities. This is well expressed by Madison:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a 
certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other 
qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of 
esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposed the
2l2Hume himself has discussed the middle station of life. As Hume claims, "the great are too 
much immersed in pleasure; and the poor too much occupied in providing for the necessities of life 
(Hume, 1964b, 376). The middle station, as Hume defines, is " a man, placed in it, can with the 
greatest leisure, consider his own happiness, and reap a new enjoyment, from comparing his 
situation with that of persons above or below him" (Hume, 1964b, 376). Hume continues to argue 
that the middle station is able to "afford the fullest security for virtue and gives opportunity for 
the most ample exercise of it" (Hume, 1964b, 377). Further, Hume argues, "the middle station 
should be the most favourable to improving our natural abilities, since there is really more 
capacity requisite to perform the duties of that station, than is requisite to act in the higher 
spheres of life" (Hume, 1964b, 378). The above Hume's idea implies a middle intellectual 
position which can be used to support the idea of the middle case for institutional design.
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existence of these (latter) qualities in a higher degree than any 
other form (Madison, 1961, 346).
However, this middle case does not assume and accept that some 
persons are so good that they do not need to be checked, or at least we can 
trust them sometimes without checking them. The reasons for that are 
given in Section 3.
There are intellectual advantages of the middle case and its 
institutional design. The first one lies in the ability to explain constitutional 
institutions both necessary and possible (Also see Hart, 1961, 191-2). Using 
the assumption of the bright side of human nature such as honesty, 
sympathy and generosity, Hume is confident in the function of the 
institutions he has devised. He sees acknowledgement of the bright side of 
human nature as a way of overcoming the difficulties posed for the 
feasibility of institutional design, which are raised by the supposition of 
knavery. There is greater feasibility in the sense that honest people, together 
with the proper structure of governmental machinery, ensure compliance 
with rules of laws and secure extensive and arduous enterprises for the 
public benefit. This is well expressed by Alexander Hamilton (1961, 458):
This supposition of universal venality in human nature is little 
less an error in political reasoning, than the supposition of 
universal rectitude. The institution of delegated power implies 
that there is a portion of virtue and honour among mankind, 
which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence.
A further possible explanation provided by the middle case might be to 
suppose that, in an initial situation, half the people are good and half are 
bad so that there are interactions between moral and immoral persons. If a 
well-designed filter mechanism is established, moral persons are 
encouraged and bad persons are punished, so that good people flourish and 
bad people do not flourish in this kind of institutional setting. In this way, a 
well-designed institution improves the initial situation, that is, more 
people become virtuous and less people become evil. Thus the intellectual 
advantage of the middle case is that it can provide an evolutionary account 
of the feasibility of institutional design, while Hume's initial supposition of 
universal knavery lacks this kind of capacity and excludes the possibility of
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an evolutionary model for explaining the feasibility of an institutional 
check system.
The second intellectual advantage of the middle case is its principle of 
promoting public virtue (rather than private virtue) for institutional 
design. There is a misunderstanding of Humean institutional design, 
namely, that Humean institutional design excludes the moral approach 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992a&b, Pettit, 1993). Here, I would argue that the 
Humean middle case contains the principle of promoting public virtue.
We should emphasize Hume's distinction between private and public 
virtues. Public virtue does not depend on private virtue, and on the 
manners and morals of a nation, but on well-conceived and well 
constructed political machinery (Forbes, 1975, 227). Hume’s institutional 
design does not exclude a moral remedy, but goes beyond the traditional 
moralizing-individual approach. It is true that the Humean project is less 
interested in a moralizing-individual approach to politics than in a public 
virtue approach in political life.2^  Hume justifies this with a discussion of 
the advantage of Humean institutional design; that is, it secures our 
liberties irrespective of the good-will of rulers (1964, 118). A good 
government could be, as Hume believes, achieved quite irrespective of the 
moral qualities and characters of the politicians who conduct the 
government. If the constitutional arrangements were judiciously ordered, 
then people in society could be assured that they would not be abused by 
their politicians (Moore, 1970, 821). For Hume, a constitution is not 
designed to end corruption, or to provide for a life of virtue. Accordingly 
there is no call for extraordinary virtue and certainly none for violence in 
the activity of fabricating a constitution. It is assumed, rather, that 
corruption is an ineradicable feature of political life, and is not to be 
removed by a return to first principles or by a new beginning. Instead it is 
the constant duty of legislators, Hume insists, to amend and adapt the rules
213This does not means that Hume takes no interest in private virtures. For Hume's theory of 
knavery also aims to persuade people to be honest according to his moral theory. As for the 
problem of sensible knavery, Hume offers two answers. One is that the best things in life are free: 
the "natural pleasures" are incomparably preferable to the feverish, empty amusements of luxury 
and expense. "They (knaves) themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes, have sacrificed the 
invaluable enjoyment of a character with themselves at least, for the acquisition of worthless 
toys and gewgaws" (Hume, 1964b, 257). Another argument is that there is always the risk of 
overreaching oneself and being found out. "They (knaves) can never extricate themselves, without
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and conventions of public life in a manner that would provide increasingly 
effective restraints on the corrupt behaviour of politicians (Moore, 1970, 
819). Thus, the essence of Humean institutional design is to seek for well 
constructed political machinery under which "private vices" can turn into 
"public virtues" and private virtues can be developed and improved.
In short, Hume’s institutional design has two aspects. On the one 
hand, the design of a political system should be based on the assumption 
that power-holders tend to be knavish and corrupt. On the other hand, 
Hume also argues, a great deal of virtue, justice and humanity are requisite 
in statesman (Hume, 1964b, 378). Thus, to select and appoint statesmen one 
needs to look at whether or not persons are honest and upright. Madison 
expresses a similar view although his emphasis which puts virtue first is 
different from Hume’s:214
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to 
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and 
most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the 
next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them 
virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust 
(Hamilton, etc., 1961, 350).
Thus the middle case requires that two principles — preventing and 
controlling knavery and promoting virtues -- should guide institutional 
design. Ayres and Braithwaite certainly follow this tradition with the 
suggestion that we need a complex model of institutional design which 
should be designed to protect us against knaves while leaving space for the 
nurturing of civic virtues (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992a, 53, 1992b). To apply 
these two principles to constitutional design, a portion of the articles of the 
constitution is required to deal with possible deceit associated with political 
actors and institutional designers. At the same time, a portion of the articles 
needs to be devised to promote public virtues. Also, a complete
a total loss of reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with mankind" 
(Hume, 1964b, 257).
214There is a difference between Hume who puts knavery first and virtue second, and Hamilton 
who puts virtue first and knavery second in designing political constitutions.
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immigration law should be devised to prevent against knavery, to promote 
national interests and to take humanitarian principles into account.
However, here, we would face the following new issue. Theoretically it 
is possible to combine the principles of preventing evil and of promoting 
virtue, but practically, these two might conflict in designing one particular 
institution such as an open or secret vote system. For example, if we assume 
that people are knaves we will build checks into the electoral arrangements 
to prevent knavery (prohibiting certain sorts of self-serving speech, or 
blocking certain sorts of interest groups from organizing). That, in turn, 
would block a purely ideal vision from being realized. As to the question of 
how a lexical order is decided regarding these two principles, Hume would 
argue that preventing evil is a priority, while Ayres and Braithwaite would 
argue for a contextual remedy: if evil is minimal, to promote virtue is a 
priority; and if the risk of evil is great, to prevent evil is the priority in 
institutional design.
6. Hume's Effects and Uses of the Supposition of Knavery
There have been different uses and evaluations of Hume's supposition of 
knavery. Here, I narrowly focus on Australian political scientists (as well 
their colleagues in the U.S.) who have used Hume's supposition of knavery 
in different ways for Australian Institutional Design Programmes.
Goodin's Interpretation
Goodin argues that Hume's thesis should be understood as that most 
people are fine, only a few are knaves. Goodin draws our attention to the 
fact that the key words "ought to be supposed" should not be understood as
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"is".215 daim that every one ought to be supposed to be a knave carries
with it the assumption that all humans are not knaves just as the claim that 
humans ought to be equal carries with it the assumption that humans are 
in fact not equal. Goodin’s interpretation plays down the universal aspect of 
Hume's supposition. This moderate intellectual position explicated by 
Goodin fits well with Hume's idea that moderate selfishness is the second 
circumstance of justice. The virtue of justice can arise only if the extremes 
are absent: "if men pursu'd the publick interest naturally, and with a hearty 
affection, they wou'd never have dream'd of restraining each other by these 
rules (of justice); and if they pursu'd their own interest, without any 
precaution, they wou'd run head-long into every kind of injustice and 
violence"(Hume, 1960, 496-7).
Furthermore, Goodin claims that Hume's institutional design does not 
deny the existence or reliability of benevolent impulses but takes such 
impulses for granted (Goodin, 1982, 113). Thus, Goodin (1982, 113-4) 
interprets Hume's thesis as such: we ought to design institutions for knaves 
on the grounds that good people will be good regardless; it is only the 
behaviour of knaves we need worry about in shaping our institutional 
designs. We can therefore say that for those who would be good anyway, 
those institutions designed for knaves do no harm; for those who would be 
bad (even occasionally), those institutions serve as important checks. It is a 
win/win or, more precisely, a 'no-lose/win' situation.
Goodin is right to argue that Hume's supposition of knavery 
presupposes the existence or reliability of benevolent impulses; I have 
shown the reason for this in Section 4. However, I disagree with Goodin's 
denial of the aspect of universal knavery in Hume's supposition. There are 
two problems with Goodin's above interpretations of Hume's thesis. First, 
Hume's thesis is itself a refutation of Goodin's interpretation that most 
people are fine, only a few are viewed as knaves for the purpose of 
institutional design, because for Goodin's interpretation to remain correct, 
Hume need not have said that every one ought to be supposed a knave. In 
fact, Hume does say that every one ought to be supposed to be a knave. We 
cannot deny that Hume makes this universal supposition at a normative 
level. Second, although Hume takes benevolent impulses for granted,
215Goodin formulated this interpretation in discussion with me.
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Hume's approach does not, as Goodin (1982, 114) suggests, presuppose that 
good people will be good regardless — that benevolent motives will 
continue to operate undiminished by the addition of extrinsic incentives. 
According to Hume's supposition of universal knavery, benevolent people 
could also be knavish in certain circumstances. Thus, Goodin's assumption 
that good people will be good regardless is obviously false.
Brennan and Buchanan’s Homo Economicus Model
Brennan and Buchanan have used Hume's supposition of knavery to 
justify Homo economicus, a model for comparative institutional analysis 
and for institutional design.216 As they assert:
Using the Homo economicus behavior model in constitutional 
analysis, and justifying this use on analytic rather than empirical 
grounds, is a procedure we have borrowed from the classical 
political economist-philosophers in their analysis of political 
institutions. And we can, perhaps, do no better in this connection 
than appeal to David Hume ... [his supposition of knavery] (1985,
59).
Albert Weale nevertheless challenges this use of Hume's thesis, 
arguing that Hume's thesis cannot form a sound principle of constitutional 
design (Weale, 1989, 45). In this matter, I am in line with Albert Weale’s 
challenge to the use of Hume's thesis by Brennan and Buchanan, who fail 
to distinguish knavery from self-interest, and ignore the problems 
associated with Hume's famous thesis. But, I disagree with Weale's 
argument against the worst case strategy.
Weale (1989, 45) argues that Hume’s supposition rests upon a 
particular attitude to risk, requiring that we weigh the worst case option, 
against the best case, in our deliberations. It is further argued that since 
harm-avoidance is not a generalizable interest, the Humean supposition of 
knavery cannot form a sound principle of constitutional design. Here, 
Weale's rejection of the worst case strategy is not sufficient, as I have shown 
the reasons why Hume adopts this strategy in section 3 above. Also
^ F o r  Brennan's self-criticism of Homo economicus, see Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, 
1985, 189-211.
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Brennan and Buchanan have already argued well for the worst case strategy 
in the following two arguments. The first argument is that "an appropriate 
behavioral model will have to reckon with the fact that the harm inflicted 
by those who behave 'worse' than the national average will be 
proportionately greater than the 'good' done by those who behave 'better' 
than the average. Accordingly, a bias toward the worst-case end of the 
behavioral spectrum is entirely justified" (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985, 
59). The second argument comes from Gresham’s law in politics that in 
social interactions bad behaviour drives out good and that all persons will 
be led themselves by the presence of even a few self-seekers to adopt self- 
interested behaviour (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985, 60).
Pettit's Knave and Managing Strategies
Pettit has discussed the principle, or the sort of strategy which ought to 
guide rational choice theorists for institutional design. He sees Hume's 
supposition of knavery as the motivating strategy, or the knave strategy, 
which aims to deal with the knave, that is, with the most explicitly self- 
interested. He acknowledges that any system of sanctioning that is worthy of 
consideration must be able to reduce the potential damage that knaves can 
do and it must be able to reassure non-knaves that their efforts are not 
undermined, exploited or derided by those of a different cast. Further, Pettit 
points out the following two problems associated with the knave strategy.
(1) If we are to put in place the extreme penalties or rewards that may be 
required to motivate the knaves, then we shall need to rely on a centralised 
system of sanctions. But if we have to do this, then we are likely to create 
more problems than we solve.
(2) Implementing the motivating strategy would be likely to switch many 
agents from a non-egocentric mode of self-management to a (fully or 
partially) egocentric mode. Pettit, therefore, concludes that the Humean 
knave strategy is unattractive. Thus Pettit advocates the managing strategy, 
which aims to deal with a more ordinary sort of individual: someone who 
deliberates in most contexts in a non-egocentric way and who is self- 
interested only in the manner associated with the virtual presence of self- 
interest. The managing strategy consists of three ingredients: possibilities of 
screening should be explored prior to considering the options for
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sanctioning; the sanctioning devices should be, so far as possible, supportive 
of non-egocentric deliberation; and the sanctioning devices should also be 
motivationally effective.
I fully agree with Pettit's managing strategy for institutional design, but 
disagree with his interpretation of or use of Hume's supposition of knavery 
and his two arguments against the knave strategy. First, Pettit regards 
knavery as self-interest, and understands Hume's knavery strategy merely 
as the public use of private interests. These interpretations lead him to 
conceptualise Hume's supposition as a motivating strategy, to motivate 
private interest in order to serve public goods. But this narrow 
understanding ignores two important aspects of Hume's supposition of 
knavery and his thesis: knavery as dishonour and deceit, and the political 
control of knavery (Section 2). The problem associated with Pettit's 
conceptualisation of Hume's thesis as a motivation strategy is that it ignores 
and confuses the two aspects above.
Second, Pettit argues that Hume's knave strategy will lead to a 
centralised system of sanctions. This, I argue, is not a problem for Hume at 
all. For the knave strategy requires a division of power and power balance, 
rather than a centralised system of sanctioning in the original context of 
Hume's idea of knavery as discussed in Section 3. Also Pettit's second 
challenge that the knave strategy would lead to a (fully or partially) 
egocentric mode, is not convincing, which I will discuss later.
Ayres and Braithwaite’s Destroy-Virtue Argument
Ayres and Braithwaite disagree with the Humean principle of institutional 
design. They argue that the supposition that actors are self-interested, 
rational non-virtuous and knavish is static, one-sided and incomplete.217 
Ayres and Braithwaite continue to argue that a flaw with Humean 
institutional design is that the worst case where actors are non-virtuous 
excludes the other case where actors do behave virtuously. Institutional 
design of a Humean kind, therefore, fails to address multi-motivations of 
political actors; and consequently it excludes a moral remedy to cure the
217Braithwaite's empirical work on corporate offending has led him to posit some alternative 
motivational accounts. Corporate actors are not just value maximizers — of profits or reputation.
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political problem s (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992b). Further, Ayres and 
Braithwaite argue, the institutions designed for knavery might make people 
knavish by treating them as such. And this kind of institutional design 
based on the supposition of knavery discourages, reduces and even destroys 
virtues (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992b).218 The claim that institutions 
devised for self-interest and knavery destroy virtues is supported  by 
Braithwaite's (1992a) empirical research on business regulations and by 
Titmuss' work which shows the extent to which commercialization of and 
profit in blood has been driving out the voluntary donor (Titmuss, 1971, 
198, 225).
The lesson is, according to Titmuss, that the ways in which society 
organizes and structures its social institutions -- and particularly its health 
and welfare systems — can encourage or discourage the altruistic in humans. 
Such systems can foster integration or alienation; they can allow the 'theme 
of the gift' — of generosity towards strangers — to spread among and between 
social groups and generations (Titmuss, 1971, 225).
Ayres's and Braithwaite's destroying-virtue argum ent is partially true 
and correct. However, it makes two m istaken assum ptions. One is to 
suppose that the H um ean project excludes a moral remedy. The other 
assum ption is that given the exclusion of a moral remedy in the Humean 
project, institutions designed for knavery make people knavish by treating 
them as such.
As for the first assum ption of Ayres's and Braithwaite's, I have argued 
in Section 5 that the Hum ean project does not exclude a moral remedy in 
term s of prom oting public virtues. Here, I should em phasise Hum e's 
distinction betw een the origins of the institutions of m orality, and the 
origins of the indiv idual's obligation to adhere to them. The role of 
socialization and social sanctions is pre-em inent in the latter, but this can 
not explain the origins of the first. W hat explains the origins of political
They are also often concerned to do what is right, to be faithful to their identity as law abiding 
citizens, and to sustain a self-concept of social responsibility (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, 22).
218Or in Goodin’s (1982,114-5) words, the good works which were formerly produced out of the 
goodness of people's hearts must now be compelled through more expensive and inefficient 
external mechanisms of social control; and morally serious people are forced either to downgrade 
their principles or, at the very least, to withdraw them in the present circumstances.
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institutions, and what distinguishes political virtues from natural, is self- 
interest. In this sense, self-interest is indeed endemic to the realm of the 
political. Yet the proximate political motives, for the well socialized 
individual, can indeed be love of the public good. Further, Hume is only 
concerned with control of effects21 ^  rather than with evaluating people’s 
motivations, because no matter what different judgments of these 
motivations there are, the results, through well-designed institutions, are 
the same. As Hume argues, whether the passion of self-interest be esteemed 
vicious or virtuous, it is all a case. If it is regarded as virtuous, men become 
social by their virtue; if vicious, their vice has the same effect (Hume, 1960, 
492).
Thus, I would like to argue that to promote public interests or virtues 
and to maintain peace and order is the task of Humean institutional design. 
The Humean project begins with the supposition of knavery and passes 
from well-designed and established institutions to promotion of virtues; it 
does not exclude a principle of promoting virtue.22  ^The difference between 
Hume and Ayres and Braithwaite is that the latter's institutional design 
begins with the assumption of civil virtues as the first appeal to promote 
virtues in their model of dynamic institutions, while the former's aims to 
promote virtue as a last or final result.
As for the second assumption of Ayres's and Braithwaite's, I first 
acknowledge that Humean institutional design does not aim to promote 
private virtue. However, Hume's approach does not necessarily destroy 
virtue. There are two reasons for that.
First, there is a psychological fact that if somebody assumes that you are 
dishonest, you would certainly be unhappy in everyday life. But the fact that 
politicians are assumed to be knavish in political life does not disturb 
people, because there is a fundamental difference between everyday private 
life and political life as discused in Section 4. Second, the institutional 
arrangement based on the supposition of knavery may destroy virtues such
219As to a further justification for this, see the famous No. 10 of The Federalists Papers, 
Hamilton, 1971, 77-84.
220Goodin (1982, 114) implicitly acknowledges this in claiming that, among morally serious 
people, Hume's strategy is bound to backfire. What was meant merely to back up mature 
benevolence ends by undercutting it instead.
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as altruism; nevertheless it nurtures the procedural concept of virtue221 
through well-established check and punishment systems.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude with two parts, the first part is about Hume's 
supposition and his thesis, the second part is about uses and evaluations of 
Hume's thesis.
Part One: Hume has suggested that institutional design should be based 
on the supposition that every one ought to be supposed a knave. He 
justifies his supposition of knavery in terms of the weakness of honor as a 
great check, the permanent problem of knavery in political life and the 
principle of preventing evil. These are sufficient to argue for the necessity of 
institutional checks, but are insufficient to justify his supposition of 
universal knavery. Alternative Humean justifications, I suggest, appeal to 
the principle of formal justice and the worst case strategy. A further 
justification appeals to a comparative examination of practical effects of the 
supposition of knavery and the assumption of virtue.
However, Hume's supposition of universal knavery on its own lacks 
the capacity to explain the feasibility of institutional design. In order to 
explain the feasibility, Hume introduces the assumption of virtue. That is 
the logic for why Hume introduces the assumption of virtue necessary for 
the operation of republican government in the end of "Independence of 
Parliament".
Drawing on Hume's initial supposition of knavery, and his later 
assumption of the honest and virtuous, the paper reconstructs the Humean 
middle case for institutional design. This allows for recognition of the 
necessity of democratic institutional check systems and for explanation of 
their feasibility. The middle case also attempts to combine the principles of 
preventing evil and promoting virtues in institutional design. It not only
221 The procedural conception of morality emphasizes rule-following and fair procedures; as 
David Hume, J. S. Mill and Adam Smith see it the virtue of justice is nothing but a disposition to 
obey the rules of justice (Macintyre, 1982,216, 218 and Gaus, 1980, 267). The procedural conception 
of the good man is also not seen as the Confucian good man, but, as Montesquieu (1989, xli) argues, 
the political good man who loves the laws and procedure and who acts from love of the law and 
procedure.
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"stands the test of reasoning and enquiry, but contributes to the amendment 
of human's lives, and the improvement in morality and social virtue" 
(Hume, 1946b, 253). It, therefore, seems to be an attractive and convincing 
intellectual basis for institutional design.
Part Two: The use of Hume's thesis by Brennan and Buchanan in 
order to defend a worst case for institutional design is justifiable. On this 
matter, however, Weale's challenges to Brennan and Buchanan miss the 
point in the sense that his empirical criticism of the Humean project fails to 
consider a Humean methodological intellectual position. Further, the use 
of Hume's thesis by Pettit, Brennan and Buchanan fails to distinguish 
knavery from self-interest, and ignores the aspect of political control of 
knavery although they contribute to an analytical discussion of the 
problems associated with Hume's famous thesis, particularly with Hume's 
idea of public use of private interests.
Goodin is right to argue that Hume's supposition of knavery 
presupposes the existence or reliability of benevolent impulses. And 
Goodin's interpretation that Hume's thesis should be understood as saying 
that most people are fine and only a few are viewed as knaves, plays down 
the universal aspect of Hume's supposition. However, Goodin's denial of 
the aspect of universal knavery in Hume's supposition is wrong. First, for 
Goodin's interpretation to remain correct, Hume need not have said that 
every one ought to be supposed a knave. Second, although Hume takes 
benevolent impulses for granted, Hume's approach does not, as Goodin 
(1982,114) suggests, presuppose that good people will be good regardless.
Ayres and Braithwaite as well as Pettit have criticized Humean 
institutional design: (1) the Humean worst case excludes the other case 
where actors do behave virtuously; (2) Humean institutional design would 
destroy virtues. These criticisms are understanble, but seem off the point. In 
fact, Hume deliberately avoids a personal moral approach to politics; and 
Hume takes no interest in moralizing-individuals-approach as a remedy to 
the political problem of knavery. On the other hand, the Humean project 
does not exclude a moral remedy in terms of public virtue. The Humean 
project begins with the supposition of knavery and passes from well- 
designed and established institutions to promotion of virtues as a last or 
final result. Furthermore, Hume's supposition does not necessarily destroy
321
virtues. It may diminsh the value of a virtue such as altruism. But at the 
same time, it nurtures the procedural concept of virtue.
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